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ORTHOGRAPHY AND THE FORMULATION OF
PHONOLOGICAL RULES
Esther Bentur
Within the framework of generative phonology, a 'rule' stands for an
hypothesis about a linguistic generalization perceived by speakers. In a
linguistic model which aims at characterizing linguistic competence realis-
tically, only valid generalizations--namely, only those which speakers may
abstract given the input data--should be expressed. An adequate analysis
should neither overstate nor underestimate the speaker's internalized knowl-
edge. It is usually assumed that only oral data counts as the basis on
which hypotheses are constructed by speakers (and consequently by linguists)
.
To demonstrate that this tenet cannot be maintained it will be shown that a
generalization, which is recoverable synchronically only from the written
data, is nevertheless perceived by speakers and becomes an integral part of
their linguistic knowledge.
The example will be constructed as follows:
First, the relevant data and the historical background will be presented.
An abstract analysis to account for those facts will be proposed. Several
arguments against it will be provided, and consequently, it will be rejected.
An alternative proposal will be offered and its validity will be tested in
two productivity tests; one involving hypothetical lexical items and the other
the elicitation of non-existing extensions of actual lexical items. The re-
sults of the second test will point, however, to the inadequacy of the alter-
native (i.e. non-abstract) proposal. A solution to the apparent paradox will
be offered by incorporating an additional factor into the model, namely the
influence of orthography. To substantiate the claim, that this is indeed
the crucial factor, the results of a third productivity test, this tima a
written one, will be mentioned.
1 . DATA
Consider the patterns of past and present forms of the following verbs:
(1) kara 'he read' kore 'he reads'
kafa 'he froze' kofe 'he freezes'
maca 'he found' moce 'he finds'
but:
(2) kara 'he tore' korea 'he tears'
mana 'he prevents' monea 'he prevents'
?ama 'he heard' 2omea 'he hears'
Whereas the past tense forms of both 'find' and 'hear' have the same
configuration CaCa , the corresponding present tense forms exhibit different
patterns CoCe (for 'finds', 'freezes' and 'reads') but CoCea (for 'tears'.
'prevents' and 'hears'). Comparison with the pattern of regular verbs (i.e.
where all the three radicals surface) such as:
(3) lamad 'he studied'
savar 'he broke'
lomed 'he studies'
sover 'he breaks'
suggests, that the present tense singular form in this verb paradigm is
C^oC eC . The CoCea forms, thus, manifest an additional final vowel a
(beside the non-occurrence of the third radical)
.
A similar pattern shows up in the following verbs:
(4) maSax 'he pulled'
na§ax 'he bit'
mosex 'he pulls'
no^ex 'he bites'
(5) barax 'he ran away'
carax 'he screamed'
boreax 'he runs away'
coreax 'he screams'
Here, the present tense forms are either of the type C-]^oC2ex (as in 'pulls'
and 'bites'), or CioC2eax, with an additional [a] preceding the third radical
[x] (as in 'runs away ' and 'screams').
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
These synchronic patterns of alternations are reflexes of an historical
rule which inserted the vowel a when either /h/, /h/ or /'^Z occurred in
final position following a non-low vowel (/i/, /e/, /o/ or In/).
Expressed in distinctive features, the rule can be formulated as:
a-Insertion Rule
(6) +syll
+low
+syll
-low
C
+low
+continuant
In MH, however, the following changes have taken place:
(7) / / is always realized as [ ?] or 0.
/h/ surfaces always as [x] and thus has merged completely
with [x] which is an allophone of /k/
.
/h/ is unstable in informal speech and is realized by most
speakers as [ ?] or as 0.
In spite of those mergers, a still surfaces in MH only when the fol-
lowing consonant was historically /^/, /h/ and /h/.
3. THE ABSTRACT ANALYSIS
Consider first the analysis which recapitulates the historical events.
According to it the a-Insertion Rule would still be a synchronic rule. Its
application must precede the merging rules:
(8)
""
>> 7
h ) X
1^ > ?
The ordering is necessary to ensure that [a] will surface only when
it is followed by [ ?] or [x] , which are realizations of historical /^ / , /h/
and /h/.
This analysis, which is crucially based on the postulation of underlying
Z'^/, /h/ and /h/ as phonemes of MH, is maintained by most standard Hebrew
grammar books, and was formulated within a generative framework by Oman
(1972). It "explains" the fact that phonetically identical segments behave
differently with respect to the application of the same phonological rule.
As Oman mentions, given this analysis, the morphology of Hebrew has become
considerably easier.
The price, however, one should note, is a highly abstract phonemic
system with underlying segments that never show up on the surface. In what
follows, arguments against this abstract analysis will be presented. It will
be demonstrated that it cannot possibly be maintained, given the existing
internal evidence which clearly points to its inadequacy.
4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ABSTRACT ANALYSIS
The postulation of non-occurring surface segments as underlying elements
in the synchronic system has been a controversial issue within generative
phonology. 2 Even the proponents of abstract analyses admit that the burden of
proof, in such cases, is on the one who advocates abstractness. For many
linguists, however, analyses incorporating hypothetical segments are auto-
matically excluded from the range of viable synchronic analyses (see Hooper
1976) . No additional arguments are needed to convince these linguists of
the inadequacy of the analysis proposed so far, since it involves the positing
of the pharyngeals and voiceless glottal fricative as underlying phonemes in
MH even though these elements are not manifested on the surface.
Yet, I would like to discuss additional evidence to indicate that an
abstract approach in this case of MH cannot be maintained even by those who
allow for hypothetical segments under certain conditions (if, for example,
several rules crucially refer to them; see Kiparsky 1971)
.
4.1 The selection of the feature F+low]
It is widely accepted that the advocate of an abstract approach has to
demonstrate clearly that the nature of the postulated segment is determined
uniquely by the structure of the language. The feature assigned to it must
be well-established within the internal system.
In the Yawelmani case (Kisseberth 1969), for example, the abstract seg-
ments were assigned the feature [+high] . The selection of this specific
property was motivated by the behavior of the corresponding surface segments
with respect to several phonological rules. Kisseberth notes that "the
choice of u: and i^: as underlying source of some surface o: and all surface
e_: is motivated since no other choice would perform the same function,"
Arguments along the same lines are provided by Brame (1972) who argues for
an underlying voiced pharyngeal fricative in Maltese.
The selection of the feature [+low] for the abstract segments in Hebrew
cannot, however, be supported on internal grounds. There are no additional
[+low] segments, which trigger the a-Insertion Rule, that could be cited as
independent evidence that the presumed underlying feature involved is [+low]
;
the only (+low) consonants, which historically conditioned the rule, are
precisely those whose existence as elements in the synchronic system is being
questioned. The assignment of the feature [+low] to those abstract segments
is therefore totally arbitrary from a synchronic point of view and cannot be
motivated given the internal organization and structure of the language;
theoretically other phonemic features could have been posited as well.
4.2 Current changes in MH
The classical argument in favor of the postulation of abstract under-
lying segment is based on the observation that this specific segment be-
haves, with respect to several phonological rules, not in accordance with
its surface properties, but rather similarly to other surface segments,
which share a specific feature. In the Yawelmani case, for example, (Kisse-
berth 1969), surface long non-high vowels were posited as high ones under-
lyingly, since they behave like surface high vowels rather than non-high
ones. If it can be shown, however, that, with regards to some of the rele-
vant rules, the abstract segment stops functioning as predicted by its pre-
sumed underlying features, and starts behaving according to its surface
properties, this would cast doubt at the validity of an abstract analysis.
An abstract analysis implies that speakers are able to maintain a
phonemic system which includes non-surfacing segments. No subsequent changes
in the direction of a more surface-oriented system should be anticipated.
Ideally, all rules should continue referring to the underlying (abstract)
rather than surface properties. In what follows several developments which
have taken place in MH will be discussed; each of them has affected the ab-
stract segments. What is common to all of these changes is the fact that
the abstract segments are being treated according to their surface features.
A proponent of the abstract analysis would probably be able to provide an
explanation for the emergence of each individual development; on the whole,
however, he would have to claim that the fact that all of these developments
affect specifically the abstract segments is totally accidental.
A non-abstract analysis (i.e. one which maintains that pharyngeals can-
not be posited underlyingly in MH) predicts that those developments will in-
evitably take place. Such changes are not regarded as random individual in-
stances but rather as related developments within a general scheme. Only a
non-abstract analysis can thus offer a unitary explanation for the emer-
gence of those changes in MH ; the abstract one will have to treat them on a
fragmentary accidental basis.
Barkai (1972) mentions several rules which were conditioned histori-
cally by /?/, 1^ I , /\\/ and /h/ (henceforth: guttural segments). He argues
that, since historical /h/ still functions synchronically as a guttural
with respect to these rules it must be posited underlyingly as such, even
though it always shows up on the surface as a voiceless velar fricative
[x] (i.e. as a segment which is not [+low]). Otherwise, he states, each
of those rules would have to be complicated.
However, for most of those rules mentioned by Barkai, it can be demon-
strated that they are no longer obligatory for historical /h/.
4.2.1 The Vowel Lowering Rule
Consider, for example, the synchronic status of the historical Vowel
Lowering Rule
:
Vowel Lowering
(9) p-syllabd
C hi
liable 1 r -hls-^ / r-sylUblc-l V J
igh J [20< low / +10W
The reflexes of this rule still show up in MH. Compare verbs in the
hiCCiC paradigm which do not have an historical guttural as a first radical,
(10) hixmin 'invite'
hisbir 'explain'
with those having historical /?/ or / / in the same position.
(11) he?ezin 'listen'
he?enik 'grant' (historically: he enik)
(The vowel following the guttural is an inserted echo vowel.)
The rule no longer applies obligatorily when the first radical was an
historical /h/; variants with a non-lowered prefix vowel have emerged, i.e.
(12) hexvir % hixvir 'become pale' (historically: hehvir)
hexzir 'v hixzir 'return s.th. (historically: hehzlr)
Both alternants are found in free variation in the speech of the same
individual.
Similarly one finds:
she
(13) texanek "^ tixanek will suffocate'you
' she
texatex '\' tixatex will be cut'
you
Given an abstract analysis, these data can be accounted for by assuming that
the Vowel Lowering Rule has become optional for some mysterious reason.
Thus, if it does apply to underlying /h/ the output, following the merger
h X will be [hexvir] . If, on the other hand, Vowel Lowering was skipped
in the course of the derivation the output would be [hixvir] . The fact that
the rule has become optional in MH is viewed, within this framework, as an
accident.
A non-abstract analysis predicts that a variant such as [hixvir] will
indeed emerge, since the element which triggered the Lowering rule histori-
cally (i.e., /h/ is no longer a segment in the synchronic system. [hexvir],
on the other hand, would be treated as an historical residue.
Another related development, which has taken place in MH , is the emer-
gence of the following variation:
(14) hixtiv '^ hextiv 'dictate' (cf. katav 'write')
hixlil "^ hex^il 'fail s.o' (cf. kisalon 'failure')
hixbid 'V' hexbid 'make heavier' (cf. kaved 'heavy')
Whereas in the case of hixzir and hixvir the velar fricative surfaces in all
related forms (cf. xazar 'return', xazara 'rehearsal', xiver 'pale') there
is a k 'V x alternation in the pairs of the type hixtiv -katav , hixsil -kilalon .
To capture the relatedness between the latter pairs, an underlying /k/ must
be postulated as the first radical; it surfaces as [x] due to the operation
of spirantization. Since the segment which underlies the surface [x] in
those verbs cannot possibly be /h/, the occurrence of the alternant with the
lowered prefix vowel (i.e. hextiv ) cannot be attributed to the effect of a
following [+low] consonant. The emergence of these variants may be viewed
as a case of analogy.
(15) hixvir - hexvir
hixtiv - X = hextiv
The Lowering Rule has thus been extended to all surface [x]'s regardless of
their historical origin. Notice that as a consequence of the merger h x
this rule has become a minor one; it applies only to some [x]'s (i.e. the
reflexes of historical /h/'s) which had to be lexically marked. The over-
generalization of the rule implies the elimination of the arbitrary marking,
a development which results, of course, in grammar simplification. Given
the emergence of the variations in (14) it becomes evident why the existence
of alternants with the lowered vowel cannot be cited as an argument to sup-
port the selection of the feature [+low] to the abstract segment.
4.2.2 Historical constraints on surface strings #C l+low| , L+lowJ
C
Historically, Hebrew had restrictions on surface strings of the type
#C [+low] and * [+low] C ; to break such impermissable sequences an epen-
thetic vowel was inserted (for details see Barkai 1972, Bolozky 1972). The
reflexes of these constraints are still manifested in MH:
Compare
:
(16) tmixa 'support'
svita 'strike'
(17) te?ima 'tasty' (f. sing.)
S£7iva ' pumping
'
similarly:
(18) mam^ix 'continue' (m. sing, pres.)
matxil 'start' (m. sing, pres.)
(19) ma?amin ( 'v mamin) 'believe' (m. sing, pres.)
maTatik ('vmatik) 'copy' (m. sing, pres.)
These constraints no longer hold for surface [x]'s which are reflexes of
historical /h/'s.
Thus we find in MH
:
(20) txina 'grinding'
sxita 'slaughter' (compare (17))
taxsov 'you will think'
maxzik 'hold' (compare (19))
These are clear cases where the presumed abstract segment no longer behaves
according to its abstract underlying properties, but rather according to its
surface features.
Within an abstract analysis this development can be handled by ordering
the relevant rules as:
1) h ^x
2) Vowel Epenethsis
A proponent of this approach may even claim, perhaps, that the mere fact
that an abstract segment stops functioning according to its underlying
properties with respect to one (or even several rules) is an immaterial acci-
dent and cannot be regarded as a strong argument against abstractness. He
might go on to suggest that as long as for some other rules (or even one??)
the segment in question continues to behave in accordance with its abstract
properties this would be a sufficient indication for its existence.
A non-abstract analysis, on the other hand, predicts the emergence of
such changes, i.e. that rules and constraints will become sensitive to sur-
face features rather than to abstract underlying ones.
4.2.3 The convergence of the le?eCoC and la7aCoC patterns
Another process which is presently taking place in MH supports the
claim that the historical phonemic contrast 111 : 1^1 is being abolished.
Consider the following data:
The infinitive of the Hebrew verb paradigm C,aC aC has the configura-
tion liC-C oC as in:
(21) lilmod 'to study' (root L-M-D)
liSbor 'to break' (root S-B-R)
For verbs which had as a first radical /?/, the infinitive surfaced as
le7eC2oCo; if, however, the first radical was 1^1 the infinitive was of the
pattern Ia'^aC„oC-. Compare:
(22) le?exol 'to eat' (7-K-L)
le?esof 'to collect', 'to gather' (7-S-P)
but:
to work' ( -B-D)
la^amod 'to stand' ('^-M-D)
If the phonemic distinction / / : /?/ is indeed kept in MH one would
have expected those patterns to be maintained; this however is not the case.
We find the following forms in free variation in standard MH even in the
speech of educated adults:
(24) le?esof -v laTasof 'to collect'
le?enox 'v. la?anos 'to rape'
le?efot % la?afot 'to bake'
leTeroz '\> la?aroz 'to pack'
In all of the forms in (24) the first radical is historical 111 . Yet it
seems that the pattern laTaC^^oC^ is more common in these cases (only two
verbs: leTexol 'to eat' and levehov 'to love' do not show these variations).
Within the framework of an abstract analysis which maintains the /?/ : 1^1
contrast, this development must be treated as accidental.
Viewed, however, in combination with other cases which have been cited
above, this process is readily explained; the speakers' inability to keep
the two patterns apart is another indication that the relevant phonemic
contrast (in this case /?/ : /^/) is no longer maintained in their phonemic
system.
4.2.4 The behavior of morphemes containing several abstract segments
Consider the case of lexical items which contain several occurrences
of the same presumed underlying segment.
The adjective taxuax 'crumbled, crushed (soil)' is derived from the
historical root T-H-H. Within an abstract analysis this morpheme would be
represented underlyingly as /tahuh/. The third radical behaves as predicted
by this analysis; it triggers the a-Insertion Rule. The second radical,
however, does not behave as a [+low] segment; the corresponding fem. sing,
form in [txuxa] namely a vowel is not inserted to break the impermissible
sequence #C [^+low| .
An abstract analysis cannot provide a plausible explanation to the
question: Why did this root receive such a mixed representation? Why was
the same segment analyzed as [+low] only in one of its occurrences in the
same lexical item?
A non-abstract approach, on the other hand, would assume that both the
second and the third radical are underlyingly /x/, but one of them (i.e. the
third) is arbitrarily marked for the a-Insertion Rule.
4.3 Children's behavior
The linguistic behavior of children speaking MH can be cited as another
piece of evidence for the claim that the abstract analysis is inadequate for
this dialect of Hebrew.
Verbs whose third radical is historical /h/ or 1^ I may surface in
children's speech with or without the preceding [a]. On the other hand, there
are many cases where overgeneralization of the rule takes place and it applies
in verbs whose third radical is historical /?/ or /k/ (remember that histor-
ical /k/ as a third radical always surfaces as [x] due to spirantization)
.
There does not seem to be a general principle governing the direction of the
process. Bar Adon (1959) concludes that "roots having as their third radical
historical /k/ and /h/ got so mixed up and it is rather difficult to distin-
guish between them. Analogy operates in both directions." He cites the fol-
lowing variations (radicals indicated in accordance with the historical pro-
nunciation) .
'he hides' (H-B-?)
'he froze' (K-P-?)
'he invented' (M-C-?)
r
'he paints' (C-B- )
'he swallows' (B-L-*^)
and similarly
(26) linsox -v linsoax 'to bite' (N-S-K)
lispoax -vlispox 'to spill' (S-P-K)
Why is it that the variability occurs precisely with the presumed ab-
stract segments?
An abstract analysis can "explain" this by invoking a principle which
states that the acquisition of abstract segments is inherently more diffi-
cult and thus will be accomplished only at a later stage. Given this ap-
proach, the specific developments which have taken place in MH are to be
attributed to children's unfamiliarity with the abstract segments. Once
those segments are acquired, however, one would have probably anticipated
the elimination of variability and confusion. If this were indeed the case,
major revision in adults' grammar should have been expected. Namely, the
distinction between infinitives for verbs with first radical /?/ and /*^/
(25)
10
would reemerge; Vowel Lowering would become again an obligatory rule. How-
ever, we do not find such revisions taking place.
4.4 Conclusions
Each of the separate developments cited above can be accounted for in
some way within an abstract approach, and thus when treated individually
they cannot be accepted as conclusive arguments against abstractness. Yet,
when viewed in combination, these developments constitute strong circum-
stantial evidence against the abstract analysis.
Notice that the abstract analysis has been rejected not only on the
basis of axiomatic beliefs such as "all phonological abstractness in the
form of imaginary or abstract segments must be ruled out" (as a consequence
of the True Generalization Condition, see Hooper 1976), or because we "take
it as self-evident that an acquisition theory faces an extraordinary burden
if it is required to account for the learning of the existence and locus of
occurrences of phonomes that do not exist as perceptual realities anywhere
in the language" (Brian 1974). Rather, it has been rejected since it was
proven to be inadequate on internal grounds . 3.^
The issue of the behavior of historical gutturals in MH has to be
viewed given the background of the revival of the Hebrew language. MH has
been revived on the basis of Biblical and post-Biblical texts. The Biblical
corpus reflects a certain phonemic system in which gutturals functioned as
a distinct group and conditioned phonological rules which were phonetically
perfectly motivated (Vowel Lowering, for example). The phonemic system of
MH is not identical to that of Biblical Hebrew; mergers have taken place
and, as a result, phonemic contrasts, on which the application of those
phonological rules depended crucially, have been neutralized. Yet due to
the relatively short period of time (MH was revived at the beginning of
this century) as well as the normativistic pressure exerted by the school
system, many surface systematicies, which are rooted in Biblical Hebrew,
are still maintained.
Some of the surface systematicies can no longer be treated as the out-
come of phonological rules, which recapitulate the historical ones. Rather,
some instances have been reanalyzed as morphologically conditioned, while
others must be treated as involving 'exception features'.
Given the above mentioned arguments one must conclude that the fact
that adult speakers of MH still maintain the a only when the final radical
was a historical 1^ I , /h/ or /h/ cannot possibly be accounted for by a
synchronic rule, which reflects exactly the historical one, since such a
rule must necessarily be sensitive to phonemic contrasts which cannot be
posited underlyingly in the synchronic system.
As an alternative one might consider an analysis according to which
morphemes are marked in an arbitrary fashion by a diacritic which will
trigger the a-Insertion Rule. The rule itself doesQnot recapitulate the
historical rule; it no longer makes reference to [+low] as the conditioning
11
environment. The question whether a certain morpheme would have an allo-
morph in which the a surfaces is treated under this analysis as an idiosyn-
cratic property of this morpheme, and is no longer entirely dependent on its
phonological make-up. In other words: this fact has to be memorized by the
To test the adequacy of this analysis two productivity tests were con-
ducted. Before presenting the results, the relevance of such tests for the
issue involved will be discussed.
6. THE RELEVANCE OF PRODUCTIVITY TESTS
Kiparsky (1974) suggests that productivity should be viewed as a gra-
dient phenomenon rather than a clear-cut dichotomy between productive and
non-productive. On one side of the scale there are alternations which are
fully productive in the sense that they extend to every new formation that
meets their structural description. Such a productivity pattern would be
taken as an indication for the extence of a major rule. On the other end
one finds the traditional suppletive patterns of the type go-went , is-are ;
these would never be productive.
In between are alternations which are only partially productive: new
words may but do not necessarily have to become subject to them. Berko
(1958) found for example that 40% of the adults in her experiment when pre-
sented with the word *heaf gave *heaves as the plural rather than *heaf
s
.
She remarks:
"l-rtien a small group of common words exist as a category by virtue of
their great phonetic similarity and their morphological consistency, a new
word having the same degree of phonetic similarity may be treated according
to this special rule."
These would be cases characterized in standard generative phonology by
minor rules (or ad hoc subcategorization) . In the productivity pattern of
those cases one does find variability among speakers, as well as inconsis-
tent behavior within one speaker, who might apply the rule only in some
cases but fail to do it in others, even though they meet the same phonologi-
cal conditions.
This behavior follows from the fact that the application of those rules
depends not only on certain phonological configurations but is determined
also by an arbitrary marking, whose existence is unpredictable. In cases
involving minor rules and ad hoc subcategorization there will always be two
possible outputs, each exhibited by some actual morphemes in the lexicon.
When confronted with a new formation, which meets the structural description
of the rule, the speaker has to decide whether to mark it as [+] or [-] the
rule. This is an arbitrary decision, since nothing in the phonological shape
of the new morpheme will dictate the 'correct' output. All the speaker can
rely on is his previous acquaintance with lexical items which seem to struc-
turally match the new one. Whether or not the rule will apply to the new
formation depends on the pattern of alternation manifested by the actual
lexical item selected as a model of reference. The factors determining the
association of a new item with a specific model are intricate and may vary
12
from speaker to speaker. All this predicts that the productivity of such
pattern may be random rather than systematic (see Ohala 1973).
If by psychological validity of a rule we mean 'perception of a certain
recurring pattern', then rules can be psychologically real without necessar-
ily being extended to all new formations which meet their structural descrip-
tion. The variability factor, mentioned earlier with respect to rules in-
volving ad hoc marking refers only to the question of applicability of a cer-
tain rule; once it applies the output is totally predictable. This pattern
of productivity clearly differs from that of the traditional suppletive
cases: those involve a pattern of alternation which is manifested in one
lexical item (is-are
,
go-went ) or by a small class of morphemes which lack
a common phonetic denominator (ox-oxen , child-children ) , and would hardly
ever be productive.
It will be assumed therefore that the degree of productivity of phono-
logical rules should be taken not only as a verification of its psychologi-
cal validity but also as an external manifestation of its most adequate
characterization in the speaker's grammar.
The subcategorization analysis suggested for the Hebrew data makes the
claim that the application of the rule involves arbitrariness. This ap-
proach predicts that in productivity tests variability would be expected.
If on the other hand, a systematic behavior will be found, this would be un-
explainable by the proposed analysis and, consequently, would point to its
inadequacy.
7. EXPERIMENT I - HYPOTHETICAL VERBS
The subjects were 20 native speakers of Hebrew (10 male and 10 female).
They were selected from among the Israeli students in Urbana-Champaign who
agreed to participate in the experiment. All of them had high school educa-
tion at least; 12 had academic education as well in either science or engi-
neering, i.e. in areas that do not relate directly to linguistics in general
or to Hebrew language in particular.
The experiment involved the formation of present tense forms from the
7 hypothetical past tense verbs. The three root radicals of each of those
verbs do not occur in this combination in any actual lexical item.
Each subject was tested individually. The items were presented to the
subjects wholly auditorily, one at a time. The two sample items (^amarti -
'I guarded' and katavti - 'I wrote') as well as the two practice items
(gamarti - 'I finished' and zaxarti 'I remembered') were 'neutral' in the
sense that they did not involve the application of the a-Insertion Rule,
Thus the subjects were not deliberately biased in favor of any of the two
possible outputs. The subjects were told that the purpose of the experiment
was to gather information about the ability of Hebrew speakers to use new
verbs. Two lexical items which do not meet the conditions for the a-Insertion
Rule, were included to divert the subjects' attention from the real purpose
of the experiment.
Table 1 represents the pattern of application of the a-Insertion Rule
for each of the relevant items.
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Table 1
Responses in the Hypothetical Verbs Test
a Insertion
CoCea(x)
a Insertion
CoCe(x) Discarded
a)
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were aware of the possible patterns but their choice of each was arbitrary.
They might have referred to the pattern of alternation which is manifested
by the actual item which was picked as a model. Reference to macati 'I
found' or masaxti 'I pulled' which have present tense forms moce and mosex
respectively, would lead to an output such as gone and nolex (i.e. repre-
sented as [-'a' insertion]). If on the other hand samati 'I heard' or
baraxti 'I ran away' serve as a model, the outputs would be gonea and noleax
respectively by analogy to the present tense forms Cornea 'he hears' and
boreax 'he runs away' . Since any of these actual lexical items could serve
as an adequate model, no wonder that two of the subjects have come up with
two possible outputs in each case (that is how we got a total of 22 respon-
ses for each stimulus rather than 20).
The results so far seem to support the ad hoc subcategorization
analysis.
8. EXPERIMENT II - LEXICAL GAPS
The subjects were the same as in the first experiment.
The second experiment involved the creations of non-existing exten-
sions to actual lexical item (such forms are referred to as 'lexical gaps').
One of the characteristics of Hebrew (and other Semitic languages) is the
fact that nouns and verbs which are semantically related are usually derived
from the same root, i.e. share the consonantal element. Whereas in English
one 'draws a picture' and 'wears a sock' in Hebrew he mCaYeR CiYuR and GoReV
GeReV respectively (a similar case in English is that of cognate objects,
i.e. dream a dream).
A list of 7 Hebrew nouns which do not have verbs derived from the same
root as actual lexical items, was compiled and the subjects were asked to
come up with related verbs (see Appendix A)
.
The stimulus-nouns were presented orally one at a time. To facilitate
the subjects' task, examples of actual nouns and verbs which manifested the
derivational relationships and were semantically close to the stimulus nouns
were provided. For example:
'To wear a sock' is ligrov gerev .
'To wear a belt' is laxgor xagora .
How would you say:
He wears a hat? 'a hat' is kova
He puts on a blanket? 'a blanket' is smixa
On the basis of the actual lexical items, which manifest semantic and
morphological relationships, and were provided as a model, the subjects were
expected to come up with hypothetical verbs which would be related to the
stimulus noun in the same fashion (i.e. be derived from the same root).
In the case of masexa and zxuxit , for example, the final radical is
realized as [x] ([a] and [it] are suffixes). Since in the infinitive, or
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present tense singular masculine, this radical occurs in final position, the
structural conditions for the a to be inserted would be met.
The results are indicated in Table 3.
Table 3
Responses in the Lexical Gaps Test
Stimulus a Insertion a Insertion Discarded
Responses
kova hat
smixa 'blanket'
masexa 'mask'
calaxat 'plate'
garin 'seed'
emca 'middle'
zxuxit 'glass'
20 kovea
20
coleax-7
mecaleax-13
^-^
gorea-4
megarea-7
20 mamcia
20 somex
moxe s -
8
20
memasex-12
zoxex-7
20 mezaxex-9
mezaxex-4
All of the subjects behave identically with respect to the application
of the rule (even though the actual outputs differed depending on the choice
of the verb paradigm).' At first, it might seem that the results actually
support the abstract analysis, which has been earlier rejected (cf. 4).
Thus, one might argue that the subjects' systematic behavior was due to the
fact that the identical surface segments differed underlyingly, some of them
being pharyngeals and that this is why they conditioned a-Insertion. Since
the stimulus-nouns were everyday words, speakers have probably had the oppor-
tunity to establish these crucial underlying contrasts.
Beside the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence against the va-
lidity of an abstract analysis mentioned above, there is an additional reason
why such an approach cannot possibly provide a satisfactory explanation in
the case of the specific lexical items included in the second experiment. The
recoverability of abstract segments crucially depends on the availability of
surface clues, namely the presumed abstract segment must behave in a unique
way which is not predicted by its surface properties. Its behavior must pro-
vide clear indications that its underlying features are indeed distinct from
its phonetic makeup.
The stimulus -nouns in the second experiment, however, do not have deriva-
tives in which the third radical of the root occurs in an appropriate
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environment to either undergo or condition any rule which could identify it
as being underlyingly something different from its surface appearance. Given
the non-existence of any clues which could have enabled speakers to differ-
entiate between identical surface segments, it must be concluded, that an
abstract approach, even if sometimes it can be motivated for handling data
involving alternations, cannot possibly offer a plausible explanation for
the subjects' systematic behavior in the second experiment.
The other alternative, namely the arbitrary marking analysis, cannot
account for the results either. It is evident that speakers do 'know' more
about the pattern involved than what is predicted by such an analysis. If
we hypothesize that the subjects were merely analogizing to existing lexical
items, we would have expected in such a case to find a great degree of vari-
ability, as was found in the first test. A stimulus-noun such as smixa
'blanket', for example, could be analogized on the basis of phonetic simi-
larity, either to cmixa 'growing', slixa 'pardon', 'forgiveness' (which have
corresponding verbs comeax and soleax ) or to tmixa 'support' nsixa 'a bite'
(whose related verbs are tomex and nofeex ) . If the hypothetical verb 'to put
on a blanket' was indeed derived by analogy, one would have expected both
somex and someax as possible outputs; only the first was, however, suggested
by all the subjects.
For other stimuli it was rather difficult to find an actual lexical
item, which could serve as a model. For zxuxi
t
a completely matching mor-
pheme does not exist in the whole lexicon of MH. Under such conditions one
might have expected the subjects simply to guess the 'correct' output, and
as a result to exhibit variability in their responses. Instead, a totally
systematic pattern of productivity was found.
A possible explanation might be that speakers were governed in their
responses by the tendency to avoid homophony. Thus, since lehamci 'invent'
is an already existing item, lehamcia was proposed for 'put in the middle'.
This hypothesis, however, can be easily refuted: whereas kovea and somex
are actual lexical items (meaning 'decide' and 'rely on' respectively) the
other theoretically possible outputs, namely, kove and someax do not occur
in the lexicon of Hebrew, yet all of the subjects suggested the former
rather than latter.
The only plausible way to account for this systematic linguistic be-
havior is to conclude, that the subjects were not operating by analogy to
subjective models, but rather all of them were applying the same rule: what
conditions the application of this rule is, however, a mystery since it can-
not be attributed to any surface or underlying difference, as has been demon-
strated earlier.
We seem to have arrived at a paradox; earlier it has been argued, that
a speaker of MH could not have formulated a major rule to account for the
forms where the a surfaces. On the basis of the second test we have come,
however, to an opposite conclusion, namely, that speakers do operate with
a very general rule.
17
9. THE RELEVANCE OF ORTHOGRAPHY
Both tests were conducted orally. The second one, however, involved
stimuli which were every-day words whose spelling was obviously known to
all the subjects.
The outputs suggested in the second test reveal the following pattern:
The a surfaces only when the third radical is spelled with the Hebrew
letters 'xet'n and 'ayin' y but never where it is spelled with 'kaf J)
and 'alef ^ . In other words, it was inserted only in words that were
spelled with letters corresponding to the historical /^ / and /h/. Thus,
the phonemic contrasts between /?/ : /^ / , /h/ : /x/, which have been abso-
lutely neutralized in MH, but are still kept in the modern orthography,
serve as clues for the modern speaker.
The first test involved non-existing lexical items. Given that their
orthographic representations were unknown and could not have been utilized
for the purposes of the application of the rule, all the subjects could do
was operate by analogy: that is what caused the variability.
To test the validity of this hypothesis an additional test was con-
ducted.
10. EXPERIMENT III - WRITTEN VERSION OF I
The experiment was conducted with the same subjects as in the first
and second tests.
The task and material were identical to those of Experiment I, i.e.
to form present tense forms of hypothetical past tense verbs.
Each of the hypothetical verbs (cf. 7) was presented orthographically
and each subject was asked to pronounce its present tense form. The third
radical was indicated half of the time by ;? or r\ and half of the time as X
or V. The experiment took place a month after the first one.
The results clearly confirm the hjrpothesis about the use of ortho-
graphic clues for the purposes of application of the rule; the [a] surfaced
only when the third radical was spelled with n or V but never when it was
represented as 3 or X .
The results of the third test can be cited as additional argument
against the validity of an abstract analysis. Such an analysis clearly
fails to account for the differences in speakers' behavior in these three
tests.
A proponent of the abstract approach might argue that the randomness
in the first test has to be attributed to the difficulties in the recover-
ability of the abstract segments. He would probably try to account for the
systematic behavior in the second test by claiming that the lexical repre-
sentations of these familiar items contain a pharyngeal. Why is it, one
must ask, that the responses in the third test differ significantly from
those of the first one, although both included the same hypothetical lexical
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items? If the systematic behavior in the third test was due to the recover-
ability of the abstract segments what made this process suddenly possible?
Obviously it was not any new phonetic information, since the test was a
written one. The only difference between the first and third test was the
availability of orthographic representations in the latter. Given this
fact, even an advocate of an abstract analysis would have to admit that the
orthographic element must be treated as a relevant factor affecting speakers'
linguistic behavior.
11. CHILDREN'S RESPONSES
The orthography-based analysis makes the prediction that in the case
of preliterate speakers, variability would be found in the second test (the
one involving lexical gaps) as well. No significant differences should be
expected in their performance in the first and second tests, since the only
factor distinguishing between the stimuli in these two tests, namely the
orthographic one, would be irrelevant in their case.
To verify this hypothesis the second test was conducted with 15 first
graders in an Israeli elementary school. The results are represented in
Table 4 (for comparison, the adults' responses to the same stimuli are
indicated as well)
.
Table 4
Responses of Adults and First Graders
in the Lexical Gaps Test
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the first graders' responses are rather striking. They clearly confirm the
hypothesis that the orthographic pattern serves as the crucial clue for the
application of the rule.
12. IMPLICATIONS
It seems that as consequence of familiarity with the spelling of
lexical items, speakers might realize the correlation between certain ortho-
graphic representations (i.e. letters) and a pattern of morphophonemic al-
ternation. Based on the contrast which is still reflected in the orthog-
raphy the modern speaker is able to formulate a generalization which is
rather close to the historical a-Insertion Rule; as has been argued earlier,
this rule could not have been recovered independently from the available
surface data.
The exposure to orthography might thus lead to modification of the
speaker's grammar; patterns of alternations which synchronically involve
arbitrariness (i.e. marking with a diacritic) may be reinterpreted as totally
predictable when orthographic clues are available. For an educated speaker
of Hebrew the contrast between kore 'he reads' and korea 'he tears' is no
longer arbitrary; it is tied up with the orthographic distinction ( /\ versus
y) which reflects the historic phonemic contrast.
One might suggest that the spelling pattern serves in this case as a
diacritic, i.e. as an arbitrary symbol which triggers the application of the
rule.
It seems desirable to avoid using the term 'diacritic' in this context
because of its connotations; when used within the current linguistic theory
it implies an element which is external and totally ad hoc. Even though
orthographic representations are arbitrary to a certain extent, they clearly
have psychological reality for educated adults and cannot possibly be re-
garded as of the same status as a mere diacritic of the type [+rule X]
(+rule 235] . One might propose that since orthography is external to the
phonological system it should still be referred to as a diacritic. Such a
definition is valid only within the basic theoretical assumptions of modern
linguistics. The orthographic factor can be treated as external only be-
cause the domain of linguistics has been pre-defined as the spoken variety
of language alone. Such a division seems to be unmotivated. Rather, the
orthographic system should be incorporated and treated as relevant linguis-
tic data, since it clearly has its effect on the formulation of the speaker's
Within a model which incorporates orthography as legitimate linguistic
data available to speakers and utilized by them, the a-Insertion Rule can
no longer be viewed as triggered by a totally ad hoc marking. It can be
claimed that for literate adults the rule has actually become a major one:
it applies whenever its structural description (i.e. a specific grapheme)
is met.
The version of the synchronic a-Insertion Rule suggested here, however,
is not a regular phonological rule. There is no empirical evidence to sup-
port the hypothesis that spelling has indeed affected the speaker's grammar
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to such an extent as to introduce new phonemic segments (i.e. [+low] ones).
Rather the application of the rule crucially depends on orthographic clues.
The best that can be done is to formulate the synchronic rule by incor-
porating non-phonological information into its structural description, i.e.:
(27)
+ syll
+ low
syll
low
##
Or, if one accepts the position that historical / / are postulated synchroni-
cally as 111 whenever they serve as one of the root radicals (see Bolozky
1972), the a-Insertion Rule can be formulated as follows:
(28)
+ syir
+ low
syll
low
//#
condition:
Such a formulation implies that for the purposes of the rule applica-
tion, literate speakers of MH rely on orthographic distinctions rather than
on phonemic contrasts.
In spite of all these unconventional properties of the rule, it has
been clearly demonstrated above that the new formulation reflects rather
accurately the speaker's linguistic knowledge. The results of the second
test indicate that the orthographically based major rule, rather than the
version involving arbitrary marking, is the psychologically valid analysis.
Ignoring the relevance of orthography might lead to a distorted picture of
what the literate speaker's competence actually is.
The influence of the orthographic system must be viewed as potential
rather than automatic. Not every historical rule which is potentially re-
coverable from the modern orthography will necessarily become part of
speaker's grammar: whereas speakers of Hebrew do perceive the historical
correlation between the spelling pattern and the application of the a-
Insertion Rule, other rules which depended originally on the same phonemic
contrasts, and are reflected in the modern orthography as well, have not
been maintained with their historical environments but are memorized as
arbitrary alternations.^ This fact does not, however, invalidate the claim
made here, namely that historical information may sometimes reach syn-
chrony due to its recoverability from the orthographic system.
To sum up; a common criticism directed towards phonological analyses
involving 'abstractness' is that they have lost psychological validity by
overstating the speakers' ability to abstract generalizations from given
surface data. This view is expressed, for example, by Braine (1974), who
notes that the issue is not that such analyses "fail to capture generali-
zations; rather, it is whether the native speakers make generalizations as
the theory captures them."
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What I have suggested is that disregarding the relevance of ortho-
graphic data in phonological analyses, results again, in a misrepresenta-
tion of the speaker's knowledge; this time, however, by understating it;
i.e. by failing to express certain valid generalizations. Analyses con-
taining rules referring to contrasts which have been absolutely neutralized
on the surface are generally considered as expensive if not automatically
ruled out. The results mentioned above suggest, however, that historical
rules whose synchronic formulation involves reference to segments which
never surface may nevertheless be recapitulated and become an integral
part of a speaker's system as long as the relevant historical distinctions
are reflected in the orthographic system (assuming of course that we are
dealing with a literate society).
NOTES
*The paper is a chapter from a dissertation entitled, "Some Effects
of Orthography on the Linguistic Knowledge of Modern Hebrew Speakers."
I would like to thank Charles Kisseberth, Hans Hock, and Michael Kenstowicz
for the valuable comments and suggestions they provided.
Historically, [x] was an allophone of /k/ derived via spirantization.
Historical /k/'s which occur as the third radical, would always surface as
[x]'s, because spirantization in Hebrew applied postvocalically, and there
is never in the verb paradigm a configuration where a third radical occurs
postconsonantally (a position where spirantization would not apply)
. Thus
these [x]'s never alternate with [k]'s. Whether this surface [x] has to be
represented synchronically as a phoneme or still as an allophone derived
from /k/ is irrelevant for the present purposes. All that matters is that
there is no way to tell [x]'s which were historically /h/ from those which
were allophones of /k/ in the third position: both are
'
always realized on
the surface as [x]
.
2
For the controversy about the abstractness of phonological analyses
see Kiparsky (1968) , Kisseberth (1969) , and Crothers (1971)
.
3Bolozky (1972) suggests that gutturals should be still postulated
underlyingly primarily because of pattern correspondences. He argues "If
one wants to account for awareness of the connection between root, pattern
and semantic reading, and for semantic correspondences between realiza-
tions of different verbs in the same pattern - then one is logically led
to assume gutturals in the underlying representations. If we want yaavod
'he will work', for instance, to be related to avad 'he worked' in the same
way that yiksor 'he will tie' is related to ka^ar 'he tied' the most logi-
cal way of doing it is to represent yaavod as /yi+'^vod/ and let 'a-insertion'
for gutturals and assimilation across a prefix map it into ya ?avod (ulti-
mately yaavod) ."
Given, however, that those gutturals are hardly ever realized as such
on the surface he suggests (p. 81) that "it is quite possible that instead
of having 111 , 1^1 and /h/ it would be sufficient to fill the slot they
used to occupy by /?/'s only, since it is almost only as [ ?] that they are
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optionally realized. ...Preserving /?/ in the ex-gutturals positions will
not cause the loss of significant generalization, and would still satisfy
the need for some additional consonants for pattern correspondences and
for a plausible explanation of some phonological phenomena attributed to
the gutturals. And since it is (almost) only /?/ that is optionally found
in the phonetic output our underlying representation would not be too ab-
stract."
The arguments in favor of the postulation of underlying /?/'s do not
hold for /h/: in this case the problem of filling a slot does not arise,
since there is always a surface segment in the place of the historical /h/,
namely, [x] . Historical /h/ could thus be postulated as underlying /x/ and
the pattern correspondences could still be maintained.
Thus, the argument mentioned by Bolosky may motivate the postulation
of an underlying /?/ as a 'slot filler': it cannot however be cited as evi-
dence for postulating phonemic contrast between the members of the histor-
ical guttural group (i.e. /?/ : / /) or for an underlying /h/.
Another possible argument against abstractness involves rule ordering.
If it can be established independently that the application of rule A which
must refer to the surface properties of segment X precedes in the derivation
rule B, which treats the same segment according to its presumed underlying
features, this would obviously constitute strong evidence against postu-
lating as an abstract segment. In many cases, however, abstract analyses
recapitulate the historical developments: if the rule which has led to the
neutralization of the historical underlying contrasts was the last to enter
the language, and if rule reordering has not taken place, there will be no
data which will enable us to construct this type of an argument. Further-
more, such argument cannot be invoked if the relevant rules cannot be proven
independently to be crucially ordered one with respect to the other. This
is, for example, the case with the a-Insertion Rule, which is presumably
triggered by /h/, and the Vowel Epenthesis Rule (i.e. the rule inserting a
vowel to break'the impermissable sequences
#c|>lowl, l+5owJ C , which no longer
refers to historical /h/ as a [+low] consonant)
.
Notice, however, that an argument based on rule ordering can be used
only negatively, namely to demonstrate that a certain abstract analysis can-
not be maintained. The nonavailability of such argument does not, of course,
constitute positive evidence in favor of an abstract analysis.
Since the number of morphemes where the a surfaces is approximately
equivalent to those which do not undergo the rule, it seems preferable to
refer to the situation as 'ad hoc subcategorization' rather than a 'minor
rule' (see Kenstowicz and Kisseberth 1977, p. 126) <, Essentially, both in-
volve arbitrary marking of morphemes; the only difference is that in the
case of minor rules one class can be identified as regular and unmarked
«
Instead of the subcategorization analysis the CaCa(x) - CoCea(x)
alternation could be represented by suppletion; i.e. by listing both forms
in the lexicon. In both analyses memorization is involved: one has either
to memorize the fact that a certain morpheme is marked with a diacritic (a
fact which is totally unpredictable) or two allomorphs of a certain morpheme
have to be memorized (in a suppletive analysis)
.
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The analysis involving subcategorization seems preferable for the fol-
lowing reasons:
a) Whereas a suppletive alternation (as defined traditionally) would
hardly be expected to be productive (e.g. extend to new items) the alterna-
tion of the type CaCa(x) - CoCea(x) is productive at least to a certain
degree
.
b) Two aspects of predictability should be distinguished. One has to
do with whether the application of the rule is predictable, whereas the
second involves the pattern of alternation. In cases of ad hoc subcategori-
zation what is unpredictable is whether a certain morpheme will manifest the
alternation or not (i.e. whether the rule will apply). Once, however, the
rule applies the pattern of alternation is totally predictable: if a mor-
pheme of the type CaCa is marked we 'know' that the alternant will be of the
configuration CoCea
. From this second aspect it is as predictable as a
major rule. For the traditional cases of suppletion (is-are
,
go-went), both
their occurrence as well as their form (pattern of alternation) are totally
unpredictable. The cases of the type CaCa(x) - CoCea(x) seem to be somewhere
in between suppletive paradigms, on one hand, and totally predictable alterna-
tions on the other. They share properties with both. Since they seem, how-
ever, to differ essentially from clear cases of suppletion (in the sense that
they are both productive and predictable at least to some extent) , I prefer
the ad hoc subcategorization to the suppletive analysis.
For the purposes of the present argument the question as to which of
the two approaches is more adequate is not of crucial importance; both imply
that for the native speaker of MH the alternations discussed involve arbi-
trariness, as opposed to the abstract analysis, which claim that they are
totally predictable.
The various verb patterns of Hebrew (i.e. C^iC„eC
,
hiC^C iC , etc.)
are generally associated with certain semantic properties such as causa-
tivity, incohativeness, etc. The variability found in subjects' responses
(licloax lecaleax, limsox lemasex) is, however, irrelevant for the purposes
of the present issue; with respect to the application of the a-Insertion
rule all subjects manifested a unanimous behavior.
Q
For example, the historical distinction betv?een infinitives of the
type la^aCoC :le?eCoC , which depended on the contrast 111 : 1^1 is not
maintained even though it is reflected in the orthography.
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APPENDIX A
a) To wear a sock is liGRoV GeReV.
To wear a belt is
(laXGoR XaGoRa)
To put on a tie is
(la?aNoV ?aNiVa)
What would be similar constructions to convey
the following ideas:
He wears a hat.
He puts on a blanket,
R
b) To sculp a statue is leFaSeL PeSeL
To draw a picture is
How would you say:
He makes a mask.
He makes a plate.
R
c) To take off the peel is leKaLeF KLiPa.
How would you say:
He removes the seeds.
R
d)
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HEADLESS RELATIVE CLAUSES IN QUECHUA
Peter Cole ard Wayne Harbert and Gabriella Hermon
A wide variety of hypotheses regarding the underlying
structure of relative clauses have been put forward in the
generative literature. Among the more imaginative-and, at
first glance, less plausible proposals-is that of Michael
Brame, who suggested that restrictive relative clauses
(with surface heads) are underlyingly headless (i.e., have
dummy heads). Surface heads are formed by a rule which cop-
ies the relativized NP from the embedded clause into the
matrix clause.
Brame 's proposal gains considerable plausibility in the
light of recent work on relativization in Quechua. The p\ir-
pose of this paper is to demonstrate the existence of surface
headless relative clauses in three members of the Quechua
language family: Ancash, Huanca and Imbabura. Evidence for
headless structure is based on case marking, word order and
the distribution of relative clause types. The results derive
primarily from field work by the authors. The existence of
surface headless relative clauses in Quechua has not been
reported previously in the literature.
The appearance in surface structure of just that struc-
ture proposed by Brame as underlying restrictive relative
clauses generally constitutes significant support for Brame'
s
proposal. It suggests that Brame 's analysis of English de-
serves new and serious consideration.
The purpose of this paper is to argue for the existence of
"headless" relative clauses in three dialects of Quechua: Imbabura
(a Quechua II dialect spoken in northern Ecuador), Ancash and Huanca
(both Quechua I dialects spoken in central Peru).l The existence of
such relative clauses in Quechua is of considerable theoretical import-
ance because it lends support to a recent claim that relative clauses
are headless underlyingly even in languages like English where heads
invariably occur in surface structure.
We shall begin by examining briefly the motivation for positing
underlyingly headless relative clauses in English. We shall then turn
to Quechua and show that there is compelling evidence for the existence
of sxirface headless relative clauses in each of the above-mentioned
dialects. 2 The clear existence of headless relative clauses in Quechua
provides important support for the proposal that relative clauses are
underlyingly headless cross-linguistically.
^
Headless Relative Clauses in English
Recent studies of relativization in English suggest that English
relative clauses are headless in underlying structure.^ According to
27
this hypothesis the underlying structure of (l) would be roughly (2)
(in which there is a dummy head5):
the £^ we made headway
A rule of promotion copies the object NP into head position, yielding (3):
(3) m
det NP
the headway that we made
The evidence for such a derivation in English is quite convincing.
Heads of relative clauses behave syntactically (with respect to a var-
iety of rules and constraints ) as though they were constituents of the
embedded clause (S.) rather than the matrix clause. Such behavior is
expected if they originate in the embedded clause and are later promoted
to constituency in the matrix clause. But it is unexpected and would
constitute an irregularity in the grammar if heads were matrix clause
constituents in (both surface and) underlying structiire.T
Let us examine an example of a head behaving as though it were an
original constituent of (S.). Consider relative clauses on the head
noun headway , which in environments other than relative clause construc-
tions can appear only as the object of make , as is illustrated in (k)
and (5):
(k) We made satisfactory headway
(5) *The headway was satisfactory
When headway is modified by a relative clause, however, the restric-
tions on its distribution are waived. Compare the \mgrammatical (5)
with the grammatical (6):
(6) The headway Cwhich we madeD was satisfactory
The grammaticality of (6) is not predicted if we assume that (l) derives
from an underlying structure in which the head originates outside the
embedded S. . But if (l) derives from a structure similar to (2), the
grammaticality of (6) is predictable. Headway is grammatical as a head
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NP in (l) according to that analysis because it originates as the ob-
ject of make
. Schachter provides a variety of arguments of similar form
shoving that relative heads with pronouns
,
picture noun reflexives and
reciprocals all behave as though they originate vithin the relative
clauses rather than as heads.
If relative clauses with heads derive universally from headless
structures (i.e., structures with dummy heads), it would seem likely
that there would be languages in which relative clauses are headless
in surface structure. 8 We shall now turn to evidence that various dia-
lects of Quechua provide instances of such languages.
We shall first consider relativization in Imbabura. Before pre-
senting the argtunents for headless relative clauses in Imbabxira, it
will be helpful to review some general facts about relativization in this
dialect. In Imbabura, as in other varieties of the Quechua language
family, relative clauses, and subordinate clauses generally, appear in
norainalized form. The choice of nominalizer in Imbabura is determined
by the temporal relationship of the relative clause and the matrix cla\ise.
This is illustrated in (T)-(9):
(T) Relative Clause with Present Nominalizer
C0. punu-ju-jJ wawa. mana cai-pi-chu
Csleep-prog-p^resent nomD child not this-in-neg
'The child who is sleeping is not here.'
(8) Relative Clause with Past Nominalizer
C0. pxinu-shcaU wawa. mana cai-pi-chu
C sleep-past nomD child not this-in-neg
'The child who was sleeping is not here.'
(9) Relative Clause with Future Nominalizer
^0- pufiu-na^ wawa. mana cai-pi-chu
C sleep-future nomH child not this-in-neg
'The child who will sleep is not here.'
In contrast to other dialects, when a head is present, the choice
of nominalizer does not depend on the grammatical role (subject, direct
object, etc.) of the relativized noun phrase. ''-' For instance, -shea
may be used in the relativization of transitive subjects and
-j_ may be
used in the relativization of direct objects. This is illustrated by
(10) and (11):
(10) Relativization of Transitive Subject with -shea
110. warmi-ta Juya-shcaD runa. aicha-ta micu-Ju-n
C woman-acc love-past nomD man meat-acc eat-prog-3
'The man who loved the woman is eating meat.'
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(ll) Relativization of Direct Object vith -j_
Cruna 0. juya-j3 wa.niii. aicha-ta micu-ju-n
Cman " love-present noin] voman meat-acc eat-prog-3
'The woman whom the maxi loves is eating meat.'
As would be expected in an SOV language, in relative clauses where
a head is clearly present, it appears to the right of the embedded clause,
this is represented schematically in (12):
^-^^ NP^ S."- ^S. NP^ ^NP ^NP
1 1
It should be noted, furthermore, that word order in relative clauses,
in contrast with matrix clauses, is strictly SOV. Compare (l3a) and
(l3b) with (lUa) and (lUb):
(l3) Word Order in Relative Clauses
(a) SOV Order
110. aicha-ta micu-jD warmi.
C meat-acc eat-present nomH woman
*(b) SVO Order
C0. mdcu-j aicha-tal warml
.
L eat-present nom meat-acc H woman
'A woman who eats meat'
(lU) Word Order in Matrix Clauses
(a) SOV Order
warmi-ca aicha-ta micu-n
woman-topic meat-acc eat-3
'The woman eats meat.'
(b) SVO Order
warmi-ca mlcu-n aicha-ta
woman-topic eat-3 meat-acc
'The woman eats meat.'
Case marking inside relative clauses follows the same principles
that operate in main clauses. Subjects receive zero case marking, direct
objects are marked with the accusative case marker -ta (or its allomorph
-da after nasals). Case marking applies within the relative clause
on the basis of grammatical relations within that clause. In addition,
the relative clause as a whole receives case marking on the basis of
its grajmnatical role in the matrix clause. These processes are illus-
trated in (15):
j'^'
30
(15) parla-rca-ni C0. runa-ta ricu-shca3 warmi-wan
speak-past-lsg L man-acc see-past noml woman-vith
'I spoke with the woman who saw the man.'
In (15) runa 'man' receives accusative case marking because it is
the direct object within the embedded clause. The relative clause as a
whole is marked with the comitative postposition -wan , the appearance
of which is governed by the matrix verb parla 'speak'. Case marking within
the relative clause differs from matrix case marking in only one way.
The accusative case marker -ta is optional inside relative clauses though
it is obligatory in natrix clauses, as shown by (l6a)
,
(l6b) and (l7):
(16)
.-ta Suppression in Relative Clauses
(a) Unsuppressed -ta
C0. wagra-ta michi-jD wawa.
C cow-acc herd-pres nomH child
' child who herds cows
'
(b) Suppressed -ta
C0. wagra michi-jD wawa.
C cow herd-pres nomD child
'child who herds cows'
(it) Absence of -ta Suppression in Matrix Clauses
*wagra . , .
wawa-ca
_^
michi-n
wagra-ta
1. •-, J ^ • *cow-0 , , _child-topic herd-3
cow-acc
'The child herds cows.'
Ve shall now turn to headless relative clauses. The clearest and
most straightforward examples of headless relative clauses in Imbabura
are in sentences like those of (18):
(18) Headless Relativization of Embedded Direct Objects
(a) Cwambra wagra-ta randi-shcaD wanu-rca
Cboy cow-acc buy-past nomD die-3 past
'The cow which the boy bought died.'
(b) Cruna alcu-ta jatu-shca3 ali-mi
Cman dog-acc sell-past nomU good-validator
'The dog which the man sold is good.'
There are two clear cut arguments that these relative clauses are
in fact headless.H Both arguments are based on a fundamental struc-
tural difference between relative clauses vith heads and those without
heads. Cross-linguistically, in those relative clauses with heads,
the head is , in derived structure at least , a constituent of the matrix
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rather than the embedded clause. It appears either immediately to the
left or immediately to the right of the embedded clause, the position
typically correlating with "basic word order in the language in question
(to the left of the embedded clause in VO languages and to the right
in OV languages). In contrast, in headless relative clauses, unless rules
changing its position apply, the relativized NF appears in its normal
position within the relative clause. It is treated by case marking and
other rules coding grammatical role as a constituent of the embedded
rather than matrix clause.
The first argument that the relative clause constructions in (l8)
are headlessHhas" to do with word order. The \inderlined NPs in (l8)
appear in the middle of the embedded clause rather than to the left or
right, as would be expected if they were heads. Compare (l8) with (19):
(19) Relativization of Embedded Direct Object (with Head)
(a) Cwambra 0. randi-shcall wagra. wanu-rca
Cboy buy-past nom II cow die-3 past
'The cow the boy bought died.'
(b) Cruna 0. jatu-shcaD alcu. ali-mi
Cman "" sell-past nomD dog good-validator
'The dog the man sold is good.'
In (18) the relativized NP appears in the normal position for a direct
object within a relative clause, that is to say, between the subject
and verb. In contrast, in (19) the underlined NP appears to the right
of the embedded verb. The differences in order between (18) and (19)
are unexceptional if the sentences of (I8) involve relative clauses
without heads and those of (19) with heads.
The second argument is based on case marking. In (18) the underlined
NP receives accusative case marking. This would be expected on the basis
of the case marking process described previously if that noun phrase is
a constituent of the embedded clause, but would be imexpected if it were
a head, which is a main clause, constituent
.
Thus, we conclude that the sentences of (18) illustrate headless
relative clauses.
Having established the existence of headless relative clauses in
Imbabura, we would now like to examine briefly the distribution of the
construction. In the preceding examples we showed the headlessness of
certain instances of relativization where the relativized NP is a direct
object within the embedded clause and the past nominalizer -shea is
employed. This type of relative clause is represented schematically in
(20):
(20) ,
It should be noted that the sentences of (18) are unambigous with
regard to whether the subject or the object has been relativized.
^^^
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These sentences cannot be interpreted as involving relativization of
the subject I^. That is, (l8a) cannot mean 'The boy who bought the cov
died.'. Nor can (l8b) mean, 'The man who sold the dog is good.'. Head-
less relativization with the nominalizer -shea is restricted to the
relativization of direct objects. -^2
Thus, in headless relative clauses, unlike those with heads, the
nominalizing suffix indicates both tense and the grammatical role of
the relativized NP. Such a mixture of functions is not unusual in Quechua
generally, but as we showed previously, it is not found in Imbabura in
relative clauses with heads. We shall employ the difference in function
of the nominalizing suffixes in relative clauses with and without heads
to help us determine whether certain other relative clauses have or do
not have heads. The difference in function of the nominalizer should
be particiilarly helpful in examples where case marking and word order
fail to distinguish whether a relative clause is or is not headless.
Let us consider the examples in (2l):
(21) Headless Relativization of Embedded Subjects
(a) Cwamhra wagra-ta randi-jD waSu-nga caya
C boy cow-acc b\ay-pres nomU die-fut\ire 3 tomorrow
'The boy who is buying the cow will die tomorrow.'
(b) C runa alcu-ta jatu-j] ali-mi
[man dog-acc sell-pres nomH good-validator
'The man who is selling the dog is good.'
The sentences of (2l) are similar to those of (l8) in that they must be
interpreted as involving the relativization of a single grammatical role,
subject, in this case. Thus, (21a) cannot constitute a statement that
the cow will die tomorrow nor (21b) that the dog is good. The sentences
of (21) differ from those of (l8) in that in (l8) the relativized NP is
the embedded direct object while in (2l) it is the embedded subject. We
shall argue that these sentences, like those of (l8), are instances of
headless relative clauses (as indicated by the bracketing and the caption
given in the examples). Alternatively, one might want to argue that these
sentences should be interpreted not as instances of headless relative
clauses, but rather as instances of right branching relative clauses with
heads on the left. The two possible structures are illustrated in (22):
(22) a. Headless Relative Clause
j^C gC SUBJECT Object Verb-jig
^j^p
b. Right Branching Relative Clause
^:iffiAD:^p 3,CSTI|JECT
We shall argue that the sentences of (2l) are not in fact right branching,
but rather are headless.
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The two hypotheses in question make the sane predictions regarding
case marking and word order. Both i)redict that the underlined noun
phrases of (2l) would receive zero case marking and appear in initial
position. Thus, word order and case marking cannot be used as tests for
headless relativization in these cases.
It is, however, possible to determine empirically whether the sen-
tences of (21) are headless or right branching. It vail be remembered
that in clear instances of relative clauses with (non-dumiror) heads,
left branching relative clauses with heads on the right , relativization
was possible regardless of the grammatical role of the relativized NP
within S. and regardless of the nominalizing suffix employed. If 'the
relative''"clau3es of (2l) are right branching, it would, therefore, be
expected that sentences similar to (2l) but involving the relativization
of the object of S. should be grammatical. But, as the sentences of
(23) show, such relative clauses are not well-formed:
(23) a. ?? wagra. Cwarabra 0. randi-jD wanu-rca
cow Cboy buy-pres nomH die-past 3
'The cow which the boy was buying dies.'
b. ?? alcu. Cruna 0. jatu-jj ali-mi
dog [man sell-pres nom] good-validator
'The dog the man is selling is good.'
« i
Right branching relative clauses in which the object of the lower clause
is relativized and the present nominalizer
-j_ is em.ployed are ungrammatical
.
It might be proposed that the sentences of (23) do not constitute
j
conclusive evidence that the right branching hypothesis is false. Per-
1
haps in right branching relative clauses the nominalizers encode both
I
tense and the gramniatical role of the relativized NP. Relative nom-
I
inalizers have both of these functions generally in most dialects of
|
Peruvian Quechua. They also have both functions in Imbabura headless j
relatives, as demonstrated by the lack of ambiguity in the examples in
j
(18). Thus, it would not be surprising if the
-j_ nominalizer were re-
j
stricted to relativized subjects and -shea to relativized objects in
^
right branching relative clauses. Hence, according to the revised right \
branching hypothesis, the ungrammaticality of (23) would be due to the
j
choice of
-j_ as nominalizer. This proposal may be easily tested by sub-
stituting -shea and/or -na for
-j_ in the examples in (23):
i
{2k) a. ?? wagra. Cwambra 0.. randi 7 _ 1^ \ ^ wanu-rca
E boy buy (Ip^^t""";^^ ^ die-past 3
•The cow which the ^oy |^^°f^^^^^^^^ died.'
-na 7*
1 ali-mihca^
dog Cman ^^1^ [ijast^'noml ^ good-validator
'The dog which the manV^ ^/ is good.'
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The ungrammaticel examples of (2^1 ), in vhich -shea and -na have
been so substituted show, we believe, that the ungrammaticality of (23)
is, in fact, not due to the choice of nominalizer. If the right branching
hypothesis were to be maintained in the face of such facts , it wo\ild
be necessary to restrict right branching relative clauses to the rela-
tivization of embedded subjects. Furthermore, headless relative clauses
would have to be restricted to object relativization. Thus, the right
branching analysis is frought with irregularities and ad hoc restrictions.
But if the sentences of (2l) are analyzed as headless, such
restrictions are \xnnecessary. In headless subject relatives, the nom- -
inalizer
-j_ is employed while in headless object relatives the nominalizer
-shea is employed. The absence of sentences like those of (23) and
(2U) is predicted if Imbabura does not allow right branching relative
clauses at all.
Thus , we conclude that in Imbabura there are two types of relative
clauses, left branching and headless. Headless relative clauses may
be formed on either embedded subjects or embedded objects. The choice
of relativized NP is indicated by the nominalizer. A similar, though
not identical pattern will be seen in Huanca, to which we shall now turn.
Huanca
The discussion of Huanca is based entirely on the excellent reference
grammar for the dialect written by R. Cerron Palomino. ^3 Cerron-Palomino
describes Huanca as having both left branching relative clauses (like
(25)), and right branching relative clauses.
(25) C0. lisqi-sha-ykil nuna-kak-man . kuti-y
'"i:know-nom-21 man-the-to return-imperative
'Return to the person that you know.'
Right branching is claimed to be predominant. He notes that if this
description is correct, the situation in Huanca is anomalous since there
does not appear to be any other dialect of Quechua in which a similar
preference for right branching relativization is to be found. We shall
propose in this section that relativization in Huanca is not anomalous,
but rather that it is quite similar to that found in Imbabura. We sug-
gest that all those instances of relative
-clauses analyzed by Cerron-
Palomino as right branching may in fact be headless. Thus, the relati-
vization strategies in Huanca are reanalyzed as headless and left
branching, the same two strageties found in Imbab\ira. The preference for
putative "right branching" over left branching is treated in o\ir analysis
as a preference for headlessness over left branching. Given the wide-
spread occurrence of headless relative clauses in Quechua generally,
the latter preference would not seem particularly surprising.
We would like to begin by arguing that certain relative clauses
analyzed by Cerron-Palomino as right branching must be headless. The
argument is based on word order, as was the first and most straight-
forward argument from Imbabura. Consider relativization of embedded
direct objects when the -sha nominalizer (cognate to Imbabura -shea )
is employed:
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(26) Relativization of Embedded Direct O'bject with -sha
luwis-pa kavallu lanti-sha-n-kak alfak-ta miku-yka-n
Luis-genitive horse buy-nom-3-the alfalfa-acc eat-prog-3
'The horse that Luis bought is eating alfalfa.'
Cerron-Palomino treats sentences like (26) as right branching.
But this clearly cannot be correct because the putative head, kavallu
appears in normal object position within the embedded clause. (Kavallu
fails to receive accusative case marking in Huanca because the suppression
of the accusative case marker is obligatory in relative clauses.) Thus,
sentences like (26) must have a derived structure like (27) rather than
one like (28):
(28)
NP^ NP^ \^P S^ ^S \P
The fact that some putative right branching relative clauses must
be analyzed as headless raises the question of vhether all putative
right branching might in fact be headless. An examination of the range
of data adduced by Cerron-Palomino provides no counterexamples to the
headless hypothesis:
(29) Relativization of Embedded Subject vith -sha
walash libra lanti-sha-n-kak wanu-ku-n
boy book buy-nom-3-the die-refl-3
'The boy who bought the book died.'
/ \ 1^(30) Relativization of Embedded Subject vith
-3^
allqu chuqllu suva-q-kak yana-m
dog corn steal-nom-the black-validator
'The dog that steals the corn is black.'
In (29) and (30) the \mderlined NPs , valash and allqu , might, on
the basis of the data available, be analyzed either as heads or as the
subjects of the embedded clauses. Ultimately, this question must be
resolved by finding dialect specific tests for the constituency of walash
and allqu
, as we in fact did in the previous section for Imbabura. We
are not yet in a position to do this for Huanca, so any conclusions
drawn at this time must be tentative. It would seem likely, however,
that Huanca relativization is not as anomalous as Cerron-Palomino
believed, and that headless relativization is central to relative clause
formation in Huanca. '-5
Ancash
Relativization in Ancash is considerably more complex than in
Imbabura and Huanca. As in other dialects, left branching relative
clauses are fovuid, as in example (3l):
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(31) poncho-ta rura-q warmi sumaq-mi
poncho-acc make-nom woman good-validator
'The woman who makes ponchos is good.
'
But, in addition, there is found in this dialect a range of case mark-
ing facts which, so far, has eluded complete analysis on our part. We
are unaware of any satisfactory general account of the complexities we
have encountered. In particiilar, we are unable to specify which gramma-
tical processes interact to derive apparent right branching relative
clauses like (32)
:
(32) kuya-a-mi taqay warmi-ta qotsu-q-ta
love-1-validator that woman-acc sing-nom-acc
'I love the woman who is singing.'
in which the apparent head and the nominalized verb both receive matrix
case marking, and apparent right branching relative clauses like (33):
(33) noqa kuya-a-mi warmi-ta qam dansa-sqa-iki-wan
I love-1-validator woman-acc you dance-nom-2-obl
'I love the woman you dance with.'
in which the nominalized verb receives the case marking of the relati-
vized NP in the embedded clause and the apparent head receives matrix
case marking. In other examples, a noun phrase bearing embedded clause
marking appears to the left of the embedded clause and the nominalized
verb receives the same case marker as that noun phrase. This is illus-
trated by example (3^):
(3U) noqa urya-a nuna-ta qam qellay-ta qusqa-iki-ta
I work-1 man-acc you money-acc give-nom-2-acc
' I work with the man you give money to .
'
In still further examples , the NP bears embedded case marking and the
nominalized verb matrix case marking as in (35):
(35) kuya-a-mi taqay siudad-caw noqa yaca-q-ta
love-1-validator that city-loc I live-nom-acc
'I love the city I live in.'
Furthermore, the range of possibilities accepted often appears to vary
iriiosyncratically from verb to verb. Until the regularity behind this
complex of surface forms is revealed, it will be risky to make claims
about the overall structure of the relative clause in Ancash."'-'
There do, however, seem to be certain relative clauses that appear
almost certainly to be headless. As in Imbabura and Huanca, the clear
cases involve the relativization of direct objects:
(36) a. noqa dansa-rqa-a mario warmi-ta kuya-sqa-n-wan
I dance-past-1 Mario woman-acc love-nom-3-obl
'I dance with the womsin Mario loves.'
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{3C) b. mario varmi-ta kuya-sqa-n wafiu-sqa
Mario woman-acc love-nom-3 died-past
'The woman Mario loves died.'
The sentences of (36) appear to be completely analogous to instances
of headless relativization of direct objects in Imbabura. As in both
Imbabura and Huanca, the position of the underlined NPs is the one
appropriate if those NPs are constituents of the embedded clause, but
not if they are heads. Similarly, the accusative case marking of the
italicized NPs is clearly due to their grammatical role within the
embedded clause.-'-^ This case marking wo\ild be unexplained if these NPs
were heads and, hence, matrix clause constituents. Additional examples,
in which oblique NPs within the embedded clause are relativized appear
in (37):
(37) a. noqa kuya-a-mi qam warmi-wan dansa-sqa-iki-ta
I love-1-validator you woman-obl dance-nom-2-acc
'I love the woman you danced with.'
b. mario wayi-caw yaca-sqa-n inipa-sqa
Mario house-loc live-nom burn-past
'The house Mario lived in burnt down.'
The argument that relative clauses like those in (36) and (37)
are headless is further strengthened by the fact that when a direct
object or oblique relativized noun phrase remains in its normal position
between the subject and the verb it may not receive matrix clause case
marking. This is shown in the examples in (38):
(38) a. *noqa dansa-rqa-a mario warmi-wan kuya-sqa-n-wan
I dance-past-1 Mario woman-obl love-nom-3-obl
('I danced with the woman Mario loved.')
b. *kuya-a-mi qam warmi-ta dansa-sqa-iki-ta
love-1-validator you woman-acc dance-nom-2-acc
('I love the woman you dance with.')
The \ingrainmaticality of the sentences of (38) is particularly striking
because matrix case marking is possible when the apparently analogous
noun phrase appears to the left of the subject, as in (33) above. Thus,
the underlined NPs in (36) do not behave as heads with respect to either
word order or case marking.
Although it is possible to establish that some relative claxises
are headless in Ancash, it is not possible on the basis of what we know
to determine the distribution of the construction. Are headless relative
clauses limited to certain instances of the relativization of objects
as in (36) and (37), or is the construction pervasive in this dialect,
as it is to some extent in Imbabura and to perhaps an even greater ex-
tent in Huanca?
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Conclusions
We have taken pains to demonstrate that three Quechua dialects have
headless relative clauses. (Cur informant for a third dialect, Cocha-
bamba, appeared to lack the construction. Headless relative clauses
are apparently not found in southern Quechua.) It is of some importance
that Imbabura on the one hand and the two Quechua I dialects on the other
are about as distantly related genetically and geographically as any
two dialects of Quechua. It would seem unlikely that either dialect
acquired the construction by borrowing and, given the rareness of headless
relative clauses among the languages of the world, it is improbable that
the three dialects developed the construction independently. ^9 Thus,
it would seem that headless relativization was likely to have been found
in Common Quechua, as P. Muysken has suggested. Headless relativization
appears to be a relativization strategy of some importance among Quechua
dialects.
We have observed that the existence of this strategy provides strong
support for the Brame/Schachter hypothesis, according to which even rela-
tive clauses with heads derive from underlyingly headless constructions.
In addition to the theoretical significance of headless relatives for
the study of the structure of relative clauses generally, they provide
a testing ground for a variety of theoretical claims. Was Ross^^
correct in defining the 'Complex NP Constraint on structures of the form
NP-S, or should the constraint prohibit extractions out of relative clauses
as such? Headless relative clauses may provide the relevant test case.
right in holding that the more a relative
clause preserves of normal sentential form, the more it will be able
to relativize "difficult" positions on the TIP Accessibility Hierarchy?
Are Quechua headless relatives in fact used for such purposes? These
are indicative of some of the questions that Quechua headless relatives
may assist us in answering.
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This is not to suggest that evidence of \inderlying headlessness
is not necessary for English and other languages.
For example, Schachter, (op. cit.), and Brame, (Ms., "A new anal-
ysis of the relative clause: evidence for an interpretative theory")
As a matter of convenience, we adopt Schachter' s dummy head pro-
posal. An alternative analysis is one in which there is no head at all
underlyingly. A third possibility is that the head is deleted under
coreference with the relativized noun phrase. We know of no empirical
consequences for the hypothesis of a dimmy head rather than of under-
lying headlessness or head deletion. Head deletion would not, however,
be compatible with Brame 's data from English.
These arguments are taken from Schachter (op. cit.), but are
apparently due \iltimately to Brame.
7For an alternative explanation of the English data, see Pauline
Jacobson ("Some aspects of movement and deletion". In: Berkeley
Linguistic Society
,
Vol. Ill (1977).
It is immaterial for our pruposes whether superficially "headless"
relative clauses contain a dummy head like that posited in deep structure,
or whether the head is deleted prior to surface structure. For the sake
of simplicity in representation, we will assume that the dummy head is
deleted. f
I
'Data in this section is based on informant work conducted by Peter *
Cole ajid Janice L. Jake. We would like to thank our principal informant,
^
Carmen Chuquin, for her generous assistance. The data presented here repre- 1
sents the Quechua spoken in Mariano Acosta, in the eastern part of the :
province of Imbabura. We do not know whether all of our claims are true |
for Imbabura generally. In particular, the uses of the nominalizing *
suffixes reported here differ from those discussed by Miaysken (op. cit.). *
Possibly the informants Muysken consulted were speakers of a subdialect
^
of Imbabura with rules different from those in Mariano Acosta.
In most Quechua dialects both grammatical role and tense are
involved in the choice of nominalizers . See Muysken (op. cit.) for a
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survey of nominalizer choice in a variety of dialects. Typically, the
nominalizer cocnate to Imbabura
-j_ is used with subjects and -shea with
direct objects. A similar pattern is found in Imbabura, but only in
surface headless relative clauses. This is discussed further belov.
That is to say, they have dummy heads or no heads. See Fn. 8.
12
And, possibly, intransitive subjects. We have elicited such
sentences as the following:
(i) jari shamu-shca yarjachi-n
man came-past nom hungry-3
'The man who came is hungry-.
'
Rudolfo Cerron-Palomino ( "Gramatica Quechua Junin-Huanca",
Ministerio de Educacion/Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (Peru, 1976)).
ll+
The
-2^ nominalizer is cognate to Imbabura
-j_.
-na relatives might be useful in testing our claims, but unfor-
tionately, all of Cerr6n-PaJ.omino ' s examples involve pronominal subjects
(so-called transitions). Thus, a word order test cannot be used:
(i) ponchu tr\ila-ku -na -n -kaq -ta apamu-y
poncho put on-refl -nom -3 -the -ace bring-imperative
'Bring the poncho that he is going to put on.'
Note that the sole reflex of the subject of trulaJm- is the third
person possessive suffix
-n_, which is appended to the nominalizer -na.
Such examples do not tell us whether ponchu would precede or follow a
subject NP.
We woiild like to express our appreciation to Celestino Figueroa
Bedon, originally from the town of Tarica, Department of Ancash for
information on Ancash.
IT
According to Peter Landerman (personal communication) David
Webber has foxmd a similar case marking pattern in relative clauses in
other central Peruvian varieties of Quechua. These facts are to be
discussed in Webber's forthcoming Masters Thesis.
l8
Though there appears to be some variation from one sub-dialect
of Ancash to another, in the sub-dialect of our informant (Huaraz-region)
the choice of the nominalizing suffixes,
-3^ and -sqa , depends solely
on the grammatical role of the relativized NP. Relativized subjects
(and locatives) take the
-3^ nominalizer, whereas direct objects, indirect
objects and obliques taJce the -sqa nominalizer.
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We woiild like to show that eeoercrhically intervening dialects
lack headless relatives , but we do not have sufficient infonuation to
do so at this time.
Thesis (1967)). MIT.
Keenan, Edward L. and Bernard Comrie ("NP accessibility and universal
gramnar". In: Linguistic Inquiry, Vol. 8 (l972), pp. 63-100.)
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ON THE ACQUISITION OF SUBJECTHOOD*
P, Cole W. Herbert G. Hermon S.N. Sridhar
This paper constitutes an examination of the process
by means of which subject properties are acquired by a noun
phrase not previously having those properties. The evidence
presented indicates that behavioral subject properties (like
the ability of an NP to delete under Equi ) are acquired his-
torically prior to subject coding properties (like nominative
case marking and control of verb agreement).
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine cross-linguistically the
historical principles governing the acqvdsition of subject properties
by a noun phrase.J Several investigators, including Keenan (19T6),
have shown that these properties do not always converge on a single
noun phrase. In this paper we are especially concerned with the ques-
tion of whether certain kinds of properties associated with subjecthood
are acquired prior to other kinds of properties. In particiilar, are
morphosyntactic (i.e. coding) properties like nominative case and control
of verb agreement acquired before or after transformational (i.e. be-
havioral) properties like control of reflexivization and deletability
by rules normally affecting only subjects? We shall argue that behavioral
properties are consistently acquired prior to coding properties.
Evidence in support of this claim will be presented from three groups
of languages: Germanic, Polynesiaji, and Georgian. For each language
(or group of languages), we will consider both behavioral and coding
properties of subjecthood at various historical stages. Among the be-
havioral properties considered will be the capacity to trigger reflex-
ivization in languages in which only subjects control that process,
the capacity to undergo and to trigger rules of deletion under ident-
ity which are normally restricted to subjects, and the capacity to under-
go subject raising rules. The coding properties considered include
subject case marking and control of verb agreement. It should be noted
that we do not consider initial position among the subject coding pro-
perties. Rather, following Timberlake (19T6: 560), we regard initial
position as primarily indicative of topicality rather than subjecthood.
V.Tiile there is a frequent correlation between topicality and subject-
hood, the two do not necessarily coincide. Thus, initial position will
not figiire in the arguments that follow.
For each language (family), we shall argue that at an early stage
in the development of the construction (Stage A) , the noun phrase in
question displays no subject properties, either behavioral or coding.
At a later time (Stage B), the ansilogous noun phrase exhibits behavioral.
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but not coding properties. If coding properties are foimd at any stage,
they are acquired subsequent to behavioral properties (Stage C). We
propose that such a sequence is the unmarked (and perhaps universal)
order of acquisition of subject properties cross-linguistically. The
bulk of the paper vill be devoted to arguments that such a sequence is
an accurate portrayal of the acquisition of subject properties in the
languages discussed here. We know of no instances in which coding
properties are acquired before behavioral properties.
II. Germanic Languages
We shall begin by tracing the development of two constructions
in Germanic: dative experiencer constructions as exemplified in (l):
(1) Dative experiencer in Germanic (example from German)
Mir gefallen diese Damen
me-dat please these ladies
'I like these ladies.'
and passive sentences with verbs taking non-accusative objects, as in (2):
(2) Passivized objects of verbs taking dative objects in Germanic
(example from German)
Uns wird von der Polizei geholfen
us-dat aux-3sg by the police help-past part
'We are helped by the police.'
We shall argue that at Stage A, no subject properties are associated
with dative experiencers or passivized non-accusative objects. At
Stage B, these noun phrases come to exhibit the behavioral accoutre-
ments of subjecthood, but fail to display subject coding properties.
Finally, at Stage C, these noun phrases, in some Germanic languages,
come to possess both syntactic and morphosyntactic subject properties.
The argioment from Germanic is complicated by the number of languages
involved and by the fact that the parent language , Proto-Germanic
,
which corresponds to Stage A, is unattested. We must produce an arp;-
ument, based on a comparison of the attested Germanic langixages, that
at this unattested stage no subject properties were associated with
dative experiencers and passive subjects.
Germanic consists of three subfamilies. East Germanic, North
Germanic and West Germanic. The sole extensively documented member of
the East Germanic subgroup, Gothic, is represented by a relatively small
corpus, the bulk of which is translated from Greek. Thus, only a very
limited amount of evidence is available which bears on the status of the
noun phrases in question in East Germanic. There is at least some
evidence from Gothic, however, indicating that dative experiencers
had no subject properties. Two rules, Equi and Conjunction Reduction,
which normally applied only to subjects, treated the nominative NP
in experiencer constructions, rather than the dative experiencer, as
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subject. This is illustrated in (3a) and (3b):
(3) a. Nominative deletes under Equi (example from II Cor 5:9)
inuJ)-J)is usdaudjam.
. . vaila galeikan irama
because of-this strive(lpl) well VCdat:(inf) him(dat)
'Because of this wc strive to please him well.'
b. Nominative undergoes conjxinction reduction (ex. from Thess U:l)
hvaiwa skiilu^ gaggan jah galeikan guda
how sho\ild(2pl) go(inf) and V:dat:(inf) god(dat)
'how you should live and please God.'
As illustrated by {h)
, the dative experiencers in such constructions
aJ.so failed to control verb agreement:
(k) Dative experiencers do not control verb agreement (ex.
from I Thess 3:l)
galeikaida uns ei bilii)anai weseima
V:dat:(3sc) ucCdat) that left might be
'It pleased us that we might be left.'
Thus, we conclude that in Gothic, the nominative, rather than the dat-
ive experiencer in experiencer constructions , had both the coding and
the behavioral properties of subjects. The significance of this evid-
ence for the development of experiencer constructions in Germanic will
be seen below.
In the earliest extensive North Germanic texts (Old Icelandic),
behavioral subject properties appear to have been associated with the
dative experiencers of only one verb, ^ykkia 'seem'. In an extensive
study of reflexive pronouns in Old Icelandic, Rose (19T6) lists several
instances in which dative experiencers of this verb serve as anteced-
ents of reflexive pronouns (a function normally restricted to subjects).
This is illustrated by example (5):
(5) Dative experiencer of ^ykkia controls reflexivization (Njall. : 278)
honum. i)6ttir ^u hafa haft vij) sik. fjtjrrajj
him(dat) seem(3sg) nom aux (inf) part prep refl death-plot
'He thought you to have had a death-plot against him.'
There appear to be no attestations in which such reflexivization is
controlled by passivized non-accusative objects, or by experiencer
NPs other than those occ\irring with fykkia . ' »° Thus, the earliest Ice-
landic texts appear to represent a transitional period, between Stage
A and Stage B. At this stage, at least one behavioral subject property
was associated with the dative experiencer of a single predicate.
In contemporary Icelandic, a substantial change appears to have
taken place. Andrews (1976) notes a variety of behavioral properties
associated both with a wide range of experiencers and with passivized
non-accusative objects in Modern Icelandic. Example (6) illustrates
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dative experiencers and (7) illustrates passivized non-accusative objects;
(6) Dative experiencers
a. trolli-nu svelgdist a stulku-nni (A 10c)
trcll-the(dat) mis-svallowed on girl-theCdat)
'The troll swallowed the girl wrong.'
b. mer ifkar/lika J)eir bilar (A lOd)
me(dat) like(3sg/pl) those cars(nom)
'I like those cars.'
(T) Passivized non-accusative objects
a. mer var bjarga4 (A 13a)
me(dat) aux VCdat^C supine)
'I was saved,
'
b. nun var be§id (A 13d)
me (gen) aux VCgenHC supine)
'I was waited for.'
As in Old Icelandic, the trigger for reflexivization must be a
subject. Example (8) shows that dative experiencers control reflex-
ivization:
(8) Dative experiencer controls reflexivization
henni svelgdist a steikinni sinni (A 39^)
she(dat) mis-swallowed on steak her(refl)
'She swallowed her steak wrong.'
Andrews does not provide examples parallel to (T) involving reflexiv-
ization. He does give examples involving the passivization of indirect
objects. Example (9a) illustrates an active sentence with both a dir-
ect and an indirect object. In (9b) the indirect object has been pass-
ivized and controls reflexivization.
(9) a. Active bitransitive sentence
teir seldi honum drengina (A UOa)
him(dat) sold him(dat) boys-the(acc)
'They sold him the boys.'
b. Passivized indirect object controls reflexivization
honum voru seldir drengirnir af fraendum
him(dat) aux(inf)sold(part) boys-the(nom) by relatives
sfnum/hans (A lt2b)
refl/anaphoric
'He. was sold the boys by his. /self's relatives.'
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Dative experiencers and passivized non-accusative otjects can also be
raised "by subject-to-object raising, a process vhich normally applies
only to subjects. This is shown in (lO)-(ll):
(10) Dative experiencer undergoes SOR
eg tel honum lika \)e±r bilar (A 19a)
I believe him inf those cars(nom)
'I believe him to like those cars.'
(11) Passivized non-accusative object undergoes SOR
eg tel i)eirra hafa veri-d be4i4 (A19d)
I believe them(gen) aux(inf) aux(sup) VC gen: (supine)
'I believe them to have been visited.'
Furthermore, experiencers and passivized dative objects Eiay be the vic-
tims of Equi
:
(12) Dative experiencer deletes under Equi
trolli-d vonast til ad svelgjast ekki a
troll the(nom) hope comp mis-svallowed not on
stulkinni (A 26a)
girl the
'The troll hopes not to swallow the girl wrong.'
(13) Passivized dative object deletes under Equi
eg vonast til ad ver4a bjargad (A 26d)
I hope comp avix(inf) VCdatD (supine)
'I hope to be saved.'
Thus, the data from Andrews indicate an extension in the history
of Icelandic of the syntactic properties of subjecthood exhibited by
experiencers and passivized non-accusative objects. It sho\ild be noted,
however, that these noun phrases do not show any morphosyntactic subject
properties. In experiencer constructions like (6b) (repeated):
(6) b. mer likar/lfka ^eir bilar (A lOd)
me(dat) like(3sg/pl) those cars(nom)
'I like those cars.'
^eir bilar , not mer, appears in nominative case. Similarly, verb
agreement is triggered by the nominative no\in phrase, or fails to apply.
This is illustrated by (6b) as well. Hence, Modern Icelandic appears
to be an instance of Stage B. Dative experiencers and passivized non-
accusative objects acquired behavioral properties typical of subjects,
but not coding properties
.
We will now ttirn to evidence for the transition from Stage B to
stage C in North Germanic. First, let us consider Faroese, which is
closely related to Icelandic. In Faroese, accorking to Lockwood (1961*: 103),
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passivized non-accusative objects in some types of passive constructions
may assume nominative case. Compare (lU)-(l7) with Andrews' examples
from Modern Icelandic
:
(lit) Active dative object sentence
teir fagnadu Depilsmonniun vael
they VCdat: Depilsmen(dat) well
'They welcomed the Depilsmen well.'
(15) Passivized dative object becomes nominative obligatorily
Depilsmenn voru va_el fagnaeLLr
Depilsmen(nom) aiix(3pl) well VCdatnCpart)
'The Depilsmen were well received.'
(16) Passivized dative object becomes nominative optionally
hon var bo4in i brudleyp
she(nom) aux VC dat II ( part ) to wedding
'She was invioed to a wedding.'
(it) Passivized dative object remains dative
maer var ikki bodid at koma
meldat) aux neg VCdat!] (supine) comp inf
' I was not invited to come .
'
Examples (lU)-(l7) show that passive subjects of verbs taking dative
objects in Faroes e have begvm to take on morphosyntactic subject pro-
perties of Stage C.
In North Germanic languages other than Icelandic and Faroese, dative
and accusative case have merged. These languages therefore no longer
have non-accusative objects. However, the acquisition of subject coding
properties by historically non-nominative experiencers is well advanced
in them. Examples will be limited to Swedish, but similar examples
from Danish and Norwegian could be supplied as well. The examples in
(18) and (19) and similar ones cited by Evans (1975) demonstrate that
in Old Swedish, as in Icelandic, such experiencers did not have the
coding properties of subjects, although they had at least some behav-
ioral subject properties.
(18) Dative experiencers do not control verb agreement
thz tykker them allom wara thz besta
that V:dat:(3sg) them(3pl dat) all be the best
'That seemed to all of them to be the best.' (Rim-Kroniker I
p. 391)
(19) Dative experiencers control reflexivization
honom thykte sik wara J enom lystelikom stadh
him(dat) VCdatU refl be in a pleasurable city
'He thought himself to be in a pleasurable city.' (Siaelinna Thrust,
p. 280, ii. 17-18)
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In modern Swedish, as in Danish and Norwegian, these historically non-
nominative experiencers have acquired the subject codinc properties
of nominative case and control of verb agreement. A partial list
of predicates which have come to occur with nominative subject-exper-
iencers is given in (20):
(20) Historically non-nominative experiencers acquire nominative
case and control of verb agreement
jag drommer
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(32) Passivized dative objects do not delete under relative clause
reduction
*Der vom Lehrer geholfene Junge bekam eine gute Note
the by the teacher help(part) boy got a good grade
(•The boy helped by the teacher got a good grade.')
(33) Dative experiencers do not delete under relative clause
reduction
*Der das Buch gefallende Junge sitzt da in der Ecke
the the book VCdatD(part) boy sits there in the corner
('The boy liking the book is sitting there in the corner.')
Thus, with respect to three behavioral properties of subject-
hood, neither passivized non-accusative objects nor dative experiencers
behave as subjects in German. For further discussion of the non-subject-
hood of passivized dative objects, see Reis (1973), Ebert (1975) and
Breckenridge (1975). We conclude that in German these noiin phrases
show neither coding nor behavioral subject properties. The relevance
of this fact for our argxjment will be discussed shortly.
We will now turn to English. As was the case with Swedish, neu-
tralization of the dative/accusative distinction in English causes
us to limit our discussion to experiencers. In Old English, there are
sporadic instances in which experiencer NPs behave as subjects, although
they do not exhibit subject coding properties. In (3^+) for example,
the accusative-experiencer verb langian 'to desire , long for' appears
embedded under the subject-to-subject raising verb onginnen 'begin'.
The raised experiencer retains its accusative case.
(3H) Accusative experiencer undergoes SSR
Jja ongan hine eft langian on his cyiipe
then began him(acc) again VCaccD(inf) for his kin
'Then he b'egan to long for his kin.' (Blick. Horn. 113:15, A.D. 971)
This example substantially antedates the first appearance of langian
with a nominative experiencer, for which Gaaf (l90ii) gives the date
1320.
As was noted by Gaaf (l90l^)and Harris (1975) inter alia, the ex-
periencer NPs occurring with a niomber of verbs , such as liken and dremen ,
had subject behavioral properties in early Middle English, but had not
yet acquired subject coding properties. Note the accusative case of
t)e 'thee' in (35a) and of him in (35^):
(35) Accusative experiencers
a. ..a foreward t)at ^e mai full well like
an agreement that you(acc) may full will VCaccD
'an agreement that may full well please you' (Dame Girith:
255, A.D. 1275)
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(35) tJ. of ^at him drempte in prisun
of that hin(acc) VCaccD in prison
'He dreamed of that in prison.' (Genesis and Exodus,
2116, A.D. 1250)
Although the experiencers in (35a) and (35h) show non-subject
coding properties , they undergo deletion by Equi , undergo and control
reduction under identity with a nominative subject, and undergo indef-
inite subject deletion, all properties generally restricted to subjects:
(36) Accusative experiencers delete under Equi
Him buri) to liken well his lif
him befits to VCaccD will his life(nom)
'It befits him to like his life well.' (Dame Sirith: 82,
A.D. 1275)
(37) Accixsative experiencers undergo conjunction reduction under
identity with nominative subject
a. Lewed men leued hym well and liked his wordes
'Ignorant men loved him well and his words pleased Cthem] .
'
(Langland, Piers Plowman
,
prol. 72, A.D. 1362)
b. Arthur loked on the swerd and liked it passynge well
(Mallory, Morte D'Arthur . A.D. 1U7O)
(38) Accusative experiencers control deletion by conjunction
reduction of a nominative subject.
Us sholde neither lakken gold ne gere. But ben
(ace) should neither VCacc] gold nor gear but be
honovired while we dwelten there
honoured while we dwelt there
'We should not lack gold nor gear, but be honoured while we
dwelt there.' (Chaucer, Canterbury Tales )
(39) Accusative experiencers undergo indefinite subject deletion
Good is qiiaj) losef, to dremen of win
'CltH is good, said Joseph, to dream of wine.' (Genesis and
Exodus: 2067,A.D. 12 50)
The above examples, and possibly others cited by Gaaf and Harris, show
that experiencers in English exhibited behavioral subject properties
before they exhibited coding properties
.
The West Germanic data, taken in isolation, might be analyzed in
either of two ways , which we shall label Hypothesis One and Hypothesis
Two. According to Hypothesis One, experiencers axid passivized dative
objects displayed no subject properties in the parent language. In
English, behavioral properties were acquired by some experiencer NPs
by the thirteenth century, and coding properties later. But in German,
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neither behavioral nor coding properties were acquired. Thus, German
is considered to have preserved the situation found in the proto-language
.
This is the position for vhich we shall argue.
According to Hypothesis Two, in the proto-language, as a resvat
of the loss of subject coding properties at an even earlier stage,
behavioral but not coding properties were associated with experiencers
and passivized dative objects. In German these behavioral properties
were lost, but in English they were not. At a later stage in English,
these noun phrases re-acquired subject coding properties.
Although taken in isolation, the two hypotheses just outlined might
appear to be equally plausible, when viewed in conjunction with the
North Germanic and East Germanic data disc\issed earlier, only Hypothesis
One is tenable. It will be remembered that in Gothic, the nominative
NP in experiencer construction, rather than the dative experiencer,
exhibited subject behavioral properties. Moreover, in Old Icelandic
dative experiencers had only incipient subject behavioral properties,
and passivized non-accusative objects appear to have had none. A clear
trend toward the development of additional behavioral and, later, coding
properties was seen in the case of Icelandic. This trend is consistent
with the claim that the noun phrases in question showed no subject pro-
perties in the proto-language , but is is inconsistent with the hypo-
thesis that in the proto-language a f\ill panoply of subject behavioral
properties were present. Hence, we conclude that the most plausible
reconstruction is that in the proto-language experiencers and passivized
non-accusative objects had no subject properties. Subsequently, first
behavioral and then coding properties were developed in some of the
daughter languages . Thus , the most plausible reconstruction for
Germanic supports our hypothesis regarding the order of acquisition
of behavioral and coding subject properties.
III. Polynesian
Further evidence in support of our hypothesis is provided by the
existence of morphologically ergative languages in which transitive
subjects are assigned historically oblique case ma.rkers. In a number
of such languages, subjects marked in this way appear to have been
historically oblique NPs (Stage A), which acquired the behavioral pro-
perties of subjects while retaining their oblique case marking (Stage B),
with subsequent reinterpretation of the oblique marking as the normal
marking for transitive subjects. In this section, we will trace a dev-
elopment of this type in Polynesian, as discussed in Chung (19T6).
Additional possible instances of this sort of change are treated by
Anderson (19TT).
The Polynesian languages fall into two large groups, those with nomin-
ative-accusative case marking and those with ergative-absolutive case
marking. In the nominative-accusative languages, the subjects of ac-
tive transitive verbs are unmarked. Upon passivization, those sub-
jects are assigned the marker e_. Compare the following examples from
Maori
:
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{ko) Active sentence in Maori
ka patu i te tuna te kotiro (Chung, ITc
,
p.l6)
aor. hit ace the eel the girl
'The girl killed the eel.'
(Ul) Passive sentence in Maori
ka tuku-a e Pacwa te waka (Chung, 19a, p. l8)
aor. leave-pass agt Paova the canoe
'The canoe was left by Paowa.
'
In the ergative group, the subjects of active transitive verbs are roark-
ed with e_. Observe the following example from Tongan, a language of the
Tongic subgroup of Polynesian:
{k2) Transitive sentence in Tongan
(Chung, 22c,p. 20)na'e taa'i 'e
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The e NPs in passive sentences cannot be deleted even though they are
(1*5) Equi does not delete passive agents
*i hiahia au ki te patu-a 'te poaka (Chung,5Ta,p.l30)
past want I comp hit-pass the pig
('I vanted to kill the pig.')
Maori also has a rule of subject-to-subject raising, governed by sen-
tential negatives like kahore 'not', which can apply to subjects, but
not to direct objects or other non-subject NPs. Compare (U6a) and (U6b):
ik6) a. Subjects undergo SSR
kahore a Hone i patu i te poaka (Chung, 158a, p. 179)
not pers John past hit ace the pig
'John didn't kill the pig.'
b. Non-subjects do not undergo SSR
*kahore te poaka i patu ai a Hone (Chung, 155a,p. 178)
not the pig past hit pro pers John
('John didn't kill the pig.')
The rule can apply to the unmarked NP (the underlying DO) in passive
sentences, but not to the e_ NP (the vinderlying subject). Compare (U7a)
and ( U7b )
:
(U7) a. Passive subjects imdergo SSR
kahore raua kia kite-a mai e nga tangate
not they sbj see-pass here agt the man
o te whare (Chung, 159a, p. 179)
of the house
'They were not seen by the people in the house.'
b. Passive agents do not undergo SSR
*kahore (e) nga tangata kis kite-a (ai) raua
not agt the-pl man sbj see-pass pro they-dual
('They weren't seen by the people.') (Chung, 156a, p. 178)
Thus, at Stage A, as represented by Maori, underlying subjects in passive
sentences in Polynesian lacked both the coding properties and the be-
havioral properties of subjects; passivized underlying direct objects,
on the other hand, exhibited both subject behavioral properties and the
zero case marking of subjects.
In the innovating, morphologically ergative languages of Polynes-
ian, the e_-marked NP (the historical agent phrase) in transitive sent-
ences is treated as subject by such rules as Equi and Raising, while
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the historical passive subject is not. Tongan, for example, has a rule
of Equi which can delete intransitive or middle subjects, but not non-
subject NPs . Compare the examples in (U8):
(U8) a. Equi deletes subjects
pea na'e 'alu 'a e tangata 'o folau mama'o
and past go abs the man comp sail far
'Then the man went and sailed away.' (Chung, l8a, p.llU)
b. Equi does not delete non-subjects
*na'e 'alu 'a e tamaiki tangata 'o ngalo
past go abs the children man comp forgotten
'enau lesoni (Chung, 25a, p. 117)
their lessons
('The boys went and forgot their lessons.') (deletion of
stative agent)
In transitive sentences, the e_ NP can be deleted by Equi, but the his-
torical passive subject cannot. Compare the examples in {h9)
:
{k9) a. Historical passive agents delete under Equi
na'e 'alu 'a e tangata 'o taa'i 'a e kuli
past go abs the man comp hit abs the dog
'The man went and hit the dog.' (Ch\ing, 26a., p. 117)
b. Historical passive subjects do not delete under Equi
*na'e 'alu 'a e fefine 'o u'u 'e he kuli
past go abs the woman comp bite erg the dog
('The vroman went and dog bite 0.') (Chung, 23a, p.ll6)
Thus, Equi in Tongan treats the historical oblique agent, not the his-
torical passive subject, as subject.
Tongan also has a rule of subject-to subject raising, governed by
the verb lava 'be able', which can raise intransitive subjects, but
not non-subject NPs. Compare (50a) with (50b):
(50) a. Subjects undergo_SSR
'e lava 'a e pepe 'o lea
unm can abs the baby comp talk
'The baby can talk' (Chung, 63a, p. 136)
b. Non-subjects do not undergo SSR
*tp 2iau lava pe 'o ngalo ia
uim we can emp comp forgotten it
('We might be able to forget about it.') (Chung, 86b, p. 11*5)
(raising of stative agent)
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In transitive sentences in Tongan, subJect-to-subJect raising treats
the e-marked NP, but not the historical passive subject, as subject.
Compare (51a) and (51^);
(51) a. Historical passive agents undergo SSR
*e lava 'e ho famili 'o tauhi koe
xmm can erg your family comp care you
'Can your family take care of you?' (Chung, 87c, p.llt6)
b. Historical passive subjects do not undergo SSR
*na'e lava 'a e fefine 'o taa'i 'e Sione
past can abs the woman comp hit erg John
^
('The woman could be hit by John.') (Chung, 8Ua, p. 11+5)
In Tongan, therefore, historically oblique passive agents have
taken on the behavioral properties of subjects while retaining oblique
case marking. Correspondingly, original passive subjects have lost
behavioral subject properties, but are still marked in the same way as
intransitive subjects. These facts are consistent with the prediction
of our hypothesis, which holds that subject coding properties will not
be acquired by an NP prior to subject behavioral properties.
A similar situation exists in Samoan, another morphologically erg-
ative language, in which historically oblique passive agents with e_
have come to behave as surface subjects, while historically passive sub-
jects have ceased to behave as subjects. Samoan has a rule of subject-
to-subject raising, governed by a nximber of verbs, including mafai
'be able', which can raise intransitive subjects, but not non-subject
NPs. Compare (52a) and (52b):
(52) a. Subjects undergo SSR
e mafai e tatou 'ona nonofo
unm can erg we comp stay
We can stay.' (Chung, 9Ta, p.l5l)
b. Non-subjects do not undergo SSR
*e mafai (e) le la'au 'ona 'ou ta-ina 'oe
unm can erg the stick comp I hit-trans you
('I can hit you with the stick.') (Chung, llBb, p.l6o)
(raising of instrument)
As in Tongan, Samoan subject-to-subject raising can operate on his-
torical oblique passive agents, but not on historical passive subjects
Compare the examples in (53):
(53) a. Historical passive subjects do not \indergo SSR
*e mafai le tali 'ona maua e le tama
unm can the answer comp catch erg the boy
('The boy can come up with the answer,') (Chung, ll6a, p. 159)
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(53) b. Historical passive agents undergo SSR
e mafai e le tama 'ona maua le tale
linm can erg the boy comp catch the ansver
'The boy can come up with the ansver.' (Chung, 119a, p.l60)
In summary, at Stage A in Polynesian, vhich is still represented
by Maori, there was a productive rule of passive, which made under-
lying direct objects into subjects, and demoted underlying subjects
to the role of oblique NP. At this stage the ^-marked underlying sub-
ject in passive sentences exhibited neither the behavioral nor the coding
properties of subjects, while the underlying direct object exhibited
both coding and behavioral properties of subjects. At Stage B, repre-
sented by Tongan and Samoan, the rule of passive lias become non-produc-
tive, and the behavioral properties of subject-hood have been transferred
from the historical passive subject to the historical agent phrase.
Both NPs , however, preserved their original case marking, so that the
historical passive subject, which is no longer a subject behaviorally
,
bears the same case as the subjects of intransitive sentences, while
the historical oblique agent, which is a subject behaviorally, bears
oblique case marking.
Stage C, the acquisition of subject coding properties by his-
torically oblique passive agents, does not appear to have been reached
in any of the Polynesian languages. In other language families, however,
in which morphological ergativity arose through a development similar
to that found in Polynesian, there is evidence for Stage C. Comrie
( 1977: p. 38) cites the case of Indo-Iranian, in which passive constructions
became dominant in the perfect, to the exclusion of active constructions
*
with the consequent loss of a productive passive in the perfect. Sub-
sequently, behavioral subject properties were transferred from the his-
torical passive subject to the historical oblique agent phrase. The
former, however, retained control of verb agreement, and the zero case
marking characteristic of subjects in other tenses, as illustrated by
the following example from Hindi:
(5li) Absolutive object, not ergative subject, controls agreement
is larke ne pustak parhi
this boy erg book(f abs) read(f)
'This boy read a book.' ( Comrie, 139, p. 39)
Comrie observes, however, that in some Indo-Iranian languages, control
of agreement is being assumed by the historical passive agent, and that
in Modern Persian, the historical passive agent has acquired all sub-
ject properties. Thus, the development and subsequent loss of ergativity
may illustrate the three stages of the acquisition of subjecthood.
IV. Georgian
So far, we have examined the acquisition of subject properties in
Polynesian and Germanic . In both cases there is good reason to believe
that behavioral properties were acquired prior to coding properties.
Although stage A is not directly attested in either case, there is
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strong motivation for reconstructing a stage in which the relevant noun
phrases lack any subject properties.
We shall now turn to Georgian. Our discussion is based on Harris
(19T6), Tschenkeli (1958) and Braithwaite (1973). We shall consider the
status of dative experiencers like gelas in (55):^"^
(55) Dative experiencers
gelas uqvars nino
Gela(dat) him-loves-she Nino(nom)
'Gela loves Nino.'-'-°
In both Old Georgian and Modern Georgian, the dative noun phrase
in (55), gelas , exhibits a nunber of behavioral subject properties.
A change has taJten place in Modern Georgian which shows that these noun
phrases are taking on morphosyntactic subject properties. Hence, data
from Georgian corroborate our claim that coding subject properties are
acquired subsequent to behavioral subject properties.
We shall turn first to the behavioral subject properties of dative
experiencers. Examples are given from Modern Georgian and Old Georgian.
There are two relevant tests of behavioral subject properties. The first
test for subjecthood which we shall consider is tav- reflexivization.
As was shown by Harris , tav- may be coreferential only to the sub-
ject of its own clause. This is illustrated for sentences with nomina-
tive subjects in (56)-(57):
(56) Direct objects do not control reflexivization
mxa-^vari daxatavs vanos tavistvis
painter(nom) he-paints-him VeLno(dat) self-for
'The painter, will paint Vano. for himself^.' (Harris, 1:2)
(57) Indirect objects do not control reflexivization
nino acvenebs patara givis tavis
Nino(nom) she-shows-him-him little Givi(dat) self's
tavs sarkesi (Harris 1:3a)
self(dat) mirfor-in
'Nino, is showing little Givi herself^ in the mirror.'
Sentence (56) shows that tav- can refer only to subjects and not to
direct objects. Similarly, in (57) tav- may only refer to the subject
Nino, 6ind not to the indirect object Givi .
Turning to verbs taking dative experiencers, we see that it is
the dative which is the antecedent of tav- . This is shown in Modern
Georgian in (58^-(6o), ajid in Old Georgian in (61):
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(58) Dative experiencers control reflexivization
temurs uqvars tavisi tavi
Temur(dat) him-loves-he self's self(nom)
'Temur loves himself.' (Harris 8:28a)
(59) Nominatives do not control reflexivization
*tavis tavs uqvars temuri
self's self(dat) him-loves-he Temur(nom)
('Himself loves Temur.') (Harris 8:28b)
(60) Initial nominatives do not control reflexivization
*tem;iri uqvars tavis tavs
Temur(nom) him-loves-he self's self(dat) (Harris ,8:28c)
(61) Dative experiencers control reflexivization
cudad mogimedgrehies tavi
poorly you-give-up-it self(nom) (^_ ^^^^. 3^^^!
'You have given up on yourself hadly.'
communication)
Sentence (58) shows that the nominative may not be the antecedent.
It should be noted that these facts cannot be due to word order. In
(60) the nominative noun phrase precedes the dative, but the former still
cannot serve as the antecedent for tav- reflexivization. Thus, dative
experiencers are treated as subjects by tav- reflexivization.
We shall now consider a second rule that treats dative experiencers
as subjects (rather than as indirect objects). This r\ile is causative
clause \mion. Causative clause union is a nile, found in many languages,
which maps biclausal structures like (62):
(62)
onto simplex strucstures like (63):
(63)
s'-'^^l
cause-verb NP^...]
In Georgian, as in many other languages, though not all, when the comp-
lement verb is intransitive, the subject of that verb is a direct
object in the output of clause union. This is illustrated in (6i+)-(65);
(6U) Active intransitive
bavsvi VI inebs
child(nom) he-sleeps
'The child is sleeping.' (Harris 5:l'+a)
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(65) Complement subject of intransitive becomes direct object
in causative clause union
dedajn bavsvi daajina
mother(erg) child(nom) she-caused-sleep-him
'The mother got the child to sleep.* (Harris 5:l6a)
(Direct objects receive nominative case with certain verbs and tenses.
See Harris, Chapter 1, for details.)
In contrast, the subjects of transitive verbs are indirect objects
in the output of the rule. This is shown in (66)-(67):
{66) Active transitive
mziam cecxli daanta
Mzia(erg) fire(nom) she-lit-it
'Mzia lit the fire.' (Harris 5:17a)
(67) Complement subject of transitive becomes indirect object
in causative clause union
mamam mzias daantebina cecxli
father(erg) Mzia(dat) he-ca\ised-light-her-it fire(nom)
'Father made Mzia light the fire.' (Harris 5:19a)
Indirect objects of intransitive verbs remain indirect objects, as is
seen in (68)-(69). (The effect of the riole on indirect objects of tran-
sitives is not relevant to the present discussion.
)
(68) Active intransitive with indirect object
komisia vanos estumra
commission(nom) Vano(dat) it-visited-him
'The commission visited Vano.' (Harris 5:20b)
(69) 10 remains 10 in causative clause union
direktorma komisia vanos astumra
director (erg) commlssion(nom) Vano(dat) he-caused-visit-him-it
'The director had the commission visit Vano.' (Heirris 5:22b)
We have seen that grammatical relations in the output of clause
union are determined by the transitivity of the complement clause and by
the grammatical relations of the noun phrases in the complement in the
input to the rule. Thus, with intransitive sentences with dative exp-
eriencers like (70),
(70) Dative experiencer
tusaijs sioda
prisoner (dat) him-hungered
'The prisoner was hungry.' (Harris 8:38a)
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if the dative nominELl is a subject in the input to clause vmion, it is
predicted that it will be a direct object in the output of the rule.
But if the dative nominal is an indirect object, it should remain an
indirect object subsequent to clause vmion. (Compare (68)-(69).) As
is seen in (Tl), dative nominals in sentences like (70) become direct
objects
:
(Tl) Dative experiencer becomes direct object in causative
clause union
tusajfi moasives
prisoner(nom) pro-cause-hunger-him
'They starved the prisoner. '/'They let the prisoner go hvmgry.'
Therefore, we conclude that dative experiencers are treated as subjects
and not indirect objects by causative clause union.
We have shown that dative experiencers behave in a manner typical
of subjects rather than of indirect objects. This is true not only in
Modern Georgian but in Old Georgian as well. We shall now turn to
coding properties. In Old Georgian these nominals displayed no subject
coding properties. Rather, they manifest coding properties typical of
indirect objects. In Modern Georgian, however, a change appears to
have taken place. Dative experiencers behave as subjects rather than as
indirect objects with respect to certain coding properties.
There are three relevant coding properties: case marking, person
agreement, and n\amber agreement. With respect to case marking and
person agreement, in sentences like (55) (repeated),
(55) Dative experiencers
gelas ugvars nino
Gela(dat) him-loves-she Nino(nom)
' Gela loves Nino .
'
the nominative noun phrase, nino , manifests subject coding properties
in both Old Georgian and in Modern Georgian. Note that nino is in
nominative case and triggers subject person agreement on the verb.
The situation with regard to number agreement, however, is more complex.
Verbs agree in nvimber with any first or second person subject, direct
object, indirect object. But they agree in number with third person
noun phrases only when they are subjects. Third person niamber agreement
is illustrated in (T2)-(T3):
(72) Number agreement (Third person subject)
a. darca
he-remained
'He remained.' (Harris 9:iia)
b. darces
they-remained
'They remained.' (Harris 9:5a)
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(73) Number agreement (Third person non-subject)
a. icnobs cems studentebs
he-knows-it my students (dat)
'He knows my students.' (Harris 9:6a)
b. acukebs tavis cigns cems studentebs
he-gives-him-it self's book(dat) my students (dat)
'He is giving his book to my students.' (Harris 9:6b)
Thus, number agreement distinguishes between third person subjects and
third person non-subjects. Only the former govern number agreement.
We shall now consider the status of the two noun phrases in sen-
tences like (55). Does the verb agree with the nominative noun phrase
or with the dative experiencer? In Old Georgian (Tschenkeli: 1958, 1+53^U)
the verb always agreed in number with the nominative noun phrase. 20
This is shown in ilk). Note the pl\iral agreement on the verb.
(7*+) Nominative governs nimiber agreement exclusively
me miqvaran
me (dat) me-love-they
'I love them.' (Tschenkeli: n.l+^lt) '
:
In Standard Modern Georgian a change has taken place. V/hen both
the dative experiencer and the nominative noun phrase are third person, '
the verb agrees with the dative rather than the nominative. Contrast
(75) » in which the first person nominative controls number agreement
and not the third person dative, and (76), in which the third person dat-
ive
,
and not the third person nominative , controls verb agreement
:
(75) First person nominative controls niomber agreement
a. mas vuqvarvar me
him(dat) him-love-I l(nom)
' He loves me .
'
b. mas vuqvarvart_ even
him(dat) him-love-we we(nom)
' He loves us .
c. mat vuqvarvar me i
them(dat) him-loves-I l(nom) 1
'They love me.' |
d. mat vuqvarvart_ even J
them(dat) him-loves-we we(nom)
^
•They love us.' (Tschenkeli: p.U59) t
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(76) Third person dative and not third person nominative controls
number agreement
a. mas uqvars is
him(dat) him-lcves-he he(nom)
'He loves him.'
b. mas uqvars isini
him(dat) him-loves-they they(nom)
'He loves them.
'
c. mat uqvart_ is
them(dat) them-love-he he(nom)
'They love him.
d. mat uqvart isini
them(dat) them-love-they they(nom)
'They love them.' (Tschenkeli : P.U59)
Hence, in Standard Modern Georgian, the dative experiencer has acquired
partial control of number agreement, a coding property.
In colloquial Modern Georgian, the acquisition of control of number
agreement by the dative experiencer has, according to Tschenkeli (1958),
been generalized. While in Standard Modern Georgian control of agreement
by third person datives is limited to environments in vhich the nomina-
tive no\in phrase is also third person, in colloquial Modern Georgian,
this has been generalized for some speakers to environments in vhich the
nominative noun phrase is first or second person. Thus, in (77) (from
Harris (1976)), the dative experiencer triggers plural agreement despite
the presence of a first person pronoun in the clause.
(77) Dative governs number agreement regardless of person of
nominative
msoblebs vuqvarvart_ (me)
parents (dat) them-love-I l(nom)
^Ity parents love me.' (Harris p. 283 fn.5)
This example illustrates the extension of the control of number agree-
ment by dative experiencers in environments not possible in Standard
Modern Georgian.
We have shown that in Old Georgian behavioral subject properties
are controlled by the dative experiencer and coding properties by the
nominative noun phrase. In Modern Georgian, especially in the colloquial
language , one coding property , number agreement , has come to be controlled
by the dative experiencer. Hence, Georgian corroborates our claim that
nominals acquiring subject properties first acquire behaviroal properties
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V. Conclusions
We have examined the historical process "by means of vhich, in a niam-
ber of languages, subject properties were acquired by a noun phrase not
previously having those properties. Among the languages examined vere
Polynesian (Maori, Tongan, and Samoan), Germanic (Gothic, Icelandic,
Faroese, Swedish, German, and English), and Georgian.
From the languages surveyed, a common pattern emerges. There are
three stages in the acquisition of subject properties. In the first
stage, the noun phrase in question shows no subject properties. In the
second stage, the noun phrase begins to take on transformational pro-
perties associated in the language with subjecthood. During the third
stage, subject coding properties are acquired. Among the coding pro-
perties are control of such morphosyntactic processes as case marking
and verb agreement. What distinguishes the third stage from the second
is that the syntactic properties acquired during the third stage are
reflected in the morphology of the language. Today's morphology, as
Givon (19T1: ^13) and others have noted, is the ossification of yester-
day's syntax. Hence, it is not surprising that morphosyntactic processes
are acquired later than purely transformational processes. It is just
such an order that we have observed.
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"TThere are two possible ways of conceptualizing the changes dis-
cussed in this paper. We are claiming that certain originally non-
subject NPs are becoming subjects historically, and that they are
therefore coming to be treated as such by rules which are sensitive to
subjecthood. Alternatively, it might be claimed that the rules themselves
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are changing, starting to apply not only to subjects, but to certain
non-subject NPs (e.g. experiencers ) as well. We reject the latter view
primarily because of its iinnecessary complexity. It is generally the
case that if one rule of a given type (e.g. a behavioral rule ) treats
such NPs as it treats subjects, others of the same type will treat them
similarly. The second of the above positions would require the positing
of several changes in individual rules in order to account for this fact.
The position that it is the NPs which are changing in grammatical role
accounts for these parallel extensions of the applicability of indivi-
dual rules as the consequence of a single change. Moreover, the rule-
change position unnecessarily requires the weakening of the otherwise
valid claim that certain processes, e.g. deletion by Equi , are cross-
linguistically restricted to subjects (of. Keenan (197^) inter alia).
2
For a fuller list of behavioral and coding properties , see
Keenaji (19T6). The distinction between behavioral and coding properties
is based on Keenan 's paper. Our paper provides additional support
for this distinction.
p.32U) lists sentence-initial position as a specific
coding property of subjects. Even if this claim is assumed to be
correct, and if initial position can be shown to be acquired prior to
behavioral subject properties, our major contention, that there is a
language-independent order of acquisition of the form: (l) behavioral
subject properties, and (2) all coding properties aside from word order,
remain \maffected.
h „Although we refer to these nominals as passivized non-accusative
objects" for all the Germanic languages, we should like to emphasize
that for languages like German in which these NPs have acquired no_
subject properties, this terminology is somewhat misleading. In the
case of Stage A, the term "passivized non-accusative objects" should
only be taken as a means of identifying those nominals that at a later
stage come to demonstrate derived subject properties in the output of
passivization.
The question of the internal grouping of the Germanic languages
has not been settled with certainty. Various investigators have ad-
vocated a tripartite division into North, West, and East Germanic, a
bipartite division into West and Northeast Germanic, and a division
into East and Northwest Germanic. The arg\iments for these divergent
positions have been reviewed in Kufner (19T2). This issue does
not affect our argviment.
The evidence regarding the acquisition of behavioral and coding
properties by passivized non-accusative objects in Gothic is conflicting.
In most instances, such objects seem to have acquired properties of both
types. That is, they seem to have become true subjects. Compare the
following examples
:
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(i) ei Ceisl in filuwaurdein seinai andhatisjaindau
that they(nom) in verbosity refl. VCdatD pass 3pl
'that they will be heard in their verbosity' (Mat 6:7)
(ii) gaveisodai wavuijun daurawaurdos
VCgen] part a\ix 3pl porters (nom)
'Porters were appointed.' (Neh 7:l)
Note that in (i), the passivized dative object not only appears as a
nominative and controls verb agreement, but serves as the controller
of reflexivization as well. In all such cases, however, the Gothic
construction translates a normal Greek passive construction with a
nominative subject. This suggests the possibility that the Gothic con-
struction has been influenced by the Greek, especially in view of the
fact that in the few instances in which the Gothic NPs did not acquire
coding properties, the Gothic constiniction was either independent of,
or in opposition to the Greek, as in (iii) and (iv):
(iii) J>airh t)atei is briikjaidau
through that it VCgen 3 pass
'through that it is used' /'through its use' (Col 2:22)
(iv) jah bajoJ)um gabairgada
and both (dpi) VCdatll pass sg
'And both will be saved.' (Mat 9:1T)
There are instances in which the reflexive possessive adjective
refers to dative experiencers with verbs other than bykkia . Rose
(19T6: 128) cites one example in particular involving the verb syna
'seem'. She observes, however, that the reflexive possessive adjective,
unlike reflexive pronouns, is used to refer to a variety of non-subject
NPs, as in the following example:
(i) hann skyldi fa henni eign sina
he should get her(dat) possessions refl.
'He should get her her possessions.' (Heimskringla 1:1+22)
Thus, the ability of an NP to serve as the antecedent for a reflexive
possessive adjective in Old Icelandic does not constitute a reliable
subject property.
Q
There are a number of attestations in Old Icelandic in which
experiencer predicates appear embedded lander subJect-to-obJect raising
verbs , as in the following examples
:
(i) Grettir kvaj) ser J)at betr i)ykkia
Grettir said her(dat) that better seem (inf)
'Grettir said that to seem better to her.' (Grettis Saga, 39)
(ii) Grettir kvaj) ser i)at allvel l£ka
Grettir said her(dat) that well like (inf)
•Grettir said that to please her well.' (Grettis Saga, T8)
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(iii) Hrolfr kua-zk ekke sua J)ykkia
Hrolf(nom) said-refl not so seem (inf)
'Hrolf said CitU not to seem so to him.' (cited in Heusler,
1967: 39)
In (iii), the \inderlying experiencer pronoun has cliticized to the main
clause verb. Unfortunately, it does not appear possible to detennine
whether in cases like the above the complement experiencer or the comp-
lement nominative has been raised by SOR into matrix object position.
It will be seen below that in Modem Icelandic , when a dative exper-
iencer undergoes SOR, it retains its dative case.
^See Andrews (1976: 13ff) for details.
Passivized genitive objects, however, may not:
(i) *eg vonast til ad verda bedid
I hope comp aux inf VCgenI] supine
(
' I hope to be waited for .
'
)
"TThe information provided by Lockwood on experiencers in Faroese
is insufficient for determining to what extent these have undergone
the B to C shift.
12
The experiencers in these languages display behavioral as well as
coding properties. In the following Swedish examples, nominative exper-
iencer subjects which developed from historically non-nominative exper-
iencers control reflexivization, delete through Equi , and are raised by
subject-to-subject raising;
(i) han tyckte sig vara i en trevlig stad
he(nom) thought refl be in a pleasurable city
'He thought himself to be in a pleasvirable city.'
(ii) Jag hoppas dromma
I hope dream (inf)
'I hope to dream,
'
(iii) han tycks minnas
he seems remember (inf)
'He seems to remember.'
The examples in (37) are cited by Harris as examples (lb) and
(id) in the appendix to her paper. Our example (38) was cited by Butler
(1976). We have \ised examples (3^*) ajid (36) rather than similar ones
cited by Gaaf (190U: 32) and Harris (1975: 20) for chronological reasons.
The examples which they cite axe of vmcertain significance, since they
postdate the first occiirrence of the verbs involved with nominative
experiencers, and since nominative experiencers appear with these verbs
elsewhere in the works of the authors cited. Our examples (3*+) and
(36) present no such problem, since they substantially antedate the first
occurrences of these verbs with subject-coded experiencers.
69
Some speakers of Austrian German allov passivized non-accusative
objects to be deleted by Equi . For these speakers, sentences like (23)
are grammatical. Thus, such NPs seem to be acquiring some behavioral
properties in some dialects of German.
C_ represents a set of consonants whose occurrence in the passive
suffix is lexically determined.
Also undeletable are the underlying DOs of passive sentences,
since these do not meet the agency condition of the application of
Equi , as in the following example
:
(i) *i hishia au ki te patu-a e Rewi
past want I comp hit-pass agt Rewi
('I wanted to be hit by Rewi.) (Chiing, 5^a, p. 150)
17
Georgian also has a special mode described by Harris as "eviden-
tial" (p. 226). This is the mode used where a speaker reports an event
which he did not directly witness, but of which he saw the results of,
or some evidence that it occurred. Using this mode also relieves the
speaker of direct responsibility for the accuracy of the statement and
Harris uses turme 'apparently' to gloss this mode. This mode usually
appears in a perfective tense. Thus, certain verbs show up in a nominative-
subJect/dative-DO and 10 pattern in the present, but take the dative
case for the subject ajid nominative for DO (and a postpositional phrase
for the 10) in the evidential mode. Thus, in (i) and (ii) the same rela-
tions hold between the berb and the NPs. The only difference is in mode
ajid in case marking:
(i) glexi tesavs teslebs
peasant (nom) he-sows -it seeds (dat)
'The peasant is sowing seeds.'
(ii) turme glexs dautesavs teslebi '
apparently peasant(dat) him-sowed-it(nom) seeds (nom) {
'The peasant has apparently sown seeds.'
|
Though we will primarily discuss the status of the experiencer dative
;
in this paper, all the facts hold also for evidential mode datives, and
|
we shall occasionally use examples from this construction. I
18 S
Harris glosses this sentence as: j
(i) gelas uqvars nino I
Gela(dat) he-loves-her Nino(nom) j
(he=Gela, her=Nino) ',
However, in our gloss we have, for the sake of clarity, decided to use
nominative pronouns for those markers which agree with nominative nouns,
and dative pronouns for those agreeing with dative-nomdnals . This is
closer in spirit to what actually happens in Georgian: the markers re-
ferring to the dative are object markers and those referring to the nom-
inative are subject markers . We do not give the markers and the verb root
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in the same order in vhich they appear in Georgian (where the ohject marker
usually precedes the root and the subject marker follows the root) due
to the fact that the markers are sometimes discontinuous (i.e., circiom-
fixes) and sometimes morphemes.
19
The verb can also mean 'weaken' . In the verb form, -£- is the
second person (singular) object marker: -es is the third person sin-
gular subject marker, agreeing with tavi . The verb is in the perfect
or first evidential, which is part of Series III. The initial subject
is 'you' , which undergoes inversion and becomes the final indirect
object, triggering indirect object agreement and occiirring in the dative
case. See fn. IT for a brief discussion on inversion (in the evidential
mode )
•
The same facts are reported by Braithwaite (1973: 110 ) (our
glossing)
:
Old Georgian (i) mas mohuklavs_ igi
him(dat) him-killed-he he(nom)
'Apparently, he has killed him.' (-s_ marks 3sg)
(ii) mas mohuklavan igini
him(dat) him-killed-they they(nom)
'Apparently, he has killed them.' (-an marks
3pl subject)
Here we see that in Old Georgian the derived subject (Nom) triggers
third person number agreement. In Modern Georgian, the Nom does not
have control over third person number agreement anymore and as a result,
even though we have a plural Nom NP, the verb is marked for third person
singular subject in agreement with the dative NP, as observed in (76b).
21
Georgian differs from Germanic in that we have no evidence for a
stage in which dative experiencers show no_ syntactic subject properties.
We hypothesize, however, that there was such a stage.
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ACCUSATIVE SUBJECTS IN IMBABl-pA QUECHUA
Peter Cole and Janice L. JaJce
This paper examines tvo impersonal constructions in Imbabura
Quechua in which a noun phrase in accusative case displays a
variety of syntactic subject properties. One impersonal constuc-
tion is governed by lexical, or non-derived, experiencer verbs.
In the other construction experiencers are formed by adding the
desiderative suffix -naya- to a verbal stem. Although in both
constructions the accusative experiencer nominal possesses certain,
though not all, properties of subjects, the two constructions
differ with regard to which subject properties are displayed in
each, indicating that the nominals in -naya- desideratives have
reached a more advanced stage in reanalysis from non-subject to
subject than have those with lexical verbs of experience.
1. Introduction
In Imbabura Quechua (IQ) , and in other varieties of Quechua as
well, subjects typically appear in nominative case and control verb
agreement. There are, however, two 'impersonal constructions in IQ
in which a noun phrase in accusative case displays a variety of syn-
tactic subject properties. The two constructions are illustrated in
(1) and (2).
(1) Experiencer verbs'^
a. can-da rupa-n
2sg-acc burn-3
'You are hot.
'
b. nuca-ta nana-n
Isg-acc hurt-3
'I hurt.'
(2) -naya- desideratives
a. can-da micu-naya-n
2sg-acc eat-desid.-2
'You would like to eat.'
b. nuca-ta punu-naya-n
Isg-acc sleep-desid.-3
'I would like to sleep.'
The sentences of (l) are instances of what we shall refer to as the
lexical, or non-derived, experiencer construction. In addition to
rupa- 'to be hot' and nana- 'to hurt' (intransitive), chiri- 'to be
cold', yarj a- 'to be hungry' and muna- 'to wsint' may be used in this
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construction. The sentences of (2) are -naya- desideratives . These,
are formed by adding the desiderative suffix -naya- to a verbal stem.
The purpose of this paper is to sketch the morphological and syn-
tactic properties of the nominals in each of the above constructions.
We shall argue that in both constructions the 'experiencer' nominal
(can-da and fiuca-ta in (l) and (2)) possesses certain, though not all,
properties of subjects in IQ. Furthermore, the two constructions
differ with regard to which subject properties are displayed in each.
We shall show that the nominals in -naya- desideratives have reached
a more advanced stage in reanalysis from non-subject to subject than
have those with lexical verbs of experience.
Our discussion is organized as follows: In each section, we deter-
mine the extent to which the nominals in question are treated as sub-
jects or as objects by grammatical processes found in IQ. Different
groups of rules are considered in each section. In section 2 we examine
the morphosyntactic properties of the experiencer nominals in the con-
structions with regard to the subject coding rules^ of Case Marking (CM)
and Verb Agreement (VA) and the object coding rule of Pronominal Object
Cliticization (POC). Although experiencer nominals are typically coded
as non-subjects by these riiles , those in the desiderative construction
may, and vmder certain conditions must, display partial subject coding
properties. TViis is not the case for nominals with non-derived exper-
iencer verbs like those of (l).
In section 3 we compare the nominals in the two constructions with
regard to three rules: Equi NP Deletion (Equi), Subject Raising (SR)
and Passivization. Nominals in both construction undergo the rules
typically restricted to subjects, Equi, SR, and demotion by Passivization,
and fail to undergo promotion to subjecthood by Passivization, this
being restricted to objects. Thus, the experiencer nominals in both
constructions behave imambivalently as subjects with regard to the rules
discussed in this section.
Two constructions in which subjects and non-subjects are treated
differently are discussed in section h. These are switch reference
ptirpose and adverbial clauses. In these constructions, nominals with
-naya- verbs behave unambivalently as subjects. Nominals with lex-
ical experiencer verbs, however, may be treated either as subjects or
as non-subjects.
In section 5, we consider the implications of the above facts for
the diachronic and synchronic analysis of the two constructions. We
argue that experiencer nominals with -naya- verbs are in the final
stages of reanalysis as subjects. Nominals with lexical verbs of exper-
ience are at an earlier stage of reanalysis. This position is supported
not only by data from IQ, but also by cross-linguistic evidence.
C. Morphosyntactic coding rules
In this section we shall consider the behavior of experiencer
nominals in the two constructions with regard to three morphosyntactic
coding rules: Case Marking, Verb Agreement and Pronominal Object
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Cliticization. Experiencer nominals in both constructions behave as
non-subjects with regard to VA. This is not true, however, with respect
to CM or POC.
With the exception of the two constructions under consideration,
subjects appear in nominative case (0 case marking), control VA and
fail to under POC. Cirect objects receive accusative case (-ta)
,
fail to control VA and may, iinder appropriate conditions, optionally
undergo POC.' These facts are illustrated in (3)-(T):
(3) Subject in nominative case and controls VA
can-0 nuca-ta ricu-ngui
2sg-nom Isg-acc see-2sg
'you see me.
'
(U) Object cliticized
can-0 (nuca-ta) ricu-wa-ng\ii
2sg-nom Isg-acc see-l-2sg
'you see me.
(5) Object may not control VA
*can-0 nuca-ta ricu-ni
2sg-nom Isg-acc see-lsg
(You see me.
)
(6) Subject may not appear in accusative case
*can-ta nuca-ta ricu-ngui
2sg-acc Isg-acc see-2sg
(You see me.
(T) Subject may not undergo cliticization
*iiuca-0 can-da ricu-wa-ni
2sg-nom 2cg-acc see-1-lsg
(I see you.
)
To return to experiencer constructions, with both desideratives
and lexical verbs of experience the experiencer nominal is frequently
coded as a superficial direct object. It receives accusative case,
fails to trigger VA and, in the case of lexical experiencers , may under-
go POC. This is shown in (8)-(ll):
(8) -naya- experiencer in accusative and fails to constrol VA
nuca-ta-ca can-da ricu-naya- •< ^ .\
Isg-acc-topic 2sg-acc see-desid-
'I wo\ild like to see you.'
i*lsg I
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(9) Lexical experiencer In accusative and fails to control VA
'nuca-ta) nana-<. .C(^ni3
Isg-acc hurt-/,^g\
' I hurt .
'
(10) Lexical experiencer undergoes POC
a • ( f!uca-ta ) nana-va-n
Isg-acc hurt-1-3
'I hurt.'
b. (nuca-ta) chiri-va-n
Isg-acc cold-1-3
'I am cold.
'
Desiderative experiencers differ from lexical experiencers in
that the desiderative experiencer nominal may optionally appear in
nominative case and can never undergo POC. The option of nominative
case marking does not exist for lexical experiencers .8 Furthermore,
desiderative experiencers differ from lexical experiencers in that the
former fail to undergo the object coding rule of POC. This is illustrated
in (11) (cf. 10):
(11) -naya- experiencer fails to undergo POC
a. *(nuca-ta-ca) can-da ricu-naya-wa-n
Isg-acc-topic 2sg-acc see-desid-1-3
(l would like to see you.)
b. *micu-naya-wa-n
eat-desid-1-3
(I vould like to eat.)
c . 'punu-naya-wa-n
,;
sleep-desid-1-3 J
(I would like to sleep.) i
Despite their appearance in noiinative case, desiderative ex- '
periencers fail to control VA: !
(12) -naya- experiencer in nominative case but fails to control VA
fiuca-0-ca can-da ricu-naya-J^ .C
Isg-nom-topic 2sg-acc see-desid'
'I would ].ike to see you.'
"{:isgi
76
(l3) Lexical experiencer may not appear in nominative
r
I
'nuca-0-ca nana- .5
.>
lsg-ncF,-topic hurt- ^ :.' (
(I hurt.)
We have shown that experiencers with -naya- verbs and ex-
periencers with lexicel verts of experience are treated in different
ways by morphosyntactic coding rules, -naya- experiencers may option-
ally be coded as subjects by CM and are obligatorily coded as subjects
by POC (if POC applies). They fail, however, to trigger VA. In con-
trast, lexical experiencers are invariably treated as objects. As will
be seen below, the two constructions differ in a similar way for certain,
though not all, syntactic rules as well.
3. Some syntactic indications of subjecthood
In this section, we shall examine the behavior of experiencer
nominals in both constructions with respect to three syntactic rules
:
Equi , SR, and Passivization. The ability of an KP to undergo these
rales has been shown cross-linguistically to be indicative of the gram-
matical role of the nominal in question. Equi and SR take subjects
as their input. The former rule deletes complement subjects under
identity with a matrix noun phrase, while the latter promotes a comp-
lement subject to matrix direct object. In contrast, Passivization
promotes iinderlying object noun phrases to subjecthood in a manner to
be illustrated below.
For each rule, we shall first show that in IQ it is normally
restricted to noun phrases with a certain grammatical role (subject
for Equi and SR, object for promotion by Passivization, and subject
for demotion by Passivization). We shall then show that experiencer
nominals with both desiderative and lexical experiencer verbs behave
like subjects rather than objects: They undergo deletion by Equi and
promotion by SR; they undergo demotion by Passivization, but they fail
to undergo promotion by Passivization. Thus, we claim, accusative
experiencer nominals in both constructions exhibit significant subject
behavioral properties.
Sentences (ll+)-(l5) illustrate the application of Equi to sen-
tences with nominative subjects:
[ik) a. Input structxire to Equi
pai-0^ i:pai-0. trabaJa-D gushta-n
3sg-nom 3sg-nom work like-3
Output of Equi
pai-0. 0. trabaja-na-ta gushta-n
3sg-nom work-infin-acc like-3
'She likes to work.'
(l^) a. Input structure to Equi
:pai-0. mishqui-ta micu-H gushta-npa.1- X _i. uaj.— V. .
1
3sg-nom Ssg-nom candy-acc eat like-3
b . Output of Equi
pai-0. 0. mishqui-ta micu-na-ta gushta-n
Ssg-nom candy-acc eat-infin-acc like-3
'She likes to eat candy,'
Sentences (i6)-(1T) shov Equi does not apply to objects:
(16) Complement object coreferntial to matrix subject
rmca-0. ELuna-ni pCpai-0 nuca-ta. ricu-chunD
Isg-nom want-lsg 3sg-nom Isg-acc see-subjvmctive
'I want her to see me.'
(17) Equi fails to apply
*nuca-0. muna-ni pai-0 0. ricu-na-ta
Isg-nom want-lsg 3sg-nom see-infin-acc
(I want her to see me.)
Equi can, however, delete the experiencer nominal in both the
desiderative and the non-derived experiencer construction:
(18) a. Input structure to Equi with lexical experiencer
warmi-0. mana gushta-n-llu Cwarmi-ta. nana-ju-3
woman-nom not like-3-neg woman-acc hurt-prog
b. Output of Equi
warmi-
woman-nom not like-3-neg hurt-prog-infin-acc
'A woman doesn't like to hurt.'
(19) a. Input structure to Equi with -naya- desiderative
wira warmi-0. mana gushta-n-llu gCwira warmi-ta. micu-nayal
fat woman-nom not gushta-n-llu fat woman-acc eat-desid
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(19) b. Output of Equi
wira wanni-0 mana gushta-n-llu 0. micu-naya-na-ta
fat woman-nom not like-3-neg eat-desid-infin-acc
'The fat woiri£.n doesn't like wanting to eat.'
Examples (l8)-(l9) show that unlike object nominals, experiencers in
both of the constructions in question may be deleted by Equi. Thus,
Equi treats the experiencer nominals in these constructions like sub-
jects rather than objects.
The rule of SR also distinguishes between accusative experiencers
on the one hand and objects of the other. 9 SR applies to nominative
subjects and to -naya- and lexical experiencers. The examples of (20)
show the effect of SR on nominative subjects:
(20) a. Input to SR
pai-0 „Cnuca-0 micu-j-ta3 cri-rca
3sg-nom Isg-nom eat-pres . comp-acc believe-3past
Output of SR
pai-0 nuca-ta cri-rca micu-j-ta
3sg-nom Isg-acc believe-Spast eat-pres. comp-acc
'He believed me to eat.'
*pai-0 nuca-0 cri-rca micu-j-ta
3sg-nom Isg-nom believe-Spast eat-pres .comp-acc
(He believed me to eat.'
d. Application of POC to (20b)
pai-0 cri-wa-rca micu-j-ta
3sg-nom believe-l-3past eat-pres. comp-acc
'He believed me to eat.'
In general, the application of SR can only be detected on the basis
of word order (which is relatively free, and hence a poor test), and
of the application of subsequent rules: e.g., case marking, matrix
clause POC and matrix clause Passivization. Note that in (20b) the
underlying complement subject is in accusative rather than nominative
case. In (20d) this noun phrase has been cliticized to the matrix
verb. These facts indicate that the underlying complement subject has
become the derived matrix object.
Further indication that the vinderlying complement subject has
become a derived matrix object is provided by Passivization The ex-
amples of (21) show that these nominals may be promoted to matrix
subject by Passivization.
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(21) a. Input to Passivization
Maria-0 nuca-ta cri-n ^.rnilcu-shca-taD
Maria-nom Isg-acc believc-3 eat-past part-acc
'Maria believes me to have eaten,
b. Output of Passivization
nuca-0-ca Maria-0 cri-shca ca-ni
Isg-nom-topic Maria-nom believe-past part be-lsg
micu-shca-ta
eat-past part-acc
'I am believed by Maria to have eaten.'
The sentences of (22) show that SR and subsequent POC and Passivi-
zation are restricted to underlying complement subjects. Note that
underlying complement objects may not undergo SR. This is demonstrated
by the failure of these NPs to cliticize to the matrix verb or to be
promoted to matrix subject by Passivization. (Accusative case marking
is inapplicable as a test for SR because the complement object is marked
accusative as a result of its grammatical role in the complement clause.)
(22) a. Transitive object complement clause
Jose-0 cri-n _CMaria-0 nuca-ta ricu-shca-taH
Jose-nom believe-3 Maria-nom Isg-acc see-past part-acc
'Jose believes that Maria sav me.'
b. Complement object fails to cliticize to the matrix verb
*Jose-0 cri-va-n Maria-0 ricu-shca-ta
Jose-nom believe-1-3 Maria-nom see-past part-acc
(Jose believes that Maria saw me.)
c. Complement object fails to become matrix passive subject
*nuca-0-ca Jose-0 cri-shca ca-ni
Isg-nom-topic Jose-nom believe-past part be-lsg
Maria-0 ricu-shca-ta
Maria-nom see-past part-acc
(I am believed by Jose for Maria to have seen me.)
Vfe have shown in the preceding paragraphs that SR distinguishes
between complement subjects and complement objects. The former may,
subsequent to SR, be cliticized to the matrix, or become the matrix
passive subject. The latter may not. Thus, SR, in conjunction with
POC and Passivization, provides a syntactic test for the status of
-naya- and lexical experiencer nominals . If these nominals vmdergo
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matrix cliticization and Passivization to matrix sutject, we are
Justified in claiming that they are treated as sutjects rather than
objects by SR. We 2hall now show that this is, in fact, the case.
The senteiices of (23) show that accusative -naya- experiencers
may be cliticized to the matrix verb. This is shown for lexical ex-
periencers in (2ii).
(23) a. Input to POC
Jari-0 fiuca-ta cri-n micu-naya-shca-ta
man-nom Isg-acc believe-3 eat-desid-past part-acc
'The man believes me to have wanted to eat.'
b. Output of POC
jari-0 cri-wa-n micu-naya-shca-ta
man-nom believe-1-3 eat-desid-past part-acc
'The man believed me to have wanted to eat.'
(2l+) a. Input to POC
jari-0 nuca-ta cri-n chiri-shca-ta
man-nom Isg-acc believe-3 cold-past part-acc
'The man believes me to have been cold.'
b. Output of POC
jari-0 cri-wa-n chiri-shca-ta
man-nom believe-1-3 cold-past part-acc
'The man believes me to have been cold.'
Similarly, experiencers in both constructions may undergo Passiviza-
tion and become matrix subjects, as is seen for desideratives in (25)
and lexical experiencers in (26).
(25) a. Input to Passivization
jari-0 nuca-ta cri-rca micu-naya-shca-ta
man-nom Isg-acc believe-3 past eat-desid-past part-acc
'The man believes me to have wanted to eat.'
b. Output of Passivization
fiuca-ca jari-0 cri-shca ca-ni
Isg-topic man-nom believe-past part be-lsg
micu-naya-shca-ta
eat-desid-past part-acc
'I was believed by the man to have wanted to eat.'
(26) a. Input to Passivization
jari-0 can-da cri-n chiri-shca-ta
mnn-nom 2sg-acc believe-3 cold-past part-aco
'The mam believes you to have been cold.'
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(26) t. Output of Passivization
can-ga jari-0 cri-shca ca-ngui
2sg-topic man-nom believe-past part be-2sg
chiri-shca-ta
cold-past part-acc
•You were believed by the man to have been cold.'
Thus, examples (23)-(26) indicate that accusative experiencers in
both constructions are treated as subjects rather than as objects
by SR.
The final rule to be discussed in this section is Passivization.
Sentences involving this rule were given above in conjunction with
ovir discussion of SR. What is relevant to the present argument is
that Passivization promotes the non-subject to derived subjecthood
and demotes the underlying subject to non-sub.lect nominative. For
example , in ( 27 )
,
(27) nuca-ca wawa-ta micu-chi-rca-ni
Isg-topic child-acc eat-caus-past-lsg
•I fed the child.'
the accusative noun phrase, wawa 'child', is the direct object. The
verb agrees with fiuca 'I', the subject. In the output of Passivization
as shown in ( 28 )
(28) wawa-ca nuca-0 micu-chi-shca ca-rca
child-topic Isg-nom eat-caus-past part be-3 past
'The child was fed by me.'
vava 'child' has been promoted to subject, as is shown by third per-
son verb agreement. As was noted previously, the promotion aspect
of Passivization fails to apply to nominative subjects while the de-
motion aspect of the rule fails to app]y to objects. Hence, an NP
that is promoted by Passivization may be assumed not to be a subject
prior to the application of the rule and an NP that is demoted by the
rule may be assumed to be a subject in the input structure.
To turn to the two accusative experiencer constructions , the
experiencer nominals fail to undergo promotion by Passivization, as
is indicated for -naya- verbs in (29) and lexical experiencers in (30).
(29) a. Input to Passivization
nuca-ta puRu-naya-rca
Isg-acc sleep-desid-3 past
'I would like to sleep.'
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(29) b. Ungramniatical output of Passivizr.ti'jn
*nuca-ca punu-naya-shca ca-rca-ni
Isg-topic slcep-desid-past part be-past-lsg
( I vas slept
.
)
(30) a. Input to Passivization
fiuca-ta chiri-rca
Isg-acc cold-3 past
'I was cold.
'
b. Ungrammatical output of PaEsivization
*nuca-ca chiri-shca ca-rca-ni
Isg-topic cold-past part be-past-lsg
(I was colded.
)
Thus , the experiencer nominals in both constructions behave like nom-
inative subjects rather than like accusative objects with regard to
promotion by Passivization.
The experiencer nominals also behave as subjects with regard to
the demotion aspect of Passivization. This is shown for -naya- desi-
deratives in (31) and lexical experiencers in (32).
(31) a. Input to Passivization
nuca-ta-ca mishqui-ta micu-naya-rca
Isg-acc-topic candy-acc eat-desid-3 past
'I would like to eat candy.'
b. Grammatical output of Passivization of patient
mishqui-ca nuca-0 micu-naya-shca ca-rca
candy-topic Isg-nom eat-desid-past part be-3 past
'Candy was wanted to eat by me.'
c. Ungrammatical output of Passivization of experiencer
*nuca-ca mishqui- ) > micu-naya-shca ca-rca-(ni)
Isg-topic candy- |'^0'°? eat-desid-past part be-(3) past-(lsg)
(I was eaten by candy / I was eaten candy.)
(32) a. Input to Passivization
nuca-ta-ca mishqui-ta m\ma-rca
Isg-acc-topic candy-acc want-3 past
'I wanted candy.'
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(32) t. Grammatical output of Passivization of patient
mishqui-ca fiuca-0 muna-shca ca-rca
candy-topic Isg-nom want-past part be-3 past
'Candy was wanted by me.'
c. Ungrammatical output of Passivization of experiencer
*nuca-ca mishqui- f'f V- muna-shca ca-rca-(ni)
Isg-topic candy- J^°'^c want-past part be-(3)past-(lsg)
(I was wanted by candy / I was wanted candy.)
The sentences of (3l)-(32) show that the experiencer nominal under-
goes demotion by Passivization as would be expected for subjects.
This is in contrast with the patient, which is promoted to derived sub-
ject. Note that the patient may not undergo demotion nor the experiencer
promotion.
These facts are predictable from the hypothesis that in the input
to Passivization the experiencers are parsed as subjects and the pat-
ients as objects. But the counter-hypothesis that both accusative
nominals are non-subjects would provide no explanation for the differ-
ent behavior of the two groups of accusative nominals. Hence, we
conclude that both aspects of Passivization provide evidence for the
subjecthood of the experiencers in both constructs oas.
In this section we have examined the effect of three grammatical
rules, Equi, SR, and Passivization, on the two experiencer constructions.
With respect to each of these rules, the experiencers in both construc-
tions behaved syntactically like subjects rather than like non-subjects.
The rules did not distinguish between the constuctions in any way.
In the section which follows, we shall see that this is not the case
for all sjTitactic rules. For certain rules, the experiencer nominals
in the desiderative construction behave more like nominative subjects
than do experiencer nominals with lexical verbs of experience.
h. Switch reference constructions
In this section we shall consider the behavior of experiencer
nominals in two types of switch reference constructions : adverbial
clauses and purpose clauses. In these constructions, the suffixes used
when the embedded subject is coreferential with that of the main clause
differ from those used when the embedded and matrix subjects are not
coreferential. This is illustrated for nominative subjects in the
examples which follow.
i
(33) a. Adverbial clause: matrix and embedded subject coreferential I
(nuca-0.) wasi-man chaya [^"^^P^]
^^^^_^_ can-da ricu-nl
-coref adv 1
dv)
Isg-nom house-dat arrive) \ -, o t„~(,*-non~cor a Isg-nom 2sg-acc see-lsg
'When I arrive home, I see you.
f
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(33) b. Adverbial clause: Matrix and crabeddcd subjects non-coref.
nuca-0. vasi-man chayaA~"^P { can-0. fluca-ta. ricu-ngui1 (*snpa>
_ J 1
°
Isg-nom house-dat arrive}"'^'^'^"^"^^ \^\ you-nom Isg-acc see-2sg
( -coref adverb ) "' ^ ^
'When I arrive home, you see ne.'
c. Purpose clause: matrix and embedded subjects coreferential
nuca-0. wasi-man ri-ju-ni (fiuca-0.) ^ can-da, ricu-j .
~^f^^^"^/1 1 J C*-chun b
Isg-nom house-dat go-prog-lsg Isg-nom 2sg-acc seeV~^°^^''' P^^P i
C -non-cor piirpj
'I am going home to see you.'
d. Purpose clause: matrix and embedded subjects non-coref.
nuca-0. wasi-man ri-ju-ni can-0, nuca-ta. ricu). .>
1 '^ '^j 1 (*-ngapaj^
, , , . ^ „ T (-non-cor. purp"?Isg-nom house-dat go-prog-lsg 2sg-nom Isg-acc seei ^ j:- ^ v
^ -^ '^ "^ ^
^
^-coref. purp J
'I am going home for you to see me.'
As is shovn in the examples of (33), the suffix -shpa is used in
adverbial clauses in which the embedded and matrix subjects are core-
ferential. When these NPg are not coreferential, the suffix -jpi is
found. In purpose clauses -ngapaj indicates coreference between matrix
and embedded subjects. The suffix -chun shows non-coreference. It should
be noted that when there is merely coreference between a non-subject
nominal in the matrix clause and the embedded subject, -jpi and -chun
are used, as was seen in (33b) and (33d). Similarly, -jpi and -chun
are found when the matrix subject and an embedded non-subject nominal
are coreferential:
(3^) Coreference between matrix subject and embedded non-subject
a. Adverbial clause
nuca-ta. ricuV , > fiuca-0. pai-ta, maca-s
1 c*-shpa^ 1 ^ j
adv^
ha
^-non-cor. J . _ ,
-j. n ^ j.jsg-nom Isg-acc seeTL ^ ^ > Isg-nom 3sg-acc hit-lsg fut(^-coref. adv. J
'When he sees me, I will hit him.'
b. Purpose clause
fiuca-0. pai-ta. maca-rca-ni pai-0
^^^^Y*_ncar)a1 S
,
-J. J. -, -, (-non-coref purp/Isg-nom 3sg-acc hit-past-lsg 3sg-nom cry < „ r- i- t
'I hit him so he would cry.'
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We shall now employ svitch reference to determine whether ac-
cusative experiencers are treated as subjects or as non-subjects.
It will be shown that the accusative experiencer nominals in -naya-
desideratives behave syntactically like nominative subjects with re-
spect to the assignment of adverbial and purposive suffixes. In con-
trast, accusative experiencers with lexical verbs of experience may be
treated either as subjects or as non-subjects for piu-poses of adverbial
and purposive suffix assignment.
We shall first consider -naya- experiencers. The sentences of
(35) show that accusative nominals with -naya- experiencers are viewed
as subjects for pupposesi- of adverbial and purposive suffix assignment.
This is shown by the use of -shpa and -ngapaj , which, as was seen above,
are restricted to sentences in which the matrix and embedded subjects
are coreferential. Note that the sentences of (35) would be xingramma-
tical if -jpi and -chun , the suffixes used when matrix and embedded
subjects are non-coreferential, were used. It will be seen below that
this is not the case for lexical experiencer nominals.
(35) Desiderative experiencers treated as subjects in switch
reference clauses
a. Adverbial clause: desiderative matrix clause
(nuca-0.) chagra-pi trabajaf'^_. . L nuca-ta.
^. n •, . , r -coref . adv. / -,Isg-nom field-m work ^^ ^ ^ V Isg-acc^ \J*-non-coref . adv^
punu-naya-n
sleep-desid-3
'When I work in the field, I want to sleep.'
b. Adverbial clause: desiderative embedded clause
(nuca-ta.) punu-naya
^
^"^ ?^
^
nuca-0- ca. punu-ni
1 -1 J .,r -coref. adv.
")
Isg-acc sleep-desid^_^^^_^^^^^_
adv^ Isg-nom-topic sleep-lsg
'When I want to sleep, I sleep.'
c. PUcpOBe clause: desiderative matrix clause
cunan tuta nuca-ta. punu-naya-n caya maimi 0.
now night Isg-acc""" sleep-desid-3 tomorrow a lot
C*-non-coref . purp._^
'I'd like to sleep tonight in order to work a lot tomorrow.'
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(35) (!• Fnrpose clause: desiderative embedded clause
nuca-0-ca. ali micuna-ta rura-ni 0.
Isg-nom-topic good food-acc make-lsg
r -ngapaj?
^*-ch\in J
-desid f/c°^ef- P^- "^
t -non-corer. purpjeat-
'I make good food so that I vill want to eat.'
Lexical experiencers exhibit a pattern different from that seen
in (35). As is seen in (36), subject to certain variation from speaker
to speaker to be discussed below, both sets of suffixes may be used:
those indicative that the matrix and embedded subject are coreferential
(
-
shpa and -ngapaj ) and those indicative of non-coreferentiality of
subjects (-jpi and -chun )
:
(36) Adverbial clauses with lexical experiencers treated as either
subject or non-subject
a. Lexical experiencer in matrix clause
0. urcu-pi trabaja ) ~^ ?^ > jari-ta-ca.
J. . . , \ -coref . adv. >mountain-m work f ^ j \ man-acc-topic(^-non-coref . adv.^
yacu-ta muna-rca
water-acc waiit-3-past
4
'While working on the mountain, the man wanted water.'
b. Lexical experiencer in subordinate clause
5uca-0. jambi-dur-man ri-rca-ni 0. nana 7 » • <
•,. . .
-, ^ ^ -. ^ ^ C-coref. adv. <Isg-nom medicine-agt-dat go-past-lsg hurt
^_non-coref . advA
'I went to the doctor hurting.'
Note that when the subject NPs are non-coreferential, as in (37),
only -Jpi is used:
(37) Adverbial clauses with lexical experiencer: non-corefer-
ential subjects
a. Lexical experiencer in matrix clause
jari-0. urcu-pi trabaja
^^if^JaS
C -non-core f. adv.^
man-nom mountain-in work Qk_coref. adv. J
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(37) a. (continued)
wawa-ta-ca. yacu-ta muna-rca
J
child-acc-topic water-acc want-past
'While the man was working on the mountain, the child
wanted water.
'
b. Lexical experiencer in subordinate clause
nuca-0. jambi-dur-man ri-rca-ni wawa-ta
Isg-nom medicine-agt-dat go-past-lsg child-acc
V*-shpai
, , r -non-coref. adv.?
^^^*l?-coref. adv. S
'I went to the doctor when the child was hurting.'
With regard to purpose clauses, some variation was found among the
speakers consulted. In the examples of (38), the symbol (#) indicates
that the sentence in question was accepted by one infonnant and rejected
by another.
(38) Purpose clauses
a. Lexical experiencer in matrix clause
fiuca-ta. trabaja-na-ta muna-n 0. culqui-ta
Isg-acc work-infin-acc want-3 money-acc
take ( -c°^e^- P^^' ?
C#-non-coref. purp.J
' I want to work in order to make money .
'
b. Lexical experiencer in subordinate clause
pai. larca-pi wambu-rca ama 0.
^^P^/#_(,h\in J
3sg brook-in swim-3 past neg burn
'He swam in the water in order not to be hot
f-ngapaj^
(#-chu
C*-coref. purp. '^
(,#-non-coref . purp.r
The examples of (38) show two patterns. For one speaJier, switch
reference in purpose clauses with lexical experiencers show the same
pattern as in adverbial clauses : the experiencer NP may be analyzed
either as a subject or as a non-subject. For the other speaker con-
sulted, the lexical experiencer in a purpose clause could be treated
only as a subject, a pattern like that found for -naya- experiencers.
Parallel to what was found with adverbial clauses , when the lexical ex-
periencer was not coreferential with the subject of the other clause,
-Chun was invariably the only form accepted.
(39) Purpose clauses vith lexical experiencers : non-coreferential
subjects
a. Lexical experiencer in matrix clause
nuca-ta-ca. taita-man. cara-na-ta muna-n
Isg-acc-topic father-dat servi-infin-acc want-3
sinlli 0. caC-^^^
.7
J L -ngapaj ^
strong te£-^°"-f^^^- P^^P'^
C.*-coref. purp. J
'I want to serve it to father so he vill be strong.'
b. Lexical experiencer in subordinate clause
nuca-ca. vava-ta. wambu-chi-rca-ni ama 0.
Isg-topic child-acc swim-caus .-past-Is g neg
rupa {-Chun ^
*-ngapaj 3
, C* -non-coref . adv.~?
\*-coref. adv. j
'I caused the child to svim so he wouldn't be hot.'
We have shown in this section that -naya- desiderative exper-
iencers and lexical experiencers differ in behavior with regard to
switch reference constructions. Desiderative experiencers are invar-
iably analyzed as subjects. Lexical experiencers, however, with some
variation from speaker to speaker, may be analyzed either as subject
or as non-subject with respect to switch reference. The synchronic
and diachronic implications of these facts will be discussed in the
following section. It is sufficient at present to note that a pattern
similar to that found for W and POC (section 2) is found with switch
reference: desiderative experiencers are (in this case, obligatorily)
treated as subjects while lexical experiencers are (in this case,
optionally) treated as non-subjects.
5. Conclusions
In the preceding sections we examined the degree to which two
types of accusative nominals , -naya- desiderative experiencers and
lexical experiencers, exhibit morphological and syntactic properties
otherwise restricted in IQ to nominative subjects. The properties as-
sociated with each type of experiencer are reviewed schematically
in (UO).
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(40)
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The interpretation of (Uo) suggested by Cole et al., which consti-
tutes
,
in effect , a partial internal reconstruction of the constructions
in question, appears to be supported by the somewhat scant comparative
data available. To the best of our knowledge, no detailed study has
been made of the properties of experiencers in analogous constructions
in other dialects of Quechua. Thus, we are not able to provide convinc-
ing arguments that experiencers lacked all behavioral subject properties
in common Quechua. But it does seem fairly clear that the subject
coding properties associated with -naya- experiencers are an innovation.
In nearly all Quechua dialects -naya- experiencers are found in acc-
usative case. The possibility of nominative is quite exceptional.
Thus, in the absence of convincing counter-evidence, such as relevant
archaisiiis , the most likely reconstruction wouid be the one in which the
property fovind in most of the d.aughter languages, accusative case, is
hypothesized to be a property of the proto-language . It would seem,
then, that comparative evidence suggests that -naya- experiencers are
innovative vis-a-vis lexical experiencers, the same conclusion drawn
above on the basis of dialect internal evidence.
The synchronic analysis of the two constructions lends support
to the iiypothesis that the desiderative construction represents a
more advanced stage in historical change than does the lexical exper-
iencer construction. Harris (to appear .,a) and Ferlmutter (to appear)
inter alia have proposed that experiencer constructions like those
examined here involve a rule, of Inversion. This rule demotes the un-
derlying subject to object. Such an analysis is well-motivated syn-
chronically, because it provides as explicit explanation for the fact
that the experiencer NP has both subject and non-subject properties.
If an Inversion analysis is accepted, there are certain interesting
consequences. The synchronic analysis of the two experiencer con-
structions, in conjunction with historical data presented by Harris
on the development of experiencer constructions in other languages,
provides additional evidence that the two experiencers are in transition
from non-subject to subject, and that the -naya- experiencers have
reached a more advanced stage than have the lexical experiencers.
An example of how Inversion allows the association of super-
ficial object properties with the underlying subject is given in
(i+2) which is roughly the derivation of (ijl):
(Ul) nuca-ta punu-naya-n
Isg-acc sleep-desid-3
(i+2) a. Underlying representation
nuca (subject) pufiu-naya-
Isg sleep-desid
b. Output of Inversion
nuca (object) punu-naya-
Isg sleep-desid
91
(U2) c. Output of Case Marking
nuca-ta punu-naya-
Isg-acc sleep-desid
d. Output of Verb Agreement
nuca-ta puiiu-naya-n
Isg-acc sleep-desid-3
Once an Inversion analysis is assiomed, certain rule orderings are
necessary in order to generate the sentences found in the language.
According to this analysis, desiderative and lexical experiencer con-
structions differ only in terms of how Inversion is ordered with respect
to other rules . The fact that desiderative experiencers are more sub-
ject-like than lexical experiencers is explained by ordering Inversion
later in the derivation for -naya- than for lexical experiencers.
The ordering of rules needed for each construction is presented in
(U3). We would like to emphasize that the rule ordering posited in
(U3) is motivated on pixrely synchronic grounds. The necessity for these
orderings is justified briefly in footnote 15-
(Us) Ordering of Inversion
a. Lexical experiencers
SR
Passivization
Equi
#Inversion
#Switch Reference Purpose
#Switch Reference Adverbial
POC
CM
VA
b. Desiderative experiencers
SR
Passivization
Egui
Switch Reference Adverbial
Switch Reference Prupose
POC
#Inversion
#CM
VA
#indicates variability in ordering
The rule ordering seen in (1+3) correctly predicts that -naya-
experiencers will exhibit a wider range of subject properties than lex-
ical experiencers. In general, the later Inversion is ordered vis-a-vis
other rules, the more subject properties will be associated with the
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experiencer nominal. Thus, the Inversion hypothesis, in conjunction
with the rule orderings proposed in (^3), accounts for the differences
between the two constructions.
We shall turn now to the diachronic implications of the difference
in rule ordering in (H3a) and (U3b). Harris (to appear, b) examines
grammatical changes leading ultimately to the loss of non-nominative
experiencer constructions in two unrelated languages, English and
Udi . Employing an Inversion analysis, Harris considers the synchronic
state of the languages at various stages in their development. She
shows that in both cases Inversion was ordered prior to morphosyn-
tactic coding rules (case marking and verb agreement) at an early
stage in the development of the language, but that at later stages
the r\ile was successivelj' reordered so as to follow the coding rules.
The effect of the reordering was to dininish, and eventually, to
eliminate non-subect coding properties. Upon being reordered after
all other rules, inversion ceased to have any surface effects, and
the rule, presiimably, was lost.
The changes reported for English and Udi provide cross-linguistic
corroboration for the analysis oflQ proposed above. We suggested
that -naya- experiencers are at a later stage in the acquisition of
subjecthood than are lexical experiencers. We shall assi^me that IQ
would be expected to undergo a process of change similar to that
found by Harris in English and Udi. On the basis of this assumption,
o\ir diachronic analysis predicts that Inversion should be ordered later
in the derivation with -naya- experiencers than with lexical exper-
iencers. This is, in fact, the rule ordering found in (US).
To summarize our conclusions, -naya- desiderative experiencers
manifest a considerably wider range of subject properties than do
lexical experiencers. The differences between the two experiencer
constructions suggest that, while experiencers in both constructions
are in the midst of a change from objecthood to subjecthood, the change
is more advanced in the desiderative experiencer construction than in
the lexical experiencer construction.
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Due to a phonological voicing rule, the accusative suffix is
pronounced -da following nasals and -ta elsewhere.
The verb m\ina- 'want 'may also be used in 'personal' con-
structions with a nominative experiencer, in which case it agrees with
the nominative NP in person and number.
k
In addition, -naya- may be added to a limited number of nouns,
e.g. yacu 'water', to form a desiderative verb, yacu-naya- 'desire
to drink, be thirsty'.
Both lexical and desiderative verbs of experience may be con-
verted into 'personal' verbs, tailing nominative experiencer. This is
done by the addition of the morpheme -chi : nuca-ta punu-naya-n
(experiencer in accusative, third person agreeement) but nuca punu-
naya-chi-ni (experiencer in nominative, first person singular agree-
ment ) . Both sentences are glossed identically as 'I want to sleep'
by speakers. The suffix -chi is normally a causative morpheme, but
that does not appear to be its function here. We shall have no fur-
ther discussion of this construction.
It should be noted that in -naya- constructions the experiencer
is understood to be identical to the subject of the verb stem. That
is, the construction may be used to express the notion 'I would like
to eat
'
, but not ' I would like Harry to eat '
.
Following Keenan (1976), we distinguish between subject coding
properties and subject behavioral properties. The former includes
rules involving the morphosyntactic coding of grammatical relations,
such as case marking and verb agreement. The latter includes non-
morphological syntactic rules, such as deletion under identity and
subject raising.
For a justification of the distinction, see Keenan (19T6) and
Cole et. al. (19T8). The distinction between coding and behavioral
properties plays a major role in section 5.
Passivization in Imbabura promotes an object NP to subject, de-
motes transitive subjects to non-subject nominatives and makes approp-
riate changes in verbal morphology. The two aspects of the rule, pro-
motion and demotion, constitute tests for objecthood and subjecthood:
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Objects, both direct ana incirect , though i.ox obliques, nay be pronoted
to sutject, but subjects may not. Subjects are demoted to non-subject
noirdnatives by Fassivizaticn.
'rcC in IQ, and in Ecuadorian dialects generally, is restricted
to first person objects. In Peruvian dialects, second person objects
may be cliticized as well. The rule is optional in IC. A full NP
object may co-occur vith the clitic for eiri'hasis
.
the nond-ncitive,
they are invariably marked as topics (-ca_). Topic marking is not re-
stricted tc any single type of NP such as subjects. It is frequently
used to disambiguate subject from non-subject, as in (i):
fiuca-ta •• ^
-ca
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axid in several others in this section, grammatical but stylistically
objectionaMe.
13
Ve were unable to obtain clear informant judgements regarding
whether the assignment of the suffixes in question is strictly con-
trolled by derived grammatical relations . Our informant failed to
have consistent intuitions with respect to the suffixes needed in adverb-
ial and purpose clauses subordinated to passive matrix clauses.
Ik
According to Perlmutter, and Harris, the rule universally de-
motes a subject to indirect object. The appearance of the underly-
ing subject as a direct object in IQ (as evidenced by accusative case)
would presiomably be acco\inted for by the subsequent promotion of the
indirect object to direct object. We shall take no position on whether
such a derivation is in fact justified in IQ.
The examples presented previously provide the basis for the
rule ordering statements which follow. It is assumed that rvtle order-
ing is transitive: If A precedes B and B precedes C, then A precedes C.
SR feeds Passivization, and thus, must precede it. Equi must
precede Inversion or Inversion would bleed Equi. With lexical exper-
iencers. Inversion may precede or follow both switch reference rules
for some speakers. For others it must follow Switch Reference Purpose
and precede Switch Reference Adverbial. Thus, Switch Reference Pur-
pose precedes Switch Reference Adverbial. (see section U for details.)
In some derivations , Inversion follows the switch reference rules but
precedes POC. Thus, the switch reference rules must precede POC.
With desiderative experiencers , Inversion may come between POC
and CM. Hence, POC precedes CM. It may also follow CM but precede
Verb Agreement. Therefore, Verb Agreement must follow CM.
The historical acquisition of subject properties does not al-
ways involve the reordering of a rule in the derivation. See Cole
et al. for details.
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WHY DYIRBAL ISN'T ERGATIVE AT ALL*
Janice Jake
The recent interest in ergativity has underi-cored the singular
position of Dyirbal as a syntactically ergative language. Even
amon^j the morphologically ergative aborigine languaceo of Australia,
Dyirbal represents a unique situation. In most morphologically
ergative languages it can be easily demonstrated that the morpho-
logy' does not dii^ctlj'- represent the grammatical relations reflected
by the sj-ntactic rules of the language, Dixon (1972), hofwever, has
claimed that absolutive and ergative, rather than subject and object,
are the relevant grammatical relations in Dyirbal, This paper exam-
ines the evidence supporting Dixon's claim that Dyirbal is syntac-
tically ergative and shows how this evidence is equally' supportive
of a nominative-accusative anal^^sis in which subject and object are
the grammatical relations referred to by the syntactic rules of
Dj'irbai, In addition to the data provided by Subject-Subject-Equi-
NP-Deletion, Conjunction Reduction, Helativization and Reflexiviza-
tion discussed in Dixon (1972), Imperative Deletion and Object-Sub-
ject-Equi-NP-Deletion offer two sets of data which can adequately
be accounted for by a subject-object analysis, but not by an abso-
lutive -ergative analysis.
Prior to an examination of Dyirbal, a few examples from Tongan and Avar
are presented to show the typical situation in morphologically ergative lang-
uages. Then Dixon's analysis of Dyirbal as a syntactically ergative language
will be coiT?3ar6d to an alternative subject-object analysis. The two analyses
are then evaluated in terms of cross -linguistic evidence and the predicticxis
they make for the other parts of the grammar of Dyirbal, Here not only do
cross -linguistic precedence arguments favor the subject-object analysis, but
the language internal evidence, conprlsed of two sets of data ^rtiich the subject-
object analysis can adequately account for, but which the absolutive -ergative
analysis cannot, includes a counterexample to Dixon's analysis.
Ergativity has traditionally referred to languages in which intransi-
tive subjects and direct objects ate marked by the same morphological form
and transitive subjects are marked by another morphological form. In some
languages morphological ergativity is indicated by case marking, as shown by
the Tongan examples in (l):
(1) Tongan (Chung, 1976a)
a, Ergative Case Marking:
Verb or »a Subject (intrans)
e Subject or 'a Direct Object (trans)
b. (intrans) »oku fu'f hela'ia 'a 'Alani 'i he ngaue
prog very tired abs Alan caus the work
'Alan is very tired because of work.'
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c, 'oku fa'u 'e hoku tolcuoa 'a e tepile
prog make erg my sibling abs the table
•>i3' brother is making a table.'
Verb agreement can also be ergative, as it is in Avar:
(2) Avar (Comrie, forthcoming)
a. vas V- ekerule
boy -abs sg/masc/abs-run
• The boy runs , •
b. jas J- ekerule
girl-abs sg/fem/abs-run
•The girl runs,'
c. vas -as: jas j- ec:ula
boy -erg girl-abs sg/fem/abs -praise
"The boy praises the girl.'
In morphologically ergative languages the NPs which are in nominative
case, as in (l), and the NPs which control verb agreement, as in (2), have
been referred to as absolutives. Transitive subjects are referred to as
ergatives.
Since nominative case marking and control of verb agreement have been
generally regarded as properties of subjects, the applicability of the notion
subject has been questioned for ergative languages, A more detailed examin-
ation of subjects shows that in addition to morphological properties like
nominative case marking and control of verb agreement being cross -linguisti-
cally characteristic of subjects, there are also certain syntactic properties
associated with subjects. Some of the properties are the ability to delete
under Equi-NP-Deletion and Conjunction Reduction, the ability to control but
not undergo clause -bounded Reflexivization, and the ability to vindergo Sub-
ject -to-Subject Raising, In morphologically ergative languages in a transi-
tive sentence, it is not the nominative NP which syntactically patterns with
the intransitive subject, but the ergative NP. The examples in (3) show that
Equi-NP-Deletion deletes subjects rather than absolutives in Tongan,
(3) a. pea na'e "alu 'a e tangata'' 'o folau mama'o
and past go abs the man coap sail far
'Then the man went andsailed away.'
_
b, na'e 'alu 'a e tangata'' 'o taa'i 'a e kuli
past go abs the men comp hit abs the dog
'The man went and hit the dog.'
c, -x-na'e 'alu 'a e fefine'''o u'u 'e he kulI
past go abs the woman comp bite erg the dog
(The womanj^went the dog bit 0^))
In (li) both transitive and intransitive subjects, but not objects, undergo
Subject-to-Subject-Raising in Tongan:
(U) a. 'e lava 'a e pipe 'o lea
\mm can abs the baby comp talk
•The baby can talk,'
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b, 'oku ou lava 'o ongo'i 'a e tame 'a mei he fale ko e
prog I can comp hear abs the music from the house pred that
'I can hear the music (coming) from that house,'
c, *na'e lava 'a e fefine 'o taa'i 'e Sione
past can abs the woman comp hit erg ^ione
(The woman^ can John hit 0.,)
As exemplified by Tongan, morphological ergativity does not correspond
to syntactic ergativity. The grammatical relation of subject is applicable
to morphologically ergative languages. The term absolutive only reflects
the common morphology of the intransitive subject and the direct object.
Ergative is not a graranatical relation but a case marking used for transitive
subjects.
In order for a langiaage to be syntactically ergative the syntactic rules
of the language must treat absolutive and ergative as grammatical relations.
Johns en il91h) attempted to characterize a hierchary of grammatical illations
which would be applicable to syntactically absolutive -ergative languages as
well as subject-object languages, ^ Grammatical relations were ranked, the
Specific relation of each rank being determined by the particular grammatical
relations a language possessed. Thus absolutive represents the highest gram-
matical relation in Dj^irbal, parallel to the relation of subject in languages
like English, The ergative is the equivalent of the second highest relation
of direct object. In Dyirbal the dative case marks an oblique or chStaer simi-
lar to the passive agent by-phrase in English, In the following discussion
of Dyirbal this terminology will be adapted to^ facilitate a conqDarison of the
analyses, Absolutive, ergative, oblique, subject, and direct object will
refer to grammatical relations; nominative, instrumental, and dative will be
reserved for case marking,
^
The subject of an intransitive sentence in Dyirbal is in nominative,
as shown in (5), The sentences in (6) sho;^ the three possibilities for
expressing an (at least underlj'ingly) transitive sentence. All three senten-
ces fundamentally express the same thing: in (6a) the relationship between
patient, agent, and verb is viewed as one event; in (6b) the dative NP is
affected by the action of the agent^ in (6c) the degree of success of the
action on the patient is not clear?
(5) bayi yafa bani-pu
cm n man n coin9<rnon-rut
•man came'
(6) a, balan ^ugumbil bangul yafangu balgan
cm n woman n cm i man i hit-non-fut
b, bayi ya^a bagun ^ugumbilgu balgal-i^a-^u
cm n man n cm d woman d hit-nay-non-fut
c, bayi ya^i bar^gun ^ugumbijni balgal-ija-pu
cm n man n cm i woman i hit-nay-non-fut
•man hit woman'
In an analysis treating Dyirbal as an abs olutive -ergative language,
(6a) would be ccnsidered to be closest to the underlying structure of a
transitive sentence. The transitive subject is in inatrumental case, which
corresponds to the ergative relation and the object is in nominative case,
as is the intransitive subject in (5). The other two sentence types could
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be transformationally derived from the structure \inderlying (6a), In (7)
Antipassive promotes the underlying ergative to absolutive and the underly-
ing absolutive is demoted to an oblique NP. °
(7) a. balan (Jugumbil bai^gul ya^ar^gu balan
cm n woman n cm i man i hit-non-fut s
(absolutive) (ergative)
b, bayi yafa bagun cjugumbilgu balgal-J)a-/iu
cm n man n cm d woman d hit-nay-non-fut
(absolutive) (oblique)
After Antipassive has applied to promote the underlying ergative and demote
the underlying absolutive, a rule of Dative Promotion could apply to promote
the oblique NP to an ergative relation as shown in (8), 7
(8) a* bayi yafa bagun ^ugumbilgu balgal-^a-_pu
cm n man n cm d woman d hit-nay-non-fut
-_^ y(absolutive) (oblique)
b« bayi ya^a bar^gun ^uguii4)ipi balgal-na^^u
cm n man n cm' i woman i hit-ijay-non-fut
(absolutive) (ergative)
This absolutive -ergative analysis of Dyirbal accovmts for the fact
that only absolutives can be deleted by Equi-NP-Deletion and Ccxijunction
Reduction and that only absolutives can undergo Re lativization and trigger
but not undergo Reflexivization, as shown in the following examples.
Equi-NP-Deletion: only nominative NPs delete
(9) balan cjugumbil barjgul yaj:ar)gu manda-n
cm n woman n cm i meui i take -non-fut
•man took woman*
(10) a. balam miran baijgun (^ugumbipi babi-n
cm n beans n cm i woman i scrape -non-fut
b« balan ^ugumbil bagum mira^gu babil-ija-pu
cm n woman n cm d beans d scrape -na-non-fut
'woman scrape beans
'
(11) a. *balan cjugumbil bangul ya^angu raunda-n " balam miran babi-n
cm n woman n cm i man 1 take-non-fut cm n beans-n scrape-non-f
b. balan ^ugumbil baifgul ya^angu munda-n bagum mir^gu babll-i^a-pu
-"
'-
- take-ncai-fut cm d beans d scrape-nay-no
si ' fll
cm n woman n cm i man i
man took woman to scrape beans' ' u
The ungrammaticality of (lla) shows that the instrumental NP in (lO) cannot be
deleted under identity with the nominative one in (9), although the nominative
NP in (10b) can be deleted, as shown in (lib).
Conjunction Reduction: only nominative NPs delete
(12) bayi yaja bani-^u
cm n man n come -non-fut
'man came'
(13) a, balan ^ugumbil baijgul yaraijgu balga-n
cm n woman n cm i man i hit-non-fut
b, bayi ya^a bagun ^ugumbilgu balgal-na«^u
.
cm n man n cm d woman d hit-nay-non-fut
'man hit woman'
(lii) a. *bayi ya^a bani-pu balan ^ugumbil balga-n
cm n man n cQme-non-fut cm n woman n hit-non-fut
b, bayi yaj:a bani-pu bagun dugnimbilgu -balgal-i^a-^iu
cm n man n come-non-fut cm d woman d hit-i^ay-non-fut
'man came and hit woman'
The nominative IIP in (12) can delete the nominative NP in (l3b) zander identity
but not the instrumental NP in (l3a),
Relativization: only nominative NP can be relativized
(1$) a. bayi yajra bagal-i)a-nu bagul yuj'igu banagsynu
cm n man n ^spear-i^ay-rel cm d kangaroo -d7 retum-non-fut
'man who speared kangaroo is returning' (bayi yara \0)
b, -Ji-bayi yapra /baga-^u bayi yu^iZ banaganu
cm n man n spear-rel cm n kangaroo n retum-non-fut
(man who speared kangaroo is returning) (bai^gul yaj'angu .^ 0)
c, -x-bayi yafa ^alan 4iigumbil huTa-na-pn/ wayndin
cm n man n cm n woman n watch-nay-rel go uphill-non-fut
(man watched by woman is going upnill) (bagul yaragu > 0)
Reflexivization : only nominative NP can control clausebounded Reflexivization
(l6) a, bayi ya^a buyba-yiri-;?.u
cm n man n hide-raflex-non-fut
b, ---bai^gul yararjgu buyba-yiri-^u
cm i man i hide-reflex-non-fut
c, ^-bagul yaragu buyba-yiri-;iu
cm d man d hide-reflex-non-fut
'man hid himself'
This absolutive-ergative analysis will be compared with the following
subject-object analysis. In this analysis (6a) i& claimed to be closest to
the underlying structure of transitive sentences. The subject is marked
with nominative case and the object ;d.th dative case. The -nay suffix marks
the verb as being active transitive. In the derivation of (oa) Passive
applies, promoting the object to subject and demoting the subject to an
oblique NP marked by instrumantal case. The verb is intransitivized by the
deletion of -gay . Object Demotion would apply in the derivation of senten-
ces like (6c), The object is demoted to an oblique NP and marked by the
instrunental case.
The iiubject-object analysis also account'? for the facts about Equi-
NP-Deletion, Conjunction Reduction, Relativization, and Reflexivization
in (9)-(l6), The nominative NPs which were absolutives in the absolutive-
ergative analysis are subjects in the subject-object analysis. Both analy-
ses v/ork equally' well in accounting for these data because they are mirror
images of each other. Each analysis chooses one sentence whose structure
is closest to the underlying form of a transitive sentence and derives the
other two sentence types by appropriate transformations. What is underly-
ing in one analysis is derived in the other and vice versa. Because the
nominative case reflects the highest grammatival relation in both analyses,
transfonrjations referring to stirface subjects or surface absolutives will
not distinguish between the two analyses. One way to evaluate the compet-
ing analyses is to find other areas of the grammar of Dyirbal for which the
two anal;/ses make different predictions and see which one is correct. Rules
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referring to the jecond highe-st grammatical relation, yuch as Objcct-oub-
ject-Equi, ought to, as well as rulej referring to underlying subjects.
9
Two sets of data dealing with t3uch areas of the gratninar of i3yirbal are
discussed below.
Lower subjects can oe deleted only under identity with terms. Thus,
in English a direct object can trigger deletion, out a passive -agent (chd-
raer) cannot.
(17) a. i'-lary told Bob to go.
b. -K-Mary was told by Bob to go.
(with the reading 'Bob go'
)
In Dyirbal a dative NP can trigger deletion of a nominative NP, but an
instrumental NP cannot,
(18) a. bayi yaj:a bagun ^ugumbilgu giga-i)a-jiu bagum mirsyigu
cm n man n cm d woman d tell-nay -non -fut cm d beans d
babil-i^a-jiu
scrape -nay -non-fut
'man told woman to scrape the beans'
b. -M-bayi yara bai^gun dugumbipi giga-i)a-/iu bagum mira^pgu
cm n man n cm i woman i tell-^ay-non-fut cm d beans d
babil-i^a-AU
scrape -nay -nu
(man told woman to scrape beans)
c. -w-bayi ya^^a bangun ^ugumbiru giga-n bagum mirajigu
cm n man n cm i woman i tell-non-fut cm d beans d
babil-i)ay-.nu
scrape -r^ay-non-fut
(womanitold man (for) 0^ to scrap? beans)
A subject-object analysis correctly predicts that objects ( in dative case)
can trigger deletion, but that oblique (instmunental) NPs cannot. An abso-
lutive-ergative analysis incorrectly predicts that ergatives (instrumental
NPs) should be able to trigger deletion and that dative case NPf should not
be aole to. Thus, the subject-object analysis correctly predicts that dat-
ive NPs represent the direct object grammatical relation and that instrumen-
tal NPs a e not terms.
Another sire a of the grammar which provides evidence distinguishing
between the two analyses is Imperative jDeletion. lOXhe following three sen-
tences demonstrate how Imperative Deletion applies in I^^irbal.
(19) a. (ninda) bani
(2sg-n) come
'come J
'
b. (ninda) bagul yafagu balgal-ga
(2sg-n) cm d man d hit-ijay
'hit the mani
'
c, (ninda) bayi ya^ balga
(2sg-n) cm n man n hit
'hit the man!
I
(let 1j„^jthe man be hit!)
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A subject-object analysis predicts that subjects of imperatives will
be deleted and an absolutive-ergative analysis predicts that aosolutivea
will oe deleted. An exajnination of the examples in (19) shows that only
in the subject-object analysis is it possible to capture the relevant gen-
eralization about Imperative Deletion. In (l9a) the subject of an active
intransitive sentence is deleted in the subject-object analysis. In the
absolutive-ergative analysis the absolutive is deleted. In (l9b) the tran-
sitive subject of an active transitive sentence is deleted in the subject-
object analysis. In the absolutive-ergative analj'sis a derived absolutive
(underlying ergative) is deleted from a derived intransitive sentence. In
(I9c) the passive agent (or underlying subject) of a derived intransitive
sentence is deleted. In the absolutive-ergative analysis the ergative ic
deleted from an active transitive sentence,
/or the subject-object analysis the generalization about Imperative
Deletion is that underlying subjects delete, .'"or the absolutive-ergative
analysis there is no clear generalization referring to only one grammatical
relation. It appears that in intransitive (derived and underlying) senten-
ces, the absolutive is deleted and that in transitive sentences, the erga-
tive is deleted. Evaluation of the two generalizations shows the subject-
object analysis to be preferred. Not OTily does it capture the generaliza-
tion that the underlying subject deletes, but is does so without resorting
to unprecedented grammatical relations.
Perhaps one objection to the subject-object analysis of Imperative
Deletion in Dyirbal is that it allows passive imperatives. This objection
is easily answered by the fact that other languages, like haori, Javanese,
and Bahasa Indonesian, also allow passive imperatives. In Maori the dis-
tribution of the active sentence is so marked that active imperatives are
ungramraabical, as shown in (20), Imperative Deletion applies to delete the
passive agent, that is, the underlying subject,
(20) Kaori (Chung, 1976a)_
a. tua-ina te rakau
fell-pass the tree
•fell the tree I'
b. -Ktua-i te rakau
fell-act the tree
(Fell the tree')
c. puhi-a
shoot -pass
'Shoot (it)!'
d. *patu te pooka
hit-act the pig
(Kill the pigl)
In passive imperatives in Javanese the underlying subject is also
deleted, as shown in (21),
(21) Javanese (Home, 1961)
a, KOntSte di-adepke" ron6.
car pass -head over that way
'Head the car over that way.'
b, Kertase' di-tulisi djenengmu!
paper pass -write name -your
•Write yoiQT name cm the paper! •
I
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Thus L^irbal is like other languages in which the passive ir; relatively
unmarked. In these languages the generalization':- aoout Imperative :)eletion
seems to be to delete the underlying subject. The subject-object analysis
can correctly account for the facts about Imperative Deletion in iJyirbal,
since Dyiroal behaves like other subject-object languages in which the dis-
tribution of the passive construction is less restricted than in English.
This cross -linguistic data argues against Dixon's (1977) position that pas-
sives are universally the more morphologically complex and restricted in
distribution than the active. There are languages in which the distribution '
passive is less restricted than that of the actj.ve. The situation in Kaori
(Chung, 1976a) parallels that fo'jnd in Dyirbal. The passive occurs in main
clauses and the active usually occurs in reduced or subordinate clauses.
While all main clauses in haori are passive, some main clause in Dyirbal do
occur in the active, as in the topic chain in (22).
(22) balagara ^urmangu bu^-alga/iu
two people-n track-d see-ijay-non-fut
'the two (women) saw the (man's) track (i.e. the path worn by his con-
stant travel to and from the scrub).' (Text XV, 12)
In languages like Javanese and Bahasa Indonesian the passive also has
a relatively unrestricted distribution. Thus, when one is faced with decid-
ing between a subject-object analysis with an unmarked passive similar to
passive in other languages or an absolutive-ergative analysis which proposes
grammatical relations which have not been attested in any other langiiage,
the preferred analysis is the subject-object analysis. Although the syntac-
tic evidence from Imperative Deletion and Object-ouoject-Equi indicates the
active transitive sentence is the more morphologically complex -i^ construc-
tion, Dixon maintains that this construction is derived and that Dyirbal is
syntactically absolutive-ergative. This position entails the necessity of
such a language being able to refer to more than one set of primary grammati-
cal relations. This complication of the grammar of Dyirbal is avoided in
the subject-object analysis,,
^
There are two possible objections which might be raised against the
subject-object analysis of Dyirbal based on morphology: first, the active
transitive form of the verb is morphologically more complex than the intran-
sitive form, and, second, while the -i^ay suffix is absent in the Passive
derived sentence, it is present in the Object -Demotion derived sentence.
In answer to the objection that the active verb morphology is more
coraplex, it can be pointed out that in the Malaysian languages in which there j
is more than one kind of passive, the non-intentional passive is less com- i
plex than the active transitive, j
(23) Bahasa Indonesian (R, MacDonald, 1976)
a, Ali men-yangka saya orang Palembang
Ali trans -thought I man Palembang
'Ali thought that I was a Palembang man,'
b, Saya Ali sangka orang Palembang
I Ali thought man Palembang
'Ali thought that I was a Palembang man' (passive)
c, Ali meng-anggap soal itu beres
Ali trans -considered problem the settled
'Ali considered the problem settled,'
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(23) (con't)
d. ;/oal itu Ali anggap be res
problem the Ali considered settled
'Ali considered the pboblem settled,' (passive)
Thus it is not the case that crosslinguistically the pasisive form of the
verb is more complex than the active.
^v'ith regards to the objection that the
-qiay suffix is not deleted in
Object Demotion derived sentences, two replies are available, j^irst, it
is not the case that morphology always corresponds directly to the syntax
of a lang-uage, For example, in Walbiri, a morphologically' ergative language,
the subject of an Antipassive derived sentence remains ergative ly marked,
(2U) Walbiri (Comrie, forthcoming)
a, Nat uluj.u ka-^a wawiri Juwaqi
Isg-erg tense -Isg kangaroo-abs shoot
•I £im shooting the kangaroo,*
b, Nat^ululu ka-na-la-t inta wawiri-ki luwani
Isg-erg* tenSe-lsg-3sg-dat-intran kangaroo-dat shoot
•I am shooting at the kangaroo,'
Comrie(forthcoiiiing) points out that in Basque the subject remains ergative
and the auxiliary verb is marked tjith a third person singular patient after
Object Deletion applies, as shown in (25). Catford (1975) discueses ergative
marking on subjects in Chechen and Dargi after Object Incorporation or
Object Deletion, rules which are similar to an Object Demotion Antipassive,
(25) Basque (Bakaikoa, personal communication)
a, guk zuei artikulua irakurri d-i-zue-gu
Ipl 2pl-dat article-def read 3sg-aux-2pl-lpl
'We read the article to you,'
b, guk zuei irakurri d-i-zue-gu
Ipl 2pl-dat read 3sg-aux-2pl-lpl
'We read to you,'
Perhaps a second reason why the -way suffix is not deleted in the Object
Deraoticai construction in Dyirbal is the ambiguity which would result from the
merger of the passive with the Object Demotion derived structure. Both have
nominative and instnimental NPs, The free word order in Dyirbal would not
distinguish whether the nominative "HP was an underlying subject and Object
Demotion had applied or whether it was a derived subject and Passive had
applied. The presence or absence of -nay distinguishes between these two
constructions involving a nominative NP and an instrumental NP,
One problematic area for both analyses of Dyirbal is the prcaioun sys-
tem. The chart in (2?), taken from Dixon (1972), has been annotated to make
explicit the correspondences of case marking to the grammatical relations of
each analysis. In the absolutive -ergative analysis absolutive intransitive
subjects and absolutive objects have different case marking. Transitive sub-
jects are marked with the sane form as intransitive subjects (except for sing-
ular pronouns in the Giramay dialect). Dative case represents absolutive
objects. In the subject-object analysis tha dative case represents the direct
object relation, Dixon's (O) forms are subjects derived from Passive, The
(S) and (a) forms represent underlying subjects; passive agents have the same
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pronoun form as do other underlying subjects, that is, the transitive sub-
jects in the -nay construction and underlying intransitive subjects. A
passive subjectTs distinguished form suJ'face subjects which were underly-
ing by the suffixation of -na cf -ga to the pronoun form referring to under-
lying subjects.
This use of -na/-:Pa is also found optionally v;ith proper and common
names, usually referring to humans and other animates. Thus object NPs (in
dative case) have two forms; so do underlying objects which have been pas-
sivized to derived subjects.
(26) underlying subject:
luiderlying object:
derived passive subject:
burbula (only)
^
burbulagu ,buTbalyiangu
burbula, burbal^a
'burbula' (name)
This optional process seems to have been made obligatory for derived pronom-
inal subjects. The problem of mapping the case morphology of the pronoun
system onto grammatical relations has a simple solution in the subject-
object analysis: underlying subjects have one form; derived passive sub-
jects have an obligatory suffixj surface objects have another form. In the
absolutive-ergative analysis there does not seem to be a clear generaliza-
tion about the relationship of case marking in the pronoun system to the
grammatical relations of absolutive and ergativej one form is used for all
derived subject absolutives, all ergatives, amd some underlj'ing subject
absolutives. These data have led Dixon (197?) to conclude that some parts
of languages can and/or must refer to subjects, -"-^
(2 7)Dyirbal pronoun system (Dixon 1972 :$0)
Abs -Erg Sintrans/Atrans abi obliqueNP
Analysis (GtSccly) (G;Aonly) object dative
Sub-Ob j underlying Sub derived object NP
Analysis (G:Sintrans) (G:Strans) passive sub
person-
number
person-
number
G 5ayba
DM r^a^a
na^£
gayguna
paygungu
ijaygungu
G r^ali
D ijali^i
K ijali
ijalyia
ijali^ina
9alina
ijaLyiangu
i)ali^ingu
ijalingu
Idu
G ijana
D ijan^i
M ^ana
i^anapa
^ana^ina
r^anana
i^anapangu
gana^ingu
^anangu
Ipl
G ijinba
DM jiinda
i)ind£ ijina
^inuna
ijtnungu
r^inungu
2sg
G Tiiibila^i
D ;iubala^i
M j;mbala
pubila<^ina
/lubala^ina
pubalana
pubila(^ingu
jiubala^ingu
jiubalangu
2du
G pura
D ^ura^i
M jiuray
purapa
pura^ine
purana
;iura;iangu
pura^ingu
purangu
2pl
In sunmarj'', it seems that all of the evidence presented in this paper
leads to the conclusion that Dyirbal is not syntactically ergative, A com-
parison of the two competing analyses has shown the subject-object analysis
not only to have crosslinguistic precedence, but also to make correct pre-
dictionc about specific facts about Dyirbal for other parts of the grammar.
It was first pointed out that while the subject-object analysis rnade the
implicit claim that the passive was unmarked in Dyirbal, this situation was
found to occur in other Janguages, Maori representing an extrene case, in
which the active has a very marked distributicai. The fact that such lang-
uages may not be as common as those in which the active is unmarked doss
not justify positing the elsewhere unattested grammatical relations of abso-
lutive and ergative.
The subject-object analysis was shown to make correct predictions
about the grammatical relation of dative NPs« The were shown to be able
to trigger Object-Subject-Equi-NP-Deletion, an argument for their status
as the second highest grammatical relation. In Imperative Deletion the
subject-object analysis was able to capture the generalization that under-
lying subjects were deleted. It was shown that in other languages allowing
passive imperatives, the passive agent, that is, the underlying subject,
is also deleted. Maori provided an example of a language in vrtiich impera-
tives could only be passive.
Two possible objections about the verbal morphology in the subject-
object analysis were shown to have parallels in other languages. The rela-
tive complexity of the transitive sentence is not unprecedented. The reten-
tion of the -nay suffix in sentences with demoted objects was shown to have
parallels in the retention of ergative case marking in formally intransitive
sentences in other languages, again demonstrating that surface morphology
is not always a valid indication of the the syntax of a language. A disam-
biguating function was also mentioned. The pronoun system of Dyirbal was
presented and shown to have a relationship with the grammatical relations
of subject and object, but not absolutive and ergative.
While not conclusive, I hope that this initial evaltution of these
two competing analyses has shown that not only is the subject-object ana-
lysis to be preferred because it accounts for the core data without recourse
to unprecedented grammatical relations, but because crosslinguistic evidence
and language internal facts show that of the two analyses, only it can
adequately account for Dyirbal syntax.
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In "Kappoteur's introduction and suiranarj' for the section on "Are
Australian Languages Syntactically Nominative -Ergative or Nominative -Accu-
satice?" in Dixon (1976), Blake has the following remarks about the distri-
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Dution of ergativity in Australian language^: : 'The evidence availaole is
not overwhelmingly strong, but the indications are that the typical Aus-
tralian language is syntactically nominative -accusative. Cn the other hand
Dyirbal is syntactically nominative -ergative, and it is the only Australian
language that has been clearly documented as being ergative in syntax."
(Dixon, 1976:ii88)
^^or a more extensive listing of subject properties, see Keenan (1976),
•^Jol-jnson (197U) proposes the following Generalized Accessibility
Hierarchy: Primary > Secondary ^ 10 ^ Oblique NP > .c. _^ chwner
^Dixon (1972) distinguishes an ergative case and an instrumental case
although they are morphologically identical. Rather than maintain this dis-
tinction, the two kinds of NPs will be treated as being marked with the same
case out as representing two grammatical relations. In Dyirbal instrumental
(true instruments) and coramitative NPs can be promoted to surface subject
in the -m(b)al construction, but agent NPs in instrumental case cannot. This
distinction is similar to the one between the ability of instruments, loca-
tives, and other obliq\ie3, but not passive agents, to undergo passive under
certain consitions. The fact that instruments but not agents can undergo
-m(b)al promotion can be accoiinted for by both analj'ses. In an absolutive-
ergative analysis the inability of the ergative to be promoted indicates that
it is a distinct grammatical relation. However, since this implies that erg-
ative NPs are very low on the Generalized Accessability Hierarchy, it is per-
haps more problematical for the absolutive -ergative analysis than for the
nominative -accusative analysis in which these non-promotable NP are treated
as passive agents.
The distinction between sentences like (6b) and (6c) is difficult to
make explicit. In order not to misrepresent the situation, the following
comment by Dixon (1972:66) is offered: "The difference between (examples
parallel to (6c)) and (examples parallel to (6b)) is felt by speakers of
Dyirbal to be a crutial and important onej it cannot be brought out through
English glosses, but is explained in terms of the 'deep syntax', «• Roughly,
in (examples parallel to (6c)) the actor, goal, and action make up an event;
(examples parallel to (6b)) imply something more -- that the actor is posi-
tively implicating the goal in the event. The difference is essentially one
of topic.'*
Use of the term Antipassive to characterize this kind of rule is per-
haps misleading, especially for languages in which ergativity is a morpholo-
gical phenomenon. In terms of grammatical relations, the rule is best refer-
red to as Object Demotion, The effect of this demotion is to intransitivize
the verb, which, in a morphologically ergative language, like West Circassian,
results in absolutive (nominative) case marking on the subject and oblique
(often identical with ergative) case marking on the demoted object. Note thatj
when the transitive subject is marked with the same case as obliques, the sur-
face morphology appears to have switched the cases of the absolutive NP, the
direct object, and the ergative NP, transitive subject. Actually the subject
is unaffected by the rule; the only change is the demotion of the diject.
Wept Circassian (Anderson, 1976)
(i)p:sasa-m c'9y-aj» ya-d-a
girl-^rg cherkessa-abs 3sg-(3sg)-sew-pres/trans |
'The girl is sewing the cherkessa.
•
X
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(ii) p:sasa-r c 'ay-em ya-d-a
girl-abs cherkessa- obi 3sg-(3sg)-sew-pras/intrans
'The girl is sewing on the cherkessa.
'
•7
This is not the only possible relationally based absolutive— erga-
tive analysis. An alternative would be to posit two Antipassives, one
de.-noting absolutives to obliques and another demoting absolutive s to the
second grammatical relation, ergative. Viihat all relationally based treat-
ments would have in common is that the ergative NP would represent the
second highest relation and the dative case would not. Johnson (197^1)
tentatively proposes such a hierarchy of grammatical relations for an abso-
ergative analysis, (See note 3.)
Q
George (1975) proposed an alternative analysis of Dyirbal in which
he posits structures underlying sentences like (6b) as closest to the under-
lying representation of transitive sentences. This is all that his analy-
sis has in common with the one which follows,
^Because the data for idiom argument? which could be used to establish
which structure is underlying and which is derived is not available for Dyir-
bal, distinguishing between underlying and derived subjects will have to
rely cai other tests, such as Imperative Deletion. (See discussion of (19).)
^'^Imperative Deletion involves the pronoun system of I)yirbal,and the
relaticyiship of the surface case morphology to grammatical relations. (See
discussion of (27).)
^•'•In Dixon (1977) i't is suggested that some transformations universally
result in the sane syntactic effect in every language in which they occur.
^ypotheses regarding the possible kinds of 'split' syntactic ergativity fall
essentially' into two categories! those in which the syntax is split according
to levels; either deep, shallow, surface, or cyclic, post and/or last cyclic,
and those in which certain kinds of rules are sensitive to one of the possi-
ble sets of grammatical relations. The first positicxi was basically that
apopted by George (1975) in an earlier relational grammar treatment of Dyir-
balj cyclic rules applied to a nominative -accusative syntax, then post cyclic
rules applied to an absolutive -ergative syntax. However, in this analysis
rules like Equi-NP-Deletion are treated as post-cyclic. The second position
can be found in Woodbury's (1977) treatment of Greenlandic Eskimo where he
posits a neutral NP hierarchy and general principals for determining the pos-
sible ranges of absolutive -ergative and nominative -accusative rules. Gener-
ally, absolutive -ergative relations are posited for morphological rules,
rather than relation changing rules. The few exceptions to this include
rules like Causative Clause Union and Antipassive (Object Demotion, see note
6), Close examination of these rules shows that not only is a neutral NP
hierarchy unnecessary, but the notion of absolutive -ergative grammatical
relaticais is unnecessary as wel]^ since the only evidence for such relations
is morphological J case marking and verb agreement rulae can apply to the out-
put of relation changing rules, as has been shown by Chung (1976a) and Harris
(1976), Note that in a language like Georgian where the system of case mark-
ing is determined by tense, aspect/and verb classes, the grammatical rela-
tions of subject, object, indirect object, etc, only make sense in view of
their sjnitactic behaviorial properties, not morphological coding properties.
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Note that in Dyirbal passives Lhe pronounc referring to the passive
,
subject and the passive agent are both in nominative case, but t,he derived I
passive subject is suffixed with -naZ-ga. This parallels the .orphology I
of lassives in Inibab'^a Quechua in whfch the passive subject is obligatorily |
marked as a topic with -ca. This distinguishes it from the passive agent^ '
a nominative case chdiner. Note that in Imbabura Quechua the verb agrees [
with the derived subject in number and person. '
(i) nuca-ca pai-lla maca-shca ka-ni
lS£-top 3sg-just hit-pass be-isg •! was hit by him.'
(ii) kan-guna fiuca-chi yach-chi-shca ka-ngui-chi
2-pl 1-pl know-caus-pass be-2-pl 'You are taught by us.'
because passive agents are not marked by instrumental case, there are two mor-
phological forms of passive in D irbal. As showi above, in the pronoun system |
it is parallel to Imbabura Quechua. In the noun system the passive agent's ,
demotion is indicated by instrumental case and the subject is optionally suf- '
fixed with -aa/-jia «
j
(i) ijayguna ijinda balga-n
i
1 sg-na 2 sg hit-non-fut 'I was hit by you' '
(ii) bayi yaj-a baggun (^ugumbipi balga-n
cm n man n cm i woman i hit-.ion-fut 'the man was hit by the woman
/or a language to have two forms of passive is not unprecedented. In Bahasa
Indonesian (see Chung, 1976b) the distribution of the two passives seems to
be similar to that of the two in Dyirbal} in general the non -canonical pas-
sive is used with first and second imderlying subjects. Appartently this ten-
dency may reflect an earlier stage in which the tendency was a restriction on
third person underlying subjects; the canonical passive was supposed to have
j
been used in these cases,
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ON ERGATIVITY IN SELECTED SOUTH ASIAN LANGUAGES"
Yajiiuna Kachru
Rajeshwari Pandharipande
In a recent paper, it has been suggested that morpho-
logical ergativity may be "a consequence of syntactic erga-
tivity and/or various types of semantic markings" (Dixon
1977, section 3.0). In this study, we examine data from
a number of South Asian languages to determine (a) if these
languages are syntactically and/or morphologically ergative
and (b) in case they are morphologically ergative, if it
is a consequence of syntactic ergativity or if it is condi-
tioned by the semantic nature of NP's, verbs or Aspect-tense.
We conclude that in the languages we have looked at, there
is no evidence for syntactic ergativity. They may, however,
be said to be morphologically ergative. But their morpholo-
gical ergativity is not conditioned by any semantic marking
and seems to be simply a consequence of the historical de-
velopment.
1.0 In a recent paper [Pandharipande and Kachru 1977), we dis-
cussed the phenomenon of ergativity in Hindi-Urdu in the framework
of Relational Grajimiar (Postal and Perlmutter 1976, Johnson 1974).
In this paper, we attempt to look at ergativity in a wider context,
namely, in the context of following South Asian languages: Bengali,
Hindi-Urdu, Kashmiri, Marathi and Nepali. These languages represent
both the inner (Hindi-Urdu) and outer group (Bengali and Marathi) of
New Indo-Aryan (Chatter jee 1926), an Indo-Aryan language outside India
(Nepali) and a Dardic language (Kaslimiri). These languages provide
us with a spread which is interesting both from theoretical as well
as typological points of view. In particular, we examine whether erga-
tivity in these South Asian languages is determined by the semantic
nature of Noun Phrases (NP's, hereafter). Verbs (V's, hereafter),
or Aspects-Tenses.
This study follows the format used in our earlier paper (Pandhari-
pande and Kachru 1977) and proceeds as follows. First, we discuss
morphological ergativity in the languages under consideration in terms
of case (or postposition) marking and verbal agreement (section 2.0).
Next, we determine if the morphological ergativity in these languages
is "a consequence of syntactic ergativity and/or various types of
semantic marking" (Dixon 1977, section 3.0). The final section states
our conclusions.
2.0 A language is said to be ergative if the intransitive sub-
ject (SI, hereafter) is treated in the same manner as the transitive
object (DO, hereafter), and differently from the transitive subject
(ST, hereafter). The clearest evidence of such different treatment
is in the case (or postposition/preposition) narking: in ergative
languages, the ST is marked differently from both SI and DO. In the
following sub-section, the marking of SI, ST and DO in each of the
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languages under consideration is discussed separately. Any effect
such marking has on verbal agreement is also pointed out.
2.1 In Bengali, neither the SI nor the ST or DO is marked with
special inflection or postposition. Only an animate definite object
is followed by the accusative/dative postposition ke^. Consider the
following sentences:
1. ami barT jacchT
I home go 1st p.
I am going home.
2. turn! barT jaccho
you home go 2nd p.
You are going home.
3. se barT jacche
he/she home go 3rd p.
He/she is going home.
4. arnra barT jacchT
we home go 1st p.
We are going home.
5. chelera barT jacche
boys home go 3rd p.
The boys are going home.
6. amT boT por I am
I book read 1st p.
I read a book.
7. se boT porlo
he book read 2nd p.
He read a book. 4
ff
8. ma cheleke daklen
,
J
mother boy ace. called hon.
^j
Mother called the boy.
'J
I
9. se tomake dakchilo M
he you ace. call was 2nd p. M
He was calling you. 1
Notice that in each of the above examples, the SI as well as ST
)
is unmarked and only the DO in 8-9 is marked with the accusative post-
j
position k£. The verb shows agreement in person (1st, 2nd, 3rd),
j
and honorific (sentence 8). We need not discuss the case of Bengali
]
any further, as Bengali does not show any overt marking for ergativity. i
We shall, however, come back to Bengali later in our discussion (sec- !;
tion 5.0). !
2.2 Unlike Bengali, in Hindi-Urdu, the transitive verb in the
perfective requires the agent to be marked with a special agentive
113
postposition ne
,
e.g., compare the following non-perfective and per-
fective sentences with intransitive and transitive verbs:
10. larka sota he / soya
boy sleeps / slept niasc. sg.
The boy sleeps/ slept.
11. lerki sotT he / soT
girl sleeps / slept fern. sg.
The girl sleeps/sleot
.
12. me sota hu
I sleep 1st p. masc. sg.
I sleep.
13. jiarke/ ne kitab parhT
(larkTJ
(boy / ag. book read
(girlj
The boy/girl read the book.
Jiarkef ne axbar oarha
MarkTj
jboy > ag. newspaper read
(girl
j
The boy/girl read the newspaper.
15. ne ne kitab parhT
I ag. book read
I read the book.
16. me ne axbar parha
I ag. newspaper read
I read the newspaper.
Notice that neither the SI in 10-12, nor the DO in 13-16 are marked
with any postposition, whereas the ST in 13-16 is followed by the
post-position ne. Notice further that in 10-12, the verb agrees with
the SI, whereas in 13-16, the verb agrees with the DO, i.e., with
kitab 'book' (fern, sg.) in 13 and 15, and axbar 'newspaper' (masc. sg.)
in 14 and 16. On the basis of data such as the above, Hindi-Urdu has
been described as an ergative language (Allen 1950). This account
of NP-marking and verbal agreement in Hindi-Urdu, however, is incom-
plete. Since the details of NP-marking and verbal agreement in Hindi-
Urdu have been discussed elsewhere (Pandharipande and Kachru 1977),
we will simply summarize them here. The following facts about Hindi-
Urdu have to be taken into" account before characterizing Hindi-Urdu
as syntactically ergative. First, some transitive verbs in the perfec-
tive do not allow the agent marked with ne, (e.g., lana 'bring'),
whereas others allow for optional marking with n£, (e.g., s ana J hna
'understand'). Second, some intransitive verbs allow the SI to be
marked with ne, (e.g., nahana 'bathe oneself, chTkna 'sneeze', etc.).
Third, the verb agreement is not sensitive to ne , it is sensitive to
any postposition. As a consequence, the verb either agrees with any
unmarked NP in the sentence, or, if all NP's are marked, shows neutral
agreement. Consider the following examples of such neutral agreement:
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17. ilerke/ ne kitabo ko utha I i ya
narkTJ
jboy 1 ag. books ace. picked took
(girl]
The boy/girl picked up the books.
18. mujhko becco ko khilana he
me dat. children ace. to feed is
I have to feed the children.
19. usse bscco ko sembhala nahT jaega
him by children ace. care not go will
He will not be able to care for the children.
Note that since all NP's in 17-19 are followed by postposition,
the verb is in the unmarked, i.e., masc. sg. form. Note also that
18 and 19 are not perfective, rather, they are modal and passive,
respectively, (see Pandharipande 1977 for a discussion of Passive in
Hindi-Urdu).
Since the ne-marker is not determined either by transitivity or
by perfective aspect, it is worth considering if the semantic nature
of NP or V conditions the occurrence of ne in Hindi-Urdu (as suggested
in Dixon 1977). Two possibilities are worth considering in this res-
pect: ne^ always marks the agent as opposed to the patient or ne_ al-
ways marks the volitional agent as opposed to the non-volitional agent.
Unfortunately, neither one of the above is borne out by the data.
Compare the following:
20. ran (ne) chTka
Ram (ag.) sneezed
Ram sneezed.
21. ran ko chTk aT
Ram dat. sneeze came
Ram sneezed.
22. ne (ne) khasa
I (ag.) coughed
I coughed.
23. mujhko khasT aT
me dat
. cough came
I coughed.
It appears as though the dative subject construction characterizes
the patient subject (in 21 and 23) whereas the agentive SI optionally
takes ne (in 20 and 22). But, consider further data:
24. bacca gira
child fell
The child fell down (accidentally or deliberately).
25. *b9cce ne gira
child ag. fell
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26. ram ne tasvTr dekhT
Ram ag. picture saw
Ram saw/looked at the picture.
27. *ran tesvTr dekha
Ram picture saw.
28. ran kitab laya
Ram book brought
Ram brought the book.
29. *ram ne kitab I aT
Rapi ag. book brought.
Ram brought the book.
30. bar is ne sara maza kirkira kar diya
rain ag. all enjoyment ruined
The rain ruined all fun.
24-30 illustrate the fact that ne does not consistently mark the
(volitional) agent in Hindi-Urdu. In dative subject construction,
the dative postposition ko does mark the experiencer (Fillmore 1968)
consistently (Kachru, Kachru, Bhatia 1976).
2.3 Nepali is similar to Hindi-Urdu in that the ST is marked
with the instrumental postposition l_e. It is different from Hindi-
Urdu in that the marking is not restricted to perfective only. Also,
the verb agreement is not affected by le^, the verb still agrees with
the ST:
31
.
ma hase
I laughed.
32. keto haso
boy laughed
The boy laughed.
33. mai le kitap parhe
I instr. book read
I read the book.
34. ketale kitap parho
boy instr. book read
The boy read the book.
The postposition le^ occurs with the third person ST in the future,
and with all subjects (i.e., both SI and ST, in all persons) in the
tenses formed with the infinitive (as in 37-40 below)
:
35. usie bhat khala
he instr. rice eat will
He will eat rice.
36. *usle ghara Jala
he instr. home go will
He will go home.
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37. usie janu pa re ha
he instr. go inf. should
He should go.
38. usIe kitap parhnu parcha
he instr. book read inf. should
He should read the book.
39. maile kitap parhnu parcha
1 instr. book read inf. should
I should read the book.
40. usle / uslai janu cha
he instr. /he dat. go imp. is
He has to go.
Notice that in case of modal constructions (37-40) the verb agree-
ment is neutral, the verb does not agree either with SI or ST. In
sentence 40, SI or ST may take either the instrumental le^ or the dative
lal . A generic ST of an imperfective (habitual present) obligatorily
takes le , as in the following:
41. rughale dukha dincha
• cold instr. suffering gives
Cold makes one suffer.
42. baghle bakhra khanchan
tigers ag. goats eat
Tigers eat goats.
43. *baghle jangalma bascha
tiger ag. forests in live
Tigers live in forests.
To complicate matters further, le may occur with the ST in the
perfective of verbs such as hacchiu garnu 'sneeze', khoknu 'cough',
etc.
:
44. usle hacchiu garo
he ag. sneeze did
He sneezed.
45. mai le khoke
I ag. coughed
I coughed.
To summarize, the distribution of le in Nepali is as follows;
46. a. Simple past and perfective tenses: all ST, some SI
b. Future: 3rd person ST only
c. Present imperfect (habitual): generic ST only
d. Vnu par-: all SI and ST (i.e., in all persons)
e. Vnu ch-: all SI and ST (i.e., in all persons)
[In e, le~lai alternate]
117
Again, it is difficult to detect any consistent semantic motivation
for this distribution.
2.4 As far as NP-marking is concerned, in Marathi , only the third
person ST is marked with the instrumental postposition ne (variant
nT) in the perfective, e.g.:
47. nT kame kelT
I jobs did 3rd pi. neuter
I did the jobs.
48. anhT kame kelT
we jobs did 3rd pi. neuter
We did the jobs.
49. tU kame kelT(_s)
you jobs did 3rd pi. neuter (2nd d.)
You did the jobs.
50. tunhT kame kelT(t)
you pi. jobs did 3rd pi. neuter (pi.)
You did the jobs.
51. tyane /tine kame kelT
he instr./she instr. jobs did 3rd pi. neuter
He/she did the jobs.
52. tyannT kame kelT
they instr. jobs did 3rd pi. neuter
They did the jobs.
Contrast the above sentences in the perfective with the following
in the imperfective:
53. ram ambe khato
Ram mango eats (masc. sg.)
Ram eats mangos.
54. sudha ambe khate
Sudha mangos eats (fem. sg.)
Sudha eats mangos.
Except for the optional second person ending in 49 and 50, the
verb agreement is similar to Hindi-Urdu. The NP-marking is different
in that in Marathi, only the third person ST is marked with ne (ni)
.
This is, however, an incompletepicture. In Marathi, the third person
SI and ST are marked with ne (ni ) in the desiderative and modal 'should'
construction also, e.g.:
55. ram ne ata ghsrT zave
Ram instr. now home may go
Ram may go home now.
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56. tyane panT mhantiT pah I jet
he instr. songs sing should pi.
He should sing songs.
Notice that the verb agrees with the DO in 56 and is in neutral
agreement in 55, cf:
57. nT ata zave
I now may go
I may go now.
53. tyane / tumhT kam kerave
he instr. / you job may do
He/You may do the job.
As in the perfective, in the desiderative (55 and 57) and modal
(56 and 58), too, the second person subject marking suffix may occur
with the verb, e.g.:
59. tu zavas / zavTs
You may go.
60. tu gharT ala puhijes
you sg. home come masc. should
You should come home.
Note that in the modal construction, all subjects may optionally
be marked with the dative -la., in which case, in the third person, we
may get either -ne or -la, e.g.:
61.
lari ala pahijeJ
ma I a /
\ tula Y gh£(tyalaj
P ]) you >
Che J
dat. home come should
I /You/He should come home.
The NP-marking and verb agreement pattern in Marathi seems to be
as follows:
62. a. SI unmarked : V agrees with SI
b. ST unmarked in imyierfective : V agrees with ST
c. ST marked (0 with lst/2nd, ne (ni) with 3rd) in
perfective : V agrees with unmarFed DO
d. ST marked (0 with lst/2nd, ne (nl) with 3rd) in
desiderative/ modal : V agrees with DO if transitive,
otherwise neutral
e. ST marked, DO marked : Neutral agreement
An example of e is as follows:
63. tyane mulTla pahila
he instr. girl ace. saw neut.
He saw the girl.
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Note that Marathi is similar to Nepali as far as NP-marking is
concerned: in both languages, subjects of perfective as well as cer-
tain modal constructions are marked. We will have more to say about
this in 4.0.
2.5 In Kashmiri, the ST in the perfective is marked with speci-
fic case forms as opposed to the following which are in the nominative:
the ST in the non-perfective, the SI in both perfective and non-per-
fective, and the DO in both perfective and non-perfective (Kachru 1969)
Consider the following:
64. bJ chus kh'ava:n
I be masc. sg. eat
I ajii eating.
65. t im chi kh 'ava:
n
they be masc. pi. eat
They are eating.
66. ne kh'av bat J
I dat. ate masc. sg. food masc. sg.
I ate food.
67. timav kheyi tsot
they ag, ate fern. sg. bread fem. sg.
They ate bread.
The case forms utilized for marking the ST in the perfective are
as follows (Kachru 1969):
68. First and second person : dative case
Third person: agentive case
The following sentences exemplify this:
69. raman dits me kitab
Ram ag. gave fem. sg. me book fem. sg.
Ram gave me a book.
70. me per kitab
I dat. read fem. sg. book fem. sg.
I read the book.
71. tse dits tamis tsot
you dat. gave fem. sg. him dat. bread fem. sg.
You gave him bread.
72. tam' par kitab
he/she ag. read fem. sg. book fem. sg.
He/she read the book.
The dative (with first and second person) and agentive (with
third person) is used with the pazi -imperative, too (Kachru 1969:268):
73. asi pazi kh on
we dat. ought eat
We ought to eat.
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Kashmiri has several nominal declension classes and very few
nouns/pronouns have distinct forms for each case, hence, it is not
unreasonable to label the so-called dative as dative/agentive in the
context of first and second person pronouns. Note that mardav may
be either the ablative or the agentive form of marJd 'men' . Now,
we can say that in Kashmiri, the ST in the perfective is marked with
the agentive case-marker. The verb agreement pattern is similar to
Hindi in that the verb agrees with the SI and also ST in the non-per-
fective tenses, while it agrees with the DO in the perfective tenses.
The agreement pattern, however, is not as consistent as in Hindi.
This is because, in Kashmiri, certain transitive verbs govern objects
in oblique cases and others do not. For instance, the verbs 'see'
and 'call' take objects in nominative case and therefore, the verb
agrees with the DO; the verb 'hit', on the other hand, takes an oblique
object, therefore, the verb is in its neutral form, i.e., it does not
agree either with ST or DO.-'- Consider the following:
74. a. me bulov su ladkl
I dat. called that boy noin.
I called that boy.
b. me bul8:v so kUr
I dat. called that girl nom.
I called that girl.
75. me loy tamis ladkl
tas korl
I hit that boy dat.
that girl
I hit that boy/that girl.
In 74 a and b, the verb bulov versus bula:v shows agreement with
the DO; in 75 the verb form is in third person masculine singular
form.
3.0 The above discussion suggests that except for Bengali, all
the South Asian languages under study may be at least morphologically
'split ergative' (Dixon 1977). In this section, we will determine if
any of the above languages are syntactically ergative, too.
According to Dixon 1977, there are three universal syntactico-
semantic primitives - A and occurring in transitive sentences and S
occurring in intransitive sentences. 'Subject' is a universal deep
structure category, involving functions A and S. The operation of
optional singulary transformations (passive, antipassive, reflexive,
etc.) on deep structures yields shallow structures. It is at this
level that generalized transformations operate, forming coordinate and
subordinate constructions. These rules may treat (derived) S and A
in the same way (i.e., S/A pivot) or they may treat (derived) S and
in the same way (i.e., S/0 pivot). If a language utilizes the S/0
pivot, it can be said to have an 'ergative' syntax.
3.1 We have already shown elsewhere that neither Hindi-Urdu, nor
Kashmiri work in terms of a S/0 pivot (Kachru, Kachru and Bhatia 1976),
hence there is no evidence for syntactic ergativity in these languages.
I
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Sharma 1977 presents evidence to show that Nepali uses a S/A pivot in
major subordinate and coordinate structures. Pandharipande 1978 pre-
sents similar evidence for Marathi, The following is a summary of
the evidence presented in the works mentioned above,
3.2 First, in terms of the accessibility hierarchy (Keenan,
Comrie 1972) , the marked ST is as accessible to relativization as
SI or DO or any oblique NP in the South Asian languages under study
here. The following exemplify this (H-U, K, M, N preceding the numbers
stand respectively for Hindi-Urdu, Kashmiri, Marathi and Nepali):
H-U 76. jis larke ne kitab xarTdT thT vah rezqarT lena bhUl jBya
wh- boy ag. book bought had he change take forget went
The boy who bought the book forgot to take the change.
K 77. su Isdki yen ra't h bath g'ov chu yet i rozan
that boy who yesterday song sang is here living
The boy who sang the song lives here.
M 78. jya mulane kal gane mhatle to ithec rahto
which boy yesterday song sang he here lives
The boy who sang the song yesterday lives here.
N 79. jun ketale hi jo git gayo tyo yahT bascha
which boy yesterday song sang that (boy) here lives.
The boy who sang the song yesterday lives here.
3.3 The conjunction reduction rule which reduces the first conjunct
of a coordinate structure by deleting the identical subject and trans-
forming the finite verb into an absolutive form, utilizes S/A pivot
in the languages under consideration here.^ Note, however, that whereas
in Hindi-Urdu, Kashmiri and Marathi, DO does not either control or un-
dergo deletion; in Nepali, DO undergoes deletion even though it does
not control deletion. For instance:
H-U 80. me ne khana khaya or me so naya
I ag. food ate and 1 sleep went
I ate (some) food and went to sleep.
H-U 81. khana kha kar me so gaya
food eat having I sleep went
Having eaten, I went to sleep.
H-U 82. me ne bacce ko mara or bacca roya
I ag. child ace. hit and child cried
I hit the child and the child cried.
H-U 83. *(me) mar kar bacca roya
I hit having child cried
I having hit (him), the child cried.
K 84. ne kh'av bati ta Songus
I food ate and slept
I ate and went to sleep.
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K 85. bl Sogus bati kh'ath
I slept food having eaten
or
bat! kh'ath sogus bi
food having eaten slept 1
Having eaten, I went to sleep.
K 86. me lo:v ladkas tl tan' h ot radun
I hit child and he cried
I hit the child and he cried.
K 87. *ne narrith h ot ladkan radun
I having hit child cried
I having hit, the child cried.
M 88. mT jevio anT mT zopio
I ate and I slept
I ate and I slept.
M 89. jevITn mT zopIo
having eaten I slept
Having eaten, 1 went to sleep.
M 90. nT mulala marl a anT mu
I
ga radla
I boy obj . masc. hit and boy cried.
I hit the boy and the boy cried.
M 91. *mT mulala narUn mu
I
ga radla
I boy obj. masc. having hit boy cried.
1 having hit (him) the boy cried.
N 92. ma i I e gulivorko yatra parhe ani ma base
I Gulliver's travels read and I laughed
I read Gulliver's Travels and I laughed.
N 93. gulivarko yatra parhera ma hase
Gulliver's travels having read 1 laughed
Having read Gulliver's Travels, I laughed.
N 94. usie chorilai kuto ra chori roi
he instr. girl ace. hit and girl cried
He hit the girl and the girl wept.
N 95. usie kutera chori roi
he instr. hit having girl wept
He having hit (her), the girl wept.
N 96. chori roi ra usie chorilai kuto
girl wept and he instr. girl ace. hit
The girl wept and he hit the girl.
N 97. a. *roera usie chorilai kuto
having cried he instr. girl ace. hit
(The girl) having cried, he hit the girl,
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b. *chori roera usie kuto
girl having cried he instr. hit
The girl having cried he hit (her).
3.4 The rule that yields past participle modifiers of NP's in
Hindi-Urdu seems to be sensitive to ergative/absolutive distinction,
for example:
H-U 98. [Isrkiya bethT] larkiya
girls sat girls
H-U 98a. bethT huT lerkiya
The seated girls.
H-U 99. [larkiyo ne kitab parhT] lerkiya
girls ag. book read girls
H-U 99a. *kitab parhT huT larkiya
The book-read girls.
H-U 100. [larkiyo ne kitab parhT] kitab
girls ag. book read book
H-U 100a. larkiyo kT parhT huT kitab
The read-by-the-girls book.
Notice that 98a and 100a are grammatical whereas 99a is ungramma-
tical: in 98a, the past participial modifies an NP identical to the
S-NP, in 100a, it modifies an NP identical to DO of the participial
verb; in 99a, were it grammatical, the participial would modify an NP
identical to ST. It has, however, been shown (Pandharipande and Kachru
1977) that the facts about participial izat ion in Hindi-Urdu are to
be explained on the basis of the semantic nature of NP's and verbs
rather than ergative/absolutive distinction.
In Nepali, the rules that yield past participial and infinitival
participial seems to utilize the S/0 pivot:
N 101. [ketiharule kam gare] kam
girls instr. work did work
N 101a. ketiharule gareko kam
The done-by-the-girls work
N 102. [ketiharule kam gare] ket
i
girls instr. work did girls
N 102a. *kam gareka ketiharule
The work-done girls.
N 103. [manche naro] manche
man died man
N 103a. mareko manche
The dead man.
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N 104. [ketale kitap parh] kitap
boy instr. book read book
N 104a. ketale parhne kitap
boy instr. to read book
The book to be read by the boy.
N 105, [ketale kitap parh] keta
boy instr. book read boy
N 105a. *kitap parhne keta
book to read boy
N 106. [mane he hase] manche
man laugh man
N 106a. hasne nancha
The man to laugh
Not much information is available on participialization in Marathi
and Bengali. As far as Bengali is concerned, participialization seems
to be as marginal a process as it is in English (Verma 1968). Marathi
seems to be more like the Dravidian languages where a wide range of
participial modifiers are used. There is no evidence at present to
suggest that either one of these languages utilizes a S/0 pivot for
deriving participial modifiers.
3.5 The discussion so far makes it clear that except for Nepali,
which uses S/0 pivot for deriving participial modifiers, there is no
evidence for syntactic ergativity in any other South Asian language
under discussion here. There is no rule such as antipassive in any of
these languages, and the passive in South Asian languages does not neces-
sarily yield a derived subject (Kachru, Kachru and Bhatia 1976). As
far as participles are considered, the case of Hindi-Urdu (Pandharipande
and Kachru 1977) suggests that a deeper examination of language-internal
facts is necessary before arriving at any conclusions. What appears
to depend upon S/0 pivot in Nepali may turn out to have an alternate
explanation in Nepali, too.
4.0 In conclusion, it is necessary to evaluate all the evidence
we have presented so far. In the absence of any evidence for syntactic
ergativity, the question naturally arises as to whether South Asian
languages exhibit morphological ergativity. On the surface, the languages
under discussion here, except Bengali, seem to be morphologically erga-
tive. Hindi-Urdu has a special postposition ne^ to mark A as opposed
to S and 0, Kashmiri has a special agentive case, and Marathi and
Nepali utilize the instrumental postposition to mark the A. The marking
of third person A only in Marathi and partially in Nepali also follow
the principles suggested by Dixon 1977. That is, on the 'potentiality
of agency scale', third person forms rank lower as compared to first
and second person forms. The marking of A in perfective also follows
the principles suggested in Dixon 1977. Note, however, that Marathi
and Nepali (and marginally, Kashmiri) go beyond the past - non-past
distinction suggested in Dixon 1977. The principle utilized by these
languages suggests the following type of split:
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107a. Nepali: Now versus non-now (timeless and potential)
b. Marathi: Past versus non-past, and actual versus potential
Kashmiri is closer to Marathi in this respect. Even this, however,
does not explain the marking exhaustively. If 107a and b were to be
consistently applicable, imperative, and subjunctive forms should
have fallen together with the modal constructions in these languages.
That does not seem to have happened.
In the absence of any synchronic explanation, it seems best to
rely upon a diachronic explanation. The perfective in New Indo-Aryan
is said to have developed from the past passive participle of old Indie
(Chatterjee 1926). That explains the instrumental marking of the A
in Marathi and Nepali. The agentive postposition and case in Hindi-
Urdu and Kashmiri respectively seem to be parallel developments, too.
It, however, raises a very interesting question with regard to Bengali.
Notice that Bengali went through identical historical stages. Never-
theless, instead of an NP-marking system (for A), what developed in
Bengali was a system of verbal affixation which copied on to the verb
the personal pronouns. Thus, both S and A are unmarked and control the
verbal agreement. Several dialects of the so-called Hindi -area went
through identical development and the tendency in Eastern as well as
Dakhini varieties is toward the same kind of development. Western
Hindi, however, has the stable ne-marker, and Marathi seems to be sta-
bilizing the 0-V agreement in the transitive sentences by losing the
optional second person suffix of the verb in sentences such as 49,
repeated here for convenience:
49. tu kame keli (s)
you jobs did 3rd pi. neut. (2nd p.)
You did the jobs.
The verbal agreement pattern does not show a neat split, however, in
that all the languages under consideration mark the in specific ling-
uistic contexts.
Dixon 1977 is no doubt a valiant attempt to bring some system to
the chaos. It, however, seems doubtful, on the basis of data from
South Asian languages, that it is always possible to explain morpholo-
gical ergativity on the basis of semantic features of NP, V, or As-
pect-Tense. The languages we have discussed here, except for Bengali,
seem to be part accusative, part ergative and part neither and these
parts seem to be determined by historical development rather than
consistent semantic principles. This suggests that the inventory of
types of split in Dixon 1977 should include a fourth category: split
conditioned by historical syntactic/morphological development.
NOTES
*Part of the research reported herein was carried out with the help of
research grant from the Research Board of the University of Illinois. The
work on Marathi was done primarily by Rajeshwari Pandharipande and the
Nepali data was supplied by Basudev Sharma.
as in Hindi-Urdu, the verb agrees with the noun in the
direct or nominative case. In the perfective, the ST is in the
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oblique case, (i.e., a case other than the nominative) and the DO is
in the nominative, therfore, the verb agrees with the DO. In case a
particular verb governs a DO in an oblique case, in the perfective,
both the ST and the DO are in non-nominative cases, hence the verb
agreement is neutral. This has been discussed in detail in Kachru,
Kachru, and Bhatia 1976.
The conjunction reduction rule discussed here works as follows.
Given (i) and (ii) , the rule yields (iii):
H-U (i) ram ghar gaya
Ram home went
Ram went home.
H-U (ii) ram ne khana khaya
Ram ag. meal ate
Ram ate (his) meal.
H-U (iii) ghar ja kar rarn ne khana khaya
home go abs. Ram ag. meal ate
Having gone home. Ram ate (his) meal.
In Hindi-Urdu, there are only two constructions with absolutive forms
which do not require the identity and coreferentiality of the S/A in
the two clauses. These are as in (iv) and (v)
:
H-U (iv) car baj kar das minat hue he
four strike abs. ten minutes happened are
It is ten past four,
H-U (v) bhaT ko dekh kar uska man sant hua
brother DO see abs. his mind calm became
He was reassured to see his brother.
Sentences (iv) and (v) involve the sets given in (vi) and (vii)
respectively:
H-U (vi) a. car baje he
four struck is
It is four.
b. das mi nat hue he
ten minutes happened are
Ten minutes have passed.
H-U (vii) a. usne bhaT ko dekha
he ag. brother D saw
He saw (his) brother.
b. uska man Sant hua
his mind calm became
He was reassured.
Note that apparently, in (vi) , the two S's are distinct, and in (vii)
the two A's are not identical: in (viia), the A is He , in (viib).
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it is His mind . The A in (viia), however, is coreferential with
the possessive NP of A in (viib) . It is interesting to note that in
Hindi-Urdu, other processes sensitive to coreferential relations be-
have similar to the conjunction reduction as in (viib).
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Babby's (1973, 1973) analysis of Russian attri-
butive adjectives is critically discussed. A re-
analysis is proposed on the basis of the assumption
that J and not KOTOR is the relative i^ronoun in
Russian,
The syntactic derivation of adjectives is probably one
of the less disputed issues within the theory of generative
grammar. There is wide ajjreement in the assumption that
attributive adjectives are related to underlying predicates
(Harris 1952; Chomsky 1957; Lees 1960a) , and that they are
transformationally derived from deeper relative clauses, i,e,,
from embedded sentences (Smith 196l, 196^; Lees 1960b;
Katz and Postal 1964; Lalcoff 1970; Ljung 1970, etc), iNThile
there are difficulties in the analysis deriving attributive
adjectives from predicate adjectives in relative clauses
(liolinger 1967; Motsch 1967; Sussex 1974), a more promising
explanation has yet to be found for the obvious relationship
between adjectives in attributive and predicative positions.
The relative clause source of attributive adjectives is
given additional support in recent studies of Russian adjec-
tives by Dabby (l973» 1975). At the center of Babby's
investigations is the syntactic relation between the attri-
butive long form (LF) and predicative short form (SF) of
adjectives in Contemporary Russian. In particular, he
argues that the LF and SF are surface structure categories
which derive from a single lexical category, Verbal (v).
Under this analysis, what is traditionally called "adjective"
is V with the feature (+adj] , and what is traditionally
called "verb" is V with the feature C-adj^ (cf. Lalcoff 1970 :
Appendix a). Neither the SF nor the LF are assumed to be
generated by the phrase structure rules. Rather, it is
argued that the deep structure category V emerges from the
transformational component as a SF if it acquires the features
of gender, number and person by the Subject-Verb Agreement
transformation. The category V emerges from the transforma-
tional component as a LF, if in addition to acquiring these
agreement features, it receives a case feature, Babby
states his main hypothesis as follows (l975:9): "the LF is a
SF that has acquired a case feature by virtue of its trans-
formational introduction into the constituency of a NP (noun
phrase)." This analysis claims that it is the derived phrase
marker configuration [. , , V « . J NP which is the defining
criterion of the LF, Fifrtncrmore , it assumes, in accordance
with the "lexicalist" theory, that inflectional morphology is
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handled by a set of postsyntact ic morphophonemic rules which
"spell out" features acquired in derivation as inflectional endings,
For example, within this framework,^ the ending -AJA of the LF
KRASIV-AJA in the NP KRASIVAJA DEVUSKA "the pretty girl" is as-
sumed to be a "spelling" of the features assigned by rules of
agreement (fern, sing, 3rd) and case marking (nom) . It is the
opinion of the present writer that assuming the operation of such
vague morphophonemic spelling rules does not adequately account
for the morphological details of inflection in the LF adjective.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to present an alternative
analysis in which some concrete, albeit tentative proposals are
made as to how the syntax might account in a more explicit fashion
for the inflectional endings of the LF.
Descriptions of Contemporary Russian by linguists operating
within both traditional and generative frameworks assume the
relative pronoun to be the morpheme KOTOR-
,
plus inflectional
endings. For example, in the generative account of Russian adjec-
tives in Babby 1975 » the structure
jT^EVUSK-^ NP. r/DEVUSK-^ NP CkRASIV-^ VP^ s) NP
•girl*. 'girl' 'is pretty'
which is posited as the underlying representation of the NP
KRASIVAJA DEVUSKA 'pretty girl' undergoes Relative-clause For-
mation to produce the intermediate configuration
[ (dEVUSK-] NP [(KOTOR-^ NP /KRASIV-^ VP^ S] NP
'girl' 'who' 'is pretty'
In the present analysis I would like to propose that what is
traditionally considered a morphologically whole inflectional
ending in LF adjectives, actually contains the relative pronoun
morpheme J, and that KOTORYJ is a surface configuration, trans-
formationally derived by the prefixation of KOTOR- to this same
morpheme J, In arguing that the relative pronoun is J, I am in
effect suggesting that one of the rules underlying the formation
of the LF adjective in Contemporary Russian is the same rule as-
^
suraed to have been operative in Old Russian. As is well known,
in Old Russian the relative was the^orpheme J (j-b nom masc) <
followed by the suffixed particle -ZE. The traditional analysis j
of the formation of the LF adjective in Old Russiaji is that of j
Vaillant 19^2, who argues that the relative pronoun eventually
^
became affixed to a regular (i.e. short) adjective to create the
LF. In assuming the concatenation of short adjectives and J,
Vaillant provides a plausible explanation for the synonymous
readings of Adj+N phrases and corresponding relative ^lauses.
Thus, in Vaillant 's view, the NP BLAGY ^=BLAG'Td+J^) CLOVEKT) [
'the good man' and the relative clause CLOVEKHd IZE (=*Jb-ZE) i
BLAG Id 'the man who is good' are identical constructions (p.5), ]
If one were to incorporate this insight in a generative-trajisfor-
,
mational treatment of the LF in Old Russian, then Adj(LF)+N
phrases would be analyzed as deriving from the deep structure
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underlying corresponding relative clauses. Under such an analysis,
a transformational rule which I shall call J-Affixation
, would
detach the relative pronoun morpheme from the K-node and affix
it to the rijht of the SF, as in (l).
(1)
CLOvm: I3
A late rule, known in the literature as Adjective or Modifier
Shift, will then move the derived LF to the left of its head-
noun to give the surface configuration BLAGY (BLAG'HD+Jb)
Clovek Hd .
The view that J is still the relative pronoun morpheme in
Contemporary Russian and that the proposed rule of J-Affixation
is still operative, finds support from the following morphological
and syntactic considerations. Zaliznjak (1967:2329) argues that
the inflectional endings of attributive adjectives in Russian
contain a morpheme which functions as the marker of long formedness,
His analysis is based on an examination of LF adjectives and their
corresponding SF • s
:
ZIV-OJ zrv-AJA
V
ZIV-A
zrv-ojo
ZIV-O
ZIV-IJI
zrv-i
Comparing the long and short forms above, Zaliznjak notes that
the LF adjective ending consists of a vowel identical to the
vowel in the corresponding SF ending plus a 'special morphological
element' J, followed by a vowel which is a copy of the one im-
mediately preceding this element. He calls the morpheme J the
'marker of attributive function'. If one accepts Zaliznjalc's
view that the inflectional endings of LF adjectives in Contem-
porary Russian are complex items of the structure V +J+V
,
where
J is the long formedness morpheme, then, in my view, it is
plausible to assume that this morpheme J is the same relative
pronoun J which Vaillant claims was affixed to the SF to create
the LF in Old Russian.
I
Adopting the position that the relative pronoun in Contemporary
; Russian is J makes it possible to explain certain syntactic facts
about attributive adjectives and corresponding relative clauses
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with predicative adjectives. Consider, for example, sentences i
(a)-(c) belov, taken frora Babby 1973: :
(a) MAL'dlK, KOTORYJ BOLEN (SF) ANGINOJ, DOLMEN LSZAT' ;
•The boy who is ill with quinsy has to stay in bed i
CELUJU IfEDELJU.
j
all week,
'
!
(b) MAL'CIK BOL'NOJ (LF) ANGINOJ, DOLZEN, LEZAT' CELUJU NEDELJUJ
'The boy ill with quinsy has to stay in bed all week,
'
(c) *>LVL'CIK, KOTORYJ BOL'NOJ ANGINOJ, DOLZ^EN LEZAT',.,
'The boy, who ill with quinsy has to stay in bed ,,,'
Sentence (a) consists of a relative clause introduced by KOTORYJ
'who', and contains the predicate adjective (SF) BOLEN 'ill'.
Sentence (b) is a reduced version of sentence (a), containing
BOL'NOJ 'ill' (LF) but not the relative pronoun. Sentence (c),
marked deviant, contains both KOTORYJ and BOL'NOJ (LJ). Babby
proposes an analysis of sentences (a) and (b), but does not
address the question of why sentence (c) is ungrammatical. I
shall repeat his analysis here and then propose an alternative
analysis which will not only explicate the relationship between
sentences (a) and (b) , but will also account for the deviancy
of sentence (c).
The deep structure proposed by Babby for the NP ' s in (a')
and (b') is (2),
(a') J>IAL'^IK, KOTORYJ BOLEN ANGINOJ] NP
'the boy who is ill with quinsy'
(b') [MAL'CIK, BOL'NOJ ANGINOjI NP
'the boy ill with quinsy'
fP, (nom)
The derivation of (a') from (z) according to Babby, involves the
j
following transformations: (i) Subject-verb Agreement copies the
j
features of [mAL'CIK]]nP„ (gender, nvunber and person) onto the main
]
verb BOL#N- 'ill', giving BOL#N- (masc sing 3rd), (ii) Relative-
j
clause Formation converts [mAL'^IKJ NP„ to KOTORYJ masc sing nom i
'who, which'. The morphophonemic rules are assumed to subsequently.
132
spell out BOl^fN- (masc sing 3rd) as BOLIiN (SF). The derivation
of (b') from (2) involves both rules (i) and (ii) plus the op-
tional transformation of Relative-clause Reduction, which results
in the intermediate phrase marker of (3).
(3) P (nom)
Mi\L'CIK
VNGINOJBOI^^N-
[mascl
sing J
3rdj
(3) is mapped into (4), the final derived phrase marker, by the
rule of S-node Deletion which deletes the node S and results in
the introduction of BOI^/N- (masc sing 3rd) into the constituent
of NP where it receives its case feature (nominative) by the
rule of Case Marking, Again it is assumed that the morphopho-
nemic rules will later spell out BOLi^N- plus the features
acquired by Subject-verb Agreement and Case Marking, as BOL'NOJ
(LF) masc sing nom 'ill'.
ANGINOJ
Babby's transformational treatment of the SF and LF adjective
has served both as a model and catalyst for the analysis I am
about to propose. In fact the two analyses differ essentially in
one small, but very significant aspect, viz., the assumption that
J and not KOTOR- is the relative pronoun morpheme in Contemporary
Russian,
The proposed base structure for the NP ' s in (a*) and (b')
in the present analysis is (2), the structure proposed by Babby,
As in Babby's analysis, the derivation of (a') involves both
Subject-verb Agreement and Relative-clause Formation, except
that in the present analysis, the latter rule relativizes
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[maL'CIkInP to J, giving (5)
#ANGINOJ#
^
Z+mascI
[+masc~]
+sing
+3TdJ
As in Old Russian the relative pronoun morpheme is too
slight morphologically to stand independently on the surface.
Its syntactic status is that of an enclitic which is evidenced
by the fact that it must either be an affix in its own position
or be affixed to some other lexical item. Thus, (5) represents
the stage in the derivation at which one of two mles may be
invoked: either the rule of J-Affixation that attaches J to the
lexical item at the V-node (#BOLbN#) to allow for the creation
of the LF (#B0LbN7fj#), or the rule of KOTOR-Support is obliga-
torily invoked, inserting the formative KOTOR- to the left of J,
giving 7rK0T0R#J# . The phrase markers resulting from the appli-
cation of the rules of J-Affixation and KOTOR-Support are
represented in (6) and (7) respectively.
fr'MAL'CIK#
/+masc~|
+sing
l+3TdJ
V
/j-adjj
#BOLbN#J#
r+mascl
+singl
l_+3rdj
#ANGINOJ#
The structure in (6) will subsequently undergo S-node
Deletion and Case Marking, the latter rule supplying the nomina-
tive case feature to #BOLbN#J# which, together with the features
of gender (masc) ajid number (sing) constitute the necessary
information for the lexical insertion of the appropriate in-
flectional endings, i.e., ^BOLbN+ti^J-rtjjv'^. This form will emerge
from the phonological component as the LF surface adjective
BOL'NOJ.
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( noni
)
^la'.
+adj
rrBOLbN# frANGINOJ#
t+inasc]
+sins/
+3rd j
The structure in (?) undergoes no additional syntactic {
transformations. The case feature needed for the selection of
the appropriate inflectional endings by the NP fr-K0T0R#J;7- , is
supplied by the subject position of this NP in the embedded i
clause. Thus, the features nom, masc, sing will provide the
specification needed for the lexical insertion of inflectional
endings, giving fr'K^^OR-f^ffJ+'bjf, The rules of phonology will
convert this form to the surface relative pronoun, KOTORYJ,
A comparison of this analysis with Babby's suggests that
both analyses account equally well for the formation of the
LF adjective. However, in my view, the alternative analysis
presented in this paper has the further advantage of offering
a more explicit explanation for why sentences like (c) *MAL'CIK,
KOTORYJ BOL'NOJ ANGINOJ ,,, containing both the surface relative
pronoun and a LF adjective are ungrajnmatical , Simply stated, if
J is the same morpheme that occurs in both KOTORY(j) and BOL'NO(j),
then the two forms cannot co-occur in the same clause. In syn-
tactic terms, the rule of J-Affixation is complementary with the
rule of KOTOR-Support .
It has been argued above that the LF adjective is not merely
a SF that has acquired the features of gender, number and case
which later get spelled out as inflectional endings. Rather, it
has been shown that a LF is a SF which, in addition to these
agreement features, has undergone concatenation with the relative i
pronoun morpheme by the rule of J-Affixation. Therefore, what
has traditionally been considered a morphologically whole inflec-
tional ending has been shown in this paper to be a complex item
consisting of both derivational and inflectional formatives,
NOTES
Babby's treatment of participles in these studies will
not be considered in this paper,
2For an earlier treatment of this question, see Levine
(1977: Ch, h).
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3According to Zaliznjalc, there is no anomaly in the
masculine form, since in this instance the preceding; the J
is merely a "vocalic infix" which brealcs up the inadmissable
consonant cluster "consonant + J," Phonemic notation is
employed here,
kZaliznjak's discussion is limited to adjectives in the
nominative case. In fact all of the nominative and accusative
forms as veil as all the feminine forms in the oblique cases of
LF adjectives show a J in their surfaces phonetic representation.
However, this analysis derives less support from those oblique
case endings where there is no evidence of a J, i,e,, in the
masculine, neuter and plural forms. It should be pointed out
that this is the same morphophonemic complication which obtains
in Old Russian and which has resisted satisfactory historical
explanation. One possible way to account for the absence of J
would be to assume that certain oblique case forms arc subject
to a transformational rule which deletes this morpheme. For a
discussion of this problem and a proposed deletion rule of this
type, see Coats' description of the inflectional morphology of
LF adjectives in Old Russian (Coats 1973).
I have altered Babby's representation of the vowel/zero
alternation in the SF adjective, replacing ;/ with b, so as not
to confuse this use of 77^ with its use as a boundary symbol,
A few words should be said about the notational conventions
employed in this description. In accordance with Chomsky and
Halle (1968:364-369), I shall assiime that each formative in the
lexicon is flanlced by a formative boundary symbolized by the
plus sign +, e,g,, +X+, +Y+, +Z+, I shall further assume,
following Chomsky and Halle, that the formative boundaries of
lexical items inserted at the terminal nodes of phrase markers
are deleted when adjacent to the word boundary symbol #, which,
by convention, is automatically introduced at the beginning and
end of every string dominated by a major lexical category, e,g,,
#+X+f/-^ #Xf/, The concatenation of two formatives resulting from
a CTAle of affixation will produce a string with an initial and
final #, but with only one internal +, For example, the conca-
tenation of j^Xf^ and ffYff will give j^X+Y,/, However, the concatena-
tion of the relative pronoun enclitic J with a lexical item will
be represented slightly differently. The syntactic status of J
will be characterized by the presence of a single internal word
botindary symbol #, between the lexical item and the enclitic J,
Thus, when J is affixed to the complex item #X+Y#, the resulting
new lexical item will be represented as #X+Y^J#, Finally, I will
assume that inflectional endings are inserted to the left of the
right word boundary of a formative, and in the case of a forma-
tive to which J has been affixed, to the left of both right word
boundary symbols, e,g,, tJ^X+Y+E^J+Ej^' , where E stands for inflec-
tional ending.
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ASPECTS OF IRAQI ARABIC VERBAL PHONOLOGY*
David Odden
In this paper, I shall investigate certain phonological processes
of Iraqi Arabic, based on data from Erwin (1963), Woodhead (196?)
and supplemented by data from a native speaker of Iraqi Arabic,
Since the majority of productive and regular morphology is found in
the verbal system, the majority of forms for this study will
be verbal. The primary descriptive goal of this study is to account
for the stem and affix alternations in the various verbal paradigms,
I shall argue that in^jerfective verb stems with the superficial
shape CCVC are to be derived from an trndarlylng CVCVC pattern via
a right-to-left iterative Syncope rule. It is noted that a similar
rule exists in Tookawa which must apply in a left-to-right manner
j
this fact refutes a claim made by Jensen and Stong-Jensen (1973)
that the direction of iteration for a rule can be determined by
universal principles. An arguement for the cyclic application of
the Stress Assignment rule is advanced, and a significant difference
in the interaction between Stress Assignment and Epenthesis in
Iraqi and Palestinian Arabic is noted.
The Iraqi verb appears in a perfective, inqjerative and imj>erfective
conjugatioii. An optional object pronoun suffix is avedlable in all coo-
jugatictis. The perfective, inqjerfective, object pronoun and imperative
affixes are provided below,
(1) Perf. Subject Imperf. Subj. Pro. Obj. Imperative
-ni
-na
-ak ?i-
-ic ?i i
-kum ?i-.««-u
-a
-ha
-hum
Morphemes preceded by a dash follow the verb root and those followed by a
dash precede the root. The subject prcaaioun sets associated with perfective,
inperfective and inperative verb stems when realized as suffixes precede
the object suffixes,
lo Stress and Epenthesis
The Stress Assignment rule of this language is essentially idBntical
to the rule found in Classical Arabic and other Eastern Arabic dialects,
A final heavy syllable (i.e, VCC or VC) is stressed, otherwise a penultimate
heavy syllable is stressed, and the antepenultimate syllable is stressed
if the two preceding conditicms are not met. The following exan?5les
illustrate this pattern.
(2) 9alee 'on him'
yihinarr 'he blushes'
marii^ 'sick*
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naadi 'club'
9iraa£ii 'Iraqi'
sallatha 'her basket'
majirasa 'school'
larika 'conpany'
mumaOOlla *actress
'
As this pattern represents the stress pattern of virtually every word in
the language, I assume the following Stress Assignment rule.
(3) V * r+stress] / ^Co((VC)V(C))]
A rule which interacts with Stress Assignment is found in the grammar
which lengthens a vowel before the object pronouns and the dative preposition
-il when it is cliticized to the verb.
(1^) kitabna
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(8)
•dog'
•goat'
'lessen'
'grave'
'clerk'
'sea'
'bench'
'date'
'hair'
'fish'
'promise'
•books'
bagla
Sal&a
§^;a
darseen
g^breen
kaatbeen
bahreen
taxteen
rutba
S^ra
simJfa
wa9di?
kutbi?
'female mule'
•bitch'
'female goat'
'two lessons'
•two graves'
'two clerks'
'two seas'
'two benches'
'a date'
'a hair'
fish'
'your f. promise'
'your f. books'
Returning to the paradigms of (6), it will oe ooserved that the 1st
and 2nd singular forms kitloit and xaab^rit have an anomalous ^phonetic
shape in terms of stress" placement, since one would expect *kitbit and
*xaabrit cai the analogy of 3 fern, kitbat, xaabrat, if the relevant
verbal endings were taken to be underlying -it. The anomaly has am explanation,
however, if we assume the underlying form of the ending to be -t and that
the following E^senthesis rule is involved, ordered crucially after Stress
Assignment (3).
(9) -^ i / C %
This rule is supported by the fact that Iraqi has no final consonant
clusters or internal clusters longer than two consonants. By this analysis,
kitibit has the underlying representation kitabt, otress falls on the final !
vowel according to p), thus kit^ot, and subsequent application of Epenthesis (9J
derives correct kitabit. If, on the other hand, we assume the relevant
terminations to be -it, there is no natural explanation possible.
There is additional evidence supporting the assumpticHi that the vowel
found in kitabit is epenthetic, beyond the explanation this assumption '
provides for Stress Assignment, A rule (or set of rules) inserts ee between
stem and consonant initial suffix if the stem ends in a vowel or geminated
consonant, and optionally if the stem contains a medial glide (which is
deleted) and a derivational prefix (such as in nlaam 'be blamed', from !
nliwam)
.
i
(10) nfsa
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Whether this is the correct designation
for such stems or not is not cinicial in this discussion; the important
point is that the application of the ee-Epenthesis rule is conditioned to
the right by a ccxisonant initial suffix.
(11) ^ee /CC^VC^(V) +C
The fact that niseet exhibits epenthetic ee_ whereas nisat does not is
explainable by the hypothesis that underlying n-isa-»-at does not satisfy the
conditions of the epenthesis nile, whereas underlying nisa+t for 'I forgot'
doeso This contrast is brou^t out in the derivations below (elisi<ii of
a will be considered later),
(12) nisa+at nisa+t
Epenthesis nisaeet
Elision nijiat niseet
Stress nisat niseet
Even though -t sometimes has the vowel i, -t nevertheless behaves like a
ccHisonant initial suffix in inducing ee-Epenthesis,
2o Some Elision Processes
Verb stems having a madial consonant cluster do not undergo Syncope
when the stem precedes the endings -at and -aw, as suggested in the formulation
of Syncope (?)• Instead, unstressed a is reduced to i.
(13) staxdam 'he hired' staxdimat 'she hired'
?abclae 'he made" ?aiidi9at 'she made'
sta^mal 'he used' sti!'9milat 'she used'
?anjaz 'he did' ?anjizat 'she did'
The full perfective paradigm of staxdam is provided below: each verb of
the type found in (13) conjugates in a similar fashion.
(lU) staxdam 'he used' staxdapiit 'I used*
staxdiijiat 'she • staxdamna 'we '
staxd^nit 'you m, ' sta^damtu 'you pi'
staxdamti 'you f . ' staxdimaw 'they '
The following rule accounts for these alternations,
JL$) a 4> i / [+seg]C ^CV +verb
|]-str6ssj
The patterns of reduction are limited to verbs, sipce nouns, for
example madras
a
'school', mioTnara 'pies of marble', sfarjala 'quince
'j
exhibit no reduction of a to i. The -stress condition is required to prevent
reduction of a in staxdaiiiit . The lefthand context C+segjC is required
to prevent reduction of the initial vowel <xi ?ab^ddil 'I change'.
It will be shown below that reduction also applies in the context V:C ^CV,
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It might oe assumed that ^eduction applies to underlying kitabat
yielding kitibat, and a revised version of byncope (7) would apply which -
deletes only the high vowels i and u in the relevant environment. However,
j
Reduction doe^ not apply in nouns, yet unstressed a deletes in saxla , 'female ,
goat', from §axala. Therefore, Syncope is correctly formulated to delete all
unstressed vowels.
We may novj return to additional examples of ^.yncope in order to show
restrictions which must be placed on that rule, byncope also applies in
the imperfective and imperative, assuming that the imperfective stem has the
shape CVCVC ( I shall argue for this position below). The data in (l6)
;
show that syncope must apply from right to left; the underlying stems i
(containing the vocalism of the imperfective) are libas 'wear', tila9 'go out',
kitib 'write' and suqut 'fail*.
*
i
(16) yii.Das 'he wears' Tili'bsi ^ 'wear (f)l' 'j
yltla9 'he goes out' yitil9uun 'they go out'
t^tio 'you write' tikitba 'you write it'
^
yusqut 'he fails' yusuqtumi 'they fail'
\
A full paradigm of libas is provided below. \
(17) yilbas 'he wears' ?aj.bas • I wear'
j
tilbas 'she wears' nilbas
^
'we wear'
j
tiloas 'you m wear' tilibsuun 'you pi. wear'
^
tilibsiin 'you f wear' yilibsuun 'they wear'
j
Within the imperfective, verbs of the shape CVCi^C (such as libas ) have
the form CCVC when followed by a consonant initial suffix or no suffix, and
have the form CVCC when followed by a vowel initial suffix. Thus, yilibsuiin
derives from yilibasuun via application of byncope (7) to the rightmost
vowel in a doubly open syllable, a. The consonant cluster in the output of
this rule created by application of Apocope prevents reapplication of ^ ,
Syncope to i. If Syncope were to apply from the left, incorrect -M-yilbasuun
j
would result.
Jensen and Stong-Jensen (1973) have argued that the direction of
!
application of rules can be predicted by xiniversal principles. One i
principle is that "accent" rules such as Syncope apply in the direction that i
minimizes application. Phelps (1975) has shown that their principles do •
not predict the direction of a inile such as Syncope, where both directions J
of application are equally minimizing. Phelps shows that Tonkawa has the
following Syncope rule,
(18) V t / VC((?)V) G V
I^+stem^ [-suffix:]
This rule must apply from left to right in Tonkawa. However, I have shown
,
that Syncope in Iraqi must apply from right to left. Since the rule in i
Tonkawa and the rule in Iraqi are fundsimentally the same rule and differ in
i
directicxi of their application, the claim that directionality can be predicted
j
does not appear to be wholely tenable.
i
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One might wish to argue for a different analysis of the derivation of
yilbas ,as deriving from an underlying stem Ibas employed in the imperfective
and derive yilibsuun from yilbasuun via some rule of metathesis which also
changes vowel quality. One might then propose the following Metathesis
rule with Raising.
(19) V+CCVC+V -^ V+C V CC+V
|>hi]
This rule directly converts underlying yilbasuun to yilibsuun . The placement
of morpheme boundaries is crucial in this rule. For example, if the righthand
+ is not specified, the rule incorrectly applies to the stem qtirih , which
contains four radical consonants, in yx-^qtirifa 'he suggests', generating
incorrect -M-yiqitrih . If the lefthand boundary is not specified, underlying
staxdamat incorrectly becomes ^s-staxidmat rather than staxdimat 'she used',
liider the Syncope analysis, the independently motivated Syncope
rule is employed to account for the stem alternations within the imperfect.
Under the Jfetathesis -Raising analysis, an additional Metathesis rule is.
required. Furthermore, a special canonical shape of the stem, CCVC, is
required in the iirq^erfective, since it is assumed that the surface shape of
the imperfective libs found in yilibsuun 'they wear' derives directly from
the vmderlying stem Ibas , The grammar must contain some statement describing
the occurrence of CCVC stems in the imperfective, since not all stems have
the shape CCVC on the surface. Note the following verbs which do not have
the shape CCVC in the imperfect: in each case, the ingierfect and perfect
are formed from the same stem,
(20) ?a+qtiri^ 'I suggest'
?a+st^dam 'I employ'
?a+bdxidil 'I change*
?a+ha^jaj 'I argue'
?a+axrr 'I insist'
?a+Iuuf 'I see'
?ii+ntirid 'I am fired'
e
Thus, it is only stems or the shape CVCVC in the perfect which have the shape
CCVC in the imperfect. One can capture this relationship by the following
rule:
(21) V ^0 / V+c ^CV Imperfective
This rule does not claim that a phonological vowel deletion process converts
the perfective stem into the in^serfective, merely that a relation exists between
these two stems.
The statement capturing the relation between imperfect and perfect stems
under the Metathesis -Raising analysis is nearly identical to the independently
needed Syncope rule. The Ifetathesis -Raising analysis is therefore to be rejected
because it contains an xinneeded metathesis rule to handle the data in (l6).
Syncope to handle the data in (6) and (8), and a stem formation irule for the
imperfectives of CVCVC perfects which is virtually identical to Syncope,
The analysis advanced here assumes a single stem to underlie the perfect and
imperfect and a alngle Syncope rule.
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One condition which must be placed on oyncope is that a vowel is
elided if the lefthand context contains a geminated consonant. To that I
extent, geminate consonants do not behave like clusters.
(22) baddal 'he changed' baddlat 'she changed'
^
yb^ddil 'he changes' ybiaddluun 'they change' i
?ajjal 'he delayed' ?ajjlat^ 'she delayed'
.,
y?^jjil 'he delays' y?ajjluun 'they delay'
i
• (
The complete perfective and imperfective paradigm of baddal 'change' is
^
provided below.
\
(23) ?abaddil Is. imperf. baddalit Is, perf.
j
nbaddil Ip. " baddaina Ip. " i
tbaddil 2m. " badd^it 2m. "
tbaddliiji 2f. " baddalti 2fo " .
tbaddluun 2p. " baddaitu 2p, "
ybaddil 3ra. " baddal 3m. "
tbaddil 3f. " baddlat 3f. " '
ybaddluiSh 3p. " baddlaw 3p. " j
On the other hand, if the righthand context contains a geminate
j
consonant, an unstressed vowel is not elided.
|
(2ii) ?axallj/ha »I let her' 1
?abaddalkum 'I change you p,'
kitabilkumi^aa 'he wrote it to you p. •
yistimirmiun 'they continue'
yi¥ma?izzuun 'they are disgusted'
V/hile deletion of vowels after geminate consonants in (22) seems to indicate
that geminate consonants behave like single consonants and should therefore
be represented as single consonants with the feature +long
,
the retention
I
of vowels before geminate consonants in (2U) suggests that geminates must
be treated as clusters of consonants. Geminate consonants in Iraqi are thus
an example of the dual behavior of geminates in language in generalj in •
this example, the very same segments behave in different ways, depending on
which side of the focus they fall on. The following revision of Syncope reflects
this fact, admittedly in a rather unsatisfactory manner.
(25) V ^ ^0/V(C.)C. ^CV
[.-stressj " "
The second restriction on Syncope is that it cannot bring two identical
consonants together. The unstressed vowel between identical conscaiants remains j
unelided and is reduced to i by Reduction (l5)o
'she argued'
|
'she furnished'
'she moved'
]
'she wasted'
'she specialized'
(26) haajaj
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This restriction is contained in (27).
(27) V » / V(C^)C^ C.V i / j
QstressJ
Again, this is a rather unsatisfactory representation of the restriction,
although I believe it correctly represents a restriction on Syncope rather than
auxiliary epenthesis rules. There is no evidence that the stem vowel ever
elides in the relevant environments in (26), and if Syncope were to have applied
to baa.ia.l+at, yielding haajj+at , it would merge that form in shape with forms
such as dazzat 'she sent' and saadda 'his having closed', so no epenthesis rule
can rescue the derivation of j^adjijat .
A derivation of representative forms is provided below. Note that
reduction of a in l;;iaajijat provides an example of reduction after a long vowel.
(28) baddad+at baddal+at
Stress baddad<-at b^ddal+at
Syncope NA b^ddlat
Reduction b^ddidat
staxdam+at feaajaj+at
st^dam+at )jiaajaj+at
NA NA
st^xdimat haijijat
The next rule I propose deletes i from the imperfective prefixes when
in an open syllable and followed by a closed syllable (i.e. VCC of WC),
This rule thus deletes the vowels of the imperfective prefixes ti-, ^-, and
but not in ?a-
(29) yba^dil
ysaafir
ysiyi
yna^
yde^wur
ybarhin
•he changes'
'he journeys'
'he closes'
'he sleeps*
' he turns
'
'he proves'
tba^dil
tsaafir
tsiyj
tna^
tde^wur
tbarhin
'she changes'
'she journeys'
'she closes'
•she sleeps'
•she turns
•
•she proves
•
nbaddil
nsaafir
nsiyi
nnaa;n
ndeewur
nbarhin
•we change'
'we journey'
'we close
»
'we sleep'
'we turn'
•we prove
'
Elision of i in these prefixes is to be contrasted with retention of a in the
first person singular forms of (30)
«
(30) ?ab4<3dil 'I change'
?asidj3 'I close'
?adeevmr 'I turn'
?asaafir
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The presence of the morpheme boundary in the inile is mo1>ivated by the fact I
that kit^ti 'you f, wrote' retains initial i where no + boundary is present. I
'sleep* derive from the structure
CVGVC via a Glide Deletion rule. Since the vovrel of the iraperfective prefix
Is elided in ynaam 'he sleeps' by Prefix Elision which requires the context
^CWG, Glide Elision must precede Prefix Elision so that the requisite W
cluster is created. Prefix Elision must precede Syncope, however, since a stem
of the shape ^CVCG derived from CVGVC via Syncope does not condition (31)
J
thus yikitbuun 'they write' does not show Prefix Elision,
3o Vowel Sequences
This section will be concerned with the question of how sequences of
vowels are modified vdien created by deletion of intervocalic glides or by
morphological juxtaposition. Verbs having initial glides that appear phoneticall;
in the perfective when ijiitial exhibit deletion of that glide intervocalically
after the inperfective prefixes. The prefix yowel and following glide
appear to combine as follows: i+w ^ oo , i^ ee , an[ ^ 22. s ilZ 1^ 22. •
In addition to these alternations which hold true for all glide initial verbs, \
the two verbs ?axad 'take' and ?akal 'eat' show apparent combination of the
]
glottal stop and prefix vowel such that a^l f aa , il? ^ aa . Glides appear i
phonetically in the perfective forms yi?as 'he despaired', yibas 'he dried', ^
w^gaf 'he stopped', wusal 'he arrived •! i
(33) yee?as 'he despairs' ye^as 'he dries'
?e€(?as^ 'I despair' ?eebas 'I dry' '
teeTsuun 'you p. despair' teebsuun 'you p. dry'
yo^af 'he stops' yoosal 'he arrives'
]
?oogaf / 'I stop' ?oosal^ 'I arrive' ;
toogfuxm 'you p. stop' too|luun 'you p. arrive'
yaaxud 'he takes' yaajcul 'he eats'
?aaxud^ 'I take' ?a£iail^ 'I eat'
taaxduun 'you p. take' taakluun 'you p, eat'
The stems ?akal and ?axad are peculiar in two ways. The first is that
a glottal stop is deleted intervocalically in these forms, whereas all other
verbs with glottal stop retaJJi that glottal stop; thus, ?ilaf 'he was tame',
yj!?laf 'he is tame', yi?ilfuto 'they are tame'. Secondly, only these two
verbs have the vocalic pattern CaCaC in the perfect (c.f, (6)), whereas all
j
other CVCVC and CVCV verbs have CiCaC or CuCaC in the perfect. These two
j
verbs also appear to have CaCaC as their vocalism in the imperfect, judging '
from the forms ?aaxu4, ya^d, whereas all other CVCVC verbs select either i
or u as their initial stem vowel. If we assume these two stems to be axad
and'"akal rather than ?axad and ?akal, with initial vowels functioning in the
place of initial ccnson^ats in terms of cancaiical patterning, the divergence
of these two steins from all other stems will be provided with a unified .
explanation.
We must now explain the remaining contraction problems. Two analyses
appear to be at first glance plausible. In the first analysis, the sequences
of glides and vowels are contracted by a single rule into a long vowel having
features of the glide. In the second analysis, the analysis to be argued
for here, features of the glide are present on the stem vowel, glides are deleted
and the resulting vowel sequences will be appropriately contracted. The first
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analysis requires the following rule.
(3U) V + r-3yl 7 V ^0r+syl-l
-cons 1
-hi
[_+5on J |_+longJ
This analysis however fails to account for yaaxud which, deriving from
underlying yi+sixud , does not contain the requisite glide for application of
(3it). Additionally, the glide -contraction analysis does not account for deletion
of stem medial glides, as will be discussed oelow.
The -vowel contraction solution we adopt here assumes that the high vowel
after the glide in underlying yi-*vugaf and yi-^yi?as must be identical to the
glide, and employs glide deletion and vowel contraction rules. Thus, yoogaf
derives from yi-hijugaf via the stage yi-higaf . An identity constraint on high
vowels after glides can oe argued to be independently neces.'^ary for the
imperfective. Glide Elision is governed by the following rule.
(35) G ^ / V V
C-longJ
In addition to Glide Elision, a Vowel Contraction rule is necessary to complete
the derivation. It will oe observed that the resultant vowel is in all
instances a lengthened and lowered stem vowel. This generalization is stated
in the following rule.
(36) sf
r+stemj r+longl
bhi J
The following derivations illustrate application of these rules
(37)
Glide Elision
Contraction
yi+akul
yaakul
yi+Trfugaf
yoogaf
?a+yibas
?eebas
Verbs which contain a glide as the second radical consonant retain
that glide phonetically if the prededing vowel is long or the glide itself
is long. A stem alternation exists in case the glide is deleted so that
CaaC appears in the perfect before vowel initial endings or when the root
is followed by and CiC or CuC appears in the perfective when followed
by a C initial ending. Compare the perfective conjugations of ?aaf 'see'
and baag 'steal'
(38) ¥.."f
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The choice of vowels in the shortened (preconscxiantal) forms might be
expected to depend on the nature of the underlying glide, based an the facts
of Classical Arabic, However, this is not the case, as can be. seen below,
since the glide w can correspond to either u or i in preconsonantal forms,
K the imperfectxve stems contains a high vowel rather than aa (as in xaaf
'fear';^ that vowel is invariably dependent on the underlying glide.
(39) l^it
bI9it
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Turning to the mechanism for selection of CaaC versus CiC ^ shovm in
(38), I assume that the stems underlying these alternations are siwaf and
buwagj which become liaf and buag by application of Glide Elision, These
stems are them shortened by deletion of the final vowel before consonant
initial suffixes by the following rule,
(Ul) V ^0 / V ^CC
V/
Notice that this rule has applied to sifit 'I saw", although the
Inquired consonant cluster is not found on the surface. If we assume that
the 1st singular and 2nd m, suffixes are underlying -t as we have assumed
earlier for other reasons, and assume a rule of Epenthesis such as (9), this
anomaly is automatically explained. These forms have the intermediate represehtati
jfiaft, which becomes ¥ift by application of (Ul) and ¥£fit by application of
Epenthesis, In assuming underlying -t rather than -it for the 1st singular
and 2nd m, perfective suffixes, we have explained three otherwise unexplainable
and unrelated facts, vis. Stress Assignment, ee-epenthesis and Shortening,
Having accounted for the mechanism which shortens glide medial stems,
we turn now to the mechanism for generating the allomorphs with long aa,
which will be derived from ua or ia. It will be noticed that the long vowel
resulting from the vocalic cluster is essentially the righthand vowel, as
was seen to be the case with glide initial and the two vcwel initial verb
stems in the imperfective, A rule assimilating ua and ia to aa already
exists in our analysis. Contraction (36), Unfortunately, that rule as formulated
is not applicable to the relevant vcwel sequences in glide medial verbs, since
(36) requires a morpheme boundary to intervene between the vowels of the cluster.
If this boundary were removiBd from the rule, the assimilation would correctly
apply to siaf
,
yielding saaf
. The revised rule would then lower all sequences
of two vowels within a stem, and should entail that no stem can have two high
vowels consecutively, but would predict long midvowels whenever they should
arise. This is clearly false, cf, ysuuf 'he sees', yjifb 'he brings'.
These forms and the forms in (39) unambiguously show that no vowel lowering
is active within glide medial stems.
It is therefore necessary to separate the lengthening and lowering
features of (36) into two rules with different domains of application so
that these data can be properly accounted for. Since Lowering only applies
between a prefix and a stem initial vowel. Lowering is restricted to that
environment. The specification that the focal vowel is a stem vowel is necessary
30 that suffixes such as the feminine imperative -i do not undergo Lowering
after vowel final verb stems, since ?l->bna-*-i becomes lihnx 'build(f)l', not
*?ibne (this will become clear immediately following),
(U2) V ^[-highJ/V*
Q+stem]
The lengthening rule on the other hand has a wider domain of application,
applying within glide medial stems as well as glide initial stems. It is not
a general condition of the language that whenever two short vowels come together*
a long vowel results. Therefore, lengthening must be stated as a specific
rule and is not a metacondition on rules in Iraqi,
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(a3) V [nong]/ V
r+stem]
To review this analysis, I have assvmed that vowel sequences are
created by Glide Deletion and by prefixing vowel final affixes to the two
vowel initial stems, A constraint on high vowels after glides disallows
x-yu and -M-wi in the imperfective stem. The observed relations between deleted
glide and resultant long vowel are analyzed as the result of this identity
constraint on high vowels and specific rules to lengthen the second vowel of
a W sequence, plus a rule lowering the stem initial high vowels, A derivation
of ¥a^ and yee?as is provided below,
ikh) siwaf yi+yi?as
Glide Elision
Lengthening aa ii
Lowering NA ^ ee
others ¥a^ yee?as
The final rule needed to complete the derivation of aa from ia is a
vowel truncation rule. This rule is necessary to explain facts other than
those discussed immediately above. Whenever two vowels come together by
suffixatioi, one of the vowels is deleted. This process has been alluded to
in the discussion of ee_-epenthesis; there, we noted that when a vowel
final verb stem such as bina 'build' is followed by a vowel initial suffix
or ee is inserted by ee-~Epehthesis (11), the stem vowel is deleted. In
the following examples, the lefthand example shews the stem vowel followed
by no suffix, while the righthand example consists of stem plus affix.
(15) bina
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(U8) V ^ ^ V
[-l§ng]
lie stress and the Cycle
I shall now turn to a consideration of the dative clitic -il and
the pronominal link -yya which occurs underlyingly between the dative clitic
and the direct object pronoun on a verb. There are two logical possibilities
for the underlying form of each of these morphemes, given the existence of
Syncope and Epenthesisj these are -il, -1, -ivya and -yya . I shall argue
that the choice of -il and -yy.a as the unH'erlymg forms is the only selection
which accounts for critical data. The vowel i appears in -il when that suffix
stands before a consonant initial suffix, and is not found before vowel initial
suffixes.
(h9) kitab+;Ll+na 'he wrote to us' kitab+1+i? 'he wrote to you(f)'
dazz+xl+na 'he sent to us' dazz+l+i5? 'he sent to you(f)'
Under the analysis with underlying -il, the vowel is deleted by Syncope
(which, it will be recalled, can delete an unstressed vowel after a geminated
consonant, as indicated by (27)) . Thus, kit^bli^ derives from kit^ili^
via Syncope.
The suffix -yya selects the vowel i after a consonant, and selects no
vowel after a vowel, as indicated below,
(50) kitabilnayyaa 'he wrote it for us' ki-tabilkumiyyaa 'he wrote it for yc
dazzeetilnayyaa' 'you sent it to us' dazzeetilhumiyyaa 'I sent it o them'
It will be noticed that the vowel of the indirect object suffix na
in kitabilnayyaa does not become lengthened by Lengthening (5). This fact
was anticipated in the formulation of that rule, since the pronoun linking
morpheme -yya was not included in the set of suffixes which condition
Lengthening. The fact that the preceding a vowel of na is not lengthened
and yet not elided in favor of i clearly shows that kitabilnayyaa does not
have the intermediate structure kitabilna^-iyyaa^, since according to (U8),
the lefthand vowel of a short vowel cluster elides (as in ?i'qri •read(f)l',
from Tigra+i). Assuming the underlying form -iyya for this suffix results
in incorrect a-kitabiIniyyaa . Only the -underlying form -yya explains the
retention of the final object suffix vowels, by deriving the vowel of iyya
through Epenthesis, whenever that vowel appears phonetically.
Having extablished the underlying form of -yya, we can now turn to
forms which show that the underlying form of the dative clitic must contain
the vowel i, and which also show the ordering relation between Epenthesis
and Syncope (specifically, Epenthesis precedes Syncope), One argument for
assigning the dative clitic the underlying representation -il is the fact
th^t that vowel appears everywhere when not cliticized to the verb; thus
?ilha 'to her', ?xla 'to him'. When -il is followed by one of the vowel initial
object suffixes -jg or -ak which are in turn followed by iyyaa, the vowel of
those object suffixes is elided,
(51) kitabilkiyyaa 'he wrote it to you (m)'
kitabiiyiyya/
^
'he wrote it to you (f)'
dazzeetilkiyyaa 'I sent it to you (m)
•
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Assuming the indirect object clitic to be -il and assuming that Epenthesis I
feeds Syncope, these forms are derived in the following manner,
(52) kitabilakyya/ kitabilijyyaa
^
Epenthesis kitabilaklyya/ kitabiliciyyaa
Syncope kitabilkiyyaa" kitabilJfiyyaa" i
On the other hand, if we assume the dative clitic to have the underlying '
representation
-1, or if we assume that Syncope precedes Epenthesis, incorrect '
results follow,
~
'
(
(53) kitabilikyyaa' kitablikyyaa 1
Sync. NA kitabUkiyyaa Epenth. ^
Epenth, kLtabilikiyyaa'^ NA . Sync. '
*kitabilikiyyaa *kitablikiyyaa *
The only analysis consistent with elision of i and a in -iS and -ak is that
Epenthesis precedes Syncope and that the dativie clitic has the underlying '
form -il, '
—
I
At this point, we have seen the relevant rules of Iraqi Arabic, so we
may now turn to a set of facts arguing that stress must be assigned cyclically.
It will be recalled that I have shewn that Stress Assignment applies before
I
Epenthesis, since Stress Assipnmant applies to the abstract representation
J
kjtabt rather than derived kitabit. Thus, an epenthetic vowel is not present j
when stress is assigned, "Now consider the following examples in terms of *
the ordering of Epenthesis and Stress Assignment, and also in terms of
application of Syncope. These examples contain the suffix(es) t which receives
its i through application of Epenthesis,
~
(5U) dirasit 'I studied' dirasftha 'I studied her' J
9irafit 'you knew' 9irafitha 'you knew her' ^
We notice two unusual facts about Verb + Object forms on the righthand side, '
Epenthetic i is stressed in a syllable closed by the person suffix and object
j
suffix -ha.~ Fortbermore, the stem final unstressed vowel in a doubly ojjen
]
syllable is not elided by Syncope. Since the epenthetic vowel is stressed, '
it must be present when stress is assigned, which means that Epenthesis must '
precede Stress Assignment, But we have already shown that Stress Assignment
precedes Epenthesis and that the epenthetic vowel cannot be present when
stress is assigned. Thus, an ordering paradox results.
The ordering paradox dissolves if Stress Assignment is applied cyclically.
Bracketing dirasitha appropriately (ie, f Cdirastfha^), cyclic application of
Stress Assignment allows that rule to both preced and follow Epenthesis. In
addition, if stress is assigned to the final stem vowel in the course of the
derivation as predicted by the cyclic hypothesis and later reassigned to the
epenthetic vowel, presence of reduced stress on the final stem vowel prevents
that vowels elision. The cyclic derivation of dirasitha is provided below.
(55)
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The cyclic application of Stress Assignment in Iraqi thus allows two anomalies
to be related and explained without resorting to adhoc conditions on rules.
A different argument for cyclic application of Stress Assignment in
Palestinian Arabic based on essentially different phenomena was provided by
Brame (197U). A crucial difference between these two dialects exists in
terms of their treatment of Stress and Epenthesis, Whereas in Iraqi an
epenthetic vowel is stressable on a second cycle, as in dirasftha, in Palestinian
Arabic, the epenthetic i is never stressable. Thus, Palestinian has dar^sit
'I studied', dar^sitha "'"l studied her'. Nevertheless, these two dialects have
the same Stress Assignment rule and Epenthesis rule. A language specific
statement of Iraqi grammar specifies that Epenthesis may apply between the
two cycles of Stress Assignment, whereas in Palestinian Arabic, Epenthesis
does not intervene. Thus, the point should be made ( and has not been made elsewhere^
that part of the condition that a rule applies cyclically is that the set of
rules which intervene between one cycle of a rule and the next cycle of a
rule must be specified in the grammar. It is a question for future research
how three cyclic applications of a rule are to be handled and what the
interactions between two cyclic rules might be,
NOTES
"""l;y thanks to Mike Kenstowicz and Chuck Kisseberth for having read and
commented on an earlier draft of this paper, Ky thanks also to Saad Ahmad,
a native of Baghdad, for providing crucial material for this study,
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EXCEPTIONS AND RULE GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF THE
PASSIVE RULE IN HINDI
Rajeshwari Pandharipande
The goal of this paper is to examine two major hypotheses
(Lakoff 1965 and Green 1974, 1976) about exceptions to syntactic
rules and their role in defining the concept of rule-government.
In this context the case of the exceptions to the passive rule
in Hindi is discussed. It is argued that the exceptions to the
passive rule in Hindi do not present true irregularity and thereby
fail to support Lakoff 's hypothesis which treats all exceptions as
true irregularity. The case of the Hindi passive supports the
hypothesis presented in Green (1974, 1976) in that the exceptions
are regular and systematic. The passive rule in Hindi applies to a
semantically specifiable class of verbs, i.e., verbs expressing a
volitional act. Thus, the verbs which do not express a volitional
act fail to undergo the rule and present apparent irregularity.
Passive is a governed rule in Hindi in the sense that it admits a
semantic class in its structural description. It is pointed out
with illustrations that the above hypothesis is independently
motivated and is needed in the language.
1.0 Introduction
A number of recent studies in linguistics (Lakoff 1965, Lakoff, 1968,
Green 1974, Green 1976, and Green and Morgan 1976) have discussed the phenom-
enom of exceptions to syntactic rules and their role in defining the concept
rule-government. Two major questions were discussed in this context: (i)
does every case of exception to the rule present true irregularity? and (ii)
should a rule be labelled as governed on the basis of the fact that it admits
exceptions? The following hypotheses have been proposed: hypothesis I
(Lakoff 1965) treats all cases of failure to undergo a rule whose struc-
tural condition is satisfied as lexical exceptions (true irregularities).
No distinction is made between lexical exceptions and other kinds of items
which for some general and independently motivated reasons fail to undergo
the rule. All rules which have exceptions are claimed to be governed rules.
In contrast to this, hypothesis II (Green 1974, Green 1976, and Green and
Morgan 1976) makes a distinction between lexical exceptions and apparent
irregularity. It is claimed that rules can apply to the semantically
specifiable class of lexical items. In such cases, lexical items which do
not belong to the appropriate semantic class fail to undergo the rule and
produce apparent irregularity. Governed rules, according to this hypothesis,
are rules whose structural description mentions semantic classes.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the passive rule in Hindi
(Passive hereafter) and investigate the nature of the verbs which fail to
undergo the rule (exception-verbs hereafter). The major points of focus are
the following: (i) Neither the traditional grammars nor hypothesis I pro-
vide any explanation for the "exceptional" behavior of the exception-verbs.
Hypothesis I forces us to treat these exception-verbs as lexical exceptions,
(ii) There is independently motivated evidence to show that these verbs are
not true exceptions. They are systematic, i.e., they fall into a coherent
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semantic class, namely, verbs expressing a non-volitional act. (iii) In
order for the hypothesis to be descriptively adequate, it is necessary to
treat Passive as a governed rule, in the sense proposed in hypothesis II.
If it is claimed that Passive in Hindi applies to the verbs expressing a
volitional act, it would explain in a straightforward fashion why certain
verbs fail to undergo the rule. Also, it would correctly predict whether
or not a borrowed verb in Hindi would undergo the rule. In the light of the
above-mentioned facts, some observations about the semantics of passive
sentences in Hindi are made. It is pointed out that passive sentences in
Hindi express more than one meaning. However, they all share one thing in
common, i.e., they all express a volitional act. Subject-less passive sen-
tences in the present tense and habitual aspect express a convention and
prescribes a particular mode of behavior, e.g., baro se istarah zorse bola
nahi jata 'it is not customary to talk loudly like this with elders.' This
sentence thus expresses a convention, namely, one does not talk loudly with
the elders, and thereby it is suggested that one should not talk loudly with
the elders. It is observed that the same type of construction is found in
the Brahmanical texts in Sanskrit literature. The purpose of these texts is
to illustrate the ritualistic conventions and prescribe a particular mode of
behavior.
This paper also includes discussion about the theoretical implications
of this proposal (cf. 6.1).
1.1 Passive in Hindi
In this section, I will describe the passive rule in Hindi and present
evidence to support the claim that Hindi has a passive rule. Passive in Hindi
applies to both transitive and intransitive verbs. When a verb is passivized,
certain changes take place in the sentence. These changes can be illustrated
as follows: (i) the main verb of the active sentence is in its perfective
form in the corresponding passive sentence; (ii) an auxiliary verb jana 'to
go' is attached to the main verb; (iii) the subject of the active sentence
(ex-subject_hereaf ter) is followed by one of the following postpositions;
se
,
(ke) dwara
,
(ke) zariye
, and (iv) when the auxiliary verb bona 'to be'
is present in the active sentence, it follows the auxiliary verb jana 'to go'
in the passive sentence. The surface structure of a passive sentence can be
illustrated as follows: (Kachru 1966:181)
ya + ja Aspect + Tense
Compare the following non-passive sentences (1) and (2) with the passive
sentences (l.a) and (2. a).
Intransitive verb calna 'to leave'
(1) ram cala
Ram left.
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(l.a) ram se cala gaya
ram by left went
(perfective)
It was left by Ram. (Ram left.)
Transitive verb gana 'to sing'
(2) ram gane gata he
ram songs sings aux
Ram sings songs.
(2. a) ram se gane gaye jate he
ram by songs sang go aux
(perfective)
The songs are sung by Ram.
Notice that the verbs calna 'to leave' (1) and gana 'to sing' (2) are in their
perfective form in (l.a) and (2. a) respectively. The subject of (l.a) and
(2. a) is_followed by the postposition se 'by.' Also, notice that the auxil-
iary bona 'to be' is present in (2) and is retained in (2. a), where it
follows the auxiliary jana 'to go.'
2.0 Verb-agreement
The verb-agreement is not the same in active and passive sentences.
While the verb agrees with the subject in an active sentence, in a passive
sentence it agrees with the object of the active sentence (ex-object here-
after). Consider the following examples:
(3) larka citthiya parhta he
boy letters reads aux
3p.sg. Sp.plu. 3p.sg. 3p.sg.
mas. fem, mas.
The boy reads the letters.
(4) larke se citthiya parhi jati he
boy by letters read go aux
3p.sg. 3p.plu. 3p.plu. 3p.plu 3p.plu.
mas. fem. fem. fem.
The letters are read by the boy.
Notice that while the verb and aux. parhta he 'reads' agrees with the subject
larka 'boy' in (3), the verb parhi 'read' and both the auxiliaries agree with
the ex-object citthiya 'letters' in (3. a).
An intransitive verb agrees with the subject in an active sentence.
However, it remains in its unmarked form in a passive sentence. Consider the
following examples:
(4) larke nahi soe
boys not slept
3p.plu Bp.plu.
mas. mas.
The boys did not sleep.
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(5) larko se soya nahi gaya
boys by slept not went
3p,plu. 3p.sg. 3p.sg.
mas. mas. mas.
It was not slept by the boys.
(The boys could not sleep.)
Notice that the verb soe 'slept' agrees with the subject layke 'boys' in (4)
but it remains in its unmarked form in (4. a). The example (3. a) shows that
when a transitive verb is passivized, if the ex-object is not followed by a
postposition, the verb agrees with the ex-object in number and gender in all
aspects and tenses. Notice that the subject in (3. a) is followed by the
postposition ^ while the ex-object is not followed by any postposition. Now
consider the following example of a passive sentence where both the ex-subject
and the ex-object are followed by a postposition. In this case the verb
does not agree with either of them.
(5) larkiyo se zakhmi admiyo ko nahi dekha gaya
girls by injured people not saw went
3p.plu. 3p.plu.obj. 3p.sg. 3p.sg.
fem. mas. mas. mas.
The injured people were not seen by the girls.
(The girls could not bear to see the injured people.)
Notice that the ex-subject larkiya 'girls' is followed by the postposition
se . Also, the ex-object adml 'people' is followed by the postposition ko.
The verb (in its perfective form) and the auxiliary dekha gaya 'was seen'
do not agree with either the ex-subject or ex-object.
The agreement rules for passive sentences can be stated as follows
(for further discussion see Kachru 1966:182)
(i) \^en a transitive verb is passivized, if the ex-object is not
followed by ko, the verb agrees with the ex-object in number and gender
[recall (3. a)].
(ii) However, if the ex-object is also followed by a postposition ko,
the verb remains in its unmarked form.
(iii) If
marked form.
an intransitive verb is passivized, it remains in its un-
The verb agreement in a passive sentence in Hindi abides by the axiom
of the verb agreement in Hindi, namely, a verb does not agree with a noun
which is followed by a postposition. Thus the case of the verb-agreement in
the passive sentences is not different from the case of active sentences
where the subject is followed by a postposition. In both cases the verb
does not agree with the subject. Notice the following example of non-passive
sentences:
(6) larko ne kam kiya
boys ag. job did
3p.plu.ag. 3p.sg. 3p.sg.
mas. mas. mas.
The boys did the job.
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(7) bacco ko ma yad ati he
children mother memory comes
3p.plu. obj.m. 3p.sg. 3p.sg. 3p.sg.
mas. fem. fem.
The children remember the mother.
Notice that in both (6) and (7), the subject larke 'boys' in (6) and bacce
'children' in (7) is followed by a postposition' (ne and ]co respectively) and
the verb is in its unmarked form in (6) and agrees with ma 'mother' in (7).
2.1 Evidence for Passive: Reflexivization
In this section, I will present evidence to show that Hindi has a
passive rule. The Hindi reflexive pronoun apna 'self refers to the sub-
ject of the Hindi sentence. Consider the following sentence:
(8) ram ne syam ko apni jagah par bheja
ram ag. ^yam obj .M. self's place on sent
Ram sent syam to his place.
Ram' s
*Syam's
V _
Notice that the reflexive apni 'self refers to Ram (subject) and not Syam
(object). However, the following example shows that the reflexive in the
corresponding passive sentence refers to the subject as well as the object.
(9) ram se syam ko apni jagah par nahi bheja gaya
ram by syam obj.m. self's place on not sent went
Syam was not sent by Ram to his place.
S^am '
s
Ram' s
The most straightforward way to account for the facts of reflexivization
in Hindi is by analyzing (8) and (9) as being transformationally related.
For, consider the alternative. If the above assumption is not made, sen-
tences like (9) may lead one to believe that the reflexive in Hindi refers
to subject as well as object. This is patently false, as sentence (8)
makes clear. The fact is that the reflexive in Hindi refers to both sub-
ject and object if and only if the sentence is passive. In active sentences
it refers only to the subject. This fact is easily accounted for if we
treat (9) as being derived from (8) by the rule (Passive) which promotes the
object to the subject position, then we can explain the behavior of apni
'self's' in a straightforward fashion, i.e., examples (8) and (9) do not
contradict the generalization namely, the reflexive apni 'self's' always
refers to the subject and not the object. It is because Syam [object in
(8)] is promoted to subject-position by the rule_(Passive) , that it behaves
like the subject and therefore the reflexive apni 'self's' can refer to
^yam [ex-object in (9)]. This evidence indicates the following:
(i) Hindi has a passive rule.
(ii) Passive is a relation-changing rule in Hindi
and (iii) Although (9) provides evidence for object-promotion, it does not
provide any evidence for subject-demotion [recall (9) where the reflexive
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continues to refer to ram (the ex-subject)] in a passive sentence. (For
more discussion on the subject of passive sentences in Hindi, see Kachru
et al 1976).
2.2 Evidence for Passive: Subject-deletion
The ex-subject is generally deleted in a passive sentence in Hindi.
Thus Hindi has the following kind of passive sentences:
(11) i kam kiya gaya
work did went
The work was done.
If we do not consider this deletion as a consequence of the Passive, and
thereby sentences like (11) as derived sentences, then we will have to treat
these sentences as being identical to the other subject-less sentences
like (12).
(12) kam hua
work happened
The work got done.
However, for the native speakers of Hindi, (11) and (12) are not semantically
identical. For them the agent (subject) is implied in (11) while it is not
in (12). This intuition of native speakers is correctly supported by the
fact that when the agent and its agency is explicitly denied in (11) and
(12) respectively, (11. a) presents contradiction while (12. a) does not.
(11. a) * kisike na karne par bhi kam kiya gaya
anybody's not doing inspite of work did went
The work was done without anybody's doing it.
(12. a) kisike na karne par bhi kam ho gaya
anybody's not doing inspite of work happened
The work got done without anybody's doing it.
(11. a) indicates that the agent is implied in it while (12. a) indicates that
it is not. The following assumptions explain the situation in a simple
fashion.
(i) The underlying structure of (11) is (13), in which the agent is
present. (11) is derived from (13) by a rule which generally deletes the
ex-subject after the application of passive rule.
(13) X ne kam kiya
X ag.M. work did
X did the work.
(ii) The underlying structure of (12) is (14) which is the same as its
surface structure.
(14) kam hua
work happened
The work got done.
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Notice that the subject is not present in the underlying structure of (12)
whereas it is in the underlying structure of (11). Thus in order to differ-
entiate the sentences like (11) from (12), it is necessary to assign to them
two different underlying structures and derive (11) from (13) by the passive
rule.
3.0 Exceptions
A number of verbs in Hindi fail to undergo the passive rule. The list
of the exception-verbs consists_of the verbs (intransitive) like dikhna 'to
seem,' khilna 'to bloom,' murjhana 'to whither,' galti bona 'to make a mis-
take,' bikni 'to sell,' tutna 'to break' and the verbs (transitive/
intransitive) which require their subject to be in the dative/oblique case
i.e., lagna 'to feel,' pasand bona 'to like' (literally, liking happen),
malum bona 'to know,' yad ana 'to remember' (literally, memory come) and
sirdard honi 'to have a headache' (literally, headache happen) etc.
The traditional grammars (Guru 1920, Vajpeyi 1958, Kellogg 1955), do
not discuss these exceptions. Within the framework of hypothesis I (Lakoff
1968), these verbs will have to be treated as lexical exceptions (true
irregularity) and will have to be marked (-Passive) in their lexical entry.
Also, since the passive rule in Hindi allows these exceptions, it will be
marked as a governed rule.
3.1 The "capabilitative" meaning
Before I present a semantically oriented explanation for the "excep-
tional" behavior of these verbs, it will not be inappropriate to see what
a passive sentence means in Hindi. A passive sentence in Hindi, with the
ex-subject present on the surface gnerally expresses the capacity of the
subject to carryout the act expressed by the verb (Vajpeyi 1958, Kachru
1966). Consider the following sentences:
(15) larke se citthiya nahi likhi jati
boy by letters not wrote go
The letters are not written by the boy.
(The boy is not capable of writing letters.)
However, whether or not a verb expresses capability of the subject, does not
help us define the exceptions for the following reasons: (i) verbs which
express capability of the subject, do not necessarily undergo Passive and
(ii) not all passive sentences in Hindi express the capabilitative meaning
(Kachru 1966:183-184). Passive sentences in Hindi cover a wide range of
meaning. A descriptively adequate analysis of the "exceptional" behavior
of the verbs should take into account all the meanings expressed by those
sentences.
In what follows, I will present evidence to show that the capacity of
the subject either to undergo or to carryout the act expressed by the verb
is not crucial to decide whether or not a verb will undergo Passive. Consider
the following sentences:
(16) phul khilta he
flower blooms aux
The flower blooms.
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(17) mujhe accha lag raha he
to me good feel prog, aux
I am feeling fine.
Notice that the subject phul 'flower' in (16) is capable of undergoing the
act of blooming. Similarly, the subject jc^ 'I' in (17) is capable of feel-
ing (fine). However, when the verbs khilni 'to bloom' and lagna 'to feel'
are passivized, (16. a) and (17. a) are ungrammatical.
(16. a) * phul se khila jata he
flower by bloomed goes aux.
It is bloomed by the flower.
(17. a) * mujh se accha laga ja raha he
me by good felt go prog. aux.
It is felt good by me.
This evidence shows that the subject's capacity to carry out or to undergo
the act expressed by the verb is not crucial to decide whether or not a
verb will undergo Passive.
3.2 In this section I shall show that a passive sentence expresses the
capabilitative meaning only when the ex-subject is present. When the ex-
subject is deleted, passive sentences lose the capabilitative meaning
(kachru 1966). Consider the following sentences:
(18) larke se citthiya nahi likhi jati
boy by letters not wrote go
(i) The letters are not written by the boy.
(ii) The boy is not capable of writing letters.
(19) i citthiya nahi likhi jati
letters not wrote go
The letters are not written.
Notice that when the ex-subject is present, (18) expresses the capabilitative
meaning. However, when the ex-subject larke se 'by the boy' is deleted, (19)
loses the capabilitative meaning.
3.3 In (3.2) we have seen that subject-less passive sentences do not
express the capabilitative meaning. Now I will present various meanings
expressed by the subject-less passive sentences under different conditions.
First, I will present subject-less passive sentences which express a con-
vention, a custom or a tradition in the present tense and the habitual
aspect. These sentences are used to prescribe a particular mode of behavior.
Consider the following sentences:
(20) baro se istarah zor se nahi bola jata
elders with like this loudly not talked goes
(One does not talk) loudly like this with the elderly people.
(21) diwali par ghar ghar me dip jalae jate he
diwali on _house house in lamps lit go aux.
On the Diwali-day lamps are lit in every house.
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(22) am chilkar nahi khae jate
mangoes having peeled not ate go
Mangoes are not eaten having been peeled.
Notice that the ex-subject is not present in (20), (21) and (22). (20)
expresses a convention, namely, it is not customary to talk loudly with the
elders and thereby suggests that it is not proper to talk loudly with the
elders. (21) expresses the custom of lighting lamps of the Diwali-day
(festival of lights, celebrated in India); and thereby suggests that one
should light lamps on the Diwali-day. (22) expresses the convention that
the mangoes are not peeled. (They are either cut into small pieces or
their juice is squeezed out.) This sentence suggests that one should not
peel mangoes. All the three sentences above [(20), (21) and (22)], carry
an habitual aspect and present tense. These sentences lose their "pres-
criptive" meaning when their aspect or tense is changed. Consider the
following examples:
(23) diwali par dip jalae gae
diwali on lamps lit went
(perfective) ^past)
The lamps were lit on the Diwali-day.
(24) am chilkar nahi khae ja rahe (he)
mangoes having peeled not ate go prog, (aux)
The mangoes are not being eaten having been peeled.
Notice that (23) is in the perfective aspect and past tense, while (24)
is in the progressive aspect and present tense. In both cases the "pres-
criptive" meaning, expressed by (21) and (22) is blocked. Neither (23)
not (24) express any custom, tradition or convention, instead, they refer
to a particular incident at a particular point in time. Thus in order for
passive sentences to convey the "conventional" meaning, the role of the
aspect and the tense seems to be crucial. The "capabilitative" meaning
is also blocked in both (23) and (24).
This "prescriptive" usage of passive sentences in present tense and
habitual aspect has precedent in the history of Indo-Aryan. The Brahmanical
texts in Sanskrit make extensive use of subject-less passive sentences.
The purpose of these texts is to interpret the Vedic texts in the context
of the sacrificial rituals. These texts describe the sacrificial rituals
and illustrate the duties of the priests and Yajamana (the host for whom
the sacrifice is performed), etc. (For more discussion see Keith 1928 and
Gonda 1975). A close examination of the data shows that subject-less pas-
sive sentences here are utilized to express conventions and thereby precribe
particular modes of behavior. The following examples illustrate the
situation.
(25) sama giyate
sacrificial prayer is sung
gai + ya (pass.) + present
The sama is sung. (l^atapatha Brahmana 5.2.46)
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(26) ahutir huyate
oblation is offered
hu + ya (pass.) + present
The oblation is offered, (^atapatha Brahmana 3.1.23,28)
(27) sa svahetyevajuhot tasmat u
he svaha thus saying offered therefore indeed
svahetyeva huyate
svaha thus saying is offered
hu + ya (pass.) + present
He offered (the oblation) with (the_words) "svaha!".
Therefore (it is) offered with svaha. ( Satapatha Brahmana 2.2.4.6)
Notice that the subject is not present in (25)
—
(27). (25) expresses a con-
vention, namely, the sama is sung. It also expresses a "prescriptive"
meaning namely, the sama should be sung. (26) expresses a convention,
i.e., the oblation is offered and thereby suggests that tha oblation should
be offered. In (27), the process of offering the oblation is described.
The first half of the sentence describes an incident i.e., he offered the
oblation, reciting the word "svaha!" (an exclamation used in offering
oblations to gods). The second half of the sentence describes the conven-
tion, 'therefore it is offered with the recitation of the word "svaha!".'
This sentence conveys a "prescriptive" meaning, namely, the oblation should
be offered with the recitation of the word "svaha! "^ This "prescriptive"
meaning conveyed by the passive sentences in the Brahmanas , is restricted
to the present tense and the habitual aspect. The following sentences in
the past tense do not convey this "prescriptive" meaning:
(28) tasmac saro nama yad asiryata
therefore arrow named because was broken
a(past M) + sri + past 3sg.
Therefore the designation arrow, because it was broken off.
( Satapatha Brahmana 2.4.1)
(29) sapta rsayah asrjyanta
seven sages' were created
a(past) +srj + ya(passive) + past 3sg.
The seven sages were created.
( Satapatha Brahmana 8.4.3—6)
Note that (28) and (29) do not express a prescriptive meaning like (26) and
(27). While (25)~(27) are in the present tense, (28) and (29) are in the
past tense. In this section I have shown that:
(i) When the subject is deleted, the passive sentences in Hindi lose
their "capabilitative" meaning.
(ii) In the present tense and the habitual aspect, the passive sen-
tences express a convention and prescribe a particular mode of behavior;
(iii) The passive sentences in the Brahmanas behave similarly [For more
discussion on the function of the passive sentences in the Satapatha
Brahmana
,
refer to Pahdharipande : 1976 (unpublished)
.
]
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This similarity between the function of the passive sentences in the
Brahmanas and in Modern Hindi leads to a speculation namely, Hindi might
have inherited this usage of passive sentences. However, in order to arrive
at this conclusion, it is necessary to investigate the function of passive
sentences in the literature_written between the period of the Brahmanical
texts and Modern Hindi. Prakrt, Apabhram^a and Old Hindi mark three major
stages of Indo-Aryan between the period of ^atapatha Brahmana and Modern
Hindi. If the investigation of the texts shows that the "prescriptive"
function of passive sentences is retained through those stages in the
development of Indo-Aryan, then it can be claimed that Modern Hindi inher-
ited the "prescriptive" function of passive sentences. At this point this
is an open question and needs further investigation.
3.4 In this section, I will show that in some "regi=;ters" (or 'function-
ally determined language-types' Halliday :1964) of Hindi (i.e., the news
paper register and the scientific register), the subject-less passive
sentences express an "impersonal" meaning. In this case, a passive sentence
is generally followed by a sentential object. These sentences are generally
comparable to English sentences such as, "it is believed that smoking is
bad for health" or "it is said that apples are good for health." Consider
the following sentences:
(30) i kahajatahe ki nehru bare dayalu admi the
said goes aux that nehru very kind man was
It is said that Nehru was a very kind man.
-
_ _
_ V '^^
(31) ajkal yeh suna jata he ki har des me
now-a-days this heard goes aux that every country in
kapro ke dam barh rahe h"^
clothes of cost increase prog, aux
Now-a-days it is heard that in every country the prices of clothes
are increasing.
Notice that in (30) and (31) the ex-subject is not present and they convey
an "impersonal" meaning. The "capabilitative" meaning is not conveyed by
these sentences. B. Kachru (1977) suggests that this function of passive
sentences (i.e., to express an "impersonal" meaning) has been borrowed from
English into Hindi as a result of the language-contact between English and
Hindi over a long period of time.
A.O Volitional act and the Hindi Passive
The discussion in (3.0)— (3.4) shows that passive sentences in Hindi
express a variety of meanings. However, whether or not a verb will undergo
Passive cannot be judged on the basis of these meanings because none of
these meanings is shared in common by all passive sentences in Hindi.
Recall that
(i) The "capabilitative" meaning is lost in the subject-less passive
sentences (cf. [3.2]).
(ii) The "prescriptive" as well as the "impersonal" meaning is governed
by the structure (it has to be a subject-less construction) and tense and
aspect (present tense and habitual aspect for the "prescriptive" meaning).
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Therefore, neither the "prescriptive" nor the "impersonal" meaning can be
said to be the characteristic of the verbs which undergo Passive.
A close examination of passive sentences in Hindi shows that they
express a volitional act, in the sense that the subject's volition controls
the act expressed by the verb, as has been observed by Kachru (1972) and
Hasan (1971). In the following discussion it will be shown that every
passive sentence (irrespective of what kind of meaning it conveys) expresses
a volitional act. The examples in focus are (3. a), (21) and (30). Notice
that (3. a) expresses the "capabilitative" meaning, (21) expresses the
"prescriptive" meaning and (30) expresses the "impersonal" meaning. The
hypothesis that (3. a), (21) and (30) express a volitional act is supported
by the following examples (32)— (34). Examples (32), (33) and (34) are
the counterparts of (3. a), (21) and (30) respectively. In (32)— (34) it
is stated that the act expressed by the verb took place although the subject
did not do it intentionally. In other words, the subject's volition is
explicitly negated in those sentences. If our hypothesis is correct, i.e.,
if the passive sentences express a volitional act, then such negation of
the subject's volition must present contradiction. Notice that (32)
— (34)
do in fact present contradiction.
(32) "larke se citthiya parhi jati he; janbujhkar nahi
boy by letters read go aux intentionally not
The letters are read by the boy (but) not intentionally.
(33) *diwali par ghar ghar mi dip jalae jate he; janbujhkar nahi
diwali on every house in lamps lit go aux intentionally not
The lamps are lit on the Diwali-day, (but) not intentionally.
(34) *Kaha jata he —janbujhkar nahi—ki nehru bare dayalu admi the
said go aux intentionally not that nehru very kind man was
It is said (but)—not intentionally—that Mr. Nehru was a very kind
man.
Notice that in the first clause in (32)
— (34), the subject's volition is
negated. Also notice that (32)
— (34) are ungrammatical. This ungrammati-
cality can be explained in a straightforward fashion if we assume that in
(3. a), (21) and (30), subject's volition is presupposed; therefore, its
negation in (32), (33) and (34) respectively, presents contradiction. The
examples (32)
—
(34) show that the volitional act is characteristic of all
passive sentences in Hindi.
4.1 Volitionality and the exception-verbs
The discussion in the following section is focused on two major points:
first, whether or not a verb will undergo Passive crucially depends on
whether or not it expresses a volitional act. Second, the classification
of the verbs into two classes, i.e., verbs expressing a volitional act and
verbs expressing a non-volitional act, is independently motivated.
4.1. a. Inanimate subject and the exception-verbs
The verbs whose subject is generally inanimate (and thereby does not
have any volition) typically fail to undergo Passive. Notice that verbs
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such as khilna 'to bloom', mur j hana 'to wither', ubalna 'to boil' (intran-
sitive) and bikna 'to sell', generally take inanimate subjects such as
phul 'flower' (khilna 'to bloom' and mur j hana 'to wither'), pan! 'water'
(ubalna 'to boil') and kitab 'book' (bikna 'to sell'). Those verbs do not
undergo Passive. Consider the following examples:
(35) *phul se khila jata he
flower by bloomed go aux
It is bloomed by the flower.
(36) *Kaliyo se murjhaya jata he
buds by withered go aux
It is withered by the buds.
(37) *pani se ubla jata he
water by boiled goes aux
It is boiled by the water.
(38) *ghar se bika jata he
house by sold goes aux
It is sold by the house.
Now consider the following verbs which take animate or inanimate subjects.
The examples (39) and (40) show that those verbs are passivized only when
their subject is animate.
(39) larki andar ati he
girl in comes aux
The girl comes in.
(39. a) (larki se) andar aya jata he
(girl by) in came goes aux
It is come in by the girl.
(40) hava andar ati he
air in comes aux
The air comes in.
(40.a)*hava se andar aya jata he
air by in came goes aux
It is come in by the air.
Notice that the verb ana 'to come' can take either animate (39) or an inani-
mate subject (40). However, when Passive is applied to (39) and (40)
respectively, (39. a) is grammatical, while (40. a) is not. (40) differs
from (39) in that the subject of_(40) is inanimate (hava 'air'), while the
subject of (39) is animate ( larki 'girl'). This discussion shows that in
order for the verb to undergo Passive, the subject's volition must control
the act expressed by the verb or, in other words, the verb must express a
volitional act.
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4.2 The negation test
The purpose of this test is to determine, independently of the passive
construction, whether or not the subject's volition controls the act
expressed by the verb. If the subject's volition controls the act in a
sentence, its negation in the conjoined sentence should result in contradic-
tion. Now contrast the_verb torn! 'to break' (which undergoes Passive) with
the exception-verb girna 'to fall'. When it is claimed that the action
took place against the subject's volition, the use of the regular verb
torna ' to_break' produces contradiction, while the use of the exception-
verb girna 'to fall' does not.
torna 'to break' (regular verb—undergoes Passive)
(41) ??? m£ ne phuldan tora halaki me torna nahi cahti thi
I ag.M. vase broke although I to 'break not wanted
I broke the vase although I did not want to break it.
girna 'to fall' (exception-verb)
(42) us bhir me vah larki gir pari halaki vah girna nahi
that_crowd in that girl fell down although she to fall not
cahti thi
wanted
That girl fell down in that crowd although she did not want to.
Notice that when the volition of the subject me 'I' in breaking the vase is
negated in the conjoined sentence, (41) produces contradiction, while (42)
is fine when the volition of the subject vah larki 'that girl' is negated in
the conjoined sentence. This result of the negation test shows that the
verbs which undergo Passive (i.e., torna 'to break') express a volitional
act while the verbs which fail to undergo Passive (i.e., girna 'to fall)
express a non-volitional act.
5.0 Evidence from constructions involving volitionality
In this section I will present evidence to show that the verbs which
fail to undergo Passive, typically fail to participate in the constructions
which require the verb to express a volitional act. The regular verbs are
contrasted with the exception-verbs and it is shown that the regular verbs
can participate in those constructions. However, then the exception-verbs
are used, the result is ungrammatical
.
5.1 The Imperative Construction
The first one of this type of construction is the imperative construc-
tion. It is generally assumed that the subject's volition controls the act
expressed by the verb in the imperative construction. Thus in English, in
a sentence like 'carry it!', it is assumed that the volition of the implied
subject 'you' controls the action of carrying. Also, notice that if a verb
does not express a volitional act, it fails to participate in this
construction, i.e.,
(43) *Like it!
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(44) *Resemble it!
Notice that the subject's volition does not control the act of liking (43)
and resembling (44). The following examples show that this construction is
blocked for the exception-verbs.
(45) *yad ao ! 'be remembered!'
(46) Alago! 'feel!'
(47) "khoo! 'lose yourself!'
Now consider the following examples:
(48) yad karo ! 'remember!'
(49) toro! 'break it!
'
(50) likho! 'write!
'
Notice that the verb yad ana 'to be remembered' (45), lagna 'to feel' (46)
and khona 'to lose oneself (47), are exceptions to Passive, while the
verbs yad karna 'to remember' (48), torna 'to break' (49) and likhna 'to
write' (50) are not exceptions to Passive. This discussion shows that
subject's volition does not control the act expressed by the exception-
verbs ((45)— (47)), while the subject's volition controls the act expressed
by the verbs which undergo Passive ((48)— (50)).
5.2 Kosis karna 'try to' construction in Hindi
Another construction which requires the verb to express a volitional
act is the one in the English sentences such as "Bill tried to help John".
Notice that the verbs which participate in this construction are verbs like
"to please" (i.e., Jim tried to please his boss), "to kill" (i.e., Sam
tried to kill Bill) and not verbs such as "to resemble" (??? John tried to
resemble Bill). Here again, the subject's volition is involved in the acts
expressed by the verbs of pleasing, killing, and helping while it is not
involved in the act expressed by the verbs such as "resemble".
Now let us consider the Hindi verbs of this type. The following
examples show that while this construction is_blocked for the exception-
verbs, such as khona 'to lose one self, yad ana 'to be remembered', it is
not for the verbs which undergo Passive.
—
— V—V —
(51) sudha ne sab janne ki kosis ki
sudha ag.M. all to learn tried
Sudha tried to learn everything.
~,
— v— V —
(52) mc ne soneki kosis ki
I ag. M. to sleep tried
I tried to sleep.
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(53) *dilip ne khoneki kosis ki
dilip ag. M. to lose himself tried
Dilip tried to lose himself.
(54) *seema ne yad aneki kosis ki
seema ag. M. to be remembered tried
Seema tried to be remembered.
Notice that the use of verbs such as janna 'to learn' (50) and sona 'to
sleep' (52) in this construction, does not produce ungrammaticality . In
contrast to this, when used in this construction, the verbs khona 'to
lose one self (53) and yad ana 'to be remembered' (54), result in
ungrammaticality. The verbs j anna 'to learn' (51) and sona ' to sleep' (52)
undergo Passive while khona 'to lose oneself (53) and yad ana 'to be
remembered' (54) do not. On the basis of this discussion, we can infer
that the subject's volition does not control the act expressed by the
exception-verbs while it does in the case of the verbs which undergo
Passive.
5.3 The dative-subject-verbs and non-volitionality
The verbs which require their subject to be in the dative case are
exceptions to Passive in Hindi. A native speaker of Hindi intuitively
feels that those verbs do not express a volitional act. Thus for him the
subject's volition does not control the act of remembering expressed by
the dative-subject-verb yad ana 'to be remembered'. The following evidence
supports this intuition. Notice that in (55) and (56), the dative-subject-
verb yad ana 'to be remembered' (literally, memory come) is contrasted with
the verb yad karna 'to remember' (literally, to do memory). In (55) and
(56) it is stated that the act of remembering expressed by the verbs yad ana
'to be remembered' (to come to memory) (55) and (56) respectively took
place against the subject's volition. While (56) presents contradiction,
(55) does not.
(55) (mere) na cahnepar bhi mera dost mujhe bar bar
(my)
_
not wanting in spite of my friend to me again & again
yad ata he
remember aux
Although I do not want to, I remember my friend over and over again.
(56) ??? (mere) na cahnepar bhi me apne dost ko
(my) not wanting in spite of I my friend Obj , M.
bar bar yad karta hQ
again & again remember aux
Although I do not want to, I remember my friend over and over again.
The examples (55) and (56) indicate that the subject's volition does not
control the act expressed by the dative-subject-verb yid ana 'to be remem-
bered' (55). Therefore, even when the act is said to have taken place
against the subject's volition, no contradiction results. In contrast to
this, the subject^s volition controls the act of remembering expressed by
the verb yad karna 'to remember' (56). Therefore, when the act is said to
have taken place against subject's volition, (56) presents contradiction.
Notice that the verb yad ana 'to be remembered' is an exception-verb while
yad karna 'to remember' is not. The hypothesis, i.e., dative-subject-
verbs do not express a volitional act, is further supported by the cross-
linguistic evidence presented in Krishnamurti (1975), McAlpin (1976), and
Sridhar (1976).
5.4 In this section I will present more evidence for the hypothesis that
the_exception-verbs express a non-volitional act. The Hindi adverbial
dhyan se 'carefully' is comparable to the English adverb 'carefully'.
Notice that the adverb 'carefully' (in English) can accompany the verbs
like "drive" (i.e., He drives carefully) and "listen" (i.e.. Listen care-
fully!), where the subject's volition controls the act of driving and
listening respectively. However, notice that "carefully" does not occur
with the verbs such as "get hurt" (*John got hurt carefully) or "like"
(*I carefully liked the movie), where the subject's volition does not
control the act expressed by the verbs "to get hurt" and "to like"
respectively. Thus in English, the adverb "carefully" does not accompany
a verb which does not express a volitional act. The Hindi data shows that
dhyan se 'carefully' accompanies only those verbs which undergo Passive
and typically does not accompany the exception-verbs. Consider the follow-
ing examples:
(57) jan dhyan se parta he
John carefully studies aux
John studies carefully.
(58) *jan dhyan se kho gaya
John carefully lost himself
John carefully lost himself.
Notice that the adverb dhyan se 'carefully' can occur with the verb parhna
'to study' but not with the verb khona 'to lose oneself. While parhna "to
study" undergoes Passive, khona 'to lose oneself does not. This shows
that the exception-verbs do not express a volitional act whereas the verbs
which undergo Passive express a volitional act.
6.0 Conclusion
The major points in the preceding discussion can be summed up as
follows: First, that Hindi has a passive rule (section (1.0)). Second,
that the list of exceptions to Passive in Hindi consists of both transitive
and intransitive verbs. Within the framework of hypothesis I (Lakoff 1965),
these verbs will have to be treated as lexical exceptions and be marked as
(-Passive) in their lexical entry. Third, passive sentences in Hindi
express a variety of meanings under various conditions (sections (3.2)
—
3.4)). However, all of them share one thing in common, i.e., they all
express a volitional act (4.0). Fourth, the discussion in (4.1)— (5.4)
reveals that the verbs which undergo Passive express a volitional act while
the exception-verbs do not.
On the basis of these observations, the following conclusions can be
drawn: The exceptions to Passive in Hindi do not present true irregularity.
Passive in Hindi applies to verbs which express a volitional act. Since
the exception-verbs typically express a non-volitional act, they fail to
undergo the rule and present apparent irregularity. Thus Passive in Hindi
170
should be labelled as a governed rule in the sense discussed in Green
(1974), Green (1976), and Green and Morgan (1976), i.e., it applies to a
semantically specifiable class of verbs.
The classification of verbs into two classes (i.e., the verbs express-
ing a volitional act and the verbs expressing a non-volitional act) is
independently motivated (recall the discussion in sections (5.0)
— (5.4).
The verbs belonging to these classes behave differently from each other
with regard to other syntactic constructions in Hindi. Thus this classi-
fication enables us to explain the "exceptional" behavior of the exception-
verbs and captures the generalization, namely, that the exception-verbs
are exceptions to the constructions which require the verb to express a
volitional act. The hypothesis which marks these exceptions as true
irregularity, misses this generalization.
The hypothesis proposed in this paper explains why some borrowed
verbs (i.e., verbs borrowed from English) undergo Passive while some others
do not. Notice, Hindi has borrowed several nouns from English, e.g.,
ekting (acting), ^ak (shock), etc. (For further discussion see B. Kachru:
1977). Some "hybrid" compound-verbs are formed with these nouns. The
process of deriving those compound-verbs is as follows: An operator (a
native Hindi verb) is attached to the word borrowed from English; these two
(the borrowed noun and the operator) function as a unit—a compound-verb.
Thus the following verbs are formed: ekting karna 'to act' or 'to pretend'.
Notice that in this compound-verb, ekting 'acting' is the borrowed noun and
karna 'to do' is the Hindi verb which is used as an operator. Now consider
the other compound-verb ^ak lagna 'to get a shock' or 'to be shocked', in
which ^ak 'shock' is the borrowed noun and lagna 'to feel^ to be attached'
is the Hindi verb used as an operator. While ekting karna 'to act' is
passivizable, sak lagna 'to be shocked' is an exception to Passive. Under
hypothesis I, the grammar of Hindi will have to mark ^ak lagna 'to be
shocked' as an exception to Passive. However, it will not explain why some
of the verbs formed with the borrowed nouns undergo Passive while some do
not. In the framework of our hypothesis, this situation can be_explained
in a straightforward fashion. Notice that the exception-verb ^ak lagna 'to
be shocked' is a dative-subject-verb. The discussion in (5.3) shows that
the dative-subject-verbs express a non-volitional act and therefore it is
only expected that it will not undergo Passive. Also, the behavior of
these verbs with regard to the constructions discussed in (5.1),
(5.2) and (5.4) shows that while ekting karna 'to act' expresses a
volitional act, ^ak lagna 'to be shocked' does not.^
6.1 The discussion in this paper raises some theoretical questions:
It has been observed (Green and Morgan 1976) that all rules that change
grammatical relations are governed. However, it is not clear as to what
degree of relation-changing capacity is necessary for a rule to be governed.
The Hindi Passive changes the grammatical relations only partially. Notice
that the ex-object in the Passive sentence (9) controls reflexivization
and thereby provides evidence for object-promotion. However, (9) does not
provide evidence for subject-demotion (i.e., the ex-subject continues to
control reflexivization in (9)). Kachru et al. (1976) have shown that the
subject of the passive sentence in Hindi is less subject-like. On the
whole, the Hindi Passive only partially changes the grammatical relations.
The discussion in this paper shows that Passive is a governed rule in
Hindi. Can we then say that the rules which only partially affect the
grammatical relations are also governed? This assumption will give rise
to the following questions:
(a) Are grammatical relations always discrete?
(b) What degree of relation-changing capacity of a rule is necessary
in order to establish a correlation between relation-changing rules and
rule-government?
The "prescriptive" meaning and the "impersonal" meaning conveyed by
some passive sentences in Hindi provide evidence for the role of language-
use in determining the meaning of a sentence. This raises the question,
how did Hindi acquire the "capabilitative" meaning? Is it a function of
language-use or of the linguistic structure?
The Hindi Passive shows that the syntactic behavior of the verbs is
determined by their role in the semantic structure of the language. One
might therefore ask, to what extent semantic structure controls the
syntactic structures of a language? At present these are open questions
and further investigation is needed.
NOTES
I am greatly indebted to Professors Yamuna Kachru, Braj Kachru and
Jerry Morgan for their invaluable suggestions, criticisms and guidance but
for which this paper would be much worse than it is. I claim the respon-
sibility for the shortcomings that remain.
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The influence of English is seen at various linguistic levels (i.e.,
lexicon, morphology and syntax) in the newspaper register of Hindi. "A
number of syntactic patterns which are transferred from English have a
high frequency in the newspaper register such as in sports news and in
headings and captions" (B. Kachru 1977). Kachru points out two major
reasons for the direct influence on this particular register of Hindi
"one reason being that until recently, English was used as the main source
for translating news items into Hindi, since the facilities for direct
communication of news in Hindi (say, teleprinters in Hindi) were not
available. Second, a large number of successful English newspapers started
sister publication in Hindi (i.e. , The Hindustan Times and Hindustan
(New Delhi) etc,)."
In Hindi, traditionally, active forms of verbs are used to convey the
"impersonal" meaning. However, the following paragraphs from newspapers
illustrate the use of passive to convey the "impersonal" meaning in the
newspaper register:
(a) yah bhi mag ki gai ki ukt sarasthan me dhan ki
this also demand^did went that said province in finances of
herapheri ki jac ki jay
mishandling of investigation did go (optat.)
It has been demanded that there be an investigation of the mishandling
of finances in the said province. (Navbharat Times , New Delhi,
October 19, 1977).
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(b) yaha tak kaha gaya ki lina ke thik bote hi use aspatal
here upto said went that line of recovering_soon her hospital
se sidhe kahi esi jagah bhej diya gaya . . .
from straight some such place sent went
It was even said that soon after her recovery Lina was sent from the
hospital to some place . . . (Saptahik Hindustan , May 22, 1977).
^There is evidence to show that the verb ekting karna 'to act'
expresses a volitional act; in contrast to this,
'
^ak lagna 'to get_a
shock' does not express a volitional act. Notice that ekting karna 'to
act' participates in the constructions which require the verb to express
a volitional act, while ^ak lagna 'to get a shock' fails to participate in
those constructions. Consider the following examples:
(a) The Imperative construction (cf. 5.1)
1. ekting karo 'act!, do the acting!'
2. *^ak lago 'get a shock!'
(b) kosis karna 'try to' (cf. 5.2)= •> ^
_ M—M —
3. ram ne ekting karne ki kosis ki
Ram tried' to do the acting^
4.
--ram ne ^ak lagne ki ko^i^ ki
ram ag.M. shock get tried
Ram tried to get a shock.
(c) dhyan se 'carefully' (cf. 5.4)
5. vah dhyan se ekting karta he
he carefully acting does aux
He does the acting carefully.
6.* vah dhyan se ^ak lagta he
usko
he/him gets a shock carefully.
Notice that constructions such as Imperative, 'Try to' and 'carefully' are
blocked for the verb ^ak lagna 'to get a shock' (recall (2, 4, and 6)). On
the other hand, those constructions not blocked for ekting karna 'to act'
(1, 3, and 5). On the basis of this, we can conclude_that while ekting
karna 'to act' expresses a volitional act, the_verb ^ak lagna 'to get a
shock' does not. Also, the fact that ^ak lagna 'to get a shock' is a
dative-subject-verb indicates that it expresses a non-volitional act. Our
hypothesis_correctly predicts that while ekting karna 'to act' will undergo
Passive, ^ak lagna 'to get a shock' will not.
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LANGUAGE- LIKENESS
Irmengard Rauch
Semiotics, the science of signs, derives its recent lin-
guistic heritage from standard bearers such as Saussure, Sapir,
Bloomfield, Jakobson and, indeed, Chomsky. Bloomfield's (1939)
claim that 'Linguistics is the chief contributor to semiotic'
and Jakobson's (1971) hypothesis that '...any human communication
of non-verbal messages presupposes a circuit of verbal messages'
indicate a modus operandi , namely the function in which all of
semiotics displays an inlay of language, in which non-verbal
communication is LANGUAGE -LIKE. It is proposed that the iso-
lation and identification of discrete elements shared by idio-
morphic semiotic systems and language semiotic systems provide
the cardinal data. The universal primitive of LENGTH is
extracted in both a set of language examples and a set of
music/architecture examples. The LANGUAGE- LIKENESS of the
music and architecture semioses is found to reside in the proc-
essing of the primitives via the inferential function of ab-
duction -- a function peculiar to language.
Linguistic theory, which is currently in the midst of a new wave of
iconoclasm, appears on the one hand to be leaning toward the laboratory
sciences for insights into the composition and linguistic functions of
the brain, while on the other hand the probings of linguists resemble ever
more the speculations of philosophy. The duality is understandable, since
language is both physical and mental. Several schools of philosophy claim
language as their principal subject matter, thus providing a ready tap for
linguists whose sole object is, in fact, language. More immediately,
within our own recent linguistic heritage we can uncover an appropriate
philosophical framework suggested by none other than Saussure, continued
by such standard bearers as Sapir, Bloomfield, and Jakobson, and even
endorsed by Chomsky. This, of course, is the discipline of semiotics,
the science of signs.
Saussure proposed in his Course in general linguistics (1966:16) 'A
science that studies the life of signs within society. . . ' He says
'I shall call it semiology. Semiology would show what consti-
tutes signs, what laws govern them. Linguistics is only a part
of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by
semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter
will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of
anthropological facts.
'
Sapir (1958:104) saw that '...every cultural pattern and every single act
of social behavior involves human communication in an explicit or implicit
sense.' The anthropological theorist Claude Levi-Strauss formulated very
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clearly a concept of society with an integrated theory of communication con-
sisting of three types of exchange: exchange of messages (linguistics), ex-
change of goods (economics), and exchange of mates (kinship). Thus semiotics
is, in effect, a science studying communication within society. We will as-
sume, for the moment, that this is society within the species homo sapiens
and, for the major part of this paper delay reference to semiotics outside
this species, i.e. zoosemiotics. Nevertheless, within human semiosis, we
must account for all three types of Levi-Strauss ' communication, which, in
turn, have many subtypes.
Let us return to our linguistic heritage. Bloomfield tells us in his
Linguistic aspects of science (1939:55) that 'Linguistics is the chief con-
tributor to semiotic' How is this possible if we are to understand, ac-
cording to Sebeok (1975:95), that 'Semiosis, independent of form or sub-
stance, is... seen as a universal, criterial property of animate existence'?
In other words, what do we do with that communication or semiosis which is
not the chief contributor to semiotics? Jakobson (1971:662) writes '...the
subject matter of semiotic is the communication of any message whatever,
whereas the field of linguistics is confined to the communication of verbal
messages.' Temporarily he answers our question: Linguistics '...has a
narrower scope, yet, on the other hand, any human communication of non-verbal
messages presupposes a circuit of verbal messages, without a reverse impli-
cation.' Thus Levi-Strauss (1963:83) claims for his three types of communi-
cation or exchange that '...language comes into play at all levels', i.e. it
preexists each exchange, it accompanies each, and it serves as a means of
translation for each non-verbalized exchange. This last function serves as
the focal point of the present paper: We want to know how language serves
as a means of translation for non-verbalized exchange, how non-verbal mes-
sages presuppose a circuit of verbal messages, i.e. how all of semiotics has
an INLAY of language, how non-verbal communication is LANGUAGE -LIKE.
The centrality of linguistics prompted Roland Barthes (1970:11) to re-
verse Saussure's statement ('Linguistics is only a part of the general sci-
ence of semiology' cf. above) by the statement '...linguistics is not a
part of the general science of signs, even a privileged part; it is semiol-
ogy which is a part of linguistics....' However, upon close inspection we
see that Barthes overstated his case, and that, in fact, he distinguished
language which is the object of linguistics from what he termed 'second-
order language,' which is the object of semiotics.
Clearly semiotics and linguistics are independent sciences, but just
as clearly they are intimately related, since language provides an inlay
for all modalities of semiotics. When we observe human language in action,
we observe an organism (a human being) producing an expression (a sound,
orthographic sequence, gesture) in order to refer by it to something (an
object) (Carnap 1961:8-9). Thus the language act is comprised of (1) a
speaker, (2) an expression, and (3) a designatum, which correlate directly
with the tripartite division of semiotics, viz. pragmatics, syntactics, and
semantics, respectively. For some linguists the semiosis of verbal language
appears to be a challenge easily commensurate with life-time devotion, so
that they opt not to treat data from speech surrogates such as cryptography,
whistle speech, drumbeat communication, and so-called paralinguistic struc-
tures such as laughing, crying, whispering, and noises of the tongue and
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lips associated with interjections. Still more linguists exclude from their
domain idiomorphic semiotic data, i.e. data from semiotic systems which are
not variform direct superstructures on languages. Samples of idiomorphic
systems can be readily named by reference to the senses, thus kinesics and
proxemics relate to the senses of touch and sight, music to the auditory
sense, architecture to sight, odor to the olfactory sense, culinary semiotics
to the sense of taste as well, and so forth (cf. further Rauch forthcoming
a).
Let us consider the likeness between e.g. music and language, or ar-
chitecture and language? Saussure (1966:17) simply says
'...the characteristic that distinguishes semiological systems
from all other institutions shows up clearly only in language
where it manifests itself in the things which are studied
least, . . .
'
That was around 1915, and apparently we are still groping to identify those
least studied things, to which Saussure ascribes the semiotic mechanism,
but never mentions as such. Somewhat parallel is the proposal of Jakobson
(1971:703) that
'The cardinal functions of language--referential, emotive,
conative, phatic, poetic, metalingual--and their different
hierarchy in the diverse types of messages have been out-
lined and repeatedly discussed. This pragmatic approach
to language must lead mutatis mutandis to an analogous
study of the other semiotic systems....'
But we ask, what is this mutatis mutandis ? It is precisely the crux of the
problem. One is then not surprised to read as recently as 1975 in an arti-
cle entitled 'Spoken and unspoken meanings' by Cohen (24), that 'It remains
quite an open question whether this clearly recognizable domain of study
[the semiotic domain] will lend itself to the construction of non-trivial,
empirically testable theories at some appropriately deep level of explana-
tory generality' (cf. further Rauch 1977).
It seems that the comparison among diverse modalities of massive or
large scale relationships, as represented perhaps in the cardinal functions
of language (above) is somewhat premature. The linguist may have more suc-
cess in relying on what is recognized as a principal time-proven tool of
all modern linguistic methodologies, viz. their ability to isolate and
identify discrete elements. Of the several theories of semantic develop-
ment, the universal primitives hypothesis, recently proposed especially by
Postal (1966:fn. 10) and extended by Bierwisch (1967:1-4, 34-6 and 1970:
181-2), appears in particular to link with semiotic theory. In effect.
Postal and Bierwisch hold that the real world, or input into the human or-
ganism, is interpreted in the form of universal semantic components or prim-
itives in a species specific manner.
Let us accordingly choose a semantic primitive and identify it in
several modalities, in order to understand how it is interpreted into lan-
guage in non-linguistic semiotic systems. The primitive which we choose is
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LENGTH or DURATION, pinpointed by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976:27J as a
universal. To be sure it is readily identifiable in linguistic semiotics,
but even within linguistic data, LENGTH is more transparent in certain
structures than in others. Thus, in the semantic component, e.g. in the
sentence 'A mile is longer than a kilometer,' the perception of LENGTH is
more direct than on the syntactic level, which may be exemplified by gapping
in e.g. 'John reads Dickens, Joe Hemingway, and Jill Kant' as opposed to
'John reads Dickens, Joe reads Hemingway, and Jill reads Kant.' A morpho-
logical example of LENGTH often cited in semiotic literature for its icon-
icity is the non-suppletive comparison of adjectives in Indo-European, where
the positive, comparative, and superlative suffixes mirror a stratified
phoneme increment, thus e.g. old
,
older , oldest . On the phonological level
LENGTH is, of course, perceptible where it alone distinguishes one word from
another; thus in Kamba, a Bantu language, three degrees of vowel LENGTH are
contrastive, e.g. kwelela 'measuring', kwele- la 'moving backwards and for-
wards', koele: la 'aiming at.' Consonantal LENGTH is observed in Italian
fato 'fate' versus fat:o 'done.' We are, of course, familiar with express-
ive or affective LENGTH as in the English expression too bad. This leads
us technically into what have been considered borderline linguistic levels,
specifically what Trager (1958) has called 'paralanguage. ' For example, his
so-called voice qualifier of extent, which would oppose 'drawl' to 'clip-
ping', represents the feature LENGTH on the paralinguistic level.
Leaving language and paralanguage but still dealing with acoustic
LENGTH, let us cross over to the semiotic system of music. An example is
the choral sequence of the first twelve notes of equal LENGTH in the Ode to
Joy of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Excepting performance modifications, any
one of the twelve notes which might be played shorter or longer relative to
its adjacent notes would be perceived as incorrect. Not surprisingly,
Gerald Warfield, who in his Layer analysis (1976) explicates the highly
structured principles underlying tonal music, stresses that (xi) '...music
can be (and j^, most of the time) understood intuitively. . . .
'
Before considering how musical LENGTH is language- like, let us apply
the LENGTH primitive to a very concrete semiotic system, viz. architecture,
and specifically to the basic box, which is man's most common form of con-
struction, be it a house, a skyscraper, or whatever. Miller and Johnson-
Laird (1976) distinguish between two systems in conceptualizing an object in
space, 1) a deictic system which is relative to the speaker's ego location
and the coordinate axes of an object, and 2) an intrinsic system which is
relative to the coordinate axes of the object itself. In the case of the
box, if the horizontal dimension, labeled A, is its maximal dimension, it
is intrinsically the 'length' or 'longer than' the secondary horizontal
dimension, labeled B, which is its 'width' or 'shorter than' A. Interest-
ingly, Miller and Johnson-Laird wrote (404) : 'Recognizing the intrinsic
nature of the parts of some objects seems to be something that users of
English manage to do without self-consciously conceptualizing it.' Once
more we superimpose the question: How then, is the LENGTH feature in ar-
chitecture language- like?
It is possible that structure or component analogues between linguistic
semiotic systems and non-linguistic semiotic systems may prove insightful,
e.g. Uspenskij's (1973) level of articulation of an icon as an analogue to
178
the phonological level in natural languages. This is a level of figuration
which corresponds to the most general painting processes, which are in them-
selves non-significant, but which allow the painter to represent meaningful
complexes.
However, beyond such analogues the primitive LENGTH, whether in the
visual arts, music, paralanguage, or language, is ultimately interpreted as
a perceptual judgment which derives solely from that semiotic system alone
capable of propositions, i.e. language. Postal (1966:fn. 10) argued that
'...the relation between the semantic primitives and their combinations
which are part of the combinatorial structure of language and the world is
not learned but innate.' Bierwisch (1970:181) hypothesized that '...all
semantic structures might finally be reduced to components representing the
basic dispositions of the cognitive and perceptual structure of the human
organism.
'
Now this innate ability of the mind to process semantic primitives can
find an explanation in the theory of inference of Charles Sanders Peirce,
the co-founder with Saussure of modern semiotic. According to Peirce we
experience external objects as percepts and interpret them through a cogni-
tive operation. All cognition involves inference and the type of inference
which Peirce holds to be the most common kind of reasoning is abduction,
whereby the minor premise is derived from the major premise and the con-
clusion. Our first premises are perceptual judgments, viz. the formation
of a mental proposition concerned with our sense experience when making the
judgment. Peirce defines this innate manner of interpreting an experience
or a perceived object as '...a judgment asserting in prepositional form what
a character of a percept, directly present to the mind, is' (1960 V:par. 54).
Meaning thus originates in the perceptual judgment, which itself can be re-
garded as an extreme case of abductive inference. The term 'educated guess'
closely approximates the abductive process, which Peirce claims is instinc-
tive. The interpretation of our chosen primitive LENGTH then, as displayed
in the various semiotic modalities, derives from one and the same innate
ability of judgment and hypothesis formation, an ability which belongs only
to the semiotic modality of language.
Thus the LENGTH cognition of the non- linguistic modalities presented in
this paper is language-like in that it proceeds from reasoning of the fol-
lowing sort:
I. for the musical semiosis:
Each of the twelve notes equals one beat.
E is one of the twelve notes.
E equals one beat.
II. for the architectural semiosis:
Maximal dimension equals the length.
A is the maximal dimension.
A equals the length.
Observe that the middle statements are abductively inferred.
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Before concluding let us turn briefly to zoosemiotics, purposely ex-
cluded thus far. Peirce (1960 VI:par. 491) compared man's instinctive power
of so-called guessing with the instincts of animals for feeding and breeding.
Sebeok (1972:46-7) describes what we may discern as differences of LENGTH of
the bee dance among six races of bees. The hundred meter distance between
the hive and the food source is calculated at six different LENGTHS in revo-
lutions per fifteen seconds: Italian 7.95, Austrian 8.4, German 9, Punic
9.05, Caucasian 9.8, Egyptian 9.25. Man's observation of the LENGTH differ-
ential is, of course, not the issue, and Sebeok rightly reports that an en-
counter between e.g. an Austrian bee and an Italian bee would precipitate
confusion of signals.
Purposely excluded also has been any species designation for the word
language
,
i.e. we have refrained from writing human language . Accordingly,
the questions which arise directly from the present paper: Can one even
contemplate a language-inlay in non-verbal semiosis? and if so. What is
the language- likeness in the animal code? join those provocative questions
presently stimulating the necessary and inevitable reappraisal of the con-
cept of language itself (cf . Rauch forthcoming b)
.
To conclude, it appears appropriate to turn to Chomsky's little known
endorsement of the Peircean theory of inference referred to at the begin-
ning of this paper. In Language and mind (1972:93) Chomsky writes:
"Speculating about the future, I think it is not unlikely that
the dogmatic character of the general empiricist framework and
its inadequacy to human and animal intelligence will gradually
become more evident as specific realizations, such as taxonomic
linguistics, behaviorist learning theory, and the perception
models, heuristic methods, and 'general problem solvers' of the
early enthusiasts of 'artificial intelligence' are successively
rejected on empirical grounds, when they are made precise and
on grounds of vacuity when they are left vague. And--assuming
this projection to be accurate--it will then be possible to
undertake a general study of the limits and capacities of
human intelligence, to develop a Peircean logic of abduction."
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A REANALYSIS Of THE
CLASS $ PREFIX IN SHONA^
Pamela S. Silver
Scott R. Krause
This paper is intended to refute the traditional ways of
accounting for the word-initial voicing alternations in the class
5/6 noun-adjective series of Shona. We will show that none of
the traditional analyses is correct and that the voiced/voice less
phenomenon under discussion should be looked upon as the result
of a morphophonemic mile. In other words, we are proposing that
there is neither a segmental nor a prefix in class 5, and that
our morphophonemic analysis provides a more concrete solution.
When examining any corpus of Shona data, one is immediately struck by
the occurrence of a voice less/voiced alternation between pairs of consonants
in certain paradigms, e.g..
(1) class 5
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Our proposal, then, is that there is no prefix for the class 5 noun/
adjective series.
We shall proceed as follows: First we will examine the dlatinctive
features and environment of the proposed rule and show why each one is
necessary. Second, in the course of the discussion, we will examine a few
features which might be proposed for our rule and show why these are un-
necessary or erroneous in nature.
As we add more and more forms to our list of data, we note that the
observed voicing alternation does not occur with every possible voiced/
voiceless pair of consonants that exist in Shona. That is to say, the voic-
ing alternation only occurs with phonemes which are [stop]]
:
a) b/p
d/t
gA
class 5
adza
guyo
bvupa
dzimba
jira
dz/ts
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were chosen, a rule of voicing assimilation would be necessary, i.e.,
(7) ^ C ^ [^vcJ^C
Since the evidence needed to determine the status of affricates is lacking,
we will adopt Chomsky and Halle's framework, and will refer to affricates as
r+stop ~]
.
[+delayed releaaej
If l+voicingj is the morphological marker for class 5, as proposed by
Heny, Fivaz and Ratzlaff, etc., why is it that only stops are affected? In
all other classes, all words, regardless of their initial consonants (or
indeed vowel), receive the prefix associated with that class. For example,
all class 6 nouns and ad.jectives are prefixed by #ma-. Because of this we
would expect all initial consonants in class 5 to beconts voiced, if in fact
the class 5 prefix were C*voicing] or some similar abstraction. That this
is not the case, as has been seen from the preceding data, argues against
such proposals.
So far we have given evidence that there is a voicing alternation between
stops in classes 5 and 6. The next logical question is in which direction
this change takes place, i.e. (+vc] j' [-vcj , or L-vcJ :> t+vcj . The evidence seems
to point toward [-vc]^l+vc] for several reasons. There are cases of
(8) a) class 5
[+vc]
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alternation, and there are no cases of
d) class $ /^ class 65 '
[^vc] Oc]
alternations in the language whatsoever.
As such, the voicing distinction between stops has been virtually
neutralized in root-initial position in class 5« To take the tack
L+vc];7[.vcJ in class 6 would necessitate an explanation not only of why
there are no voiceless stop-initial class 5 words, but also an explan-
ation of exactly in what environment a voiced stop devoices, which is
impossible to state even when taking tonology into consideration (i.e.,
would require marking each item which undergoes this devoicing in the
lexicon).
Some linguists may claim, however, that admission into class 5 is
dependent upon a root-initial voiced consonant. This assumption is
inherently claiming that there is a devoicing rule for class 6 (exactly
the opposite of our proposal - a voicing rule for class 5). In view of
the fact that a devoicing environment for class 6 is impossible to state,
a linguist making such a claim would have to say that all root-inital
stops that do not devoice in class 6 are exceptions. However, in view
of the fact that an initial voiced consonant is not a valid requirement for
inclusion, into class 5, since root-initial voiceless fricatives occur in
abundance^, and in view of the fact that our analysis (whereby a voiceless
stop voices in class $) is exceptionless in that all stops voice in the
following environment,
(9) /#
the [-vcj-^l+vc] directionality does indeed seem preferable. (This voicing
alternation only occurs in root-initial position, as we have seen in the
data thus far and will see in greater detail later.) Thus, in the view of
simplicity and the lack of convincing evidence to the contrary, we
tentatively have
(10) C ^[:*vcJ/#
M-stOp]
[-VC J
We have implicitly assumed up to this point in the discussion that the
voiced/voiceless alternation only occurs in classes $ and 6. This is not
entirely true, but as we shall see below, all those voicing alternations
outside of classes 5 and 6 may be accounted for by a separate rule, 5
and 6 being the only place where our proposed non-phonemic alternation
takes place.
The next question is how many mornhological features we need to include
in our rule, i.e., I+5j» K+N T] , C-Vj , etc. Since this particular
Li*AdjJJ
. .
altamaioo only takes place in class $ nouns and adjectives,
it seems that in the strictest senae both the feature \*^~\ and (+N
Adj
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might not be needed. In the 21 noun classes of Shona, all 21 agreement
series have overt prefixes, and in the noun/adjective series, all classes
except 5 and 9 have overt prefixes, although it appears that some sort of
synchronic nasal may be posited for class 9.^ Aa such, the only place
in which we have word-initial non-prefix consonants of either series of
noun classes is the class 5 series of nouns and adjectives. Therefore,
to state both [+$] and fC+N ^~] would be redundant, but to state one or the
other is necessary, because outside of the noun class series, this rule is
not productive. The following data will show that the root-initial stop
of verbsj^ even when in word-initial position (this only happens in the
imperative), never voices.
(11) infinitive imperative
kutenga ter)ga 'buy'
kutarisa tarisa 'look'
kupa ipa ' give
'
kukura kura ' grow
ku'J^e^geta ^engeta 'save'
kupfugama pfugama 'kneel'
The voicing altemati<»i does seem to serve a function of sorts in
class 5» although it is not as pervasive as one might hope if it were a
purely morphological function, as other scholars would have it. So we
now have
(12) C > [>vc]/#
+stop'j
-vc /
^5 J
Thus far, our voicing rule has been formulated so as to affect only
word-inital voiceless stops in class 5 nouns and adjectives, since we have
already seen that verbs are not affected by our rule. It must now be
noted that there are tiro different types of adjectives, and the following
may shed more light chi the subject. (In the predicate adjectives, as we
have elected to call them, #r- in class 6 is an agreement marker; -a- is
a relative marker, and -ka- is some kind of tense marker.)
(13) the r«d book buku dzuku
the book is red buku rakatsuku
the red books mabuku matsuku
the books are red mabuku akatsuku
the white book buku ^ena
the book is white buku rakacena
the white books mabuku macena
the books are white mabuku akacena
an agreeable voice
the voice is agreeable '^ izwi rakatendeka
the voice that is agreeabli.3
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agreeable voices "^
the voices are agreeable < raazwi akatendeka
the voices that are agreeable )
the broken bell
y ^
the bell is broken
^
Jare rakaputsika
the bell that is broken
the broken bells j
the bells are broken '< matare akaputsika
the bells that are broken J
the sharp hoe )
the hoe is sharp I Oadza rakapinza
the hoe that is sharp )
the sharp hoes
the hoes are sharp
^
mapadza akapinza
the hoes that are sharp
In discussing this data, we will refer to adjectives such as -cena
•white' as "real adjectives," and those such as tendeka, 'agreeable,'
as "predicate adjectives." (Although they may not function as predicate
adjectives do in English, this term will be adopted from Heny, 1972.)
Our class 5 morphophonemic rule as formulated has no trouble explain-
ing such forms. However, one might also wish to account for why some
adjectives can never appear as real adjectives, but only as predicate
adjectives. If one could argue that adjectives which occur only as
predicate adjectives were underlyingly verbs, then this distribution
could be accounted for, and the lack of stem-initial voicing of stops
would be doubly explained: first, because the stem-initial stop of a
predicate adjective is never in word-initial position, and second because
the initial stop of a verb is never affected by our class $ morpho-
phonemic rule.
While there appears to be sufficient evidence to argue for the
latter solution, this is not within the scope of our paper and we will not
present the details of the argument. Were such an argviment to be accepted,
hcwever, we would have more choice in formulating our rule. Instead of
specifying [+5j, we could choose to note [-Vj.
We now come to the question of implosives in our analysis. It
appears that there a?e only two implosive consonants in Shona , cT* and £
.
There are thus no non-stop, no velar, and no voiceless implosives that
appear in the phonetic representation of the language.
In classes 5 and 6, these voiced implosives alternate either with
voiced implosives, e.g.
,
(lit) class 5 class 6
Buri ma&uri 'hole'
cTutu mac^^tu 'strong wind'
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or with voiceless non-implosives.
(15) class $ class 6
bLpito mapipito
cTura matura
'shoulder'
'granary'
In the cases where voiced implosives alternate with voiceless non-
implosives we are faced with five basic alternatives to account for the
alternation,
(l6) a) [voiced ~1 _, voiceless 1 ^ [voiceless
[implosivej [implosivej [non-implosivej in class 6
e.g.*
.
b) fvoiced ~1
[implosivej
voiceless
Lnon-implos ive in class 6
e.g.,
c) jvoiceless
[implosive
J
voiced
implosive2 in class 5
e.g.
P
d) pvoiceless ~^
e.g.
voiced voiced
I
[jion-implosivej Lnon-implosivej ' ^implosivej
in class 5
e) Pvoiceless
[non -implosive
voiced
[implosive
.
in class $
e.g.
Alternatives a and b are ruled out becuase, as we have argued before,
to devoice in class 6 rather than voice in class 5 puts an added weight on
the granitnar of explaining why all class 5 stop-initial words begin with
a voiced segment and under just what circumstances the stops devoice,
everything being much more predictable under our analysis of voicing in
class 5. Alternatives a and c, whereby we come about the alternation via
a step including a voiceless implosive are a priori infeasible and ruled
out because there are no such phonetic entitle* as voiceless implosives,
and we prefer not to have any level in a derivation containing an un-
pronounceable item. Since we can avoid the postulation of so abstract a
phoneme as a voiceless implosive, we have chosen to do so. This is not,
however, to say that we are totally against the use of abstract entities
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in a solution.
Of the two remaining alternatives under our analysis
j
d) p:
e) p
it appears that d would be the most attractive, in that the voicing and
implosivizing are broken up into two clear steps rather than voiceless
non-implosives becoming voiced implosives in one fell swoop. However,
if one were to simply state that all instances of non-implosive /b/ and
/d/ becOTie implosive, i.e. something like
(17) C
stop
-impl
-vel
+vc
[+implj
as a general clean-up rule for.
(12) C
+stop
-vc
+5
L+vcJ/#_
we appear to run into trouble with borrowed words where A>/ and /d/ are
never implosivized.7
(18) class 5
biza
darau
dada
class 6
mabiza
madamu
madada
'horse'
'dam'
'duck'
It thus appears that the proposed ioplosivizing rule does not apply
to the entire lexicon of the language, but rather only to native Shona
vocabulary. We are not splitting the vocabulary in half just at whim,
however. The native Shcna lexicon also differs from the borrowed vocab-
ulary in that borrowed words never undergo our proposed morphophonemic
voicing mle, e.g..
(19) class g
ketane
peni
puris
a
class 6
maketane
mapeni
mapurlsa
'chain'
'penny'
'police'
Thus it appears that not only our morphophonemic voicing rule, but also
the implosivizing rule, must be "marked" as applying only to native Shona
vocabulai7. In other words, we are saying that at least some rules must
be sensitiTB to a [t native] feature. Our rules now look like the
following.
(3) G
f+stop
-vc
l+native
[+vc]/#.
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(20) C
- (*impl]
+3top '
+TC
-velar
+native
-delayed release
(Note that none of the other analyses of voicing in class 5 make any c
about the state of implosives whatsoever.)
We also might, stLthough it is not integral to do so, posit an under-
lying implosive 3 for native Shona, even though it is abstract in that it
never shows up on the surface. An advantage and reason for doing this is
to give more regularity to the underlying phonemic system in respect to
the set of in^jlosives. That is to say, under such an analysis all native
Shona voiced stops would be underlying implosives rather than just the
non-velar ones. As such, the final version of our implosivizing rule
would be.
(21) C ^ 1+impll
+stop ~]
-vc
-impl
+nativej
with a general mile that de-implosivizes all velar implosives,
(22)
V+v«lar1
l+impl j
[-implj
Thus far, we have given the impression that our native Shona morpho-
phcwieraic voicing rule as it stands is exceptionless. Unfortunately, this
is not the case, because we have forms like the following.
(23) class $
tsime
pfumo
class 6
matsime
mapfumo
•well'
•spear*
where we would expect voicing in class 5 but do not get it.
In the cases of the affricates of class 5 we seem to be encroaching
upoi another morphophonemic process of sorts whereby forms like the
following are acceptable.
(2U) class $
dzlme
bvumo
'big well'
'big spear'
A voicing of the stops is permissible to give the noun the added dimension
of ugliness, bigness, clumsiness, or some pejorative quality of this
nature, although the extent of this process is not yet clear to us. And
this happens not only in classes 5 and 6, but also, for example, in
class 21.
(2$) class 21
kranana 'child'
zigomana 'big child'
If these initial segments voiced in class 5, this would lead to ambiguity;
that is, dzime could mean either 'well,' or 'big well,' It appears that
this process, whatever the full ramifications of it are, is not reversible
as such in that the devoicing of a regularly voiced stop does not give
us a less ugly, large, or clumsy connotation, and in fact gives us
ungrammatical forms.
(26) bveni / mapfeni
but, «pfeni
bvupa / mapfupa
but, »pfupa
An amazing fact about all of this is that only pf and ts are ever
exceptions to our morphophonemic rule of voicing in class $, For this
reasoi, these and only these phonemes maj be overtly affected by the
peJorativizatL CXI rule. That is to say, /p/, /t/, /k/, /8f/ are never
overtly affected by this pejorativization rule, as they are always
voiced in class $ by the morphophonemic rule.
One analysis that could bring some sort of order to this chaos
involving the class 5 and 6 affricates ta and pf la t« elaiji that those
root-initial affricates that show the voicing alternation and are normally
voiced in class 5 are also inherently big, ugly, clumsy, or whatever;
those that are inherently voiceless are not and only acquire voicing when
a special quality of largeness or the like is attributed to them. Under
such an analysis, it is proposed that our morphophonemic voicing rule never
cones into play with ts and pf
.
Such facts aeem to be borne out to some extent, becavuse we have
(27) class $
bvembe
bvupa
bveni
dzimbo
dziwa
where the affricate T0lea8,as opposed to class 5 pfumo 'sp>ear', tsime
•footprint', pfuro 'pond', where the affricate does not voice. That is
to say, to call a baboon ugly is to carry coals to Newcastle and the pf
of pfeni thus is naturally voiced, whereas semantic forms like 'pond'
and 'footprint' are more innocuous and only acquire such pejorative meanings
specially.
class 6
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In claims whereby the affricates ts and pf are never affected by our
rule of morphophonemic voicing, one must block it from applying in some
fashion. The simplest manner would seem to be as follows.
(28) /#
In such a claim, one might be imply^Lng that ts and pf consist of two
different phonemes each, whereas /J/ and /c/ are single phonemes and under-
go the rule as if they were just one phoneme. However, to make such a claim
that ts and pf never undergo our morphophonemic voicing rule, along with
the claims, implications, and necessary finaglings needed to show that there
is a semantic division in the lexicon corresponding to the division between
those ts and pf that voice in class 5 and those that do not, is unsupportable
for several reasons, among which are the following.
(29) a) There is no independent evidence to support the claim that
te, dz,
c and
pf , and bv are of differend phaieme status frcm
b) Tlisre is no natural phcmological reason why the condit-
ioning environment for our voicing rule should be /# ^V
instead of merely /# .
c) The semantic differentiation between "normally" voiced
affricate -initial words which alternate with a voiceless
affricate is not seen as cold hard fact but only as a
tendency of sorts oa the basis of the limited forms
available
.
As such, we are unfortunately left to mark those affricates ts and
pf that, in a handful of forms, do not voice root-initially in class $,as
exceptions to our morphophonemic irule and seek perhaps an historical
explanation for the peculiar phenomena surrounding these two phonetic
sequences,^
Our discussion, and the formulation of our rule, have led the
reader to believe that the voicing of root-initial stops in class 5
occurs caily when those stops are also word-initial. There appear to be
two exceptions to this, however, and examples of each follow.
(30) claas $ class 6
^anga mapar)ga ' knife •
zibarjga mazipa^ga 'huge knife'
danga matanga 'corral'
zif'anga mazitar)ga 'huge corral'
bveni mapfeni 'baboon'
zibveni mazipfeni 'huge baboon'
bvupa mapfupja 'bone'
zlbvupa Bazipfupa 'huge bone'
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ganda ibvawi wakanda mapfawi 'the skin is tender'
3faya ibenzi majaya mapenzi 'the young man is
cra»y'
There are several possible explanations for both of these apparent
counter-exanqples to our claim, and we shall examine each alternative in
turn, eventually choosing one as being more probable than the others.
The first and most obvious way of accounting for the above forms is
to say that the affixes #i- and -zi- are exceptions to our proposed rule
in that they allow voicing of a root-initial stop that is not also vord-
initial. According to this solution, then, these prefixes would have to
be marked as being able to optioiuilly intervene, i.e..
(31)
tiS)
While this analysis works—there are, after all, no other affixes which
allow root-initial stop voicing in class 5—we will eventually discard
marking them as exceptions in favor of another solution.
In examining the above forms which contain #i-, we see two
possible explanations for the data other than marking #i- as an exception.
The first possibility is to claim that our rule may be altered so that
root-initial voicing could take place even if that root-initial stop were
not word-initial, but were preceded by an optional vowel. Under such a
solution, our rule would look like the following.
(32) C > [cjMV)
7+stop
vc
native
We do not accept this reformulation, however, for it appears to be an
ad hoc way of accounting for the data and has virtually no natural phonological
explanation. Since there seem to be no other prefixes which consist of
a single vowel, this change in our proposed rule cannot be supported
by any other forms and is merely a way of "doctoring it up,"
Ihe third possible explanation for why root-initial stops voice even
when they are preceded by the prefix #i- is the analysis we will accept
as being preferable to the others. Notioe that when #i- is prefixed onto
a noun, the result is always a sentential element. We will argue, there-
fore, that the #i- which is prefixed onto these nouns is not to be
considered to be a prefix in the generally-accepted sense of that word, but
that the element should be analyzed as a word. In this manner, the under-
lying form for i^adza would appear as #i#padza and not as #i-»padza .
Our rule of voicing stops in word-initial position in class 5 would then not
be blocked from applying, and will produce the correct surface form, i£adza .
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Earlier in the paper proof was offered of a rule that voices initial
stops to change the lasaning of a word (phonemic as opposed to our non-
phonemic Tolcing). In such cases, the voiced alternant had the added
meaning 'big, huge, ugly' or sosnething similar. Now we see that there
is an infix, -zi-, which also means 'big' when affixed to a noun, and
appears to be an exception to our voicing rxile, in that in class 5, the
stem-initial stop voices even though it is not in word-initial position.
Our explanation of this unexpected voicing of class $ root-initial stops
is the following: Since stem-initial voiced stops are obligatory when
-zi- is added to forms that would otherwise be affected by our morpho-
phcaiemic voicing rule, but voiceless stem-initial stops are obligatory
when -zi- is added to forms not normally affected by our rule, the
simplest method of accounting for the facts is to posit the insertion
of -zi- 'big' at a synchronic level later than that of the noun class
marker; otherwise, we would have no practical means of explaining why
stops voice after #zi- (class 5) but not after #raa-zi- (class 6), Below
is a sample derivation.
(33)
u.f.
class marker
our rule
-zi-
surface
class 5
par)ga
Ga^ga
zi-»€ar)ga
ziSaifjga
class 6
pai)ga
ma+papga
iija+zi+pa9ga
nazipa/^ga
It has been shown that the two apparent counter-examples to our
proposed rule for class $,
(3) c
+3top
-VC
native
[vc]/#.
are really not counter -exan^iles at all. The sentence -forming element
#i- is probably a word in and of itself, and therefore the consonant
iiranediately following it is word -initial and subject to our morpho-
phonemic rule voicing initial stops in class $. The infix -zi-, meaning
•big, huge', can co-occur with root-initial voiced stops because it is
introduced afterour rule of morphophonemic voicing in class $ has applied.
We can offer yet another piece of evidence as to the validity of
our claim that word-initial position is the only environment in which a
stem-initial stop of a class 5 noun or adjective is subject to our
voicing rule. There is a small class of nouns ( pei^o 'insane', tendi
'believing', dzidzi 'student', fuai 'rich', ronbo -^oor', fara 'sickly')
that, when used to modify a class 5 noun, show a #mu- prefix and the stem-
initial stop is not affected by our class $ voicing rule.
(3U) class 5
Jaya mipepgo
jaya mutendi
Jaya mudzidzi
class 6
maJaya mapen go
majaya raat^di
ma^aya madzidzi
'insane young man'
'believing young mi
•student young man
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This prefix #inu- appears to be a marker of personification, even thongh
non-human nouns can also appear in these constructions:
(35) class $: ruwa mufara
6: maruwa mafara 'sickly flower'
class 9: nika mufara
10: nika mifara 'sickly country'
Note, however, that if we speak of a rich country,
(36) class 9: nika fumi (*nika mufumi)
10: kanika kafumi
we are not personifying, and therefore we do not use #mu-. This is evidence
that the #mu- of class 5 is not a "fixed" prefix for any certain adjectives.
Ibtil now, all nouns in class $ have tseen affected by our morphophonemic
rule of voicing, because their stem-initial stops also happened to be word-
initial. Now we have evidence that nouns in class $ whose stem-initial stop
is not word -initial are not affected by our voicing rule for class $ nouns
and adjectives. Therefore, it is imperative that we include word- initial
position in the formulation of the rule.
To summarize, we have seen that our analysis of the voicing phenomencsi
in class $ is by far preferable to the other analyses proposed to date,
because we are able to account for the peculiarities surrounding the voicing
in class 5 in a natural phonological way, something that has been impossible
under the proposals of Fivaz, Heny, etc. That is to say, we have shown that
the voicing phenomenon is due to a morphophcmemic process which is limited
to word -initial stops in class 5, rather than to a purely morphological
"prefixing" process, as the other analyses would have it. Within such a
standpoint, a prefixing process, whatever the exact proposed ramifications
are, fails to explain why this ••prefixing" only affects some root-initial
ccHisonants some of the time and vowels not at all, whereas all other noun
class prefixes of both series affect, or are present with, aU. root-initial
segments all of the time.
We have also delved to some extent into the status of implosives in
the language, the existence of a "pejorativizing'^ root-initial segment
voicing^rule, the necessity of allowing phonological rules to be sensitive
to thel^ native/feature in Shona, and the like. Above all, we have seen
that there is no prefix in the class $ noun/adjective series, and that the
voicing alternations that occur in classes 5 and 6 are due to the following
morphophonemic rule.
(3) C _^ 7 [+vc]/#.
r+stop
-vc
|_+native
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NOTES
1
This paper was presented at the Ninth Annual African Linguistics
Conference held in East Lansing, Michigan, in 1978. We would like to thank
our language consultant, Kokerai Rugara, for his patience and help, and
Dr. Charles Kisseberth for his comments on an earlier version of this paper,
Apecial thanks go to Lee A. Becker, for the time he gave us in revising our
earlier paper.
2
^6' represent implosires, b, d, etc., represent non-implosives.
3
Since tones in Shona have no bearing on our analysis, we will not mark
our exaii?>les for tone,
a
Note that although there is a tendency for borrowed words with root-
initial voiced stops to enter into classes 5 and 6, but those with voiceless
stops to fall into class 9,
class 5/6
damu/ madarau 'dam'
darama^i/ madarama^i ' dynamite
•
buku/ mabuku 'book'
biza/ mabiza 'horse'
bara/ mabara 'wheel baiTOw'
juzi/ majuzi 'jersey'
class 9
tafura 'table'
tii 'tea'
kati 'coffee'
pen 'pen'
kapu 'cup'
I this is not always the case, e.g.,
class 5/6
purisa/ mapurisa 'police
•
peni/ mapeni 'penny'
Since this tendency could be looked upon as being either the result of only
voiced stop-initial words going into class 5, OR as the result of analogy to
the end product of our rule of morphophonemic voicing, this is a moot point.
The class 9 "prefix" comes from /ni/ historically*
6
This i- is prefixed onto mono-syllabic words.
196
7
All cases of A)/ and /d/ in native Shona vocabulary are phonetically
realized as implosives {{JcP),
It would be intei^sting, of course, if the historical explanaticn has
the pejorative connotation rule come into play.
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LINGUISTIC CONVERGENCE:
INDO-ARYANIZATION OF DRAVIDIAN LANGUAGES
S. N. Sridhar
It is well-known that over three millennia of language
contact on the Indian subcontinent has resulted in the conver-
gence of linguistic features of the four language families of
the area. A major part of this ongoing process is the adap-
tation of Indo-Aryan characteristics by the twenty-three
or so Dravidian languages. The present paper is an attempt
to study the various aspects of this phenomenon in broad
outline. Following the introduction, the language contact
situation between Sanskrit , Prakrit , and the modern Indo-
Aryan languages on the one hand, and the literary and non-
literary Dravidian languages on the other, is described.
Next, variation in the nature and extent of Indo-Aryanization
both within and across the Dravidian languages is outlined.
Section four deals with the impact of Indo-Aryan on Dravidian
phonology, morphology, lexicon and syntax; this is followed
by a discussion of the processes of nativization of borrowed
elements. Section six describes the sociolinguistic impli-
cations of Indo-Aryanization, especially the emergence of
the manipravala style , the reinforcement of caste dialects
and diglossia, and language attitudes. The conclusion raises
some issues concerning the role of Indo-Aryanization in the
evolution of Dravidian languages.
1. Introduction
It is often remarked that the Indian subcontinent has a genius for
assimilating foreign influences without losing its essential character.*
Nowhere is this resilience demonstrated more clearly than in the way
the Dravidian languages have absorbed what, by any count, must be
regarded as massive Indo-Aryan influence and yet retained their essential
Dravidian character .-'-
In discussing the Indo-Aryanization of Dravidian languages, we are
talking about an ongoing phenomenon that must have started about 3,500
years ago. The presence of linguistic features of possible Dravidian
origin in the Rig Veda (e.g., retroflex consonants) suggests Aryan
contact with the Dravidian-speaking people as early as about 1500 B.C.
This possibility is confirmed by the geographical distribution of the
Dravidian languages—e.g., Brahui in Balochistan, Gondi in Madhya Pradesh.
Malto in Bihar-West Bengal, among others. Ignoring the possibility
of reverse-migration, this scatter suggests the presence of Dravidian-
speaking people over most of India at one time, and their gradual
recession before the advancing Aryans. However, our recorded history of
Dravidian contact with Indo-Aryan goes Tsack only to the early centuries
B.C.
ITie present topic may be—and has been-studied from many points of
view. 3 In the past, the main concentration has been the phonetic and
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semantic modifications undergone by Indo-Aryan words in Dravidian
languages. However, there is much more to the topic than that. In the
present paper, my aim is to present an overall picture of the many
facets of Indo-Aryanization of Dravidian. Following the introduction,
section 2 discusses the reasons, sources and mechanisms of Indo-
Aryan borrowings; section 3 outlines the variation in the extent of
Indo-Aryanization; section U is a survey of the Indo-Aryan influence
on Dravidian on various levels; section 5 is devoted to nativization;
section 6 discusses the sociolinguistic implication of Indo-Aryanization,
and section 7 comprises the conclusion.
Before proceeding further, I would like to point out that what
follows is more in the nature of a bird's eye view than a microscopic
examination of minutiae. Due to the paucity of materials and my own
inexperience, I have not been able to do equal justice to all the
languages involved. Yet, I hope the following discussion may serve
at least as a programmatic sketch for a much needed full-length
treatment of this important topic.
2. THE REASONS AND SOURCES OF BORROWING
The reasons for the prodigious influx of Indo-Aryan features into
Dravidian are fairly well-known. First, Sanskrit has traditionally
occupied an exalted position as the language of the elite in India, a
position analogous to that of Latin in Europe until a few centuries ago.
Sanskrit was not only the language of the scriptures, the epics and
classical literature, it was also the repository of a vast body of
philosophical, scientific and technical literature in every field.
It enjoyed royal patronage, and the prevalence of Sanskrit-based
education largely under the control of the Brahmans reinforced its
prestige. All this led to the creation of a vast body of literature
in the Dravidian languages, composed in conscious imitation of the Sanskrit
models , bringing in its wake a veritable flood of Sanskrit words
.
While many of these words were introduced to meet the technical needs of
specialized language-types (or "registers", for example, in grammar)
and often to suit the demands of intricate versification (for example,
adiprasa and antyaprasa) , a large number must have been introduced
simply because it was prestigious to do so.
Secondly, Prakrit (and to a lesser extent, Pali) played a crucial
role in the Indo-Aryanization process. In some languages (e.g., Tamil),
the words that came in via Prakrit far outnumber those borrowed directly
from Sanskrit. There are two major reasons for this Prakrit influence.
It was the court language during some periods in the Dravidian South,
for example, during the Satavahana and the early Pallava periods. Also,
the South, especially Karanataka, was the haven of refuge for the Jainas
and a large number of very prominent authors in the Dravidian languages
were Jainas who often composed in Prakrit as well (e.g., Nemichandra)
.
Many prominent Prakrit authors also wrote in Dravidian language^, for
example, Pushpadanta, Trivikrama, and Sakat"ayana, who wrote in Kannada.
Many of Indo-Aryan loan-words in the non-literary languages are also
traceable to Prakrit forms.
The next major category of Indo-Aryan loanwords in Dravidian comes
from modern Indo-Aryan, especially Hindi -Urdu and Marathi in the
literary languages of the South, Oriya in Pengo and Kui , Sindhi in
Brahui , Marathi 'In Kolami , Hindi in Kurukh, etc.
Parts of South India cqjne under Muslim rule in various periods
,
especially during the reign of the Baharaani kings in Andhra and North
Karnataka, and that of Hyder Ali and Tippu Sultan in South Karnataka.
D\iring the latter period, Persian was the official language of the
princely state of Mysore, with official records being kept in that
language. The prolonged Muslim rule has contributed a large niamber
of words in the fieldsof law, administration, and land-management, as
well as those relating to Muslim culture (see Sridhar, 1975). Finally,
the increased commerce between the North and South since the beginning
of the Independence movement has resulted in the introduction of more
Hindi words (e.g., kalapanT
,
gh^Vao, bandh, ^arkha , etc.).
As for the influence of Marathi, both geography and politics
have been contributing factors . Maharashtra shares borders with both
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, and there is intensive code-mixing in
these border areas ( see, Gumperz and Wilson, 1971; Upadhyaya, 1971).
Politically, much of North Karnataka came under the Bombay Presidency
until the reorganization of the states in 1956, and the administrative
language as well as the language of education in this region was
Marathi. Further^ South, the Tanjavur area in Tamil Nadu was iinder
Maratha rule for nearly two centuries \intil l800 A.D. (Subramonian and
Ganesha Sundaram, 195*+). The Desastha Madhwa brahmins in the South
have traditionally been bilingual in Marathi and Kannada, Telugu or
Tamil.
The non-literary languages of the South (Toda, Kota, Kodagu,
Badaga, etc.) have also numerous Indo-Aryan borrowings in them, but
these seem to have resulted from diffusion from their literary neighbors
(Emeneau and Burrow, 1962). As for the non-literary languages outside
the major Dravidian belt, their language contact with Indo-Aryan needs
no explanation. Speakers of these languages often indulge in such
occupations as wood-gathering, basket-weaving, and perform menial jobs,
and in general are crucially dependent on their Indo-Aryan neighbors
for economic survival. Bilingualism in the dominant language of the
region is for them a cardinal necessity. Under these circumstances,
it comes as no surprise that some of these languages show much more
radical changes in response to Indo-Aryan influence than their literary
sisters.
The preceding discussion assumes, following the long recognized
theory, that the main agency responsible for the transfer of traits in
a language-contact situation is the bilingual individual. Several
recentsociolinguistic studies of language use in bilingual communities
(e.g., Gumperz and Wilson, 1971, and Upadhyaya, 1971, in the Maharashtra-
Karnataka border) give us an insight into the processes by which the
present day convergence of features in Indian language must have come
about. In particular, Kachru (1978) argues that code-mixing may be a
crucial factor in the kind of language change we have been discussing.
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3. VARIATION IN THE EXTENT OF INDO-ARYAUIZATION
The Dravidian languages show a great deal of inter-language and
intra-language variation in the extent of Indo-Aryan influence. The
non-literary languages spoken in the Indo-Aryan region seem to have
undergone a greater amoiint of structural (morphological, syntactic)
influence (see section U.3), whereas the literary languages of the
South have been influenced predominently on the lexical level. Second,
the non-literary languages contain few unassimilated Sanskrit lexical
items while this category plays an important role in the lexicons of
the literary languages. Third, it is suggested (Andronov, 196h) that
the dialectal dissolution of Dravidian was already well under way before
Indo-Aryan began to exert its influence. If this is correct, ^ then
that fact could account for some of the variation. Finally, the extent
to which a given language has been influenced by Indo-Aryan also
depends on the language attitudes of its speakers. For example, Tamil
has traditionally been more conservative than its neighbors in this
regard—a fact commonly attributed to the fierce loyalty of the Tamils
to their language and their desire to preserve its "purity"' (see
section 6.3 for a detailed discussion). In contrast with this, consider
Bhattacharya's observation that speakers of Ollari (a non-literary
Dravidian language spoken in the Koraput district of Orissa ) disclaim
proficiency in their mother tongue (Bhattacharya, 1957).
There is also a great deal of intra-language variation with regard
to the extent of Indo-Aryan influence. In this respect, the chief
variables involved are (i) style, (ii) caste, and (iii) topic of
discourse.
Dravidian languages show more Indo-Aryan features in written style
than in speech, and within the written style, more in poetry than in
prose. It is well known that during the various periods in the history
of Dravidian literature, a style of writing characterized by heavy
Sanskrit borrowings, often together with the original Sanskrit declensions
and long compounds (e.g., Te. dharmanivahanodyogamummanaku ) became
fashionable (see Kunjunni Raja, 1972). This style, commonly referred
to as Manipravala (combination of gems and corals) reached its peak
in Malayalam (e.g., Chandrotsava ) , but it is met with in the other
three literary languages as well (for example, the inscriptions of
Raja Raja Chola and in the Jaina and Vaisnava philosophical literature
in Tajnil, in the work of Nannaya and Potana in Telugu, and to give a
modern example, Kuvempu's Ramayapadarsana in Kannada) . Like the epic
sytle of Milton, Manipravala never found universal favor and is largely
a literary and linguistic curiosity now, being used marginally in
orthodox Brahman doctrinaire tracts, if at all.
The extent of Indo-Aryan features also varies according to the caste
of the speaker (writer). Bright (1966), Bright and Ramanujan (196H),
and Ramanujan (1968), among others, have observed that one of the
variables distinguishing the Brahman dialects5 in Tamil and Kannada
from the non-Brahman is the presence of Sanskrit phonemes and clusters
and vocabulary. Here we see what the anthropologist Srinivas calls
'Sanskritization' (Srinivas, 1966) operating in a literal sense, the
Sanskrit features serving as a symbol of caste identity and distinctness.
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The emergence of hypercorrect forms with unnecessary aspiration may
also be regarded as a manifestation of this phenomenon.
The third parameter of variation is the topic of discoxirse: Indo-
Aryan features are more likely to be present in the discussion of some
topics than in others. For instance, religious discourses, in
particular, explication of scriptures, known as upayasas in the South,
contain heavy Sanskrit borrowings, as do texts and oral discourses on
poetics, aesthetics and philosophy, as well as those on the social
sciences in general. By the same token, one finds extensive use of
Hindi-Urdu words (ultimately of Perso-Arabic origin) in discussions of
law, land-revenue, Hindustani (or North Indian) music, wrestling,
etc. (for a detailed discussion of this register-oriented code-
mixing, see Sridhar, 1975 and 1978). In modern times, Sanskrit has
been serving as the principal source of new coinings in all the
scientific and technical fields. (Tamii is, once again, an exception
to this statement, the emphasis there being on the exploitation of
native resources.)
The foregoing discussion of variation in the extent of Indo-
Aryanization should suffice to make clear that any facile generalization
about Indo-Aryanization of Dravidian languages, and especially the
non-literary ones, is likely to prove wrong. Here, one can only note
some general tendencies, always keeping in mind the cowplex inter-
and intra-language variation. With this caveat, let us now turn to
an examination of the influence of Indo-Aryan on various levels.
I4. INDO-ARYANIZATION OF VARIOUS LEVELS
U.l Vocabulary
Anyone who looks at the dictionaries of Dravidian languages cannot
but be struck by the extravagant proportion of Indo-Aryan words in
general, and Sanskrit words in particular, contained in them. Emeneau
and Burrow (1962) rightly attribute this to ''the tendency for all four
of the Dravidian literary languages in the South to make literary
use of the total Sanskrit lexicon indiscriminately (p.l)." Even
in the colloquial language, so many words of Indo-Aryan origin have found
their way and been assimilated that it is hard to speak even a few
sentences without using some of these words. It was no doubt partly
because of this high proportion of Sanskritic elements (and the
similarity in the sound values of the graphemes in the scripts Ccoxmting
the grantha script in Tamil]) that, until just over a century ago, it
was generally believed that the Dravidian languages were descended
from Sanskrit. Even Western scholars like Pope, Colebrooke, Carey,
and Wilkins s\abscribed to this view. Caldwell (1903) spends a
considerable part of his classic work dispelling this misconception.
It is impossible to give a list of borrowings in Dravidian (for
a partial list, 5 see Emeneau and Burrow, 1962) or even to specify the
conceptual fields they denote, for there is no field of activity which
has not been influenced by them. In many cases, the native terms have
been replaced by the borrowed items , even in the areas generally
regarded as part of the basic vocabulary. A case in point £s the
set of direction terms in Kannad©, where the native words mu^al,
paguval , ba^agal, and tenkal have been replaced by the Sanskrit
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purva
,
pascima
,
uttara, dakgir?a ,even in everyday colloquial use.
Sjoberg and Sjoberg (1956) estimate that about twenty percent of the
"non-cultural" part of the basic vocabulary in literary Dravidian now
consists of loan-words from Indo-Aryan, creating problems for
glottochronology (for a detailed discussion, see Sjoberg and Sjoberg,
1956, and Sreekantaiya, 1956). The proportion of borrowings in those
areas that are more prone to cultural influence is, obviously, much
higher, probably as much as fifty to sixty percent. Among the non-
literary languages, Emeneau ( 1962a: 20) estimates that the vocabulary
of Kolami (Wardha dialect) contains approximately thirty-five
percent of words with Marathi etymologies. The case of other non-
literary languages is perhaps not much different.
Certain salient features of the Indo-Aryan loan-words in Dravidian
may be noted. First, the loans are not restricted to any one register
or set of registers, they are everywhere—in basic as well as tech-
nical vocabulary, in the written and the spoken language, in the language
of intimate conversations and personal letters as well as that of news-
papers and public speeches. Second, the loans are not restricted to
content words alone, but include a large number of function words such
as ouantifiers ( kevala , baha^a , alpa ) ,intensifiers ( atyanta , matra )
.
adverbial conjunctions ( akasmat , bahu/ah ) , etc., as well as bound
morphemes of various kinds (see next section). Third, a large number of
Sanskrit words have been borrowed both in their root form (e.g., jiva )
and in their derived forms (e.g., jivanta , saktiyuta , aprakai;ita
,
taratamya
, etc.). Fourth, the Dravidian languages, especially the
South Dravidian languages, have a substantial number of Indo-
Aryan loan words in common (e.g., nadi 'river', candra 'moon',
ratri 'night', bhumi 'earth', etc.) and these words often undergo
similar phonetic and semantic changes in these languages (e.g.,
anumana(m) (u) ' suspicion 'QSkt. id. 'inference, guess '^, see section
i+.5 below). Fifth, all the literary languages have sets of two
forms, one taken from Sanskrit and employed with minimal modifi cation,
and the other either borrowed from Prakrit or modified in the borrowing
language, or both. Often these pairs are distributed in a diglossic
fashion (see discussion in section 6.2). Finally, the majority of
Indo-Aryan loans undergo various kinds of phonetic and semantic
changes, some of which are common to all the Dravidiaji languages and
some language-specific (see section 5 for more details).
^.2 Phonology
This large-scale infiltration of Indo-Aryan words has resulted in
the introduction of several phonemes alien to the Dravidian phonological
structure. Among these, the most important are the aspirated stops
(kh)Ch,th, th
,
ph
,
and their voiced counterparts) as in, for example,
Ka. khara 'spicy hot', chatri 'umbrella', thaqe 'station', kathe 'story',
phala 'fruit', and ghan^e 'bell', 'hour' jhari 'centipede', mudha 'fool',
nidhana 'slow', bhara 'heavy'. Other new introductions are the
distinction between s_, s_, and s_ as in sasegha 'yet to be finished',
and the diphthong au as in gau^a 'village chief. The scripts of all
the literary languages except Tamil now possess characters for the
full complement of Sanskrit phonemes. Even in Tamil the grantha script
accomodates these phonemes.
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The Indo-Aryan loanwords have also resulted in the loss or
violation of some positional constraints in Dravidian. Thus, the
presence of voiced consonants in the word-initial position as in
gamaka , initial consonant clusters and non-homorganic plosive clusters
as in pr'arabdha , word-final obstruents, as in fakat ("*H-U) , among
others, may be attributed to Indo-Aryan influence.
However, it is important to note that thesenon-native phonemes
and consonant clusters are not found in all speakers and in all styles
(see Sjoberg, 1962, and Fowler, 195^). As already noted, these features
mark certain styles and their presence is determined by socio-
linguistic variables (see section 6.1 for further discussion).
The non-literary languages have also adopted many phonological
features from Indo-Aryan. For example, Brahui and Kurukh have developed
nasal vowels of the Indo-Aryan type. Brahui has also lost the short
e_ and o_ characteristic of Dravidian (Emeneau, 1962). Similarly, Pengo
(another non-literary Dravidian language spoken in Orissa) has lost
the distinction between j_ and z_ that it inherited from Proto-Central
Dravidian, presumably under the influence of Oriya, which lacks that
distinction. Pengo has also developed the feature of aspiration,
although it is confined mostly to loanwords from Oriya and used only
sporadically even there (Burrow and Bhattacharya, 1970).
it.2 Morphology
On the morphological level, the most striking characteristic is
the productive use of a large number of Indo-Aryan derivational affixes.
Sanskrit suffixes such as -ant
a
,
-igtha , -kara , are freely used (e.g.,
Ka. hanavanta 'rich', Te. k'opigthi 'irascible'. Ma. vasajkaram
'imprecation'), as are the Hindi-Urdu ones like -dar (Ka. patt'edara
'detective') -kh'or (te. lancakoru 'corrupt man'), -ya1 a (Ka. mTsevSla
'the moustached man'), and -giri (Ka. , Te. giimastagiri 'clerk-ship').
The employment of prefixation as a productive work-forming device
in Dravidian must be attributed to the Indo-Aryan impact and is seen
in the niimber of forms involving, for example, Sanskrit apa-, ava-
,
ati-
, SU-, pari- , as well as the Hindi-Urdu prefixes, b"-
,
maj7^
,
gair-
,
etc. Consider, for example, the following. Ka. apakTrti 'ignominy',
Te. apa d~ru 'insinuation', Ka. , Te. apar'u'pa (m) 'rare', Ka. ati matu
'garrulousness' , Ka. sulocana 'eyeglasses', Ka. pari vik^a^e 'survey',
Ka. proJ:i obba 'each one', as well as Ka. , Te. b'eniyat(tu) 'disloyalty',
gairuhajari 'absence', maji adhyak^a 'eK-president
'
, etc. Most
of these affixes freely collocate with native roots as well , although
it is more common to attach them to other borrowed words and use
them in a sense not attested in the source language (as in the case
OS the Ka. patte'dara. )
In a different vein, Andronov (196U) has observed that the gradual
loss of many negative-incorporated forms in the major Dravidian languages
and the use of analytical modes of expressing negation by means of a
positive verb followed by a negative word may be due to the influence
of Indo-Aryan. Thus, in Keinnada, for example, forms such as hoga ,
mai^a have gone out of use , having been replaced by hogoci-illa and
madod-illa.
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Turning to the non-literary languages, Bloch (195^) has pointed
out that the infinitive suffix -na in Gondi is indubitably borrowed
from Hindi-Urdu. Another infinitive suffix -le in the same language
is attributed to the influence of Eastern Marathi
.
Pengo occasionally employs the Oriya genitive morpheme in -r_
as in rajar kuvar 'king's courtyard', and kumar ar 'potter's wife'.
In Pengo, one also finds a marginal occurrence of the Oriya locative
suffix -ne as in barhane 'in the rain'. More regular and widespread
is the use of a number of Oriya post-positions, such as the instrumental
hudun
,
san
,
'with', the dative kajin 'for the sake of, and the locative
bitre 'in^, tarento 'beneath' (Burrow and Bhattacharya, 1970, iil ff.).
Emeneau ( 1962b) has brought to light an interesting case of
morphological borrowing in Brahui , namely the allomorphs kar and
kam ('to do, make') from Sindhi and Balochi , respectively, on the
lines of the established Brahui irregular structure with -nm and -r_.
Brahui has undergone several other significant morphological changes
not attested elsewhere in Dravidian, but these changes, as Emeneau
rightly suggests, are probably directly traceable to the influence
of Balochi rather than of the Indo-Aryan Sindhi.
U.3 Syntax
The influence of Indo-Aryan is least pronounced on the level of
syntax. Although a number of syntactic patterns modelled on those
of Sanskrit were introduced by various authors from time to time,"^
by and large, few syntactic traits in contemporary Dravidian can
be traced to Indo-Aryan influence. There are a few notable exceptions,
however. Modes of compounding such as the avyayibliavg (where the
first component carries the major semantic burden
, e.g., yath'a
sakti 'according to one's ability') seem to go against the general
Dravidian tendency to place the determiner before the determined and
are probably due to the influence of Sanskrit. Similarly, the passive
construction, (for example, Ka. hu(^ugiyinda blgilu tereyalpa^ttitu
'girl- instr .-door-to open (inf
.
)-experienced' "the door was opened
by the girl"), seldom used as it is, is also likely to have developed
under the influence of Sanskrit, a tendency further reinforced by
the influence of English. The third major syntactic trait in
Dravidian traceable to the impact of Indo-Aryan is the clausal mode
of relative-clause formation, (described below), which is widely
attested in all the literary Dravidian languages.
As is well-known, the preferred mode of relative clause formation
in Dravidian is by turning the main verb into a participle and deleting
the coreferential noun, as in Ka. hasiru sire u'^ti^^uva- hengasu nanna
hegdati 'green-saree-wearing-woman (is) my-wife'. In addition to
this construction, we now find another construction, closely modelled
on the Indo-Aryan, e.g., Ka.
,
yava hengasu hasiru sTre uij-^iddalo
ava^u nanna heQ^ati , 'which-woman-green-saree-is-wearing+ indefinini-
tizer-she (is) my-wife'. "The woman who is wearing the green saree is
my wife." It may be noted that this construction presents one of
the few cases in Dravidian where the main verb in a subordinate clause
is not changed into a non-finite form, and a cftreferential subject
is not deleted. Nadkarni (l9T0) convincingly argues for the Indo-
205
Aryan origin of this construction.
The non-literary languages in day-to-day contact vith Indo-Aryan
show greater receptivity to syntactic influence. For example, Brahui
has developed enclitic pronoxons which occur suffixed to verbs and
nouns (Emeneau, 1962a:6U). Brahui has also lost the inherited Dravidian
system of natural gender in the demonstrative pronoims. Both of
these traits are, once again, probably due to Balochi influence. However,
a third trait, the use of ki^ as a complementizer may be attributed as
much to Sindhi as Balochi influence. Pengo has borrowed the morpheme
ki from Oriya, which is used as an interrogative particle appended
to the end of the sentence, as in venvatay ki? 'did you not hear?'
Ki is also used in the sense of 'or'. Pengo also employs the Oriya
conjunctive particles ar_, are ( 'and' ,' again' ) (Burrow and Bhattacharya,
19T0:6l). Gondi has lost the relative participle typical of Dravidian
and has adopted the Hindi relative prono\in (Caldwell, 1903:50).
In concluding this section of the influence of Indo-Aryan on
different levels, it must once again be emphasized that the prece ding
characterization is by no means intended to be exhaustive. It is
merely illustrative of the kind of influence Indo-Aryan has had on
Dravidian.
5.0 NATIVIZATION
There has been a long tradition, in the native grammatical
literature, of distinguishing two broad classes of borrowings from
Indo-Aryan, namely tatsama ('same as') or words which undergo little
(final vowel or consonant) or no modification, and tadbhava ('derived
from' ) or words which have been nativized or assimilated. For
example, Kannada has both the \inassimilated pak§i (<Skt. pakgin
'bird') and the assimilated hakki . In this context, "assimilation"
refers only to phonological modification and does not include semantic
changes that the Indo-Aryan loans undergo in Dravidian.
5.1 Phonetic Adaptations
Some sound changes in borrowed words are common to all four
major languages. For example, the doubling of the final obstruent
followed by the addition of the enunciative -u (e.g., sampattu 'wealth',
hukummu 'order', tejassu 'halo'), the substitution of unaspirated stops
for aspirated ones (e.g., parike 'broomstick'[<Skt . parikriaj), the
dropping of a final consonant (e.g., raja 'king'£<Skt. raj an^ ) , the
substitution of s_ for £ and ^ (ka. hasu (<"Skt . pasu ' cattle '3 ), simplification
of consonant clusters by anaptyxix (e.g.. Ma. kariya£<Skt . karya 'work'3),
intervocalic voicing of voiceless plosives (Ta. vigadanf^ Skt . vika^a )
,
and so on. Many of the changes are, however, language specific.
In Kannada, for example, the final -a of loan words changes to -e_
(e.g., matS3>taate , ilakha :? ilakhe
,
etc.) while in Telugu, such a
change occurs only marginally. Similarly, Malyaylam speakers substitute
1^ and ^ for the Sanskrit t(d) and t(4) in certain contexts, e.g.,
when followed by a plosive ( talparyajn , tal^bhavam , vasalkaram , khalgam , etc.),
whereas Tamil substitutes an r_ (Aiyar, 1973) . Similarly, the regular
substitution in Tamil of voiceless consonants for the voiced ones in
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Sanskrit (e.g., cinkaram < Skt . sringara ) occurs much less frequently
in other languages
.
By and large, most of the phonemic suhstitutions in Dravidian
follow the regular phonological rules of the languages concerned.
This adaptation, together with the fact that a majority of Indo-
Aryan loans commonly used in Dravidian have come via Prakrit, makes
some forms hardly recognizahle as originating from Sanskrit. A
case in point is Ka. habba 'festival' (Skt. parva ) which comes from
Pkt. pawa (or pabba ? ) and, with the mutation of v and b in Kannada,
enters as pabba in old Kannada, and with the change of initial £ to
h which took place around the 10th century, becomes habba in Middle
and Modern Kannada.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that this tendency to
regularize loanwords to make them conform to the native phonological
structure operates more strongly in Tamil than in the other Dravidian
languages. As a result, Tamil has fewer unassimilated Sanskrit words
than the others. At least two reasons may be advanced to account
for this. One is the influential injunction in Tolkappiam (Sutras
397,^01-2) according to which only those Sanskrit words could be
used which either had letters common to Tamil and Sanskrit or had
been modified in such a way that they could readily be represented
in the Tamil script. This rule was scrupulously adhered to for over
l600 years \mtil the great inflxix of Sanskrit words (including tatsamas )
diiring the Vijayanagar period (l6th century). The second, related reason
may have been spelling pronunciation, the Tamil script lacking
characters for voiced consonants and apirates , and palatal and
retroflex sibilants. Note that the other literary languages have
been more lax in this regard and have moved in the opposite direction,
extending their phonemic (and graphemic) inventory to accomodate the
foreign sounds
.
5.2 Semantic Changes
Many of the loan-words from Indo-Aryan \indergo various kinds of
meaning change when used in Dravidian. Some of these changes are
common to South Dravidian as a whole, while others are innovations
peculiar to one or two languages. The following table, based on
Aiyar 193^-35, illustrates some common semantic developments.
Source Word Meaning in Sanskrit Meaning in Dravidian
anumanam inference; guess suspicion
antahstah in the middle state story of a building;
high rank,
asahya unbearable loathsome
avasth'a state miserable condition
p'apam sin, evil sin,pity
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Both Aiyar (op.cit) and Eraeneau and Burrow (1962) contain many
more examples of this phenomenon, traceable probably to diffusion
within South Dravidian. Similar changes may be noticed in Hindi-
Urdu borrowings as wall, e.g., Ka. Te., khayam (<id. 'stand erect')
'permanent', dubara(i ) (<id. 'twice') 'excess ,wastage '
.
On the other hand, cases in which the same Sanskrit word has
developed different meanings in the Dravidian languages are more
frequent. For example, "arambham in Telugu has the meanings, 'pride'
and 'killing' (literary), as well as the original Sanskrit meaning
of 'beginning'. The same word in Kannada means 'cultivation' as well
as 'beginning'. Similarly, 'amodamu in Teluga means 'dalliance' as
well as ' frangrance
'
; in Kannada, the word is used only in its Sanskrit
meaning of 'enjoyment'; piramatam in Tamil means 'excessive; as
well as 'excellence'; the derivative of the same source in Kannada,
pramada has the meaning of 'blunder'. The Malayalara word gog^hi means
'prank, contort ions, gesture', while in Kannada and Telugu, the same
word has the original Sanskrit meaning of 'assembly'.
The semantic changes that take place in Indo-Aryan words when
used in Dravidian comprise of virtually every known type of deviation
discussed in the linguistic literature. There is, for example, restriction
of meaning in S. Dr. udyoga 'employment; (<Skt. 'work'); extension in
Ka. anubhava 'mystical experience' (<Skt. ' '); speciali-
zation in Ka. j angama 'a Virasaiva saint' (<Skt. 'mobile'); ame-
lioration in Te. alaya 'temple' (-CSkt. 'house'); deterioration in
Ka. adhvana
,
Te. adhvanamu , Ta. attuvanam (<Skt . adhvan 'path, way')
'destruction, disarray', and so on. Similarly, Hindi-Urdu and
Marathi words also change their meaning in various ways, e.g., Ka.
cadi (<Ma. cahad ' ') 'petty complaint, informing on someone',
Te., Ka. usf5.d (^-H-U ust'adi 'teacher') 'wrestler, gymnastics teacher',
Ta. att'avanai (Ma. a^havana 'recollection') 'index, ledger', Te.,
Ka. sa^a ^-U §ara ' condition
'
) 'post script', etc.
6.0 SOCIOLINGUISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF
INDO-ARYANIZATION
It was remarked earlier (section 3) that all the Dravidian
languages are not uniformly Indo-Aryanized, nor are all varieties in
a given language influenced to the same degree. This variation is
sociolinguistically conditioned to a large extent, and, in turn,
contributes to an already complex sociolinguistic situation in the
Dravidian languages. In this section we shall briefly examine
this aspect.
6.1 Caste Dialects
The existence of caste-related differences in Dravidian
languages has long been recognized. In particular, sharp differences
are noted between the Brahman and non-Brahman dialects on the levels
of phonology, morphology, and lexicon. While many of these
differences have nothing to do with borrowing (e.g., Kannada ide (B)
versus aite (NB) for 'to be 3rd sing, neut.), quite a few of the
variables involve elements introduced in the process of Indo-
Aryanization, in particular, Sanskritization. The most important of
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these variables is aspiration in loanwords from Sanskrit. Even
in these secular days, it is not \incommon to find parents and teachers
upbraiding an unaspirating urchin for "speaking like a sudra "' Another
important variable is the existence of separate sets of lexical
items in the Brahman ajid non-Brahman dialects. As Aiyar (1932) has
pointed out with reference to Tulu, words borrowed directly from
Sanskrit are far more numerous in the Brahman dialects, while words
borrowed or adapted from Middle Indo-Aryan (Jaina Prakrit or Pali)
are common to both Brahman and non-Brahman dialects (e.g., Tu.
upavasa (B) vs. nompu (NB) 'fast'; Ta. tirtho" (B) vs. tanni (NB)
'water'). Even when the same Indo-Aryan word has been borrowed into
both dialects, it \indergoes different modifications: (Tu. s'avira (B) vs.
sara (NB) 'thousand'; Ka. baha^a (b) vs. b'a^.a (NB) 'much, very').
The reasons for this conservatism" of Brahmaxi dialects are not
hard to find. The preservation of Sanskrit features in their speech
gives Brahmans a social identity which their insignificant number
denies them. As a byproduct of the elitist position of Sanskrit in
India, this feature gives them prestige as well. Moreover, as
Ramanujan (1968) correctly points out, part of the reason may also be
the high premium placed in that community on the accurate rendering
of the texts and their conservative outlook toward cultural innova-
tions in general.
The symbolic value of Sanskritic features in the Dravidian socio-
linguistic context has also led to the inevitable phenomenon , of..hyper-
correction. Thus we find scores of native Dravidian words restructured
to incorporate prestige features such as aspiration. Kannada offers
many examples of this sort: bhatta 'paddy', cha^i 'cold', jhari
'centepede', etc. (cf. also, Te. iddharu 'two persons'). These
hypercorrections are manifestations, in a literal as well as in the
sociological sense in which Srinivas (1966) employs the term, of
Sanskritization .
6.2 Diglossia
Indo-Aryanization—in particular, Sanskritization—has also contri-
buted to the age-old cleavage in Dravidian languages between the
literary and the colloquial styles. In this context, the term' literary
style' is used in its broad sense, to refer to all styles of insti-
tutionalized use of language including that of the public platform, and
is not restricted to the written form. There have been a number of
studies of diglossia in Dravidian (e.g., Caldwell, 1903:78ff; Shanmugam
Pillai, i960; Radhakrishna, 1971; Nayak, 1967), all of which point
out that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the 'High' style
is the preponderance of Sanskritic features. The 'High' style is
characterized by the presence of non-Dravidian features such as
aspiration, and the use of unassimilated borrowings, as well as struc-
tures such as the passive construction and the clausal mode of relative
clause formation. This penchant for mixing non-native elements in the
literary style gives it a rather artificial and stilted character,
and when carried to an extreme, as in the Manipravala style, often
becomes unintelligible to the uninitiated layman. It is not surprising,
therefore, that from time to time, there have been movements, in all
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the literary languages , to bring the literary style closer to the
language of the common man, and a recurrent theme in these programs
has been a call for reducing the Sanskritic component in the literary
style (see the next section).
The association of Sanskrit with the High style in Dravidian has
resulted in an interesting phenomenon: the diglossic distribution of
multiple derivatives on the borrowed words. Dravidisin languages
provide many instances of two forms of the same Indo-Aryan loanword
being used in different senses, one, typically the unassimilated
Sanskrit word, retaining its original meaning or undergoing ame-
lioration, and the other, typically the form borrowed or adapted from
Prakrit, undergoing deterioration. The follwoing examples from
Kannada are relevant: samsthe 'organization'; sante 'weekly village
market'; parigattu 'institution'; parse 'annual fair'; dhana 'wealth';
dana 'cattle'; arya 'respected person, an Aryan'; aj
j
a 'grandfather,
an old man'; vandhye 'infertile woman'; banje 'id (pej)'.
In this connection, mention must also be made of the resort to
Sanskrit terms for euphemisms in polite conversation and in writing.
Thus, the preference for terms like jaghana 'thighs', kuca 'breast',
mardana 'manipulation of the breasts', rati 'sexual intercourse
'
asana
'erotic position' etc, makes even erotic meinuals read like learned
treatises! Turning to a sombre vein, terms like vidhave 'widow',
nidhana 'death', sivaikya 'death', divangat
a
'dead* are generally
preferred, in writing at least, to their native-language counter-
parts.
6. 3 Indo-Aryaniz at ion and Language
Attitudes
As pointed out earlier, the large-scale importation of Indo-
Aryan features into the Dravidian languages has not gone unopposed, at
least in the literary languages . However , the reasons for the oppo-
sition, its intensity, and scope vary from language to language.
In Tamil Nadu, it has turned out to be an emotional issue. Even
from the dawn of Dravidian history, the attitude of Tamilians to this
issue has been different from that of the speakers of other literary
languages. It will be recalled (section 5.1) that To^kappiam sanctions
the borrowing of only those words that fit into the phonological
structure of Tamil, This restriction is not met with in the grammars
of the other three literary languages , which have traditionally adopted
a more liberal attitude to loan words , welcoming tatsamas and
tadbhavas alike, often asserting that theaspirated sounds (mahaprana's)
are integral to their language, and recognizing the expeinded scripts
resulting from incorporation of non-native sounds. All of these
grammars do, however, recognize the distinction between native and
foreign ( d'esya and anyadesya ) words and enumerate eleborate rules for
deriving the native forms of the loan-words, but they do not proscribe
the use of tatsamas . In fact , they even go one step further and impli-
citly encourage the use of Sanskrit compounds in their criticism of
the employment of hybrid compounds (called arisamasa in Kannada and
vairisajiiasa in Telugu) . Further, some grammarians even go out of
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their way to show the similarity between the native language Eind
Sanskrit by concocting examples of constructions never used in the
language. These grammars are also unlike Tolkappiam in their
adoption of the Paninian model and terminology. (Some of these grammars
are, in fact, written in Sanskrit.) Thus the difference in the attitude
of the Tamilians on the one hand and the speakers of the other literary
languages on the other toward the borrowing of Indo-Aryan features has
been pronoimced and long-standing.
While the Andhras , the Kannadigas , and the Malayalis have wel-
comed Indo-Aryan borrowings in principle, they have often reacted to
the indiscriminate use of these loans. As noted earlier, the Mar}iprava].a
style never found general grass-roots appeal. On the contrary, there
arose a number of counter-movements seeking to bring the literary
language closer to the common colloquial idiom. In Kannada, for
example, there have been at least three such movements. Andayya
(c. 13th century) composed his Kabbigara Kava. using only native words
and assimilated loans; the Virasaiva protest (l2th century) against
the tyranny of Brahmanism found its literary counterpart in the vacanas
whose language is relatively free from Sanskrit borrowings. In modern
times, there has been a sharp reaction against the Sanskritiz^d fet^^-l^e
of Kuvempu and others, and a call to eschew unfamiliar Sanskrit words.
Similar trends are found in Telugu and Malayalam as well, for example,
in the work of Somanatha (who advocated janu Telugu 'pure Telugu')
and Ezhuttacan (a contemporary Malayalam poet).
The target of these movements, however, is only the excessive use
of Sanskritic elements—unfamiliar words, long compounds, etc.—but
the forms already present in common parlance—both assimilated and
unassimilated—are accepted as a proper part of their respective
languages. Thus their attitude toward Indo-Aryanizat ion is essentially
rooted in considerations of general intelligibility rather than any
philosophical objection to borrowing per se. The latter attitude,
however, has played an increasingly important role in Tamilian
glossopolitics in this century.
In his excellent discussion of the purism movement in Tamil,
Annamalai (to appear) observes that the movement was fostered by
several factors: the desire to assert the identity of Tamils following
the Independence movement which stressed national unity, the discovery
of the antiquity of Tamil and its self-sufficiency as demonstrated in
the ancient Sangam literature, the change of power-structure from the
domination of Brahmans to that of non-Brahmans , among others.
The scope of the "pure Tamil" movement was quite comprehensive.
It covered all styles of language, and affected the script,, the voca-
bulary, and even proper names. Most of the borrowed words (including
assimilated words) were excised and native Tamil words from the early
literature revived to take their place. An informal estimate (quoted
in Annamalai, op.cit.) is that the Sanskrit words in use in Tamil
writing have come down from fifty percent to twenty percent in the last
fifty years. However, there do seem to be more Sanskrit words used
in spoken Tamil. This situation is similar to early modern Icelandic,
but we know where modern Icelandic has gone.
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T.O CONCLUSION
As we conclude this 'broad survey of the influence of Indo-Aryan
languages on Dravidian, it may not be out of place to step back, as
it were, and ask, what in the final analysis has been the role of
this process of Indo-Aryanization in the history of Dravidian. This
is a very difficult question, not only because it can quickly get
transformed into an emotional question, but also because the process
is an ongoing one. However, trying to steer clear of value-judge-
ments, one may attempt a partial answer.
First of all, there is no denying the fact that the impact of
Indo-Aryan has been both profound and widespread. There is no
Dravidian language that has not been touched by this influence, nor is
there any aspect ;. of a given language. The Dravidian languages
have stood to gain from this process in many ways—their vocabularies
have been enriched and their style-range widened. They have developed
countless new registers and added to their metrical repertoire. It
should not be forgotten that many of the Indo-Aryan words were first
introduced by way of literary compositions, some of which are among
the finest in Dravidian literature. The Indo-Aryan influence came
at a time when the Dravidian languages were beginning to assert
their separate identities and aided them in this process. It may
be recalled that Indo-Aryanization was probably the key factor in
the separation of Malayalam from Old Tamil, the former having
adopted a more liberal attitude towards the importation of Indo-'Aryan
features.
Yet, one does not have to be a purist to concede that Indo-
Aryanization has not been an unmixed blessing. Among what in some
quarters may be regarded as not quite wholesome effects of this process
are the following: the creation of an elite variety based on the
incorporation of foreign elements; the emergence of a pedantic
literary style, based on the same principle; widespread linguistic
slavery manifested in the preference for borrowings over exploitation
of native resources; the disappearence of scores of perfectly adequate
and expressive native term.s under the onslought of the borrowings;
and so on.
Granting that the tendency to borrow has been excessive and indis-
criminate, it may still be maintained that Indo-Aryanization per se
need not take all the blame for the phenomena just mentioned ^ Socially
defined variation is an integral feature of language whether borrowed
features serve as the relevant variable or not; variety in literary
style is also equally inherent in the medium, literature would be of
little interest any other way; words do change their meaning, fall
into desuetude, and their place is not always taken by borrowed items.
The question, then, is, would the Dravidian languages have developed
the variety of registers that they now have, without the benefit of
Indo-Aryanization? Probably yes; but the more relevant question is,
whatever be our language policy for developing technical terms to serve
in contemporary registers, must we get rid of the terms that are already
in use, just because they did not once belong to our language" The
Tamiliams say yes, the other Dravidians say no. So each group goes
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in its own way, the former resorting to ancient Tamil, the latter to
classical Sanskrit, but the two have one thing in common—they are
both attempting to blow new life into antique forms, while a
relative newcomer to the scene, English, knocks persistently at
the door.
*I am grateful to Professors Braj Kachru and Hans Hock for
commenting on an earlier version of this paper.
^The last part of this claim is not strictly correct. Burrow
and Bhattacharya (l9T0:ix) note that in many areas, the Pengos
have lost their own language and have become Indo-Aryan speakers
.
The authors cite the example of the agricultural tract west of
Nowrangpur and adjoining the Bastar border, "where the Pengos no
longer speak their own language, though they are aware of its
one-time existence." Nevertheless, in so far as the true character
and identity of a language resides in its morphology and syntax
(apparently basic vocabulary is less impregnable than commonly assumed
if the Dravidian case is any proofCsee section k.l belowti) , Dravidian
languages may be said to be still pretty much intact.
^For a cautious questioning of this traditionally accepted
position, see Hock (1975)-
^See References at the end of this paper. The items marked by
as asterisk were not available to me at the time of writing.
^However, the reliability of the method of glottochronology on
which Andronov's claim is presumably based, has been called into
question; see, e.g., Bergsland and Vogt , 1962; also note Hock 19T6.
5l am aware that the use of the term 'caste dialects' has been
criticized recently, on the basis of the observation that education
rather than caste is the relevant variable. However, if we recall that
until recently, the term' educated' could be used interchangeably
with 'Brahman', much of the ground for objection disappears. Moreover,
sociolinguistic stereotypes are not always commensurate with socio-
logical reality.
°This list is limited to those borrowings from Indo-Aryan which
have either l)undergone extensions of meanings or far-reaching
phonetic changes or both; or 2) penetrated into non-literary languages,
whether or not special meanings are found (Emeneau and Burrow, 19^2 )
.
Preface)
.
^One can cite numerous examples of this tendency. Sekhar (1969:
l6l) has observed that Malayalam inscriptions of the 11th and 12th
centuries contain examples of concord between modifiers and substantives.
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This phenomenon seems to have existed in Telugu as well (Sastri,
1969:271). According to Sekhar, Lilatilakam
,
the lUth century grammar
disapproves of such imitations of Sanskrit syntax yi Malayalam. The
highly respected 13th century grammar of Kannada, Sabdamapidarpapa
contains an "extrapolated"' (an\ikta) sutra in which it is claimed that
even intransitive verbs can be passivized in Kannada.
"'Conservatism' as applied to Brahman dialects in Dravidian
may be confusing. It is true that the Brahman dialects have
traditionally been innovative in acquiring non-native phonology,
lexis, etc. However, in so far as the borrowed elements do not
undergo the processes of nativization that apply generally in their
respective languages, the Brahman dialects are relatively more
conservative (see Bright and Ramanujan, op.cit.. and the references
cited in that work for further discussion).
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HOW A NODN CIASS SYSTEM MAY BE LOST J
EVIDENCE FROM OTDBA (UNGUA FRANCA KIKONGO)*
Susan U, Stucky
This paper discusses the status of the noun class
system in a Bantu lingua franca, Kituba, spoken In
southeim Zaire. Section 1, outlines the general character-
istics of Bantu noun class systems. Noun classes are
marked morphologically by prefixes on the noun In both
the singular and the plural. Typically, these prefixes
trigger agreonent for a variety of syntactic categories
(i.e. verbs, pronouns, and adjectives). The data In
section 2. shows that Kltuba has lost many of the plural
prefix markers and, of those that remain, many appear
to be unstable. In addition, one of the plural markers
is being generalized. It is argued that the language
is moving towards a system in which the singular is
unmarked while the plural Is marked. This analysis Is
supported by evidence from agreement patterns and the
behavior of loan words. Section 3» compares the Kltuba
noun system with that of other Bantu lingua francae. It
is pointed out that while Kltuba shares many patterns
with the other trade languages. It has gone further In
the elimination of a noun class system. The claim is
then that Kltuba Is moving towards a nonclass system
with an unmarked singular and a marked plural. Further-
more, It is concluded that this change is spreading
through the lexicon item by item and proceeds through
a variety of mechanisms.
1.0. Introduction
This paper presents a discussion of the status of the noun class system
in Kituba» a Bantu language which has undergone considerable simplification
over the past several hundred years. Today, Kituba is used primarily as a
means of ccxnmunication between various Bantu language speaking peoples in
Bas Zaire, In the Kwangu-Kwilu region of Zaire, and In the southwestern
part of Congo-Brazzaville. The data in this paper were obtained from
Sallkoko Mufwene, a native speaker of Kltuba as it is spoken In Bandundu
In Zaire. Sallkoko refers to his language as either Klkongo ya leta or
Kikongo ya bulamatari, which are the two names applied to Kituba In the
western Kltuba speaking area.
While simplification has taken place in several parts of the grammar,
as is typical of trade languages such as Kltuba, It is the reduction of
the noun class system which is the topic of this paper.
217
The noun classes in Bantu languages are marked by prefixes on the noun
stem. They typically fall into singular and plural pairs so that the noun
has an overt morphological marker for the singular noun and a separate overt
marker for the plural. It will be shown that the Kituba noun class system
has reduced the number of singular-plural prefix pairs significantly and,
in addition, that the system is moving towards an unmarked singular^narked
plural system through the generalization of one of the existing plural
markers. Another characteristic of Bantu noun class systems, agreement,
will also be shown to have entirely disappeared. Taken together,
these two facts do suggest that very little is left of the noun class
system. It is concluded that the noun class system in Kituba is barely
functional and is in the process of being eliminated entirely.
1,1, Background
Some background information about Bantu noun class sjrstems will be
helpful in following the discussion. As mentioned above, the noun in Bantu
languages belongs to a noun class which is marked by a prefix (sometimes 0)
on the noun itself. While the number of classes varies from language to
language, there are rarely fewer than ten or more than eighteen in any given
language (Guthrie 196?: 13) • TWenty-three proto classes are proposed by
Cole (1971), the largest number of classes reconstructed so far. Within
Bantu linguistic tradition, the classes are numbered with reference to the
proto-classes. This system will be followed here so that the Kituba
evidence may be more easily compared to other Bantu languages.
One of the clearest functions of the noun class syston is marking the
difference between singular and plural. Often there is a pairing of the
singular-plural prefixes and when the term gender is applied to a language
of this type, it refers to a pair of prefixes, one which marks the singular
and one which marks the plural. Certain behavior of the nouns, however,
precludes treatment of the entire system as pairs of singular and plural
prefixes. Some classes, such as the locatives, the abstract class, and the
liquid class, are not markee for either singular or plural. In addition,
two singular prefixes may take a single plural prefix. For eocample, Proto-
Bantu Class 10 (henceforth marked Class*10), a plural marker, is often
found as the plural of both Class*9 and Class*ll in a given language.
Furthermore, a single prefix in a modern language may be a reflex of two
prefixes historically. Finally, there is no necessary correlation between
what constitutes a singular-plural pair in one language with this distinc-
tion in another. Thus, each prefix must be handled separately. What is
significant for this paper is that number is overtly marked in the Bantu
languages because both singular and plural forms e^diibit a prefix which
may be clearly identifiable as separable frcsn the noun stem,
A further characteristic of Bantu noun classes is that they govern
agreement in a wide variety of constructions. The categories most often
exhibiting agreement include 1) the genitive marker, 2) subject and object
pronouns (both clitics and independent forms), 3) adjectives, and I*) verbs.
In some cases, a single phonetic form of a prefix may govern two types of
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agreement , This is generally taken to be evidence that this prefix is not
the marker of a singular class but of two separate classes.
A third feature of noun class systems in Bantu languages is the semantic
domain assigned to many of the classes. Th« correlation between a given noun
class marker in a Bantu language and a semantic domain is not as consistent
as in the instance of number, so caution is reeonnended in treating the
classes as representative of semantic daaains. Nouns do not often fall into
categories assigned to the prefix."'
In this analysis, nouns in Kituba will be evaluated along the two most
consistent parameters, number and agreement, with only slight reference to
semantic domain.
2.0. The analysis
To perform the analysis of the Kituba noun systaa, a list of approxi-
mately 450 singular nouns was submitted to the consultant who then provided
the corresponding plural forms. The original list was extracted from three
sources J ELiet (1933), Swift and Zola (I963), and Fehderau (I966). The
first two sources provide a vocabulary from the northern Kituba region. It
is interesting to note that there was almost no difference between the sing-
ular and plural forms given by the consultant and those provided in the
three other sources. Thus, western and northern Kituba are fairly cohesive
with respect to the basic vocabulary.
2.1,0. The expression of number in Kituba nouns
This section establishes the relationship of the noun class prefixes
exhibited in the languages Fehderau (I966) established to be most closely
related to Kituba, These languages include the central Kikongo dialects
(Kimanyanga, Kinyombe (north), Ladi and Kisikongo). The Kituba nouns were
checked against the central Kikongo vocabulary noted by Laman (193^) to
determine what changes in class affiliation have taken place. The resulting
system is outlined below. Note that because no agreement remains, the only
criterion on which to base the existence of a class will be its pairing with
a plural prefix.
2.1.1.0 Class 1 mu-
Very few examples of Class 1 nouns remain in Kituba. Earlier changes
in the Kikongo languages show that many of the nouns reconstructed to be in
Class*l have as a prefix only a homorganic nasal. Several scenarios have
been proposed for the loss of the vowel of Class i mu- and the subsequent
assimilation of the nasal. (See Bell 1972, for example). None of these
seem to account for this phenomenon in Kituba, however. What is important
here is that the appearance of many Class 1 nouns in Kituba with a prefix
N- is not an innovation in Kituba. There is another class of nouns which
take N^ as well. They belong to Class*10. In Kikongo, Class 1 and Class 10
nouns were distinguished by their concord. However, since concord has been
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lost in Kituba, the two classes of nouns are indistinguishable. The
result is a scission in Class 1 such that some nouns originally in Class 1
now appear in Class 10.
Only two nouns out of the entire lexicon elicited behave as though
they belong to Class 1. These are the following!
1. mu-ana /pwani7 'child'
ba-ana ^axi&J 'children*
2
.
mu-ntu ' person
'
ba-ntu 'people'
Class 1 nouns typically take their plurals in Class 2, These no\ms
show no sign of change in the plural.
Several other mass nouns which cannot have plurals but which do exhibit
a mu- sequence word initially are the following
i
3. mwamba 'sauce'
mutoki 'perspiration'
mubisu 'rawness'
Since these forms do not govern agreement nor take plurals, there is no
evidence that they are analyzed as containing prefixes. Neither is there
any direct evidence that they do not. There is a possibility for mutoki
•perspiration' to be analyzable into a prefix and stan since a verb ku-toka
'to sweat' does exist in Kituba,^
2.1.1.1. Class la 0-
Class la is a class that did not have a reconstructed prefix. It is
usually paired with a Class 2 ba- plural. Class la is t3rpically restricted
to kinship terms. In Kituba, this class is only of historical interest
since other pairs of nouns with no singular marking and a ba- prefixed to
the sg. stem have been added to the system. Examples include the following:
bakala/babakala 'man, husband'
nkuluntu/bankuluntu 'older sibling'
mama/bamama ' mother
tata/batata 'father, sir'
2,1.1.2
Class 2 ba- has already been mentioned with reference to Class 1 and la,
for which it functions as a plural marker. Ba- has beooaie a plural marker
for many noxms in Kituba and it is generally prefixed to the entire noun as
in the examples in {k) above. This is the form which, it will be argued, is
being generalizea as a plural marker.
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2,1.1.3 Classes 3 "m- and k mi-
Class 3 mu- was originally distinguished from Class 1 mu- in Klkongo
for two reasons. First, Class 1 mu- takes as its plural Class 2 ba- , while
Class 3 mu- takes as its plural Class k mi- . Secondly, Class 1 and Class 3
goTemed different agreenent forms, a distinction which can no longer exist
in Kituba since all noun class agreaaent has been lost. In addition, many
of the nouns in Class 3 merged with nouns in Class 9 Hh ^®* ^^® vowel of
the prefix was lost. Thus, some nouns which originally belonged to Class 3
now belong in Class 9 and the rest are indistinguishable from Class 1 nouns
except for their plural pairings.
In Kituba, some change is occuring with respect to the plural marker,
j
In Kikongo, the normal plural form for Class 3 mu- would have been Class k
ml-. Nouns in Class 3 in Kituba taking Class ^ mi- plurals are the following:
5.
^
nulangi/mllangi
Biupepe/mipepe
rausapi/misapi
musuni/misuni
mutindu/mitlndu
nutunga/mitunga
mudinga/midinga
mungungu/migungu
mukanda/mikanda
fflunoko/minoko
•bottle*
'breeze, wind'
'finger, toe'
'flesh'
•variety, sort'
'needle, hospital*
'smoke*
'voice, throat'
•letter'
'mouth*
For a group of nouns in Class 3 there are alternative plural forms,
Note that the first alternative plural consists of ba- prefixed to the
singular noun stem. The second plural form is made up of ba- plus the
original plural marked by mi-» These are as follows!
6. mungamba/mingamba
bangamba
bamlngamba
'day laborer'
nmtubi/mitubi
batubl
bamltubi
'spokesman, speaker'
muteki/mlteki
bateki
bamiteki
'seller'
rauyibl/miyibi
bamiyibi
•thief*
munganga/mlnganga
baminganga
'doctor'
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mundele/aindele 'white person, European'
bamlndele
mukombi/mlkombi 'sweeper*
baralkombi
rawinda/minda ' light
'
banwlnda
Note that the alternative plural forms were all human nouns but one
(the last). Since Class l/2 typically contains human nouns, it might be
argued that these forms were derived by the addition of ba- marking humans.
Additional support for this analysis comes from the fact that no alternative
agreement forms now exist for distinguishing Class 1 mu- from Class 3 mu-.
This seems to be a plausible explanation for the ba+stera forms. The gener-
alization of the ba+mi+stem forms could also be a result of the human marking
of ba- . However, we will see later that ba- has been generalized to marking
the plural for many nouns not of the human class. In light of this general
pattern in the language, forms like ba+mi- stem suggest that the prefixes
mu- and mi- are no longer separable and that ba- was prefixed to an already
existing plural form for which the mi- was no longer separable. An alterna-
tive explanation, that these forms were formed by analogy to French loans
where ba- was prefixed to French plurals, is less easy to argue for or
against since such an analogical process requires that the speaker be aware
that the French loans were plural to begin with, A neighboring lingua franca,
Lingala, does, however, Bokamba (personal cc»nmunication) has pointed out
that Lingala (a neighboring lingua franca also has such ba-mi- forms. He
suggests that historically the Lingala ba-mi plurals were derived by analogy
to the Kituba forms since such plurals are found in only Kinshasa Lingala
(the area of greatest contact between Kituba and Lingala speakers) and since
these fonns are most common among Kituba speakers of Lingala.
2.1.1.^ Class 5 di-
Class 5 has been retained from Kikongo with no change. It has the
prefix di- in the singular and takes the plural in Class 6 ma-« There are
no exceptions in the data. Class 5 often contains body parts and names of
food and plants. Here is a sample:
dikutu/makutu
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nouns In three classes: Classes 5f 11> &nd 1^, and also for 8<»te mass novms,
particularly those referring to liquids. The Class 5/6 pairing was noted in
(7) above. Examples of the Class 11/6 pairing include only onei lupangu/
mapangu 'fence,' The other two found in the vocabularies (lukaya 'leaf,' and
Iwinda 'cockscomb') were not used by the consultant. Only one Class 14 bu-
noun was in the list. However, unlike the Kikongo plural which was in Class
6, the plural in Kltuba has shifted to a ba- plural which is prefixed to
the singular noun.
8. bu-ala (bwala)/babwala 'village'
The liquid ma- nouns are given below:
9, malafu 'wine, liquor'
maza 'water, river'
mafuta 'oil'
A number of mass nouns also take the Class 6 form.
10. makasi 'anger'
madidi ' coldness
'
raakelele 'noise'
A few nouns which are not in the liquid class also take a raa- plural prefixed
to the singular form,
11. raasua/bamasua 'boat'
falanga/mafalanga ' franc
'
fofolo/mafofolo 'match*
bafofolo
talatala/matalatala 'glass'
The first of these is undoubtedly of Bantu origin. The second is a
borrowing from French but has been widely used in many of the Bantu languages
in the area. The second two are more difficult to identify and no explana-
tion is offered. Note that one form has an alternative ba-plural. Another
item (clearly a borrowing) for which Laman (I936), Swift and Zola (I963),
and Eliet (1953) recorded a ma-plural and which has shifted to a ba-plural
in Salikoko's speech, is the form papayi/bapapayi 'papaya.'
Thus Class 6, like Class 4, exhibits a certain degree of instability.
Some nouns originally taking a plural in Class 6 have shifted to an unmarked
singular form and a marked plural (ba- ) form. Others have not. The Class
5-6 pairing, on the other hand, appears to be relatively stable,
2,1.1.6 Classes 7 ki- and 8 bi-
Class 7 ki- nouns took their plural in Class 8 bi- in Kikongo, This
pairing still holds for Kituba. Approximately twenty nouns out of the list
show this alternation. Several examples follow:
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12. kibakaMbaka 'wall'
klfu/bifu 'habit, custom'
kisalu/bisalu 'work, job'
kisanunu/bisanunu 'ccxab'
Certain items have been borrowed from Lingala into Kituba. The
Lingala reflex of Class 7 is, however e^ and not ki- . Class 9 in Lingala
remains bi- » The prefixes of such nouns have not been changed on the
borrowed nouns although some alternation between £ and u is noted. Two
such examples were noted in the list and are given below.
13. el^agi/bilungi 'face' (Ling, elongi)
ekeku/bikeku 'statue' (ling, ekeko)
One could perhaps account for these forms by saying that since Salikoko
knows Lingala he uses these forms when speaking Kituba, Bokamba (personal
communication) has remarked that a u-o alternation is common in Lingala as
spoken by Kituba speakers and furthermore that Kituba u often correlates to
Lingala o. Thus, such a correlation seems to be common and accoiints for
the alternation in (13).
2,1,1,7 Class 9 N-
The reflex of Class *9 ni- in Kikongo is a nasal consonant (N^) which
assimilates in place of articulation to a following consonant. Various
nasal consonants ( n , g ) appear before vowel initial stems as a result
of a number of historical changes which need not concern us here. Reflexes
of Class *9 are numerous. This class is often cited as the animal class
and there are ample examples of these in the list. In Kikongo (as in many
other Bantu languages), Class 9 took a plural form in Class 10. However,
Class 9 nouns in Kituba now take a plural ba- prefixed to the singular form,
14. mbulu/barabulu 'jackal'
mbuluku/bambuluku 'antelope'
ngombe/bangombe ' cow
'
mfwenge/barafwenge 'civit-like animal
'
mfinda/bamfinda ' forest
'
ndunda/bandunda 'vegetables/varieties of vegetables'
nioka/banioka ' snake
'
nuni/banuni 'bird
'
In Kikongo, monosyllabic nouns in Class 9 appear with a prefix vowel
i- appearing before the nasal. In Kituba these have all but disappeared.
Their plural forms are of the same type of those in (I'*) above,
15. (i)mbwa/ba(i)mbwa 'dog*
(i )mpu/bampu ' hat
mvu/bamvu 'year'
nzo/banzo 'house'
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Since Kituba nouns do not govern agreement, the Class 1 ma- and
Class 3 nouns with reduced prefixes have fallen together with nouns of
Class 9« Both sets now take a marked plural fonn where ba- is prefixed
to the singular. Nouns containing a nasal word initial in the singular
and a ba- plural marker prefixed to the singular form constitute, statist-
ically speaking, one of the largest groups of nouns in the list,
2.1.1.8 Class 10 N- or zi-
Class 10, which was either N^ or zi- in Kikongo depending on the
dialect, was, at first, ai- in Kituba. Shepherd's dictionary (1926)
listed Class 10 ai- as the plural of Class 9 but by the time Fehderau did
his research (1960* s) ai- had disappeared entirely and had been replaced
by the prefixation of ba- to the singular form. Class 10, then, has
entirely disappeared; its pluralization function has been replaced by the
ba- prefix.
2.1.1.9 Class 11 lu-
Class 11 lu- has a variety of plurals associated with it. Class 6
ma- has already been mentioned (See section 2.1.1.5). Class 13 tu- was
at one time a regular plural for Class 11. However, there are only a
very few examples of Class 11 in the data. Regardless of their plural
forms in Kikongo, each instance has been replaced by the marked plural form.
l6, lusambu/balusarabu 'prayer'
lusadisu/balusadisu ' aid
'
lutu/balutu ' spoon
'
2.1.1.10 Class 13 ka-
Class 13 ka- apparently has disappeared entirely, there being no
examples in the list having this form.
2.1.1.11 Class 14 bu-
Class 14 bu- is attested in only two words. The first bwala/babwala
•village' was discussed in (2,1,1.5). Its plural has been reassigned from
Class o ma- to the marked plural ba- form. Abstract nouns often appear in
this class. By virtue of their abstract meaning they do not have plural
forms. One such example is buaoba 'stupidity,' It is related semantically
and perhaps morphologically to Kituba aoba 'stupid,' another noun of Bantu
origin. Thus it may be that the prefix bu- of buaoba 'stupidity' is still
analyzable as a prefix. Still, Class 14 as a plural marker has all but
disappeared.
2.1.1.12 Class 15 ku-
Class 15 ku- is the infinitive form. Its status as a noun is not known
since no examples appear in the sample. In Kikongo, the ku- form can be
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used as a noun and has as its plural Class 6 ma-. As a verbal form In
Kituba, it appears in a past progressive construction with an auxiliary
verb,
2,1,1,13 Classes l6 va-. 1? loi- and 18 mu-
The status of Classes 16-18 is likewise unclear. In Kikongo they
had two functions, one to mark a noun as a locative and the other to
construct locative phrases consisting of one of these prefixes and a full
noun. The status of the locatives in this second function is not made
clear in any of the sources. According to Fehderau ",,,Lingala forms are
more current in the case of these prefixes" (Fehderau 1966:55). That is,
Lingala na 'in, at, to, on, by' is preferred to Kikongo (Niraanyanga dialect
rau 'in,' ku 'at, to,' va- 'on,' kwa 'by,' The choice of na over the loca-
tives irould result in the elimination of Classes 16-18, Na in Kituba is
an all purpose particle covering comitative, instrumental, conjunctive,
and locative constructions. While locatives were not investigated to any
degree in Salikoko's speech several examples using rw as a locative turned
up in the data. Here is an example
»
17. familia na mono meme bika na bwala
family of me past stay loc. village
'my family stayed home*
Locative prefixes also appear attached to noun stons, as noted above, to
form locative nouns. None of these were obtained in the sample either. It
may be concluded, then, that Classes 16-18 are either not very productive
in Kituba or have disappeared entirely.
2.1.1.13 Class 19 fi-
This class is a diminutive in Kikongo, having the plural in Class 8
bi-. In Kituba, according to Swift and Zola (I963), all take a ba- prefixed
to the singular to form a plural. The few examples cited by Swift and Zola
were not known by Salikoko the Kituba consultant so that no statement can ^
be made about the status of this class.
2.2 Conclusions and hypothesis
Several generalizations can be drawn from the examples just discussed.
First, a new method of plural formation has emerged. By marking the singu-
lar noun with a ba- to form the plural, part of the system has shifted
away from a marked singular/marked plural. Into this group of nouns fall
all nouns formerly taking a class 10 plural prefix and those nouns in Classes
1 and 3 which already had a reduced form of the prefixes (a nasal C), The
remaining plural classes. Classes k, 6, 8, and 13 all show some degree of
instability. That is, some nouns which took one of these class markers for
the plural now take ba- exclusively (prefixed to the singular form) or
show some degree of alternation between the newer ba-stem form and the
original plural class marker. Thus, it appears that the system is in a state
of flvix. For some classes, the movement to a morphologically marked plural
is conplete. For others (4,6,8, 13), it is not. This change would conform
to Greenberg's Universal 35 irtiich claims that there are no languages in
which the nonsingular would be (moirphologically) marked as opposed to the
singular (Greenberg 1966i9^), since in every case, marking has taken place
in the plural and not the singular when such marking has taken place (e»g.
plurals for 3, 9, H, and lU),
Furthermore, the change has apparently taken place not by a single
mechanism, but by several. Thus, the shift of most of Class 3 from a Class
k plural to a double prefix took place for more human nouns than for non-
human nouns. This leads one to suppose that the semantics of Class 2 ba-
may have SOTie significance for the change. That is, the addition of ba-
may have been, at least in scxne cases, for semantic reasons. Or, alterna-
tively, it may have been by analogy to class la where no singular prefix
existed. Secondly, the change in Class 9/10 nouns may have been internally
motivated as well. In the original system. Class 9 and 10 nouns would not
have been distinguished in the singular and the plural after the elimina-
tion of concord. Thus, there may have been pressure to mark plurality.
Finally, the classes structurally most vulnerable (i.e. 11, ih) have been
affected. Thus, while the overriding reason for the change in the noun
class system may have been a drive towards a non-class system, or, at least
a simplification of it, the mechanisms are diverse.
Two explanations for the current system in Kituba are possible. The
first is that the language is moving towards a non-class system where
singulars are unmarked and plurals are marked by ba-. Furthermore, if it
is correct that the noun class system is in the process of disintegrating,
this data would indicate that the change spreads slowly through the lexi-
con, item by item and not by wholesale generalization of ba- plural marking
to a given class.
Finally, since agreement with noun prefixes has been entirely elimi-
nated, the system has no grammatical function other than to mark singular/
plural
,
The alternative proposal would be to claim that the noun classes are
still present and that the correct interpretation of the unmarked singular
is that it contains a 0- prefix for those noons. The rest of the forms
which conform to the Kikongo pairings (Classes 5/6 and 7/8, for example)
would thai be evidence for the retention of the noun classes. One problem
with this alternative e:q>lanation is that it does not explain why there
should be variation in the plural forms. More importantly, it does not
explain why the variation is consistent.
The first proposal, on the other hand, explains the variation in the
plurals. The presence of some nouns which have not changed, this hypothesis
would claim, is because the process is not yet ccHopleted. Further evidence
that this proposal is the correct one (i.e. that the noun class system is
disappearing in favor of an unmarked singular-marked plural system) comes
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18. are/bare
moften phonetically similar, which marked agreement on several classes of
words, the main ones being verb, adjective, and the genitive marker. All
such agreements no longer appear in Kituba. The following examples illus-
trate the cfflnplete lack of agreement in Kituba verbs. In Kikongo, on the
other hand, a prefix would appear on the verb marking agreement with a
subject.
19* mwana mene vila
bana
muteki mene Vila
miteki/ "
bamiteki " "
ndeke mene tina
bandeke " "
diboko mene bukana
maboko " "
kibulu mene vila
bibulu "
avio mene pela tia
bavio " •• ••
bilo mene pela tia
babilo " "
•the child has been lost'
'the seller has been lost'
•the bird has flown away'
•the arm has broken
•
'the beast has been lost'
'the airplane has caught fire'
'the office has caught fire'
Adjective agreement has also been lost. Normally (in Kikongo) an adjective
follows the noun and receives an agreement prefix corresponding to the class
of the head noun. In Kituba, adjectives do not follow the noun directly,
but are preceded by an associative or genitive marker. Here are some examples!
20, mwana ya fioti
bana " "
muteki ya masonga
miteki/" "
bamiteki
ndeke ya kitoko
bandeke " "
diboko ya mbl
maboko " "
kibulu ya nene
bibulu " "
'small child'
'honest seller'
•pretty bird'
'bad arm*
•big beast'
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avio ya nene 'big airplane'
bavio " "
bllo ya fioti 'small office'
babilo " "
Note in the examples above that the genitive marker (ya) exhibits no
evidence of concord either. In Kikongo, on the other hand, there would
have been sane agreement morphone attached to this marker, marking class.
Thus the concordial system, by being fully eradicated, contributes
nothing to the retention of noun classes, Furthermore, the one syntactic
function assigned to noun classes has entirely disappeared. If the defini-
tion of a noun class system includes the process of agreement, then the
Kituba system by definition is no longer a noun class system,
2.5 Pronominal forms
The pronominal system does not reflect any difference in noun class
either. Instead, there is a tendency towards an inanimate/animate distinc-
tion in the third person. Third person animate pronouns are yandi 'he,
she, it and b£ 'th^, ' The inanimate pronoun 22. serves both the singular
and plural functions for inanimates. However, this distinction was one
already made in the independent pronominal system of Kikongo and does not
reflect an innovation in Kituba,
3. Noun Class Systems in Other Bantu Pidgins
3.1 Reduction of the Noun Class Systems in Other Bantu Pidgins
Previous attempts at sximmarizing the nature of the reduction of noun
classes in Bantu pidgins include Pierre Alexandre's article, "Note sur la
reduction du syst^me des classes dans les langues v^hiculaires "a. fonds ban-
tu" (1968), parts of Bemd Heine's book Pidgin Sprachen im Bantu Bereich
(1973). and Eyamba Bokamba's article "The impact of multilingualism on
language structure 1 the case of central Africa" (1977).
Alexandre cites several characteristics of the reduction of the system
of nominal classes based on an examination of Up-Country Swahili, Lingala
and Pidgin A-70. He notes the retention of independent nominal prefixes to
show number, the loss of determinatives and concord, with fewer derived
prefixes (i.e. mass and abstract markers). However, he also notes a replac-
ing of the grammatical agreement (concord) by a notional one, animate/in-
animate. All grammatical agreement in Kituba has been lost. As to the
tendency towards an animate/inanimate distinction, the only case found in
the pronominal system existed previously in Kikongo. It is not an innova-
tion of Kituba.
Heine notes several other tendancies in data gleaned from Fanagalo,
Lifigala, several dialects of Swahili, Pidgin A-to, Town Bemba and Kituba.
I
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In addition to the retention of nuaiber and loss of concord mentioned above,
Heine mentions a tendency to mark the plural iihile leaving the singular
unmarked. In Kitnba, this is evident in nouns in the 0-/ba- classes. The
distinction of number is often lost. An example of this is found in the
use of absolute pronouns where both 'it' and 'they' are now a single form
yawtt-yo , Heine also remarks on the loss of class pairs. In Kituba, not
only were two plurals lost, but a total of five pairs were eliminated in
favor of 0-/ba-,
Prcfflu both Alexandre's and Heine's presentation of other Bantu pidgins,
it appears that Kituba is now very similar to them, but differs in the
extent to which the system has been rcKiuced, Bokamba (1977) in discussing
the noun class systems of several dialects of lingala and Swahili notes
several kinds of simplification. In particular he notes for Kinshasa
Lingala the prefixation of ba- to already existing plurals. Thus, the
language Is moving towards a unified plural marking but in a way different
from Kituba and all other Bantu lingua franoae.
k. Summary
The data In the paper show that the noun classes in Kituba have been
severely reduced. It was argued that the language is moving away from a
class system towards a system in which the singular is unmarked and the
plural marked by an existing plural marker ba- in the langusige. In addi-
tion, it was suggested that the change is proceeding slowly through the
lexicon by means of various mechanisms.
NOTES
*Thl8 paper represents a c<»itlnaation of research begun on this topic
in 1975 at the University of Kansas. However, the first part of the re-
search was based on secondary sources rather than on informant work.
Results of that research were reported on at the 7th African Linguistics
Conference (Stucky 1976). I would like to thank Professor Frances Ingenann
of the University of Kansas for her careful criticism of that earlier work.
Thanks are also due Professors Hans Hock and Charles Kisseberth, and E^araba
Bokamba at the University of Illinois for their help on this more recent
research. Any errors are, of course, solely my own responsibility. This
research was supported, in part, by a NDFL Title VI Fellowship through the
auspices of the African Studies Center at the University of Illinois.
Fehderau, in his dissertation "The Origin and Development of Kituba
(Lingua Ft*anca Kikongo)" (I966), tries to demonstrate that Kituba originated
as a pidgin arising from a contact situation due to commercial trade and
slave traffic beginning in the fifteenth century. Although the impetus for
trade may be attributed to the arrival of the Europeans, largely the Portu-
guese, Fehderau discredits theories pointing to a linguistic basis in Portu-
guese, Baglish or French (Fehderau 1966i89-92). A further proposal, that
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Kituba in its various forms arose by independent parallel development from
local languages, is likewise untenable, he maintains. The structural simi-
larities are too numerous for all the dialects of Kituba, and the structure
of the local languages is so different from that of Kituba that they must
have come from a single source (Fehderau I966193). Fehderau then posits
as a point of origin, the trading center of Manianga in central Lower
Zaire, He maintains that a period of creolization evidenced particularly
in urban centers has extended over the last thirty years.
The simplification of the noun class system has, however, taken place
within the last thirty or forty years (See Shepherd's 1926 dictionary, for
instance). If Kituba is really a pidgin, one wonders why it has taken so
long for the noun class system to break down. Furthermore, this breakdown
has taken place during Fehderau 's period of creolization. Since reduction
is not a characteristic of creolization, while expansion is, the evidence
from the noun classes mitigates against the classification of Kituba as a
pidgin. More internal evidence is needed to support Fehderau 's arguments
which are based largely on external evidence.
2Special thanks are due to Salikoko Mufwene, the consultant. He is a
native speaker of Kituba, a rarity, I might add. In addition to Kituba, he
speaks lansi, Lingala, Franch, and English. He reports that he used Kituba
in non-academic and non-familial social interaction.
•^elmers (1973) lists the following categories as representative of
what one finds synchronically in many of the Bantu languages. (The most
recent attempt to define the semantics of the Proto-Bantu noun classes is
found in Denny and Creider (I976),
1/2 most personal nouns
3/4 trees, plants, other inanimates
5/6 misc., may be augmentative j nouns of style
7/8 misc., nay be either augmentative or diminutive; 8 is
sometimes used adverbially
9/10 animal names, personal nouns and inanimates
11 attenuative, abstracts
12/13 diminutive
14 abstract nouns
15 infinitive
16-18 locative
19 diminutive
A much larger vocabulary is available in Swartenbroeckx's (1973)
Dlctionnaire Kikongo et Kituba - Francais. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to determine which nouns are exclusively of Kituba origin or in which
Kituba speaking area the nouns are used. Another, undoubtedly excellent,
source would be Fehderau 's Kikongo (ya Leta)-francais-anglais , a dictionary
recently published in Zaire (I969). This was not obtainable.
In many Bantu languages, the noun prefixes participate in morphologi-
cal word formations. Whether these processes are still productive in Kituba
is difficult to ascertain. One would suspect that if the prefix system is
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no longer mat-king noun class that It would be unlikely for the prefixes to
participate in word formation as well. Given the tremendous difficulties
in formulating the notion of productive, no attanpt was made to test word-
formation in Kituba,
I would like to thank Professor Hock for calling to ny attention
the possibility of internal motivation for the change in Classes 9/10.
In addition, Bokamba has pointed out that Classes 9/10 are generally the
first to in most Bantu lingua francae to adept a plural,
7
A framework for the discussion of the allocation of loanwords within
the African class languages can be found in Heine (I968), Heine proposes
three different criteria. The first is automatic allocation. All nouns
are assigned to a given class because they are loanwords. The second is
phonological allocation. If one of the segments is phonologically similar
to that of a nominal affix then it is assigned to that class (as in Kikongo),
Semantic allocation, assigning a noun to a class because of its common
semantic d<»iain, is the third type.
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PREFACE
The present volume of Studies in the Linguistic Sciences (SLS) is
devoted to the Forum Lecture Series presented at the 1978 Linguistic
Institute of the Linguistic Society of America, hosted by the University
of Illinois from June 12 to August 5, 1978.
At the outset, as the director of the 1978 Institute, I felt that
the Forum Lecture Series should focus on a few selected topics which
would present "the state of the art" in our discipline during the 1970s.
I was pleased to find that the Organizing Committee for the Forum
Lectures agreed with this proposal. We therefore selected, after long
and serious consideration, the following seven areas as the topics for
the lectures: language change, multilingualism, functional phonology,
theories of meaning, language universals, language acquisition, and neuro-
linguistics. The idea behind this structure was to provide a synthesis
of contemporary approaches to the seven most debated areas in the lin-
guistic sciences.
The papers included here present such an overview. And, as Henry
Kahane, Chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Forum Lectures, said
while introducing the Series, we wanted to "view each of our seven themes
with two sets of eyes, through the medium of two intellects." That
explains why we invited two distinguished scholars to discuss each topic.
But as we know, in our field — perhaps as in other fields — an overview
generally results in a presentation of one's own view. If that sub-
jectivism is present in any of these "state of the art" papers, it is
unavoidable, and we did not discourage it.
This volume, however, does not include all of the fourteen Forum
Lectures. The two papers on neurolinguistics presented by Harry Whitaker
(University of Rochester) and Grace Yeni-Komshian (University of Maryland)
could not be included since the authors had other plans for publication.
I
In addition to the Forum Lectures, this volume includes the Herman
Collitz Lecture and the Linguistic Society of America Professor's
Lecture. The Collitz Professorship was held by George Cardona (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania) and the Linguistic Society of America Chair by
Charles Osgood (University of Illinois)
.
There are several agencies and a number of individuals to whom we
owe thanks and gratitude for making the Forum Lectures a success, and
making it possible to publish them in book form. The very successful
and stimulating Lecture Series would not, of course, have been possible
without the cooperation of the distinguished scholars who took part. We
are indebted to the Forum Lectures Organizing Committee, who planned the
Series meticulously, giving due consideration to every subfield of our
discipline. The Committee consisted of William 0. Dingwall, Georgia M.
Green, Braj B. Kachru, Henry Kahane (Chairman), and Michael J. Kenstowicz.
Josephine L. Wilcock, a moving spirit behind every undertaking on which
our department embarks, took care of every minute detail. In this she
received excellent help from Marjorie S. Olson, Secretary of the 1978
Linguistic Institute. Hans Henrich Hock, Assistant Director of the
Institute, provided valuable advice for coordinating the lectures with
the Institute's heavy academic and social schedule, and in innumerable
other ways. William D, Wallace assisted in the editing of the papers.
The support of the Division of Applied Linguistics, the Office of
International Programs and Studies, and the Department of Linguistics
at UI-UC, made it possible to publish this volume.
Braj B. Kachru
Urbana-Champaign
October 1, 1979
vi
RELATIONS BETWEEN CAUSATIVES AND PASSIVES IN INDO-IRANIAN*
George Cardona
University of Pennsylvania
The Sanskrit of Plnini's time (ca. 500 B.C.), described in his
Astadhyayi, has a fully developed system of causative verbs. In Panini's
description, causative bases are derived from primitive ones with the
affix Nz'C {i with two markers), which appears in the form au in certain
contexts. For example:
gam 'go' (3 sg. pres. gaochati) : gam-i (gamayati) 'cause to go'
budh (budhyate) 'perceive' : bodh-i {bodhayati)
bhuj (bhufikte) 'eat' : bhoj'-i ibhojayati)
path ipathati) 'recite, study' : path-i (pathayati)
as (aste) 'be seated' : as-i (asaya'ti)
hr (havati) 'take, carry' : har-i_{hd.rayati)
kr (karoti) 'do, make' : kar-i (karayati)
p'ac ipacati) 'cook' : pao-i {pacayati)
Since the Sanskrit Panini describes corresponds closely to the lang-
uage of Brahmana and sutra'texts (Cardona 1976a:238), this means the full
causative system had developed by late Vedic times. Thieme (1929:17-23)
argued that early Vedic lacked true causatives. According to him, the
derived bases usually called causatives served originally only as transi-
tives corresponding to intransitives (including passives). Kuryiowicz
(1956:88-9, 1964:87) accepted Thieme's thesis in his own attempt to recon-
struct the prehistory of this formation. More recently, Jamison (1976)
has once more reiterated this position. I shall argue that this generally
held view does not withstand scrutiny, hence must be abandoned.
1.0 Let us begin with causatives in the Sanskrit described by Panini,
1.1 The following examples illustrate syntactic features concerning
these causatives.
(A)
(1) a. gaochati manavako gvamam 'The boy is going to the village.'
b. devadatto manavakam grSmarn gamayati 'Devadatta has the boy go
to the village.
'
(2) a. budhyate putro dharmam 'The son perceives his duty.'
b. pita putram dharmam bodhayati 'The father makes his son
perceive his duty.'
(3) a. devadatta odanam bhuhkte 'Devadatta is eating rice.'
b. yajnadatto devadattam odanam bhojayati 'Yajnadatta feeds
Devadatta rice.
(4) a. Hsyo vedam pathati 'A student is reciting the Veda.'
b. adhyapdkah sisyam vedam pathayati 'The teacher is having his
student recite the Veda.'
(5) a. devadattdh kata aste 'Devadatta is seated on a mat.'
b. devadattam kata asayati "... has Devadatta sit on a mat.'
(B)
(6) a. harati bharam manavakah 'The boy is carrying a load.'
b. lidrayati bharam manavakam '. . .is having the boy carry a
load.
'
c. harayati bharam manavakena (idem)
(7) a. devadattah katam karoti 'Devadatta is making a mat.'
b. devadattam katam karayati '. . .is having Devadatta make a
mat. '
c. devadattena katam Karayati (idem)
(C)
(8) a. odanam pacati devadattah 'Devadatta is cooking rice.'
odanam paoayati devadattena ' . . .is having Devadatta cook
rice.
The non-causal sentence (la) has the verb gam together with the nomi-
native manavakah/- and the accusative gvamam, respectively denoting the
agent and goal of going. The causal sentence (lb) has the causative gam-i
in construction with gramam, which again refers to the goal of going, and
a second accusative: manavakam, which refers to the agent of going, now
the object of causation. Similarly, (2a), (3a), (4a), (5a) have nominative
forms that refer to agents of perceiving, eating, reciting, sitting:
putrah 'son', devadatta!]. 'Devadatta', sisyah 'student', devadattah. In
addition, (2a), (3a), (4a) contain accusative forms used with reference to
objects of actions: dharmam 'duty', odanam 'rice', vedam 'Veda'. The
verb as of (5a) occurs with the locative kate 'mat', denoting the locus
where Devadatta is seated. To the nominative forms of all these correspond
accusatives in the related causative sentences: (2b) putram, (3b) devadat-
tam, (4b) sisyam, (5b) devadattam. Note also that (1) - (4) involve verbs
of specific semantic groups: movement, perception, consuming, and verbs
such as path, which take objects that are speech elements, things said or
recited.
(6a) and (7a) are like the non-causal sentences of (1) - (4) in that
they too contain verbs (Jir, kc ) used with nominative forms referring to
agents (manavakah, devadattah) and accusatives referring to objects (bharam,
katam). Moreover, (6b), (7b) resemble the causative sentences of (1) -
(4) in that they too have causative verbs construed with two accusatives.
However, (6c), (7c) have no counterparts in (1) - (4). To the nominatives
in the non-causal sentences (6a), (7a), correspond here instrumental forms
(manavakena, devadattena) instead of accusatives, as in (6b), (7b). The
same is true of (8b), which has the instrumental devadattena corresponding
to the nominative devadattah of (8a)
.
Instrumental forms are also used in passive sentences related to the
non-causal sentences (6a) - (8a)
:
(9) manavakena bharo hviyate 'A load is being carried by the boy.'
(10) devadattena katah kriyate 'A mat is being made by Devadatta.'
(11) odanah paayate devadattena 'Rice is being cooked by Devadatta.'
The primitive verbs of (1) - (4) also enter into passive constructions,
and these too have instrumental forms denoting agents. The passive sen-
tences corresponding to (la) - (4a) are:
(12) manavakena gramo gamyate
(13) putrena dharmo budhyate
(14) odano bhujyate devadattena
(15) sisyena vedah pathyate
in which the singular passive forms gamyate (gam-ya-te) , budhyate, bhujyate,
pathyate agree in number with the nominative singular forms gramah, dharmah,
odanah, vedah.
There are thus two types of causative constructions. One is a double
accusative construction: a causative verb occurs with an accusative form
referring to the goal, object of the act denoted by the primitive verb and
another referring to the agent of this act, the object of causation. In the
second construction, an instrumental form is used, as in a passive sentence,
with reference to the agent of the act denoted by the primitive verb. The
double accusative construction is regular with causative verbs derived from
primitive verbs of particular semantic groups, as shown in (1) - (4). The
second construction is regular with causatives formed to other transitive
verbs. In addition, as shown in (b) , two verbs have causatives that are
used in either construction. Finally, causatives formed to intransitive
verbs such as as follow the pattern shown in (A), with a single accusative
referring to the agent of the primitive verb, object of causation.
1.2 I have thus far spoken of transitive and intransitive verbs with-
out specifying criteria whereby given verbs in given contexts may be so
classed. There are straightforward criteria for determining in Sanskrit
whether or not a verb is transitive, and it will be useful to consider these.
It can be seen from (1) - (4) that the primitive verbs gam, budh, bhuj
,
path can take accusative complements, as can also hr, kr of (6), (7) and
pac of (8). Moreover, these verbs are used in true passive constructions:
(9) - (15). Similarly, to
(16) manavako gramam agamat 'The boy went to the village.'
(17) abuddha putro dharmam 'The son perceived his duty.'
(18) devadatta odanam dbhukta 'Devadatta ate rice.'
(19) sisyo vedam apathTt 'A student recited the Veda.'
(20) manavako bharam ahdrsTt 'The boy carried a load.'
(21) devadattah katam akdrsTt 'Devadatta made a mat.'
(22) devadatta odanam apaksTt 'Devadatta cooked rice.'
with the preterital (third singular aorist) forms agamat, abuddha, dbhukta,
apathTt, ahdrsTt, akdrsTt, apdkszt, correspond the passive sentences
(23) agami mdnavakena grdmah
(24) abodhi putrena dharmah
(25) abhojy odano devadattena
(26) apdthi vedah sisyena
(27) ahdri bhdro mdnavakena
(28) akdri devadattena katah
(29) apdcy odano devadattena
These contain the third singular passive aorist forms agami, abodhi,
abhoji, apdthi, ahdri, akdri, apdai, which agree in number with nominative
forms denoting objects, just as in (9) - (15). In the same manner, the
participial forms gatah 'gone to', buddhah 'perceived', bhuktah 'eaten',
pathitah 'recited', hrtah 'carried', krtah 'made', pakvah 'cooked' in
(30) mdnavakena grdmo gatah
(31) putrena dharmo buddhah
(32) odano bhukto devadattena
(33) sisyena vedah pathitah
(34) mdnavakena bhdro hrtah
(35) devadattena katah krtah
(36) odanah pakvo devadattena
agree in number with nominatives grdmah etc. Again in
(37) devadattena kalxiv akrsdtdm 'Two mats were made by Devadatta'.
(38) devadattena katd akrsata 'Several mats were made by Devadatta'.
the aorist forms akrsatam (3 du. mid.), akrsata (3 pi. mid.), used pas-
sively, agree in number with the nominatives katau (du.), katah (pi.),
as do the participles krtau, krtah of
(39) devadattena katau krtau
(40) devadattena katah krtTUi
Such participles also agree in gender with nominatives referring to objects;
gatah etc. in (30) - (36), (39) - (40) are masculine, as are gramah etc.,
but krta of
(41) devadattena stKdlT krta 'A pot has been made by Devadatta.'
is feminine, in agreement with sthalT.
Let us agree that a verb which occurs in constructions as shown is
transitive. A verb such as as, which does not occur in these constructions,
is then intransitive. Thus, of itself this verb does not occur with object
accusative complements.-^ It does form a passive, as in
(42) devadattena kata asyate
the passive counterpart to (5a) , but asyate fails to show number agreement
in sentences such as
(43) purusabhyarn kata asyate
(44) purusaih kata asyate
corresponding to
(45) purusau kata asate
(46) purusah kata asate
Similarly, to
(47) devadatta kata asista
(48) purusau kata asisatam
(49) purusah kata asisqta
correspond passive sentences
(50) devadattena kata asi
(51) purusabhyarn kata asi
(52) purusaih kata asi
all with the third singular form asi, and
(53) devadattena kata asitcon
(54) purusabhyam kata asitam
(55) purusaih kata asitam
have the neuter singular participial form asitam.
That a verb such as pao in (8a), (11), (22), (29), (36) is transitive
does not mean active forms like paaati must always occur with an object
accusative complement or indeed that pao must always be transitive. Con-
sider, for example,
(56) odandh pacyate 'The rice is cooking,'
(57) odanena paoyate [passive equivalent of (56)]
(58) apacy odandh 'The rice cooked.'
(59) apacy odanena [passive equivalent of (58)]
(60) odanena pakvam [alternative to (59)]
A condition for the use of (56) as opposed to (11) is that an agent perform-
ing the act of cooking on rice not be mentioned. Moreover, since (57), (59),
(60) are formally like (42), (50), (53). one can rightly consider that pac
of the set (56) - (60) is intransitive.^ Nevertheless, the fact remains
that examples of this type regularly have specific verbs which are other-
wise transitive, namely those denoting actions objects in which are produced
(e.g. kr^ 'make') or undergo a change of state (e.g. pao 'cook', hhid
'split, break', lu 'cut', muc 'loose'). Verbs like as, which are regularly
intransitive, do not enter into this construction.
Also excluded from constructions of the type (56) - (60) are verbs of
movement such as gam. These verbs have, in addition, other syntactic fea-
tures which set them apart. As shown in (la), the goal of going can be
signified by an accusative like gramam. This can also be signified by a
dative form such as gramdya:^
(61) gaochati mdnavako grdmdya
In (30) the participle gatah is coreferential with grdmah, both used with
reference to the goal of going. However, gata 'gone' can also be agentive,
referring to an agent of going, as in
(62) mdnavako gramam gatah 'The boy went to the village.'
where gramam denotes a goal.
The verb smr 'remember, yearn for' behaves in general like budh. Thus,
(63) mdtaram smarati devadattah 'Devadatta remembers his mother with
longing.
'
has the accusative matavam 'mother', and the passive
(64) niata smavyate devadattena
contains the nominative niata, with which the passive verb smavyate agrees
in number. However, something one yearns for can also be denoted by a
genitive in construction with smv, as in
(65) matuh smarati devadattah
with the genitive matuh. ^ Moreover, (65) has a passive counterpart
(66) matuh smaryate devadattena
of the type (42): there is no number agreement between smaryate and the
genitive. If one substituted the dual svasdrau 'sisters' or the plural
svasdrah for mdta in (64) , one would also have to substitute the dual and
plural verb forms smaryete, smaryante for the singular smaryate, but sub-
stituting svasroh (gen. du.) or svasrnam (gen. pi.) for matuh in (66)
entails no change in the verb smaryate. Further, since the type (42), in
which a passive verb shows no number variation, is typically intransitive,
one may rightly consider that smv is intransitive in (65), (66).' This
does not alter the fact that smr in (63), (64) is transitive. Consequently,
it is altogether proper to say that the causative smav-i of
(67) matavam smavayati devadattam
(68) matuh smavayati devadattam
is derived from both an intransitive and a transitive base verb. For (67)
and (68) correspond to (63) and (65), respectively.
1.3 The causative constructions spoken of can be reduced to the fol-
lowing schemata, together with related non-causal and passive present
constructions:
(69) a. V Ni-nom. N2-x8 [non-causal]
b. V-pass. Ni-instr. N2-nom./x9 [passive]
c. V-i^ N]^-acc. N2-X N3IO [causative]
(70) a. V N]^-nom. N2-acc. [non-causal]
b. V-pass. N]^-instr. N2-nom. [passive]
c. V-^ N^-instr. N2-acc. N3 [causative]
(69c) is the norm for transitive verbs of group (A) and intransitive verbs,
(70c) for transitive verbs other than those of (A) , and the two construc-
tions are alternatives with causatives formed to the two verbs of (B)
.
1.4 Though causatives with the affix i {ay) are freely derived from
primitive verbs, it is nevertheless not the case that all bases derived
with this affix have only causative value in the Sanskrit of Panini's time.
For example, there are non-causative derivates in -i such as:
ava-i (aroayati) 'praise'
garh-i (garhayati) 'revile, deprecate'
ohdd-i (ahadayati) 'cover'
dhars-i (dharsayati) 'dare'
para-i (paraayati) 'blend'
mars-i (jnavsayati) 'tolerate'
rmrj-i (marjayati) 'cleanse'
yoj'-i (yojayati) 'join'
vavj-i (varjayati ) ' exc lude
'
vdr-i (vdrayati) 'keep from, ward off from'
srdth-i (srathayati) 'loose'
sah-i (sahayati) 'endure'
It is true that most such bases are not directly cited in the AstadhyayT
but are known from recensions of the dhatupatha (catalog of verbs) which
date from centuries after Panini.H Nevertheless, it is certain that
Panini indeed used such derivates without causative value. His rule
1.4.27: varanarthanam Tpsitah (sampradanam 24) provides that with respect
to acts denoted by verbs meaning 'keep from' (varanartha) , that which
someone wishes to reach (tpsita) is classed as sampradana. The purpose of
this classification is to let a rule apply which introduces an ablative
ending after a nominal when a sampradana is to be signified. For example,
(71) agner manavakam vdrayati "... keeps the boy from the fire.
'
(72) kupdd andham varayati '. . . keeps the blind man from the well.'
have the ablatives agneh 'fire', kupat 'well'. The action noun varana of
vdranartha in Panini 1.4.27 must be derived from var-i, showing that
Panini knew and used such non-causative derived verbs.
1.5 It is important to my subsequent discussion briefly to summarize
the general pattern of uses for atmanepada and parasmaipada affixes
—
medio-passive and active affixes— in the Sanskrit described by Panini.
Passives, whether of the type shown in (9) - (15) or of the type illustra-
ted by (42) - (44), have atmanepada affixes, and endings such as te are
regularly preceded by the affix yaK.^^ So far as concerns verbs with
agentive endings, these are of three general types.
Some verbs take only atmanepada affixes; for example, the intransitive
verb as (dste
,
[5a]) and the transitive verb bhuj {bhw'ikte
,
[3a]). 13
Other verbs take either parasmaipada or atmanepada affixes, depending
on a semantic contrast. If the result of the act signified by the base is
intended for the agent, atmanepada affixes occur; for example, (7a), (8a)
are used if Devadatta is making a mat for someone else or cooking rice for
someone else to eat; if he were making a mat or cooking rice for himself,
one would use kurute
,
paeate A^
Still other verbs regularly take parasmaipada affixes; for example,
the intransitive verb sad (stdati) and the transitive verb path (pathati
,
[4a]). 15
Causative bases generally follow the second pattern: karayati is
used, as in (7b, c), if the causal agent causes something to be made that
is not for himself, but karayate is used if this is intended for the causal
agent. 16 However, atmanepada affixes are regularly used in reflexive
causatives. For example, corresponding to
(73) bhrtya rajanarn pasyanti 'The king's subjects see him.'
there is a causal sentence
(74) raja bhrtyan darsayate 'The king shows himself to his subjects.
'
in which the causative darS-i 'cause to see' is followed by the atmanepada
ending te and construed with the accusative bhrtyan 'subjects. '1^
2.0 With this brief summary of causative and related constructions in
the Sanskrit of about 500 B.C. as a background, let us now consider earlier
Vedic usage. For the syntax of causatives in Panini's time certainly has
a prehistory and reflects changes that occurred in a living language.
Moreover, as I have noted, semantic differences play a role in the syntax
of causatives in the Sanskrit of Panini's time, so that I shall consider
such differences also in connection with causatives of earlier Vedic.
2.1 A goal one reaches is signified by an accusative or a locative in
construction with a verb of movement. For example:
(75) RV 1.145.3ab: torn id gacahanti juhvas tarn arvatzr visvany ekah
srmavad vaoamsi me 'To him (Agni) go the ladles (i.e. oblations), to
him the speedy hymns; he alone will hear all my utterances.'
(76) RV 1.1.4: agne yarn yajnam . . . visvatah paribhur asi/ so. id
devSsu gacohati 'Agni, that sacrificial offering which you encompass
from all sides goes to the gods.'
In (75), gacahanti (3 pi.) takes the accusative complement torn 'him', and
in (76), gacchati (3 sg.) is construed with the locative devisu 'gods'.
Both these complements refer to goals. The causative gam-i is also used
with an accusative or a locative denoting a goal; for example:
(77) RV 10.145.4cd: param eva paravatam sapdtntm gamayamasi 'We make
the cowife go to the very farthest distance.'
(78) RV 5.5.10c: tatra havyani gamaya 'Make the oblations go there.'
The accusative param . . . paravatam in (77) refers to where the wives make
a cowife go, the farthest distance, and the locatival tdtra 'there' of
(78) denotes where oblations are supposed to be made to go.
The goal one attains or is made to attain can also be an abstract
property, a state, and gam-i is used with an accusative referring to such
a state. For example, in
(79) TS 2.1.1.1: so. evainam bhutim gamayati 'He (Vayu) makes him
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(the sacrificer) attain prosperity.'
gamayati occurs with bhutim 'prosperity'. The same is said in TS 2.1.5.5.,
where it is Indra who causes one to attain prosperity. In a similar
context,
(80) MS 2.5.4. (p. 51.15): yathaisa sviyam asnuta evcan evainam sriyam
gamayati 'As he attains wealth, thus does he cause him to attain
wealth.
'
gamayati is used with sriyam 'wealth'. A parallel passage,
(81) KS 13.6 (p. 188.7-8): yathaiva sa sriyam prapnoty evam enojn}
sriyam prapayati
has the causative prap-i {prapayati) 'make to attain' with sriyam, which
is also construed with the non-causative prap 'attain' (prapnoti)
.
Although in early Vedic verbs of movement such as gam usually occur
with accusative or locative forms denoting goals, the construction type
(61), with a dative referring to a goal, is also used. For example,
(82) AV 16.6.4: yam dvismo yds aa no dvesti tdsmd enad gamayamah
'We make this (bad dream) go to him whom we hate and who hates us.'
has the causative gamayamah construed with the accusative enad 'this' and
the dative tdsmai 'to him', the latter referring to that person to whom a
bad dream is made to go. This causative construction implies a non-causal
sentence in which the goal is also denoted by a dative such as tdsmai .'^^
2.2 In (75), the subjunctive srnavat 'will hear' occurs with the
accusative vaaamsi 'utterances, hymns'. A verb of perception such as sru
'hear, listen' is also used in construction with a genitive (cf. [65]).
In particular, sru commonly occurs with a genitive denoting a person to
whom one listens. For example,
(83) RV 4.22.10a: asmakam it su srnuhi tvdm indra 'Indra, listen
well to us.
'
has the imperative srnuhi construed with the genitive asmakam 'us'. " The
verb ait 'perceive, know' also is used with either an accusative or a
genitive denoting what is perceived. For example,
(84) RV 1.10.2c: tdd indro drtham oetati 'Then Indra perceives the
purpose.
'
has the accusative drtham 'purpose' with aetati , but in
(85) RV 1.2.5ab: vdyav indras ca cetathdh sutdndm . . . 'Vayu, you
and Indra perceive the Soma juices that have been pressed.'
cetathah (2du.) occurs with sutdnam (gen. pi.) 'pressed Soma juices'.
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Other verbs of perception usually occur with accusative complements.
This is true of drs 'look, see', as in
(86) RV 10. 71. 4a b: utd tvah pdsyan na dadarsa vaoam utd tvah hrnvan
na srnoty eriam 'The one, while looking, has not seen speech, the
other, while listening, does not hear her.'
where the perfect dadarsa is construed with the accusative vacam 'speech'.
Similarly, tks (tksate) 'look, see' takes an accusative complement, as in
(87) VS 5.34a: mitrdsya rrid cdksuseksadhvam 'Look at me with the eye
of Mitra.
'
where the imperative Tksadhvcav (2 pi.) occurs with the accusative wa 'me'.
Causatives are formed to all the verbs mentioned: srav-i 'make to hear,
to listen', cet-i 'make to perceive', tks-i 'make to see'. In
(88) RV 4.29.3a: sravayed asya kcomd vajayddhyai 'Make his ears
hear, so that treasure (booty) be won.'
the imperative sravdya (2 sg.) is used with one accusative: a chanter is
told to make Indra's ears (karma) hear. What is supposed to be heard is
not specified, but this is known from context. The previous verse,
(89) RV 4.29.2ab: a hi srrid yati ndryas cikitvan huyamdnah sotrhhir
upa yajndm '(Indra,) manly, knowing, comes to the sacrificial offer-
ing when he is called by the Soma pressers.'
speaks of Indra coming to the sacrifice when he is called {huyamdnah 'being
called'), and Indra, characterized as having attentive ears (dsrutkaima)
,
is elsewhere asked to hear the call of those who call him:
(90) RV 1.10.9a: asrutkarna srudht hdvam 'Attentive-eared (Indra,)
hear my call.
'
The imperfect dcetayat (3 sg.) is used with the accusative aaztah 'who
do not perceive, imperceptive' in
(91) RV 7.86.7c: dcetayad acito devo arydh 'The noble god (Varuna)
made the imperceptive to perceive.'
Gramatically, acit is an agent noun that refers to one who does not per-
ceive {na oetati) . The causative cet-i is thus related to the active
eetatt. 20
In addition, the causative imperatives darsdya, sdmtksayasva (2 sg.)
'make to see' are found in double accusative constructions:
(92) AV 4.20.6ab: darsdya md ydtudhdndn darsdya ydtudhdnydh 'Let
me see the warlocks, let me see the witches.'
(93) AV 4.15.3a: sdmtksayasva gdyato ndbharnsi 'Let (us) who are
chanting see the clouds.'
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The accusative plural forms yatudhandn 'warlocks', yatudhanyah 'witches',
ndbhamsi 'rain clouds' refer to objects of seeing, and rria 'me', gayatah
'those chanting' signify objects of causation, those caused to see these.
2.3 The verb pa (3 sg. pres. pibati) 'drink' is used with an accusa-
tive or a genitive denoting what is drunk. For example,
(94) RV 1.15.1a: indva somam piba rturia 'Indra, drink the Soma in
due time.
'
(95) RV 1.4. 2b: somasya somapah piba '(Indra,) drinker of Soma,
drink the Soma.
'
both have the imperative piba. Indra is asked to drink Soma juice, and
this is referred to by the accusative somam or the genitive somasya. The
causative pay-i (2 sg. imper. payaya) takes two complements: an accusative
(e.g. madhuni 'sweet drinks') or a genitive (e.g. gen. sg. madhvah 'sweet
drink') denoting what is drunk and an accusative (e.g. ydjatran 'those
worthy of awe-inspired worship'), as in
(96) RV 3.57.5cd: . . . ihd visvam dvase ydjatran a sadaya payaya
da. madhuni '(Agni,) have all the worshipful ones sit here and drink
the sweet drinks.'
(97) RV 1.14.7: tan ydjatram . . . madhvah sugihva payaya 'Wonderful-
tongue (Agni,) have the worshipful ones drink the sweet drink.'
2.4 The verb vao (vivakti, vakti) 'speak, say, utter' occurs with an
accusative denoting what is spoken, said, uttered, or said to be and either
a dative or an accusative signifying one to whom something is said. For
example,
(98) RV 1.74.1b: mdntram vocemagndye 'We would utter a mantra to Agni .
'
(99) RV 10.80.7b: agnim maham avocama suvrktim 'We have uttered a
great hymn to Agni.'
In (98), the optative vocema occurs with the accusative mdntram (sacred
formula) and the dative agndye 'to Agni', but the aorist avocama of (99)
is construed with two accusatives: suvrktim 'hymn' and agnim.
The causative vdc-i is common in Brahmana and srautasutra passages,
and this can occur with more than one accusative. For example,
(100) TS 5.4.3.5: ta yd.jamanam vdoayati '(The Adhvaryu priest) has
the patron of the rite say (formulae) to them (the deities) .
'
has vaoayati construed with ydjamanam, referring to the person made to
utter formulae, and tdh 'them', which refers to those to whom these are
addressed.
2.5 In (96), sdd-i (a sadaya with the preverb a) 'have . . . sit'
occurs with the accusative ydjatran and the locatival ihd. The base sad
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'sit', from which sad-i derives, is also used in this way, as in
(101) RV 1.188.6c: usasav ehd stdatam 'May the two dawns (i.e. Dawn
and Night) sit here.'
where iha is used with a . . . stdatam (3 du. imper.).
2.6 As was shown in 2.2, sru and ait with active inflexion are used
transitively. There are also middle forms of these verbs used intransi-
tively or with passive value. Middle forms of sim have the senses 'be
heard' and 'be heard of, be famous', as in
(102) RV 1.74.7: no. yor upabdir asyvah srnve rathasya kaaaand/ yad
ague yasi dutyam 'No hoofbeat sound of horses (as they pull) a
moving chariot is ever heard, Agni, when you go on your mission (to
the gods) . '
(103) RV 8.6.14c: vrsa hy ugra srnvise 'For, mighty (Indra,) you
are famous as a bull.'
where srnve 'is heard' is used with reference to the sound of hoofs
(upabdin) and srnvise 'you are heard of (as being . .
.), you are famous'
is used in connection with Indra. Similarly, aite 'is perceived' occurs in
(104) RV 10.143.4ab: aite tad vam suradhasa ratih sumatir asvina
'Generous Asvins
,
your generosity, your benevolence is perceived then
(at the time you come to the seat of the ritual) .
'
Corresponding to such middle forms, srav-i, cet-i are used in the
senses 'make to be heard, to be heard of, to be famous' and 'make to be
perceived, to appear' . For example,
(105) RV 8.96.12d: sravaya vaaam kuvid a'lga vedat '(Chanter,) make
heard your speech (so that) perhaps (Indra) will be aware of it.'
(106) RV 7.62.5c: a no jane sravayatam yuvana 'Young (Mitra and
Varuna,) make us famous among the people.'
(107) RV 1.3.12ab: maho drnah sdrasvatt prd cetayati . . . 'The
Sarasvati makes visible her great flow of water.'
(108) RV 3.34.5c: daetayad dhiya irria jaritre '(Indra) made these
hymns (thoughts) perceptible to (to be perceived by) the chanter.'
These are of the type (69c), though (105) lacks N2-X. In (108), moreover,
the value of N2-X is jaritre 'to the chanter', a dative. To (108) would
correspond a non-causal sentence
(109) dcitran dhiya irria jaritre 'These hymns became perceptible to
the chanter.
'
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(110) AV 14.1.31c: brahmanaspate patim asyai rocaya 'Brahmanaspati,
make (the bride's) husband please her.'
corresponds to a non-causal sentence
(111) brahmanaspate patir asyai rocatam 'Brahmanaspati, may (the
bride's) husband please her.'
with a well-known construction: the verb rue (roeate) meaning 'be pleas-
ing' occurs with a dative denoting one whom another pleases. 21
Now srav-i, cet-i in the functions under discussion differ in an
obvious way from sad-i (2.5), though all three correspond to intransi-
tives. The verb sad is regularly intransitive (see 1.2), but sru and ait
can also be transitive, and it is middle forms of these that have intran-
sitive or passive value, while sad is regularly inflected actively. The
derivate sad-i can rightly be considered a transitive counterpart to sad.
However, srav-i, cet-i cannot be treated so simply without doing injustice.
These have two functions. First, they play the role of transitive-
causative verbs in relation to middle forms such as srnve , cite. In
addition, they function as causatives to transitives {srnoti , cetati)
.
2.7 There are other sets such that an intransitive verb with middle
inflexion is paired with a derivate in -i , which takes active inflexion.
A well-known example is vrdh: vardhate 'grows (in strength, age),
increases' and vardhayati 'makes to grow, to increase'. For example,
(112) RV 6.37.5b: indro gzrhhir vardhatam vrddhamdhah 'May Indra,
who is of grown might, (still) grow strong through our hymns.'
has the middle imperative Vardhatam, and
(113) RV 5.11.5cd: tvam girah sindhum ivdvam-r mdhtr a prnanti
savasa vardhdyanti ca '(Agni,) hymns fill you with might, as great
streams fill up the Sindhu, and make you grow in strength.'
has vardhdyanti. Nevertheless, pairs such as vardhate, vardhayati differ
significantly from pairs like srnve, srdvayati , considered in the preceding
section. To begin with, sravayati 'makes to be heard' corresponds to a
passive srnve 'is heard', and the relation between vardhayati and vardhate
is not comparable. At best, one might suppose from comparing (112) and
(113) that indro gTrbhir vardhatam could mean 'May Indra be made to grow
by our hymns', so that vardhate could be a quasi-passive to vardhayati.
However, vardhate is an agentive form; compare, for example,
(114) RV 10.161.4ab: satdrn jTva sarddo vdrdhamanah satam hemdntan
ohatam u vasantan 'Live a hundred autumns, a hundred winters, a
hundred springs, increasing in strength.'
which has the participle vdrdhamanah (nom. sg. masc.) 'growing, increas-
ing.' It is, then, proper to say that gtrbhih of (112) refers to hymns as
causes, not causal agents. In addition, sravayati 'makes to hear'
contrasts with smoti 'hears', but there is not a comparable contrast
between vardhayati 'makes to grow' and vardhati . On the contrary, these
are used in an equivalent manner. For example,
(115) RV 7.99.7c: vardhantu tva sustutayo giro me '(Visnu,) let my
hymns, of good praise, make you grow strong.'
has the active imperative vardhantu used in the same manner as vardhdyanti
in (113).
Similarly, the intransitive verb ni vartate (3 pi. imper. ni vartan-
tani) 'turn back' contrasts with the transitive verb ni vartayati (2 sg.
imper. ni vartaya) 'make to turn back', but there is no contrast between
this and ni vartati (3 sg. inj . ni vartat)
:
(116) RV 10.19.3ab: punar eta ni vartantam asmin pusyantu gopatau
'Let these (cows) again turn back, let them thrive in (the possession
of) this cow owner.'
(117) RV 10.19.2ab: punar end ni vartaya punar end ny a kuru 'Make
these (cows) turn back again, make them be here again.'
(118) RV 1.121.4cd: ydd dha prasdrge trikakum ni vartat dpa dri'tho
mdnusasya duro vah 'When the three-humped (bull Indra) turned back
(the cows, i.e. waters) in their flow, he opened the doors of the
deceiver of man.
'
2.8 There are other verbs from which are derived bases in -i that
are equivalent to active forms of the primitive bases but which differ
from vrdh, vrt and such in that their middle forms can have passive value.
Consider, for example, mrj 'wipe, clean, polish, curry' (cf. Thieme 1929:19,
22). This verb is transitive by the criteria available in Sanskrit (see
1.2). The active mdrsti (3 pi. mrjdnti) takes an accusative complement
denoting an object of cleansing, as in
(119) RV 9.8.4a: mrjdnti tva ddsa ksipah '(Soma,) the ten fingers
cleanse you.
'
which has the accusative tvd 'you'. The middle mrje (pres. ptcple. mrjdnd)
is used with passive value, and there is a marked passive mrjyate:
(120) RV 9.109.17: sd vdjy aksdh sahdsraretd adbhir mrjdno gobhih
srindndh '(Soma,) this steed of a thousand seeds, has rushed, being
cleansed by water, blended with cows' milk.'
(121) RV 9.3.3: esd devS vipanyubhih pdvanidna rtdyubhihl hdrir
vdjdya mrjyate 'This heavenly (Soma,) as he is filtered, is cleansed
by the inspired poets, truth seekers, (like) a bay horse (curried)
for treasure (booty) .
'
In addition, the participle mrstd 'cleansed, curried' is used with refer-
ence to an object of cleansing, as in
(122) RV 9.82.2b: dtyo nd mrstS abhi vdjam arsasi '(Soma,) you rush
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towards the treasure prize like a horse that has been curried.'
The base marj-i formed to this verb is used in the same manner as the
simple active rriarsti; for example,
(123) RV 9.89.4c: svasara tm jamayo marjayanti 'The twin sisters
(i.e. the fingers of the hand) cleanse him (Soma).'
which in content is fully comparable to (119)
.
2.9 It is true, as Thieme emphasized, that derived verbs such as
marj-i, formed to transitive bases other than those considered in 2.1-2.4,
are regularly equivalent to simple transitive verbs in the Rgveda. It is
also true, as has been pointed out (see Delbrlick 1888:224-6), that con-
structions of the types shown in (B)
,
(C) of 1.1 occur in Vedic texts.
The causative grah-i 'cause to seize' occurs frequently. For example,
(124) TS 3.4.8.5: etad va asyai nirrtigrhTtam/ nivrtigrhTta evainarn
nirrtya grahayati 'That (part) of this (earth where one practicing a
spell against another offers) is seized by Destruction; (the one
practicing the spell) causes Destruction to seize him (against whom
the spell is intended) at the place seized by Destruction.
'
(125) MS 2.5.6 ^p. 54.17-8): prajapatih praja asrjata/ to. enam srsta
Citycananycental ta atimdnyamaria varuneriagrahayat 'Prajapati created the
creatures. When they had been created, they became uppity towards
him. He had Varuna seize them, being uppity.'
The causative dap-i 'cause to give' occurs in the same construction:
(126) TS 5.4.9.3: dhnaivasmai ratrim pro. ddpayati ratriyahali '(The
Adhvaryu) causes the day to give the night to him (the sacrif icer)
,
the night (to give him) the day.'
Similarly,
(127) Ait.Sr. 5.1.5: rajaputrena carma vyadhayanti 'They have a
Ksatriya pierce the skin.
'
has vyddh-i, the causative of vyadh (vidhyati) 'pierce', in the context of
part of the Vajapeya ceremony, when Ksatriyas shoot arrows at a skin.
These are instances of construction (70c), with instrumental forms signi-
fying agents of non-causal acts: nirrtya 'Nirrti, Destruction', vdru-
nena 'Varuna', ahrid 'day', ratriya 'night', rajaputrena 'king's son,
Ksatriya'
.
Causatives in a double accusative construction of type (69c) also
occur:
(128) Ait.B 3.46.2: tad dhaitad eva jagdham yad asamsamanam drtvij-
yam karayata uta va me dadyat uta va rrid vrntteti 'That is (called)
jagdha ('eaten', i.e. similar to leftovers) when (the patron of a
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sacrifice) has carry out the office of officiating priest (a Brahmana)
who wishes, "May he give me (some money) or select me".'
(129) S5r. 5.8, KBU 3.3.8: esa hy eva sadhu karma karayati tarn yam
ebhyo lokebhya unninTsata esa u evasadhu karma karayati tarn yam
adho ninzsate 'For this one alone causes him to do good whom he
wishes to lead up to those worlds; this one alone causes him to do
bad whom he wishes to lead down.
'
The accusatives drtvijyam 'office of Rtvi j
'
, sadhu karma 'good work, deed
(sanctioned in traditional lore)', asadhu karma 'bad work, deed (forbidden
in traditional lore) ' refer to objects of the non-causal act denoted by the
primitive verb k£^ 'make, do', as in Ait.B 5.34.3: artvijyam karoti 'carries
out the office of Rtvij ' . The accusatives asamsamanam 'who wishes', tarn
yam 'him whom' refer to objects of causation, signified by the derivate
kar-i (karayate, karayati).
Such causatives can also be used in elliptical sentences, where a
term of a full construction is to be supplied. For example, SB 1.7.1.18:
athottamam dohayitva 'Then, after having the last (cow) milked . . .',
has one accusative, uttamam 'last (cow)', but lacks a term referring to
the agent of milking. This is known from the sacrificial context; the
Adhvaryu, his speech held in check (vagyatah) , has a non-Sudra (asudrena)
milk (dohayati) cows:
(130) K^S A. 2. 22: vdgyato dohayaty asudrena
(130) is itself elliptical, since the objects of milking are not here named
and this does not specify the causal agent.
In
(131) a. AV 3.20.8c: utadistantam dapayatu . . . 'And let him cause
to give one who does not wish to give.'
b. VS 9.24c: dditsantam (Hpayati ... 'He causes to give one
who does not wish to give.'
c. TS 1.7.10.1: dditsantam dapayatu . . .
dap-i occurs with one complement, the accusative dditsantam 'who does not
wish to give'. Of course, dd 'give' is regularly a transitive verb, used
with accusative complements denoting things given. But the non-causal
sentence corresponding to (131a) would have ditsati used absolutely:
dditsantam dapayatu = yo nd ditsati torn dapayatu. It is understandable,
then, that ddp-i of (131) occurs in the construction type (69c) , with
Ni-acc. corresponding to N^-nom. of the non-causative sentence. The verb
ji too can be used absolutely: jayati, vi jayate 'is victorious, wins'.
But ji also can be used with an accusative denoting that over which one is
victorious, which one conquers, wins. And jdp-i, the causative to this
verb, is found in a double accusative construction:
(132) VS 9.11: brhaspate vdjam jaya brhaspdtaye vaaam vadata
brhaspdtim vajam jdpayata/ indra vajam jayendrdya vacam vadatendram
vajam japayata 'Brhaspati, win the prize; (drums,) make your sound
to Brhaspati, make Brhaspatl win the prize. Indra, win the prize;
(drums,) make your sound to Indra, make Indra win the prize.'
(133) TS 1.7.8.1: indraya vacarn vadatendvam vajam japayatendro vajam
ajayit 'Make your sound to Indra, make Indra win the prize. Indra
has won the prize.'
(134) MS 1.11.3 (p. 163.9-10): indraya vacam vadatendraya vaaam sam
vadatendram vajam japayatendra vajam jayeyam 'Make your sound to
Indra, make your sound together to Indra, make Indra win the prize.
Indra, I would win the prize.
'
2.10 As I noted in 2.6 srnve can be used as a passive ('is heard')
or in a stative sense ('is heard of, is famous'). Consider now
(135) TS 2.1.4.6-7: yah papmaria grTrttah syat so. agneycm kvsndgrxvam
a labhetaindram rsahham/ agnir evusya svena bhagadheyenopasrtdh
papmanam dpi dahaty aindrenendriydm atmdn dhatte/ muayate papmano/
bhavaty eva 'One who should be seized by evil should immolate a
black-necked animal offered to Agni, a bull offered to Indra. Agni,
approached with his share (of the offering), burns his evil. Through
the (bull) dedicated to Indra, he puts pov7er in himself. He gets
loose from evil. Indeed he prospers.'
(136) TS 2.3.13.2: yah papmdna grhttdh syat tasmd etam aindravarunTm
payasyam niv vapet/ indra evasminn indriyam dadhati/ vdruna enam
' varunapasan munaati 'For one who be seized by evil, one should set
down this offering of curdled milk dedicated to Indra and Varuna.
Indra puts in him power. Varuna looses him from the noose of Varuna.
'
The verb of mucyate papmdnah 'He gets loose from evil' in (135) is compara-
ble to mrjyate of (121) in that both have the affix -ya- . However, in
(121) the passive is accompanied by an agentive instrumental, which is
absent in muayate papmdnah. Moreover, the affix -ya- bears the high pitch
in mrjyate, while in muayate it is the verbal base that is so accented.
This form thus has the accent pattern of jayate 'is born' and statives such
as pusyati 'thrives'. It is licit, then, to consider that muayate in (135)
is not a true passive, as I have indicated with my translation. This
intransitive is related to the transitive munaati 'looses', as in (136).
Now,
(137) TS 3.4.1.1: vi vd etdsya yajnd rdhyate ydsya havir ati riayate
'His sacrifice fails to prosper the oblation of which is excessive.'
has ati riayate 'is excessive'. This is accented in the same manner as
muayate. Moreover, its meaning precludes treating it merely as a passive
of, ria 'leave behind'. This too is a stative, like rdhyate 'prospers',
vi . . . rdhyate 'fails to prosper'. To the intransitive ati riayate cor-
responds a transitive ati reaayati 'makes excessive' (3 sg. opt. ati
reaayet) , as in
(138) TS 3.4.1.3: ydd ava dyed ati tad reaayet 'If he were to cut
into (a pregnant animal), then he would make (the offering) excessive.'
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This Is of the type srav-i 'make to be heard, to be famous'. Thus, in the
language of Brahmana texts also there are found derivates in -i of this
kind.
As one would expect from what was pointed out in 1.4, there are also
found here derived verbs such as niarj-i 'cleanse', without causative
value. For example,
(139) ^B 1.8.1.43: dtha pavitrayor marjayante 'Then they wash (with
water) in two filters.'
has marjayante, and this is not causative: participants in the rite are
said to wash themselves, not to have others wash them. In his commentary
on this passage, Sayana notes that rriarj-i is here a verb of the tenth
class (cf. 1.4 with n 11) and glosses sodhayanty atmanam 'cleanse them-
selves' .
2.11 There is evidence to indicate that in early Vedic there was, in
addition to the morphologically derived causative discussed thus far, a
periphrastic causative construction in which a dative of an action noun was
used with kr or dha 'make'. For example,
(140) RV 1.112.8b: prandham sronam aaksasa Stave krthah '. . . (As-
vins,) you make the blind to see, the lame to go.'
(141) RV 3.31.19cd: druho vi yahi hdhuVd adevTh svas ca no maghavan
tsataye dhW^ 'Generous (Indra,) avoid the numerous godless deceivers,
and make us to win the sun.'
(142) RV 7.79.5c: vy uaahantT nah sandye dhiyo dhah 'As you shine,
(Dawn,) make our hymns to win.'
However, no periphrastic causative construction was generalized in Indo-
Aryan. Only morphologically derived causatives remained the norm, 22 so
that these alone will concern us.
2.12 It will be useful now to summarize what I have sketched out thus
far and to make an additional point before considering how to account for
historical developments. As shown, we have to do with the following kinds
of relations.
(a) A transitive verb is related to a derived causative in early Vedic
(2.1-2.4):
gacchati 'goes' gamayati 'causes to go'
srnoti 'hears, listens' sravayati 'makes to hear, listen'
ceiati 'perceives' cetayati 'makes to perceive'
pasyati 'sees' darsayati 'makes to see' [suppletion]
"vksate 'sees' Tksayate 'makes to see'
pihati 'drinks' payayati 'has . . . drink'
vivaktij bravTti^ aha 'says' vacayati 'has . . . say' [suppletion]
(b) An intransitive verb is related to a transitive-causative in
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-i (2.5):
stdati 'sits' sadayati 'seats, sets'
(c) A middle intransitive/passive is related to a transitive-causative
in -i (2.6 cf. 2.10):
srnve 'is heard, is famous' sravayati 'make to be heard, famous'
cite 'is perceived, percep- oetayati 'makes to be perceived,
tible' perceptible'
(d) A middle intransitive is related to a transitive active, which is
equivalent to a derivate in -i (2.7 cf. 2.10):
vardhate 'grows' vardhati, vardhayati 'makes to grow'
ni vartate 'turns back' ni vartati, ni vartayati 'makes turn
back'
(e) A passive, either unmarked, with raedio-passive endings alone, or
marked, with ya before these endings, is related to a transitive active and
a derivate in -i which are equivalent (2.8 cf. 2.10):
mrje, mrjyate mdrsti, marjayati
(f) In later Vedic, a transitive verb has a passive and a causative
in -i related to the transitive (2.9):
grhyate 'is seized' grhnati 'seizes' grahayati 'has ... seize'
dtyate 'is given' dadati 'gives' ddpayati 'has ... give'
vidhyate 'is pierced' vidhyati 'pierces' vyadhayati 'has ... pierce'
kriyate 'is made, krmoti 'makes, karayati 'has ... make, do'
done' kavoti does'
duhyate 'is milked' dogdhi 'milks' dohayati 'has ... milk'
[dugdhe 'gives milk,' n 4]
The verbs of (a) are transitive in the Sanskrit of Panini's time (1.2).
Verbs of the semantic groups in question were used transitively earlier too.
As shown, srnve in (102) is passive. The participle srutd 'heard'
also has passive value, referring to an object heard:
(143) RV 6.49.3d: mdnma srutdm naksata raydmdne '(Night and Day)
come to the devotional hymn, heard (by them) as they are celebrated
in verse.
'
Though srutd occurs also in the sense 'heard of, famous', this does not
alter the fact that it can be passive. The passive drsydte 'is seen'
occurs in
(144) AV 7.101: ydt svdpne dnnam asriami nd prdtdr adhi gamydte/
sdrvam tad astu me sivdm nahi tad drsydte diva 'l"/hat food I eat in a
dream is not found in the morning; may that be propitious to me; for
it is not seen by day.'
(145^ RV 10.88. 7ab: drsenyo yo mahirid samiddho rocata diviyonir
vihhava '(Agni,) worthy of being viewed, through his greatness, whose
womb is in heaven, who shines afar, has shone when kindled.'
contains drsenyah 'worthy of being seen, viewed'. This is comparable to
usenya 'desirable' (RV 7.3.9c) from the verb vas 'desire', which takes
object accusative complements. Of the same type is tksenya 'worthy of
being seen' (RV 9.77.3c). That middle forms of drs may be considered to
mean 'appear' does not change the fact that this verb has passive forms,
as does any transitive verb. The passive prydte 'is drunk' occurs in
(146) AV 5.19.5cd: ksTram yad asyah pTyate tad vai pitrsu kilbisam
'If its milk (the milk of a Brahmana's cow) is drunk, that is a
stain on the Manes.'
(147) RV 1.175. lab: matsy ccpayi te . . . matsaro madah '(Indra,) get
drunk, for you have drunk the intoxicating drink.
'
has apayi 'has been drunk', a passive aorist, and
(148) RV 8.32.16c: no. sbmo apvata pope 'Soma was not drunk without
reward.
'
contains the passive perfect form pape . In addition, the participle pTtd
can refer to an object that has been drunk, as in
(149) RV 6.47.3a: ayam me pxtd ud iyarti vaoam 'This (Soma) arouses
my speech when drunk (by me) .
'
It is true that, like English 'drunk', pvtd can also refer to one who has
drunk, but the fact remains that it is used passively. As shown in 2.4
vac takes an object accusative complement referring to what one says.
(150) RV 1.77. lab: katha daserriagndye kasmai devdjustoeyate bhamine
gzh 'How may we honor Agni? What hymn, pleasing to the god, the
shining one, is (to be) uttered?'
has the passive uayate 'is uttered, said', and in
(151) RV 6.34.5b: indraya stotrdm matibhir avaai 'A hymn of praise
has been uttered to (this) Indra, through (our) thoughts.'
the passive aorist avaai 'has been uttered, said' occurs. Again, in
(152) RV 4.41.1: indra ko vam varuna surnndm apa stomo havismcffh .../
yo vam hrdi krdtumWfi asmdd uktdh paspdrsad indravaruna ndmasvan
'Indra and Varuna, which praise with oblation has attained your
benevolence? (Which is it,) Indra and Varuna, that, full of insight,
obeisance, touches your heart when uttered by us?'
uktdh 'uttered, said' is used passively. And
(153) RV 6.45.6c: nrbhih suvTra uoyase '(Indra,) you are said by
noble men to have a wealth of heroes.'
contains the passive ucyase 'you are said ..."
With the above, one may compare similar forms of transitive verbs
such as mrc (2.8) or kr:
(15A) RV 5.29.15ab: indra bvahna kr^yamand jusasva ya te savistha
navya akarma 'Indra most powerful one, take pleasure in the poetic
formulae being produced, which we have made, new, for you.'
(155) RV 4.6.11a: akari brdhma samidHdna tubhyam '(Agni,) you who
are being kindled, a poetic formula has been made for you.'
(156) RV 7.61.6d: kvtdni brahma jujusann imdni 'May these poetic
formulae produced (by me) please (you, Mitra and Varuna) .
'
By the criteria which serve to show that a given verb is transitive,
then, the above verbs are indeed transitive. Consequently, srdvyati etc.
in (a) are to be considered causatives to transitive verbs. That these
transitive verbs do have such causatives in early Vedic distinguishes
them from others, like mrj (2.8). But then, some of these verbs have an
additional property that distinguishes them from other transitive verbs:
they can take object complements other than the accusative. This group of
items thus forms a fairly well defined subset of transitive verbs.
Verbs of movement such as gam also share these features. The verb
gam occurs with nominals denoting goals, in the accusative, locative or
dative, and gamayati is related to gacchati as its causative. However,
in earliest Vedic gam and similar verbs had not developed a full passive
system. In the Rgveda, the participle gata. usually refers to an agent of
going, and the passive gamyate does not occur. Nevertheless, it is also
patent that from early times this verb was developing a full passive
system. The Rgveda itself has an example of gata used with reference to
an object, a path one has gone on:
(157) RV 7.58.3: brhad vdyo maghdvadbhyo dadhdta jujosann in marutdh
sustutim ndh/ gatb nddhva vi tivdti jantum pro. nah spdrKabhir
utzbhis tireta '(Maruts,) grant great life force to the generous
patrons. Let the Maruts enjoy our praise. It will take a living
one across (life) as (does) a path that has been traversed. May you
bring us to the fore with your desirable aids.'
Moreover, in
(158) MS 1.6.12 (p. 105.1-2): jdnam bhdgo
'
gacchat tdsmdd ahur jdno
gantavyas tdtra bhdgena sdm gacchatd iti 'Bhaga went to the people.
Therefore, they say, "One should go to the people; there one comes
together with ones share".'
the gerundive gantavyah 'to be gone to' is used of a goal to which one
should go, the people \jdnah) . Such usage is understandable only if gam
was indeed treated as a transitive verb. Of course, in the Sanskrit of
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Panini's time gata could still refer to an agent or an object, as in (30),
(62).
Now, gatah in (157) does not refer to a goal. It is used here of a
path, road (adhva) one has taken on the way to a goal. The passive parti-
ciple gata is thus used here of an object. In this context, it is worth-
while to consider details about the Paninian rule (2.3.12: gatyarthakarmani
dvittyaoaturthyau cestayam anadhvani) which serves to account for pairs of
sentences such as (la) gaachati mdnavako gramam, (61) gaachati rrianavako
gramdya. Another rule (2.3.2: karmani dvitTyd) says a nominal base is
followed by an accusative ending (dvittyd) to signify an object (karman)
.
According to 2.3.12, a nominal base is followed by either an accusative
or a dative ending (dviftyd, oatupth%) to signify an object {karman) with
respect to the act denoted by a verb of movement (gatyartha) , unless the
object is a path, road (anadhvani). In his second varttika on 2.3.12
(dsthitapratisedhas ca), Katyiyana remarks that this negation ipratisedha)
applies with regard to a road that one has taken (dsthita) . That is, the
option provided by 2.3.12 applies with reference to a road that is a goal,
not a road one takes; the latter is referred to by an accusative, as pro-
vided for in 2.3.2. Thus, one says
(159) adhvdnam gaachati 'He is going on the road, to the road.'
(160) adhvane gacakati 'He is going to the road.'
The passive counterpart of (159) is
(161) adhvd gamyate
and (157) contains such a passive turn, with the participle gata.
The verb r {rcchati 'gets to, reaches') also takes accusative comple-
ments. For example, in
(162) TS 5.5.3.2: yan nyanaam ainuydt prsthita enam dhutaya rccheyuh
'If one were to set up (the fire) face down, oblations would get to
it from the back.
'
rcoheyuh (3 pi. opt.) occurs with an accusative (enan 'it') referring to
the fire into which oblations go. As shown in 2.1, (82) has the causative
gam-i, used in speaking of making a bad dream go to enemies.
(163) RV 10.164.5de: pdpS yarn dvismds tarn sd vcahatu yo no dvesti
tarn rcchatu 'Let this evil (intent) get to him whom we hate, let it
get to him who hates us.'
contains roahatu 'let ... get to' with an accusative {torn 'him') in a
similar context. More figuratively, raahati occurs with an accusative
(etam 'him') in
(164) TS 2.1.10.2: aputd va etdm vag rcchati yam djaghnivdmsam abhi
sdmsanti 'Impure speech gets to him whom people calumniate without
his having killed.
'
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referring to one who is the object of calumny, whom impure speech (aputa
vak) gets to. In addition, rcchati frequently occurs with suk 'pain,
affliction' and an accusative denoting that which pain gets to, as in
(165) TS 6.4.1.4: pa&or va aLahdhasya hvdayam sug rcohati 'Pain
gets to the heart of an immolated animal.
'
Compare a passage like
(166) ^B 3.8.5.8: pasov ha va alabhyamanasya hrdayam suk sam abhy
dvaiti 'Pain gets into the heart of an animal being immolated.'
which has the movement verb i 'go' (with preverbs sam abhy dva) . Further,
the past participle rtd is used with reference to an object to which pain,
affliction has gotten. For example,
(167) TS 5.1.4.3: tdsmat sarriqvat pasunam prajayamananam aranydh
pasdvah kdntyamsah/ sued hy rtdh 'It is for this reason that, among
animals born otherwise the same, wild ones are smaller. For they
are afflicted by pain.
'
Given suoa ... rtdh 'gotten to by pain', one must accept that accusatives
such as hrdayam of hrdayam sug raehati 'pain gets to the heart' in (165)
are object accusatives.
The available evidence thus indicates that the primitive verbs of
(a), including a verb of movement like gam, are transitives. Consequently,
gamayati etc. of (a) must be considered causatives to transitive verbs.
In addition, some of these verbs have passive forms such as srnve , and the
causatives of (c) are related to these.
Now, by the criteria mentioned, sad of (b) is intransitive. Of
course, there is no true passive to such a verb, so that the contrast
between transitive and passive does not obtain. Moreover, there is here
no possible contrast between a transitive and a causative. The same is
true of type (d) . However, in this case there is also a redundancy in
that, despite the absence of an opposition between transitive and causa-
tive, one has pairs like vardhati, vardhayati . In type (e) , transitive
and passive do contrast, but there is no contrast between transitive and
causative. In addition, we have here redundancy both in the passive
(jnrje, mrjyate) and in the transitive (mdrsti, marjayati^ . Finally, type
(f) is like (a) in that there is here a three-way contrast of passive,
transitive, and causative. However, causatives of (f) are demonstrably
later than those of (a)
.
3.0 There are, then, two major questions to be considered: How
were causatives of type (f) introduced into the language? How is it that
causatives take part in different syntactic constructions? The data
sketched above suggest answers to these questions.
3.1 Consider now a development involving passives. From examples I
have given, it can be seen that simple middle forms could be used with
passive value in early Vedic. Thus: (102) srnve 'is heard', (120) adbhir
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mrjanah 'while being cleansed by water', (148) pope 'was drunk'. Simi-
larly,'
(168) RV 10.112.3cd: asriabhir indra sakhibhir huvanah sadhrToTnS
mddayasva nisadya 'Indra, sit down and get yourself drunk with us
as you are called by us, friends.'
has huvanah 'being called (by us, your friends)', a participial form to
have 'is called', and
(169) RV 1.92.7b: divah stave duhita gotamebhih '(Dawn,) the daugh-
ter of heaven is praised by the Gotamas.'
contains stave 'is praised'. In addition, there are present and imperfect
forms that I call marked passives, in which the affix ya precedes middle
endings or a participial affix. Thus: (121) mrjyate 'is cleansed',
(89) huyanianah 'being called'. Similarly,
(170) RV 3. 22. led: sahasrinam vajam ... sasanvan tsan tstuyase
Ja.tavedah ' (Agni) Jatavedas, you are praised, being one who was
gained treasure in the thousands.'
has the marked passive stuyase 'you are praised'. In early Vedic, then,
there was a competitive situation, which involved redundancy: either
marked or unmarked passives could be used. However, by the period of
Into-Aryan represented in Brahmana texts, the marked passive had all but
completely ousted the unmarked passive (see Speyer 1896:49, §167). One
is thus practically to the system of the Sanskrit described by Panini
,
wherein a present or imperfect passive regularly has atmanepada affixes
preceded by yoK and third singular aorist forms of the type akari 'has
been made', opposed to akrta 'has made for himself, are the norm in pas-
sive function (see 1.5).
I think it can be considered no accident that, in addition, the stage
of Indo-Aryan represented in Brahmana texts has a fully developed causa-
tive system, including causatives of type (f) in 2.12. Not only this, but
causative bases have passive forms, as do any transitive verbs. Thus,
(171) TS 6.5.2.2: upopte 'nye gvahah sadyante'nupopte dhruvah 'Other
cups are set on a place where (earth) has been strewn, the Dhruva
cup on a place where it has not been strewn.
'
(172) MS 2.3.9 (p. 37.9): brahmanah payayitavyah 'The Brahmana is
to be given to drink.
'
contain sadyante 'are set' and payayitavyah, a gerundive of pay-i used
with reference to one who is to be made to drink. Further,
(173) ^B 12.4.1,12: tad ahuh/ ydsyagnihotrt dohySanand vasyeta kirn
tdtra karma Kd prayascittir vti 'They say: what is to be done,
what is the expiatory procedure, on the part of one whose cow for
the Agnihotra ceremony should bleat while one is having it milked?'
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has the passive participle dohyamana 'while being caused to be milked',
to the base doh-i , as in
(174) K^S 4.14.1: agnihotrtm dohayati 'He has (someone other than
a Sudra) milk the cow for the Agnihotra' (cf. [130]).
Such passives are also part of the verbal system in the Sanskrit of
Panini's time. For example, as (la) gacohati rridnavako gvamam has a pas-
sive counterpart (12) manavakena gramo gamyate, so also does (lb) devadatto
nidnavakam gramam gamayati:
(175) devadattena rridnavako gramam gamyate
3.2 The elimination of unmarked passives in Indie had systematic
repercussions in the rest of the verb system. So long as unmarked passive
forms of the type mpje coexisted with marked passives of the type mrjyate,
the contrast between transitive and passive could be correlated directly
with the contrast between active and middle, the affix ya being redundant.
Once the type mrjyate has become the norm, however, this is not so. Now
if a verb has both active and middle endings contrastively , this is cor-
related only with the distinction between performing an act for ones own
benefit and doing this for someone else. Both active and middle endings
of the present-imperfect system now can be said to signify agents, as
opposed to objective middle endings preceded by ya, now required.
In this context, consider again a verb such as vrdh, of type (d) in
2.12. The middle vardhate was retained in Sanskrit, as a deponent. On the
other hand, the active vardhati was gradually eliminated and does not have
a place in the Sanskrit of Panini's time. In the emerging system, a
transitive vardhati could be paired with a middle vardhate of the type
kurute 'makes for himself or with a true passive vrdhyate of the type
kriyate 'is made'. Understandably, neither of these was used. Conse-
quently, vardhati ceased to be used. In the later system, then, one has
only vardhate, in which the middle ending signifies an agent of growing,
opposed to the causative vardhayati . Similarly, the later system has
vartate and vartayati. Note, in addition, that in this way a redundancy
was eliminated. In early Vedic, there was no contrast between Vardhati and
vardhayati or ni vartati and ni vartayati. In the emerging system, this
lack of contrast is reflected formally, with only Vardhayati, ni vartayati.
3.3 Consider now the consequences of such developments with regard
to transitive verbs like mrj, of type (e) in 2.12. As has been shown, in
the early system such verbs entered into constructions which are schemati-
cally as follows:
(176) a. V- S *.j r N.-instr. N.-nom. [passive][ya-mxd.J 1 2
b. V-act. N -nom. N -ace. [transitive]
c. V-i N -nom. N„-aee. [transitive]
With the elimination of the type rrrrje from the present passive system, we
have:
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(177) a.
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is a passive like pTydte in (146): it agrees in number with asanam 'food'.
On the other hand, asyate in
(179) tdsniad etesam pasundm ndsyate 'Therefore, one does not eat these
animals.
'
which corresponds to
(180) 5b 1.2.3.9: tdsniad etesam pasundm ndsitdvyam 'Therefore, one
is not to eat these animals.'
is like smaryate of ^(66). It does not agree in number with the genitive
plural etesam pasundm, just as the neuter singular gerundive asitdvyam of
(180) shows no gender-number agreement with this genitive. Let us now
agree, as I think we must, that sentences such as (la) and (61) or (94)
and (95) are equivalent to each other so far as concerns the relation
between the acts in question and the goal or object: in both instances,
someone is going to a village and Indra is asked to drink Soma. Further,
as shown, verbs of the type (a) in 2.12 are transitive. However, as also
shown, the goals, objects of these verbs could be denoted by non-accusative
forms. And, as can be seen from (179), (180), such forms could be used
also in passive sentences. To such sentences, one could not have a new
causative of the type (70c) , with an accusative corresponding to the nomi-
native of the passive, for the simple reason that the passive lacked such
a nominative. Moreover, as noted in 2.12(a), (c) , though causatives such
as srdvayati could indeed be related to both an active and a passive, there
was a clear semantic difference: srnoti 'hears, listens^ : srdvayati 'causes
to hear, listen' as opposed to sruyate 'is heard': srdvayati 'causes to be
heard'. These facts suffice, I think, to account for the fact that con-
struction (70c) was not fully extended, to include also old causatives
that entered into the double accusative construction, eliminating (69c) .
One should, nevertheless, expect some encroachment of (70c), under
specific conditions: if a verb of the semantic groups for which (69c) was
the norm were used, possibly with specialized meaning, regularly with an
accusative complement. There is evidence to show such extension. For
example,
(181) TS 6.4.1.4-5: sa hrdayasuldm ahhi sdm eti/ yat prthiv^am
hrdayasuldm ud vdsdyet prthivxm suodrpayed ydd apsv apdh sucarpayet/
suskasya cdrdrdsya ca samdhav ud vasayaty ubhdyasya sdntyai/ yam
dvisydt tarn dhydyet/ sucaivainam arpayati 'It gets to the heart spike.
If (the Adhvaryu) were to remove the heart spike onto the ground, he
would cause pain to get to the earth, if onto water, he would cause
pain to get to the water. He removes it to a juncture of dry land
and wet land, to let both have peace. Let him (then) think of one he
hates. (Thereby,) he causes pain to get to him.'
has prthivTm sucarpayet 'he would cause pain to get to the earth', in which
the causative arp-i (3 sg. opt. arpayet) , seen also in suca ... enam
arpayati 'he causes pain to get to him', is construed with an accusative
(,prthiv%m, enam) that refers to the object afflicted by pain and an instru-
mental {suca) referring to pain, affliction, which is caused to get to
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these. As can be seen from sa 'it (i.e. pain)', this passage is part of a
larger context. It continues immediately after (165), where hrdayam sug
voahati occurs. Patently, arp-i is the causative to r, a verb of movement.
The primitive verb vochati in usages such as (165) regularly takes only an
object accusative complement, which implies a nominative in a passive
construction together with an instrumental referring to pain which gets to
someone (cf. [167]). Accordingly, one finds arp-i in construction (70c).
There is also evidence to show that, at least in some areas, the
causative construction (70c) was extended to other verbs which originally
entered into double accusative causatives. In varttika 5 on Panini 1.4.52
{adikTmdintvahTnam pratisedhah) , Katyayana remarks that the agent of
certain acts, among them those denoted by ad, khdd 'eat', should not be
classed as object with respect to causatives. In his discussion of this
varttika, Patanjali gives the following examples (Abhyankar 1962:337,
lines 15, 18):
(182) a. atti devadattah 'Devadatta is eating.'
b. adayate devadattena '... is feeding Devadatta.'
(183) a. khadati devadattah
b. khadayati devadattena
Further, in virttika 7 on 1.4.52 (bhakser ahimsarthasya) Katyayana notes
that the same prohibition should be made for the causative of bhaks meaning
'eat'. By the third century B.C., then, these three verbs of consuming
formed causatives which could occur in construction (70c) . And by this
time these verbs regularly took only accusative complements.
However, so far as I know, this construction had not been fully gener-
alized by Panini 's time. Indeed, verbs of the semantic groups which had
construction (69c) in early Indo-Aryan continued to enter into a causative
construction different from that of other transitive verbs, and do so to
this day (see note 22)
.
3.4 In sum, the available evidence requires one to accept that earli-
est Indie had true causatives, formed to particular transitive verbs. New
causatives were then developed at a fairly early time, certainly by the
times of Brahmana works, leading to the system known from Panini 's era. 23
I suggest the new causative construction is to be accounted for as shown
in 3.3.
4.0 At the beginning of this paper. I pointed out that according to
the view now prevalent early Vedic did not have true causatives. Let me
now turn to the arguments advanced in favor of this position.
4.1 Jamison (1967:126) states the following: 'Though in early Skt.
(= RV, AV, early Brahmanas) there existed no specifically causative means
of expression, either morphologic or periphrastic, in the later language
(= later Brahmanas, Epic, and Classical) causativity could be expressed
morphologically by means of a verbal formation with -aya-suffix. The -aya-
causative of this later period is the formal continuation of the -aya-verb
of the older Vedic period. However, this earlier formation was not a
causative in function but merely had tr. [transitive, GC] value." Later
(1976:127), Jamison remarks that the fundamental property of the formation
in question in the later language is causativity, not transitivity. One
of the pieces of evidence which leads to this conclusion is that, according
to Jamison, non-causative transitive derivates such as ahad-i in
(184) RV 6.75.18a: mamiani te varmand chadayami 'I cover your vul-
nerable areas with armor.'
cannot be formed in the later language. The evidence fails to support
Jamison's claims. In view of even the select examples given in 2.9, her
statement concerning the absence of causatives in the early language must
be considered false, so far as concerns the Atharvaveda and Brahmanas
.
Moreover, since derivates in -i were not made exclusively causative in
Sanskrit, right up to Panini's time, her claim about the later language is
also factually unacceptable.
Jamison's major claims are two. First, she says derivates in -i were
formed in the early language only to intransitive verbs, so that the central
function of these derived bases was then transitivity. Second, true causa-
tives arose, according to her, through a syntactic analogy due to 'the
inherent ambiguity' (1976:133) of accusatives in sentences with two accusa-
tive forms. To support her claim that early derivates in -i could only be
formed as transitives to fundamentally intransitive verbs, Jamison has of
course to do something about the verbs of my type (a), 2.12. Her procedure
is simple. She merely says (1976:130) that verbs which, though they do
take accusative complements, also take others are thereby intransitive,
and concludes: 'Thus, according to my definition, when a noun can occur in
the AC [accusative case, GC] or in another case in the same meaning, the
noun is not a DO [direct object, GC], and the verb with which it appears
is not transitive, even at those times when the non-object complement is in
the AC' Further, Jamison strongly emphasizes the type Vardhayati (see
2.7), which occurs with a single object accusative, and says (1976:126),
'In the early language the defining syntactic feature of the -aya-transitive
was that it could be construed with a single AC direct object . . . ' She
also remarks (1976:126) that a verb such as vardh-i in RV 1.36. lid:
agnim vardhayamasi 'We make Agni grow strong' had 'another secondary
syntactic feature' in that such a sentence could 'be perceived to be func-
tioning as causative to a corresponding intr. sentence built to the same
underlying root . . . ' According to Jamison, then, a sentence such as AV
12.3.34d: enam [var. etdm] ... gamayantam (which she translates [1976:132]
'Make him go to the end') has only one object accusative: enam 'him'. The
accusative antam is not objective, either here or in the corresponding
non-causative sentence sd gacohaty dntam, which Jamison treats as intran-
sitive. However, she goes on to say (1976:133), sentences like the last
cited have surface structures identical to sentences with transitive verbs,
both containing accusatives. And due to the ambiguity of the accusative,
a sentence such as enam . . . gamayantam could then be reinterpreted as con-
taining two object accusatives. In this manner, she concludes (1976:133),
'
. . . causativity, came to be perceived as the central function of the
-aya-formation, ' although earlier this was merely (1976:128), '. . . an
accidental byproduct of the relation between a fundamentally tr. and a
fundamentally intr. verb.
'
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It is crucial to Jamison's thesis that the accusatives in sentences
such as (75) tarn ... gaaohanti .... visvany ekah srnavad vacamsi me, (84)
... indro artham cetati, (86) ... tvdh ...no. dadarsa vacam, !.. tvah
. . . na smoty eriam, (87) ... rria ... Tksadhvam, (94) ... somam piba ...
not be object accusatives. Moreover, she rightly stresses (1976:130) the
need to distinguish between object accusatives and others 'without appeal-
ing to semantic intuitions,' that is, on formal grounds. However, the
single formal criterion she uses is not sufficient. Simply to say that a
verb which can take a non-accusative complement in addition to an accusa-
tive is thereby intransitive by definition is not justifiable. Recall now
that (114) contains the participial form vdrdhamanah, to the intransitive
verb vrdh (2.7), the intransitive verb JTv (2 sg. imper. JTva) 'live', and
the accusatives katam ... saraddh 'a hundred autumns', satam hemantan 'a
hundred winters', satam ... vasantan 'a hundred springs'. Similarly,
(185) TB 1.1.3.9: so'svatthe samvatsaram atisthat 'He (Agni) remained
in the Asvattha tree a year.
'
has the intransitive stlia (3 sg. impfct. atisthat) 'stand, remain', the
locative asvatthe, and the accusative samoatsaram 'a year.' Again, in
(186) 5b 11.5.1.11: tan ma ekam ratrim ante sayitase 'Then you will
lie near me one night .
'
the intransitive st (2 sg. fut. sayitase) 'lie, sleep' occurs with the
^
locative phrase me ... ante 'near me' and the accusative phrase ekam vatvim
'one night'. That jTu, stHd, s~ occur with accusatives in such examples
does not, or course, suffice to make them transitive verbs. The accusa-
tives found here have specific semantic features. In (114), (185), (186),
they refer to times associated with the acts in question, during which
these take place or are supposed to, and in
(187) RV 2.16.3cd: na te vdjram anv asnoti kascana ydd asubhih
pdtasi ySjana puru '(Indra,) no one reaches your vajra when you fly
many yojana with your fast (horses) .
'
the accusative yojana puru 'many yojana (measures of distance) ' used with
pat 'fly' refers to a distance. In effect, these are adverbial accusatives,
traditionally called accusatives of extent, and they are neutral in the
sense that they can be used equally with intransitive and transitive verbs.
Thus, prathamam ratrim 'the first night' in
(188) SB 12.8.2.8: asvinena pdyasa prathamam ratrim pari sinaati 'He
sprinkles (the wine) the first night with the milk dedicated to the
Asvins.
'
occurs with the transitive verb pari sinaati 'sprinkles round'. Similarly,
(189) RV 1.98. 2d: sd no diva sd risdh patu ndktam 'May he (Agni)
protect us from harm day and night.'
has the transitive verb pa 'protect' with the object accusative nah 'us'
and the adverbial phrase diva ... ndktam 'day and night', in which the
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accusative naktam is coordinated with the instrumental diva. Such adverb-
ial elements remain unchanged in passive sentences. For example,
(190) RV 10,95.4cd: astam nandkse yasmin aakan diva naktam snathitKd
vaitasena ' (UrvasT) came to the house (of Pururavas) , in whom she
took pleasure, pierced by his rod day and night.'
has the passive participle snathita 'pierced' with the adverbial phrase
diva naktam. The situation is quite different concerning the accusatives
which occur with gam, sru, cit, drs, ~ks, pa ('drink') in (75), (84), (86),
(87), (94), and similar sentences. To begin with, these accusatives do not
fit into any one semantic category; they are not like adverbial accusatives
of time and distance. In addition, the verbs with which these accusatives
occur are found in passive constructions such that passive verb forms show
number and gender agreement with nominative forms corresponding to accusa-
tives in non-passive sentences (see 2.12). Thus, if one considers the
criteria which should be considered, one must conclude that these verbs
have to be treated as a subset of transitive verbs. By singling out one
syntactic feature and omitting others, Jamison fails to take into account
the necessary facts. Hence, the crucial part of her thesis fails. Given
this, there is no need to go into her explanation concerning how speakers
are supposed to have perceived things.
Jamison also suggests an explanation for the use of instrumental forms
in the construction type (70c). She says (1976:134, n 3) , 'I consider
this type of expression a secondary development of the one with double AC,
designed to avoid the ambiguities inherent in having both DCs in the same
case.' This too I consider unacceptable. After all, despite possible
ambiguity, the double accusative causative construction was maintained.
Moreover, the distribution of the two causative constructions used in the
Sanskrit of Panini's day shows a distinction among transitive verbs that
supply causatives for these that is remarkably systematic, not what one
might expect if, as Jamison says, one of the constructions was used to
avoid ambiguity. Under her explanation, one should expect a more random
distribution, the potentially ambiguous construction steadily losing
ground. However, what is potentially ambiguous in isolation is not so in
context, and speakers use sentences in contexts. For example, consider
(191) TS 6.6.2.2:
a. yajna yajnam gaeaha yajndpatim gacahety aha (TS 1.4.44.3)
'(The Adhvaryu) says "Sacrifice, go to the sacrifice (i.e. Visnu)
,
go to the patron of the sacrifice".'
b. yajndpatim evdinam gamayati 'He makes it go to the patron
of the sacrifice.'
Taken out of context, (191b) could be ambiguous, but, as can be seen from
the anaphoric pronoun enom (ace. sg.), this is embedded in a context, where
it is unambiguous.
4.2 In an earlier study of Sanskrit causatives, Thieme also tried to
demonstrate that early Vedic had no true causatives, formed to transitive
verbs. I agree with Thieme (1929:19) that sentences such as (7b) result
from influence of causatives formed to intransitive verbs, that is, from an
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extension of the double accusative construction. Moreover, Thieme's
treatment of the Issues shows the mastery of Vedic and Paninian materials
so typical of this scholar. Nevertheless, I regret I cannot consider his
arguments fully cogent. In essence, Thieme tries to show that all verbs
which formed derivates in -i that one might call causative were intransi-
tive in early Vedic. He takes up (1929:21-2) the causative construction
for verbs of movement etc. in the Sanskrit of Panini's time (see 1.1, [A]),
refers to Vedic passages where this is found, and then says (1929:22)
concerning the verbs in question: 'Zu alien diesen Verben ist ein Intran-
sitiv denkbar, das ausdrllckt, dass die vom Verb bezeichnete Handlung am
Subjekt in Erscheinung tritt. Dieses Intransitiv kann entweder durch das
blosse Medium ausgedruckt werden (vardhati "starkt," vardhate "wird
stark") Oder—was besonders haufig ist—durch das Medium mit -ya {rrw.jyate
"wird sauber"), oder durch das Verbaladjektiv mit -to. (vrddhd "einer der
gewachsen hat," gegenuber ptta, das auch heissen kann "einer der getrunken
hat"). Tritt zu diesem Intransitive der Agens im Instrumental, so sprechen
wir von Passiv. Z.B. harsate "freut sich," aber X.30.5 yabhih ... harsate
"durch die er erfreut wird." mrjyate "wird sauber, lauter," z. B. in
IX. 86. 6 ycdi pavitre adhi mrjyate harih, aber IX. 76.4 yah suryasyastrena
mrjyate "der gelautert wird durch • • •'" [Emphasis Thieme's].
The above actually involves two points. Let me begin with the claim
that an intransitive middle is conceivable for all the verbs in question.
The verb gam regularly takes middle endings in Panini's time if it is
accompanied by the preverb sam (Panini 1.3.29: samo gamyrcchibhyam
[kartojn 14, atmanepadam 12]): sam gam 'come together'. This is so also
in earlier Vedic, as can be seen from examples such as (158) and RV
1.119.3a: sam yan mithah pasprdhariaso agmata '. . . when they came together
competing one'with the other'. And ud gam 'go up' also is found with
atmanepada affixes (e.g. RV 8.69.7d). However, such uses of the middle of
gam can hardly account for causatives like gamayamasi in (77), at least not
in the way required by Thieme. It is true that sravayati 'make to be
heard' is paired with a middle like srnve 'is heard', but sravayati
'makes to hear' cannot be considered merely a transitive related to an
intransitive middle. It must be paired with svnoti 'hears' (see 2.2, 2.6).
Similarly, though oetaryati 'makes to be perceived, to appear' is a trans-
tive-causative related to aite 'is perceived, appears', aetayati 'makes
to perceive' must be coupled with cetati 'perceives'. It is also unac-
ceptable to consider that dnrsayati 'makes to see' is merely a transitive
to a middle drsyate 'is seen, appears', and for the same reason. Under
Thieme's thesis, darsayati would have to be a transitive to drsyate mean-
ing 'appears', but a transitive of the type aetayati with an accusative
denoting what is made to appear and a dative signifying one to whom this
is shown, as in (103), simply will not account for sentences like (92),
(93). As shown in 2.12, pa 'drink' is transitive. This verb usually has
active inflexion except in passive usage. It is true that early texts also
have non-passive forms of this verb; for example, RV 10.114.7cd: apnanam
ttrtham ka iha pro. vocad yena pafKd pra pihante sutasya 'Who will proclaim
here the Apnana ford, the path on which (the gods) drink the pressed Soma?'
Note, however, that pra pibante occurs with sutasya here, and is thus
syntactically like piba in (95). It is also true that such middle forms
^
of pa can be used absolutely, as in RV 10.135.1b: devaih sam pibate yamdh
'.
. . Yama drinks with the gods'. However, the active of ^a is similarly
used, as in RV 1.23.18b: yatra gavdh pihanti nah '. . .in which our cows
drink'. Consequently, it is not possible to account for the causative
pay-i in the manner Thieme suggests. The verb vaa too is transitive
(2.12). To be sure, there are non-passive middle forms of this verb, but
they do not conform to the requirements of Thieme 's thesis, since they are
regularly transitive. For example, in RV A. 5. 11a: rtam voce namasa
praahycmidnah 'I will tell the truth when asked with a show of obeisance'
the middle form voae (1 sg. aor. inj
.
) occurs with the object accusative
rtcim 'truth'. No matter how conceivable it might at first appear, then,
the fact is that saying derived bases such as gam-i, srav-i, dars-i
,
pay-i, vaa-i originally were nothing more than transitive derivates cor-
responding to intransitive middle forms cannot be justified from the
evidence.
Thieme makes his second point by bringing in sentences of type (56)
odandh paoyate 'The rice is cooking', when he speaks of mrjyate used with
or without an agentive instrumental. ^This sentence type does occur in
Vedic. For example, TS 5.1.9.2-3: sa yad hhidyetavtim araahed yaja/nano
hanyetasya yajndh 'If it (the ukha pot) were to break, the patron of the
sacrifice would undergo ruination, his sacrifice would perish' has
bhidyeta, hanyeta, optative forms corresponding to intransitive middles
bhidydte 'breaks', hanydte 'perishes'. However, bringing in this type
does not overcome the objections set forth above. In fact, this raises
additional problems. The sentence type (56) regularly has verbs which
can and do take object accusative complements and have true passives. The
feature particular to this type is that an external agent performing an
act on an object may not be specified, and the verb behaves like an
intransitive verb. However, not all verbs enter into this construction,
and verbs of movement such as gam do not. Moreover, if a form like
pacyate, bhidyate, hanyate is used passively ('is cooked', 'is broken',
'is killed'), an external agent is signified by an instrumental. Conse-
quently, under Thieme 's thesis, one should expect only construction (70c)
in causative sentences, not also (69c).
Of course, Thieme is well aware of the problem, and he anticipates
Jamison's position, by arguing that verbs which have causatives with
construction (69c) are actually intransitive. Thus, he says (1929:20)
that pdrdm ... paravdtam of (77) is an accusative of direction (Richtungsak-
kusativ), vajam of (132) an accusative of content (Inhaltsakkusative) , so
that the primitive bases gam, ji from which gam-i, jdp-i derive are intran-
sitive. He does admit that accusatives used with verbs like Tks, budh
are object accusatives. For he calls these transitive verbs (1929:20).
Still, he hesitates to give them full transitive status, saying (1929:20),
'Transitive Verben der Art wie zks, budh jedoch sind ihrem Ursprung nach
intransitive Verben des Vorgangs, die mit einem freieren Akkusativ, dem
Akkusativ der Evstreakung , konstruiert werden' [Emphasis Thieme's], and
in a footnote (1929:20 n 2) he further suggests these verbs may originally
have been construed with an accusative of goal (Akkusativ des Ziels) , of
direction. Later (1929:22), Thieme reiterates that gam takes an accusative
of direction, a verb of perception an accusative of extent, though here
he puts 'der Erstreckung' within inverted commas. Further, according to
Thieme (1929:20-1), a genitive used with a verb of consuming like pa
'drink' is a partitive genitive, and an accusative construed with such a
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verb is one of extent: 'Ahnlich llegt der Fall bei pa "trinken", das mit
dem acQ . aber auch mit dem ^erz . part, konstruiert warden kann, wenn
nahmlich die Handlung sich nur auf einen Teil der bezeichneten Sache
erstreokt^ [Emphasis Thieme's]. The above does not withstand scrutiny.
One must obviously recognize an accusative of goal, which alternates with
other case forms (2.1), as one has to distinguish, with respect to verbs
of movement, an accusative denoting a road taken and one denoting a road
to which on^ goes, as in (159), (160). Moreover, one might claim that
raahati, rtah in examples such as (165), (167) are forms of a verb that
has undergone semantic specialization, meaning 'afflict, attack', so that
it would not be strictly a verb of movement. However, there is no escaping
the fact that an accusative of goal construed with gam is treated in the
same manner as an object accusative, witness (158), and whatever one says
about raahati, the fact remains that it is transitive. Hence, gam-i,
arp-i can be nothing other than causatives to transitive verbs. Whatever
be one's opinion concerning the possible origins of accusatives used with
verbs of perception, it is difficult to see how these could be equated
with adverbial accusatives in examples such as (114) , (185) , which can
rightly be termed accusatives of extent. Similarly, though a genitive
like somasya in (95) be labelled partitive, there is no obvious semantic
difference between (94) and (95), and there is no justification for claim-
ing the accusative somam of (94) is of the same type as accusatives of
extent found elsewhere. It is also difficult to justify the claim that
ji and oap-i in examples like (132)- (134) are construed with an accusative
of content, a cognate accusative. A phrase such as jitim jigyyh in ^B
3.2.2.2: yajnena vai deva imam jitim jigyuh "The gods won this victory
through the sacrifice' clearly contains a cognate accusative^ j'lttm 'vic-
tory'. This is not the case in RV 8.76.4ab: ayam ha yena va idam svar
mavutvata jitam 'This (is Indra,) by whom, with his troop of Maruts, this
sun was won', since svar 'sun' is totally unrelated to the base ji of the
participle jitam 'won conquered', nor is vajam in ^ (132)-(134) a cognate
accusative. It might well be that phrases like vajam jaya svar jitam
could represent an extension of an original construction with a cognate
accusative. However, this cannot justify arguing that ji, incontrovertibly
transitive in Vedic, is somehow not a true transitive verb in examples
like (132)- (134) because what is spoken of as won is a thing and not a
person conquered.
4.3 Two major attempts to show that early Vedic did not have true
causatives, formed to transitive verbs, thus fail. 24 Given what has been
shown, then, I consider inescapable the conclusion that earliest Indo-
Aryan did indeed have true causatives, derived from transitive verbs of
particular semantic groups.
5.0 The early Iranian evidence is, as one might expect, more sparse
than that of Indie. However, as one might also expect, it does not disa-
gree with the Indie evidence.
As the Indo-Aryan verb gam occurs with an accusative, a locative, or
a dative denoting a goal (2,1), so too does the Avestan verb gam. Thus,
para hyat ... jimaitT 'before ... come' occurs with the accusative ma 'to
me' in
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(192) Y 48.2ab: vaoea nidi ya tvam vTdva dhura/ para hya-j^ ma ya mang
paraQa jimaitT 'Lord, tell me what you know, before the retribution
in your mind come to me .
'
and in Y 49.1c, gaidt. rrioi 'come to me', gaidi (2 sg. imper.) is construed
with the dative nidi 'to me'. Further, in
(193) Y 51.15b: gavd damane ahurd mazda jasat pouruyd 'The Wise
Lord came first into the house of chant.'
jasat occurs with the locative garo damane 'house of chant'. From this
verb~is derived the causative jamayeiti, as in
(19 A) Yt. 17.20: raekd me haaa aqha zamat vaqhd karanaoiti yd mam
aevd Jamayeiti yd spitamd zaraQustrd 'He makes it better that I
leave this earth, Spitama Zarathushtra, who alone makes me leave.'
where it is used with one accusative, mam 'me'.
The verb fra par (preverb fra) 'cross over' occurs with an accusative
denoting what one crosses; for example,
(195) Y 46.10e: fro tais vlspais cinvatd fra fra paratum 'With all
these would I cross the bridge of the elector.'
where fra fra (1 sg. aor. subj.) is used with the accusative paratum
'bridge' . On the other hand,
(196) Y 19.6: yasca me aetahmi ar)hvd yat astvainti spitama zaraQustra
ha'iam ahunahe vairyehe ... fra va... srdvaydt ... Qrvsci-^ tard
parartumcit Ke urvanam vahistam ahum fraparayeini 'Spitama Zarathu-
shtra, I will make his soul thrice to go across the bridge (of the
elector), to the best life, who in this corporeal world recites out
loud the Ahuna Vairya prayer.'
contains the causative fraparayeini 'I will make to cross' in construction
with tard paratumcit 'across the bridge' and two accusatives: urvanam
'soul' and vahistam ahum 'the best life (paradise)', of which the latter
denotes a goal. In addition, the causative niparayeinti 'they cause to
come, bring' in
(197) Yt. 17.54: md ois ar^ham zaoBranam vindita yd mavdya niparayeinti
'No one shall have part in these oblations which they bring me . . .'
is construed with the accusative yd '(the oblations) which' and the dative
mdvdya 'to me'
.
An object of perception can be denoted by an accusative or a genitive
in Indo-Aryan (2.2), and this is so also in Iranian. Thus, the Avestan
cognate of Sanskrit sru, the verb sru (2 sg. opt. surunuy&) takes the
accusative complement yasnam 'prayer' in Y 68.9: surunuyd. no yasnam
ahurdne 'AhuranT, hear our prayer', but in Yt 10.32: surunuyd. no miQra
yasnahe 'Mithra, hear our prayer', the same verb occurs with the genitive
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yasnahe. In addition, middle forms of sru are used in the same manner as
those of sru, meaning 'be heard', 'be heard of (2.6). For example,
(198) Y 34.12ab: kat toi razav^ kat vaH kat va stuto dat va
yasnahya/ sruidyai mazda fra vaoca ... 'I'/hat is your command, what
do you wish in praise or prayer of veneration? Wise one, proclaim
it that one might hear ..."
contains the medio-passive infinitive svuidyai 'that ... be heard' (cf.
Benveniste 1935:76), and Y 46.14b: fea va frasruidyai vast~ 'Who wants to
be famed?' has frasruidyai 'to be heard of, famous'. Further, the finite
form spuye (1 sg. mid.) is used in this sense in
(199) Y 33.7ab: a ma idum vahista .../ asa vohu manaqha ya sruye
pard magaorio 'Come to be, best ones, with Truth and Good Conception,
that I be heard before the priests.'
Corresponding to this medio-passive, there is a causative srav-i', for
example, Y 49.6cd: ... yaOid z sravayaenid tarn daenam ya xsmavato ahurd
'.
. . how we may make heard this your religious insight. Lord'. This
causative is also used specifically with reference to reciting sacred
texts, as in (196).
The Avestan verb vard is cognate with Sanskrit vrdh (2.7) and used in
the same meanings. First, it means 'grow, increase':
(200) Yt. 13.68: x'^aepaiQe rid dair^hus fraSataeaa varsSdtae ca 'Our
land is to flourish and grow. '
In addition, the active (3 sg. varadaitz) is transitive, meaning 'make
grow' ; for example,
(201) Y 28.3: ya va asa ufydni manasad vohu .../ mazd^cd ahuram
yaeibyo x^aQramcd .../ varadaitT drmaitis a nidi rdfa&rdi zavang
jasatd 'Come to my calls, to help me, I who will praise you in chant
with truth: Good Conception, the Wise Lord, and ruling power, for
whom Devotion makes grow their ruling power.'
Moreover, the derivate yorJ-i is used in the same sense as the active:
(202) V 2.4: dat me gaeQa vara6aya 'Then, (Yima,) make my world
increase.
'
Similarly, the primitive verb paiti.irinaxti 'abandons' and the derived
verb paiti ... raecayeinti 'abandon' are equivalent: Yt. 14.47: ko
rasnOm paiti.irinaxti 'Who abandons Rasnu?' Yt. 10.41: paiti Qrdtdra
yazata ... vasmano raecayeinti 'The gods who protect them abandon the regi-
ments'. This too is paralleled in Indo-Aryan (2.8, 2.10).
6.0 Since the early Iranian data are in harmony with those of Indie,
I think it safe to say that the causative system found in earliest Vedic
is inherited from Indo-Iranian. Indeed, even if there were no Iranian
evidence, one should be led to this conclusion. For, as has been shown.
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the trend within Indie is for causative formations to be extended from an
earlier limited domain, so that the early Vedic system, in which true
causatives were formed to transitive verbs of particular semantic groups,
could hardly be an Indo-Aryan innovation. What I call the old system,
then, had the following network of contrasts.
II. Verbs of movement, perception, consuming, and verbs meaning
'say' or similar: For these, there was a three-way contrast among tran-
sitive, passive, and causative (2.1-2.4, 2.12). In addition, a causative
could be related to either an active or a passive, so that two causative
constructions could contrast, meaning 'C causes A to V B' and 'c causes
B to be 7-ed by /I ' (2.6).
Ill- Other transitive verbs: For these, there was a two-way contrast
between transitive and passive. The contrast between causative and tran-
sitive did not obtain (2.8, 2.10).
III. Intransitive verbs: There could be no contrast between transi-
tive and passive, nor was there one between transitive and causative (2.5,
2.7, 2.10).
In the innovating system, there is a contrast between transitive and
causative for all transitive verbs. Moreover, by the time of Panini the
contrast between causative sentences meaning 'C causes A to V B' and 'c
causes B to be V-ed by A' was being obliterated. However, the old system
leaves its traces in syntactic dintinctions
:
J9, Verbs of movement, perception, etc. (J^ above) as well as intran-
sitive verbs: Causatives of these enter into construction (69c), in which
an accusative denotes the agent of the non-causal act.
JJ5 . Other transitive verbs: Causatives of these regularly enter
into construction (70c) , in which an instrumental refers to the agent of
the non-causal act.
The old system leaves another trace in that some derived verbs such as
rriarj-i, var-i are also used without causative value (1.4, 2.10).
My theses, then, are these. First, earliest Indo-Aryan had true
causatives, formed to verbs of particular semantic groups (J^ above), and
this state represents an inheritance from Indo-Iranian. Secondly, there
took place in Indo-Aryan at a time certainly prior to Panini a series of
syntactic and morphologic changes, involving middle and passive forms as
well as causatives, which led to the generalization of causative forma-
tions (3. 1-3. 3). 25
ABBREVIATIONS
Ait.Sr. : Aitareyaranyaka; Ait.B: Aitareyabrahmana; AV: Atharvaveda;
KBU: Kausitakibrahmanopanisad ; KS: Kathakasamhita; K^S: Katyayanasrau-
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tasutra; MS: Maitrayanisamhlta; RV: Rgveda; ^Ar.: Sankhayanaranyaka;
5B: ^atapathabrahmana; TB: Taittirlyabrahmana; TS: Taittiriyasamhita;
V: Videvdat (Vendidad); VS: Vajasaneyisamhita; Y: Yasna; Yt.: Yast.
*Thls is a revised version of the Herman Collitz Lecture delivered
at the 1978 Linguistic Institute on July 25, 1978. An abbreviated version
is also to appear in the Golden Jubilee Volume of the Vaidika Samsodhana
Mandala, Poona. I with to thank H. H. Hock and Bh. Krishnamurti for
helpful discussions on the matters treated here and G. Dunkel for valuable
comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities for support I received while writing this.
For a brief presentation of Panini's derivational system, see
Cardona 1976b (pp. 146-8 on causatives in particular).
2
I cite such isolated forms in their pre-pause variants, with -h etc.;
different ones may appear in sentences cited, due to phonologic environ-
ments.
I say 'of itself because combinations such as adhi as 'remain in,
rule over' are transitive.
Thus Panini, who treats the rice spoken of in these sentences as
agent (Cardona 1974:241-3). Forms of the type paayate 'is cooking' are
not used for certain verbs; e.g. dugdhe 'gives milk' (duhyate 'is milked'),
namati 'bends'.
a locative is also used; see (76). In the
Sanskrit of Panini's time, a verb such as vis 'enter' could still take a
locative complement, but not if used with the preverbs abhi, ni; abhi vis,
ni vis govern accusatives.
The use of a genitive in construction with certain verbs is more
widespread in earlier Sanskrit (see 2.2, 2.3). I have omitted many
details concerning locative and genitive complements with particular verbs
in later Sanskrit.
^Thus Panini; see Cardona 1974:289 n 49.
Q
That is, the nominal N2 can be followed by different endings, as
shown.
Q
N2 in b is followed by a nominative ending if it has an accusative
ending in a,; otherwise, the same ending occurs with N2 in both.
V-i is a causative base derived from the primitive verb V of a, b^.
according to which iiiC is optionally added to bases which follow, up to
and including dhrs (see Pathak-Chitrao 1935:668 [immediately preceding
verb 1807]), without causative value; ara-i etc. given above are among
these verbs.
241. Forms of the type (50) asi, (58) apaci have
the affix CtN, which in Panini's derivational system is introduced before
the ending ta. This ending is then zeroed. Passive forms other than the
ones noted simply have middle endings.
'protect', bhuj has agential forms with parasmai-
pada affixes, bhunakti etc.
I have of course given only a bare outline of the distribution,
and cannot consider more details here.
Here again, I must omit many details. Note nevertheless that bodh-i
([2b] bodhayati) does not have a middle under the condition given. Nor
does a causative like bhoj-i ([3b] bhojayati) , to a verb of consuming,
though pay-i ([96] paydya) can have a middle.
I do not imply, by speaking of reflexives, that one should consider
a reflexive pronoun implicit in such sentences; see Cardona 1976b: 148,
156-7.
For Iranian parallels, see 5.
19 f
In Vedic, genitives construed with sru regularly denote persons to
whom one listens, but in Iranian a genitive can also signify a thing
listened to; see 5.
20 »
That a comparable passage (RV 7.60.6b) has acetasam (ace. sg.)
'lacking insight' does not affect the grammatical relation noted.
21 _ . _ _ .
Cf. also aviv bhu 'become apparent', avis kr 'make apparent', con-
strued with a dative denoting one to whom something becomes or is made
apparent.
22
This is true also of modern Indo-Aryan, where distinct causative
constructions still exist for different types of transitive verbs. On the
other hand, in major languages such as Gujarati and Hindi the double
accusative construction is not used. Instead, an indirect object form
denotes the agent of the non-causal act. I cannot discuss this or facts
from middle Indo-Aryan in the present paper.
23
I have not discussed here the aorist type which is regularly paired
with causatives, the reduplicated aorist, but this does not affect my
argument
.
24
I have concentrated on Jamison's and Thieme's views because these
are the only scholars who have truly attempted to justify their positions.
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Earlier, Gaedicke (1880:277) proposed an explanation which was refuted by
Thieme (1929:20). Delbriick (1888:226) suggested that an instrumental
appears in a casuative construction because the subject appeared so much
to be the main participant that the second agent was demoted to being a
means. This fails to explain why double accusative constructions also
were used. Most recently, Haudry (1977:382-9) has treated causative
constructions in a manner which is vague, ill-founded, and fails to
account for the chronology of different constructions. I discuss his view
in a review of his book, to appear in Kratylos.
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In order to avoid ending on a note of speculation, I have not gone
on here to discuss the question of causatives in a broader Indo-European
context, though I plan to take this up. For the moment, let me only note
that there is sufficient evidence from subgroups such as Germanic and even
Italic to suggest that in Proto-Indo-European too causatives may have
been semantically restricted, at least so far as concerns morphologically
derived causatives. In addition, pairs such as niarsti , marjayati (2.8,
2.10, 5) doubtless represent a merger of forms that originally belonged to
distinct categories, which brings up the question of iteratives. For the
instant, I think it sufficient to emphasize that Indo-Iranian definitely
had true causatives formed to transitive verbs of perticular groups, so
that any future study of the Proto-Indo-European type *g^om-ey-e-t-i
(Skt. gamayati, Av. jamayeiti) , *louk-ey-e-t-i (Skt. rocayati , Av. rao-
cayeiti, Lat. luoere , as in Plautus, Casina 118 luaebis ... faaem 'you'll
light the bridal torch') must start with this as a datum; cf. also Lat.
disco 'learn', doceo 'teach', a causative found in a double accusative
construction, and a causative such as Gothic dragkjan, which corresponds
to the transitive drigkan 'drink'. Moreover, one must keep in mind that
Proto-Indo-European could well have had periphrastic causatives such as
shown in 2.11.
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CONSERVATIVE WORDS AND RADICAL SENTENCES IN
THE SEMANTICS OF INTERNATIONAL *POLITICS*
Charles E. Osgood
University of Illinois
Albert Einstein, with the foresight characteristic of true genius,
had this to say at the dawn of the nuclear age: 'The unleashed power
of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking. Thus
we are drifting toward a catastrophe beyond comparison. We shall require
a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.' It
will be my thesis that a new manner of thinking about our world will
first require a revolution in how we talk about it.
I shall try to demonstrate that certain principles of psycholin-
guistics have relevance to the science, and art, of politics—particularly
international politics. Psycholinguistics is that facet of the human
sciences which deals with relations between the characteristics of
messages and the states of the (human) organisms which exchange them.
We shall be concerned primarily with the semantic aspects of these
relations—with the meanings of word forms, with the rules by which words
are combined into phrases and sentences, with the effects of one's utter-
ings and scribblings upon others, with the semantic and valuative
constraints upon what we ordinarily say with our words and sentences,
and with how we can get out of this bind by some calculated rule-breaking.
You may well be wondering already just what all this could possibly
have to do with politics, particularly international politics. To satisfy
this wonderment is, or course, the task I have set for myself. Through-
out this talk I shall introduce each new notion with illustrations
drawn from ordinary language and only then move into illustrations and
analyses in the realm of international politics. I adopt this strategy
for two reasons: first, because we are all most familiar with the
ordinary language we use in communicating with family, friends, and
storekeepers, and the examples are therefore more compelling; second,
because examples drawn from contemporary international relations, neces-
sarily reflecting my personal political values, are liable to be
controversial and hence lose their force.
Personification of international relations is a common practice of
social scientists and statesmen, just as it is among laymen. It is even
to be found regularly in the writings of those scholars who would be the
first to deny, as a matter of disciplinary principle, that laws of
individual behavior apply to social groups. Such implicit personification
—and consequent uncritical use of folk psychology in the interpretation
of international relations—is both deceptive and dangerous. But there
is a paradox here: although one may deplore such naivety, if personifi-
cation is in fact common practice in thinking and decision-making in
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international affairs, then it must be considered part of the subject
matter of political science and made as explicit as possible . I shall
assume that principles of semantics discoverable at the individual level
can be transferred to the national level—because individual humans do
participate in the 'behaviors' of nations, because certain individuals
do play key roles in the 'decisions' of nations, and because principles
of information-processing (perceiving, interpreting, decision-making,
executing) do have their analogues at all levels.
CONSERVATIVE WORDS
Words are conservative. Although they adapt to changes in the real
world, they do so very slowly if left to themselves. Assuming a lawful
and immutable relation between words and things, we humans keep trying
to force things to conform to the meanings their words have acquired in
the past. Thus were the semantics of World War I applied in preparing
for World War II, and the French built a completely useless Maginot Line
and a false sense of security behind it. So do we seem to be preparing
for World War III, despite desperately not wanting it, by applying the
semantics of World War II.
Wrapped up in the whole process as we are, it is difficult to
perceive the lag between our language and the world it is supposed to
describe and interpret. Occasionally a dramatic failure of events to
conform with our expectations may jolt us into awareness that our world
is changing—a rash of race riots or a score of people suffocating in
the smog of an American city. The brighter among us may note that there
is a constant conservative bias in our predictions about the future
—
sputniks appeared in our skies and the Chinese tested deliverable nuclear
weapons long before these things were supposed to happen.
In periods of history when the rate of cultural change was slow,
words could almost keep up with things and their mismatch was barely
perceptible. But in the present age, with its exploding population and
its exploding technology—which means increasing human interaction and
accelerating cultural change—our semantic maps of the real world become
outmoded more and more quickly. Add to this the fact that most decisions
in today's world are being made by men in their fifties, sixties, seven-
ties, or even eighties—men whose maps were outlined at least 30 years
ago—and the language gap threatens to become an abyss. Led by old men
reading old maps, we are trying to find our way through the Wonderland
of the Twentieth Century, having more contact with the phantasy of words
than with the reality of things.
The gap getween word and thing also increases with the remoteness
of things from immediate, individual experience. As one moves outward
—
away from the intimacy of family, possessions, and the ordinary round of
living, toward the community, the nation, and the world— the map becomes
a less and less reliable guide to the territory. For one thing, we
become less able to correct our verbal maps against the facts of the ter-
rain. For another, the meanings of our words become increasingly
dependent upon the words of others. The words with which we talk about
the most critical issues of our time—nuclear overkill, arms control.
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population control, and Palestinian Coiranandos—are what in the Business
of Semantics are termed 'assigns'. Their meanings are literally assigned
by association with other words put together by other people (usually in
the mass media) rather than from direct experience with things and events.
We have immediate knowledge about what a knife can do: our knowledge
about what a nuclear missile can do is rather remote and gutless. Thus,
irrationally, knowing that one's city is targeted by a 20-megaton missile
some ten thousand miles away is not as threatening psychologically as
knowing that a madman with a carving knife is loose in the city streets.
The Power of the Word
Words may be conservative, but they can also be powerful. Wherein
lies the power of the word? It obviously doesn't lie in the noises and
squiggles per se. It lies, rather, in a very remarkable relation between
these physical manifestations, called 'signs', and certain processes in
language-users, called 'meanings'. This is the representing relation .
Words come to evoke in their users some distinctive representation of the
things referred to, and these representations can be manipulated symboli-
cally much more easily than the things themselves. Thus we can behave
—
appropriately or otherwise—with respect to the not-here and the not-now.
A Jinrniy Carter can devise strategies in which nation-names move about
his mind like chessmen on a board; words about things remote can give
him hope (President Nasser makes a peace initiative by going personally
to Israel to talk peace in the Middle East) or they can give him fear
(the possibility that Communist Cuba and Russia may threaten the dominance
of the West in Africa and threaten 'balance of power' stability).
Exactly what noises and squiggles will be used to represent what
things and events is largely arbitrary—which is one reason why human
languages are mutually unintelligible. When one is born into a given
language-culture community, he unwittingly assumes a social contract to
use noises and squiggles the way others in his community do— to use the
noise man to refer to adult male humans, for example. But once the myriad
contracts of lexical and syntactic usage have been agreed upon, the rela-
tion of meanings to things is not arbitrary—which is one reason why
human languages are mutually translatable.
The meaning of a word can be conceived as a simultaneous bundle of
distinctive semantic features. These features represent those differences
in reactions to things and events which, in human experience, have been
found to make a difference in adjustment to the physical and social
environments. Thus the representing or symbolizing process utilizes a
kind of code for highlighting what properties of things and events have
been found to be important in experience. Recent studies in comparative
psycholinguistics are beginning to make it clear that human groups,
regardless of differences in language or culture, tend to use very similar
systems of semantic features—as if, in general, they have found the same
kinds of distinctions important to make.
In some of our own research, for example, we have been finding that
humans highlight certain properties of interpersonal behavior, but not
others, as semantic features in their interpersonal verbs. I'fhat is also
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interesting is that they use many of the same verbs with the same features
to talk about international relations, as if nations were people. There
is an Associative-Dissociative feature (help vs. hinder, proteat vs.
attack), an Ego- vs. Alter-oriented feature (exploit vs. aid, manipulate
vs. advise), a Superordinate-Subordinate feature (dominate vs. submit to,
lead vs. follow), a Future-Past feature (promise vs. apologize, threaten
vs. retaliate), and so on. Needless to say, there is considerable danger
of misrepresentation when we apply, willy-nilly, the semantics of inter-
personal relations to the things and events of international relations.
Since the semantic features on which words are coded can never
exhaust the properties of things which might be represented, it is inevita-
ble that words must be abstractions. In this sense, words are caricatures
of things. Although this is most obvious for big, impressive symbols like
Colonialism or Blaak Power, it holds also for little ordinary words like
dog and pencil. It is precisely in this selective abstraction from reality
that the power of words lies . Those properties of things that are seman-
tically coded are sharpened in thinking; those properties of things that
are not so coded are blurred in thinking. A man can freeze to death for
lack of kindling wood and yet be found with a pocketfull of wooden
pencils—because pencils are coded 'to write with', not 'to make fires
with'
.
What facets of reality are sharpened or leveled by words depends on
what properties of things have made a difference in the past use of the
language. This is the conservatism of words, and it can make us attend to
features of events which are now irrelevant and be oblivious to features
which are now critical. Bound by an antiquated semantics of Power
Politics, diplomats keep wary eyes on the shifting patterns of alliances
and scurry about trying to maintain mutual security pacts—NATO's, SEATO's,
CENTRO's, and PREPOSTRO's. The semantic coding of mutual security pact
simultaneously fixes thought on the solidarity of one group and on its
antagonism toward another. But the differences within the groups so
segregated and the similarities between their particular members are
obscured. Within the so-called Free World there are members which, by
most criteria, are more similar to members of the so-called Communist
Bloc, and vice versa.
The semantic features of words may either define or imply. For
English speakers, the term father includes Male, Adult, and Parental among
its defining features, and Dominance and Goodness among its implicative
features. Any human we call a father must be an adult male who has
progeny, or else we are breaking our linguistic contract, but obviously
he need be neither good nor dominant. Substitution of implicative for
defining features— that is, the use of emotive language— is the trademark
of propaganda. Buck teeth and a spider body obviously did not define a
Japanese human, but it did make him more killable in World War II. Just
as the same odor may be called an aroma or a stench, depending on how one
wants the listener to feel about it, so may the same guerrillas be called
freedom fighters, rebels, or terrorists, depending upon how one wishes
the listener to feel about them.
Words of Power
Among the few remaining places where myth and fantasy still have
power for modern man are advertising and international relations.
Although we cannot eat words, smoke words, or shave with words, the
advertising industry makes a valiant effort to achieve that end; incan-
tations, spells, contagious and analogic magic are part of the trade.
International politics has its incantations ('the right to self-
determination'), its spells ('we have a commitment'), its contagious
magic ('a threat to freedom in Asia is a threat to freedom in Podunk,
U.S.A.'), and its analogic magic ('another Munich'). Both advertising
and international relations have everything it takes for myth-making
—
remoteness from the individual, conflict between ultimate Goods and Evils,
and near-omnipotence of the storytellers. And, in both, the myths created
do serve many social functions: they provide an illusion of understanding,
simple prescriptions for ordering a complex world, and the promise that,
if the illusions are believed and the prescriptions followed, everyone
will live happily ever after. In the political arena, at least, the
storytellers are often their own most gullible audience.
The words of international power politics are typically analogic.
There are analogies from interpersonal relations; nation-states become
We' s and They's who assume military postures, who glare at each other eye-
ball to eye-hall, who harass or intimidate each other, who trust or are
suspicious of each other. There are analogies from 19-century physics,
with balances of power or power vacuums, with slippery slopes or rows of
dominos along which vague forces operate with some natural inevitability,
with attractions and repulsions, and centers toward which power gravi-
tates. Analogies have the same sharpening and blurring effects upon
thinking that ordinary words do, only more so; they raise the feature
analogized to a dazzling prominence which obscures other, often more rele-
vant features.
The pseudonyms which pepper dialogue in the nuclear age carry this
attenuation of word from thing even further, adding semantic features
which do not exist in the thing and neatly countermanding features which
do exist. The title CAMELOT conferred a romantic, even chivalrous, tang
to an ill-fated U.S. Army project designed to study the causes of revolu-
tions. To name an anti-ballistic missile system SAFEGUARD certainly must
make its possessors feel more secure. A touch of nobility is added to
raw power when intercontinental ballistic missiles are named THOR,
JUPITER, ATLAS, ZEUS, and POLARIS—although I miss the ultimate in seman-
tic deception which would be a missile named VENUS!
Acronyms—short-cuts which compress the forms of phrases into their
initial letters—carry the attenuation of word from thing even further.
They also put a great burden on human memory. Debates on the status of
NATO and on the merits of SALT negotiations can be carried on with only
remote reference to the things involved. They become 'things' of sorts on
their own, things to be defended or attacked by partisans or critics with
more reference to personal and political loyalties than to the complex
events and arrangements in the real world they actually represent. When
an acronym is devised before a thing is given an ordinary name, contact
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with reality Is liable to disappear entirely. A playful example from the
argot of military space scientists is EGADS, which names the system used
to destroy a malfunctioning missile after it has been launched
—
translation: 'electronic ground automatic destruct sequencer'!
Much of military jargon is designed to dehumanize things and thus
protect the speaker or listener from feeling moral qualms. In The Domes-
day Dictionary of Kaplan and Schwerner (1963), for example, we find that the
tertiary effects of nuclear blast are 'damage received by displacement of
the biological target, or blast flight' and this is further analyzed into
'differential displacement' (which translates as violent separation of
hand, arm, leg, head, etc.) and 'total displacement' (which really
translates as being tossed into the next block in one chunk) . . . The
military do have a way of juggling semantic features. We never bombed a
simple village hut in South Vietnam, it was always a 'VC structure'.
Here are a few words of power to conjure with: The word power
itself is often confused, by those who think they have it, with the word
forae. The meaning of power, unlike force, includes the feature of being
able to produce a desired result. According to political scientist Murray
Edelman, 'force signals weakness in politics, as rape does in sex.' If
the use or threat of force serves to create the very outcome it was
designed to prevent— for example, setting up military bases in Thailand
resulting in a sharp increase in communist counteractivity— then it is
selfdefeating and certainly not a demonstration of power.
Peace and freedom are nice words, but they are otherwise rather
empty semantically. And being empty, they lend themselves to bizarre
uses. Is peace a world spinning toward eternity triggered for mutual
annihilation and kept from it only by mutual fear? This is what the
phrase 'peace through military strength' really means today. The name of
freedom, along with the resounding phrase 'law and order', is often used
to justify its exact opposite—to rationalize subservience to authority
and to condone suppression of the freedom of others.
The term coexistence does reflect an awareness of the irrationality
of mutual nuclear annihilation—but what more than this does it mean to
people? At an International Convocation on the Requirements of Peace,
held in 1965 by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium said: 'coexistence means only that you and
we renounce war. For the rest we fight, trying to make the best demon-
stration we can that one system or the other is best.'
In is interesting that most participants in the conference used the
phrase peaceful coexistence to describe this state of affairs. Surely,
competitive coexistence would more aptly represent what they had in mind.
There are many ways one can enliven the word coexistence, and by so doing
point forcefully to quite different real-world possibilities: one could
talk about fearful coexistence, pointing to the inherent nature of mutual
nuclear deterrence; one could talk about tolerant coexistence, pointing
to acceptance of differences without trying to change them, and even
co-operative coexistence, pointing to co-operation rather than competition
despite differences in systems.
In Defense of Ambiguity
Ambiguity can hurt. It does when the same word is used in the same
context , but with different meanings for different people. Such is the
case with socialism and capitalism— to say nothing about democracy as
used by Americans vs. Russians, for example. But for most ordinary words,
potential ambiguity is effectively eliminated by context . I'Jhen someone
says duck in the barnyard, I will not crouch as I will when the same word
is uttered in a sand-lot ball park.
Proponents of One World Language as the salvation of Mankind often
include elimination of ambiguity as one of the planks in their platform
—one word one meaning! Not only would this increase the size of our
working vocabulary inordinately— the little word play, for example, has
some 40 different meanings, at least 15 of which are quite common—but a
language free of ambiguity would be like sand in the fluid coupling of
man-to-man and man-to-government. Some degree of ambiguity is necessary
for a smoothly functioning society.
Political scientist Murray Edelman also makes the insightful observa-
tion that administration of laws governing ordinary social behavior tends
toward a compromise between the letter of the law and the vagaries of
human nature—too loose administration sets man against man and too strict
sets man against government. When law is enforced as if it were a command
rather than a virtuous generalization, around which a game can be played,
it becomes a trial of force rather than a trial of wits.
In international politics there appears to be little tolerance of
ambiguity. Negotiators strive for months to overspecify the inherently
unspecif iable, to wring all possible ambiguities out of every statement in
every language. At the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 it took six months for
delegates to decide in what order they should enter and be seated in the
negotiating chamber! How many weeks did it take to decide on the shapes
and markings of tables for the U.S. /Vietnam negotiations in Paris? Inter-
national politics ^ more a trial of force than a trial of wits, and
ambiguity is therefore more threatening than challenging.
A prime example of intolerance of ambiguity is reification of The
Nation as the unit in international affairs. Since the flowing forests
and oceans do not recognize these creations of the human mind, we put up
boundary markers, erect walls and fortification, establish bordercrossing
restrictions, try to impose language homogeneity within boundaries, define
invisible territorial extensions into the seas and brightly color our
maps in different hues so that children can learn just what is really
where—all to reaffirm that The Nation is indeed a unitary thing like other
things that have names. It then becomes easier to personify nations as
Actors in a great global game, and harder to appreciate either the simi-
larities across boundaries or the differences within.
Part of any semantic revolution must be an increase in the ambiguity
of nation names, by using language which deliberately levels distinctions
between nations and sharpens differences within them. This implies gradual
dissolution of the nation-state as the prime political unit—which, surely.
is heresy. But in a nuclear age there may be more security in disunity
;
out of creative chaos there could come both a greater tolerance of ambigu-
ity and more accurate semantic mapping of the complexities of the real
world
—
paradoxical as that may seem. Fortunately, human languages contain
the seeds for their own revolutions, so let us turn now from words to
sentences.
RADICAL SENTENCES
We refer to our species as homo sapiens, but homo loguens would be
more accurate. Other animals have been shown to symbolize the not-here
and not-now to some degree—witness the way honey bees can represent the
distance and direction of new food sources by their dance; other animals
certainly manipulate the environment toward their own ends—witness the
dams built by beavers. But no other animal really talks, in the sense of
using a shared set of abstract rules for making propositions about the
world. This is at once our great advantage as a species and, potentially,
our downfall. Ability to propositionalize about things leads to control
over them, but control over things without understanding and control over
ourselves invites disaster.
Humans share many needs with lower organisms—needs to procreate, to
feed, to avoid pain, for example. But the fact of propositional language
creates uniquely human needs, particularly the need to know and the need to
do something about what is known. When one can conjure with the not-here
and not-now, one often assumes some responsibility toward it. Myths,
religions and ordinary daily news are testimony to the need to know, or at
least have some illusion of knowing, and knowing impels doing things in
anticipation of events—making an offering at the shrine of one's God,
planting crops at a time deemed propitious by omen or science, or even
building a fall-out shelter in anticipation of a nuclear attack—which has
now become sheer nonsense.
Valid propositions about the environment, either informal ('common-
sense') or formal ('science'), have given humans considerable freedom from
its harsh constraints. But scientific control of the environment has
already reached the point where we now have a new kind of freedom—
a
freedom ^, which is positively embarrassing in its riches: freedom to
make deserts into gardens, freedom to manipulate our own numbers and even
our own genetic makeup, freedom to bring any part of the world to any
doorstep by satellite communication. The possibilities are staggering to
the imagination, but choice among them demands fresh and apposite proposi-
tions about the world.
Rules for Creating and Understanding Sentences
We make propositions by combining words into sentences of a particular
type. Propositional sentences make assertions about their topics, and they
can be signaled by I state that, I assume that, I claim that, and the like
—but we are rarely given this warning. Unlike words, propositional
sentences can be tested for their truth value. Take, for example, the
sentence Tom is a thief. One can ask significantly, is it true that Tom
is a thief? One cannot ask significantly, is it true that Tom? or ask
is it true that thief?
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When prepositional sentences come from prestigious persons and make
assertions whose truth values cannot be readily tested—either because of
the remoteness of the things referred to or because of the inherent
ambituity of the concepts involved— their power of conviction is compelling.
Faced with the assertion of a Pentagon expert that a missile gap exists
and threatens our security, what is hapless Mr. Congressman to do but vote
for a bigger defense budget—even though this assertion eventually proves
to be false? Interestingly enough, resistance to such assertions, when it
comes, is usually not so much based upon the truth-value of the assertions
per se as upon the veracity of the speaker as a source. The peculiar
power of sentences comes from the fact that they can assert something about
the topic to be true—even this sentence, what I say (topic) is not true
(commentary)
.
The meanings of words are constrained by the sentences in which they
appear. Let us represent, for convenience, the meaning of a word as a
string of pluses, zeros, and minuses—a strip-code for its bundle of
semantic features—and then ask ourselves what may transpire when two or
more words are forced to interact within phrases or sentences. (1) If the
coding of one word is the same on a certain feature as another word with
which it is pressed into syntactic combination, it will intensify that
feature of meaning—as the adjective sudden does for the noun surprise in
the phrase sudden surprise. (2) If one word adds distinctive codings where
the other has zeros, then it serves to modify the meaning of the whole
—
as in the phrase sudden anger (one can also experience slow, burning
anger) . (3) If one word has codings opposed to those in another word on
the same semantic features, then what are called 'semantic anomalies' are
produced—as in sudden aomplaaency or meek contempt. This 'feeling of
incongruence' is a most significant human capability, of which I shall
have more to say momentarily.
The assertion Tom is a thief momentarily punches some of the semantic
codings of thief onto the topic of the sentence, Tom, thereby modifying
the meaning of Tom—quite congruently for the arresting officer who caught
him with his hand in the till but completely incongruently for Tom's
Mother! Yet they both understand what the speaker intends, whether believ-
ing or not believing him. This momentary fusion of semantic features is
essential for understanding phrases and sentences, but it would be disas-
trous if the change in word meanings were permanent. Fortunately, words
tend to snap back into their normal semantic shape after being bent to
the purposes of sentences. Otherwise our semantics would become a murky,
meaningless shambles.
The influence of word upon word within sentences can be quite subtle.
In English the word neighbor is not coded for sex. Yet if I say My new
neighbor is pretty, you automatically assume that I am referring to a
female, and if I say My new neighbor is handsome, you assume that it is a
male. The sex codings of pretty and handsome are being momentarily con-
ferred upon neutral neighbor. Sentences graced by the phrase most people
carry a sense of ubiquity that far exceeds its casual method of calcula-
tion. Use of the phrase Administration Spokesman confers an aura of
intimate access and sophistication upon the source which is hard to escape
(be it news secretary, just secretary, or even chambermaid). Conversely,
I
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one of the many ways of 'belittling' sources is to make the propositional
nature of their assertions explicit. To report that The Russians claim
that the Communist Summit Conferenae was a demonstration of unity within
the world of socialist societies is to cast the shadow of doubt upon what
they are claiming. Propositional sentences are most compelling when
their propositional status remains implicit.
Students of the Oxford School of Philosophy, notably Wittgenstein
and Ryle, have suggested that words can only have meaning when used in
sentences. But surely this is a two-way street. Just as sentences
constrain the meanings of words, so do the meanings of words constrain the
sentences that can be produced in ordinary language.
At the grossest level there are syntactic rules : correctly speaking
English, I cannot create sentences of words coded grammatically as Object-
Subject-Verb in that order— for example, Garlic I taste—although ordinary
speakers often do produce just such non-sentences when highly motivated
by the logical object {garlic). At the finest level there are strictly
semantic rules : it is semantically anomalous to say She plead with him
tolerantly, because plead with is coded for a Subordinate relation of
she to him whereas tolerantly implies a Superordinate relation of she to
him. This is the level at which language can most subtly constrain how
we think about things, and some semantic juggling is often necessary to
make true propositions. I think it would have been accurate to say in
January 1973 that Secretary Henry Kissinger plead tolerantly with Presi-
dent Thieu of South Vietnam to accept the terms of the Paris Accords—
tolerantly because of relative power status of the nations involved.
There are, finally, pragmatic rules of usage—rules which reflect what we
know, or think we know, about the real world. Thus the sentence He shot
at the car with a Reagan sticker is unambiguous only because we know that
you can't use bumper stickers to shoot with.
Why do I claim that sentences are potentially radical? For one thing,
whereas the words available to us at any time are finite, the number of
sentences we can create with them is potentially infinite. For another
thing, most sentences we encounter are novel as wholes; I know that most
of the sentences in this paper were novel to me as I wrote them, and I
assume they are novel to you, yet I have reason to hope that we both
understand them. Furthermore, sentences can be whimsically nonsensical
or deliberately nonfactual—we can lie with sentences. But most impor-
tantly, sentences 'do things' to the words they use, forcing new and
sometimes revealing interpretations of reality. When, of a certain woman,
I say She will make someone a nice husband—or, so that Woman's Lib. won't
come after me. He will make someone a nice wife!— I am breaking semantic
rules, to be sure, but I am also offering a thumbnail personality sketch
of the lady—or gentleman— in question.
Sources and Effects of Sentences
Now let's return to the world of international politics. Precisely
what sentences about this world are we likely to create and how are people
likely to interpret them? The actual sentences about nations and their
relations that we hear are a vary small subset of the possible sentences
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which could be produced, even within the rules of sentencing just outlined.
The reason is simply that we usually say 'what is in our minds'—but this
will require a bit of elaboration. In my analysis of why we create the
sentences we do and interpret them the way we do, I shall emphasize only
one semantic feature— the evaluative or attitudinal feature. But this
aspect of meaning certainly carries the most weight in politics.
Try to imagine a space of some unknown number of dimensions within
which the concepts we talk about appear as points. The dimensions of
this space are the semantic features already discussed. The most promi-
nent dimension of this space—let's say the up and down of it— is the
evaluative, or good-bad , dimension. This dimension of meaning is based
upon the human bedrock of pleasures and pains, of rewards and punishments,
of threats and promises.
One's own Ego, or selfconcept, is good by virtue of biological
imperative—at least until one is taught about sin or becomes old and
cynical—and this Ego early-on becomes the arbiter for evaluating other
concepts. Signs of immediate things like PAIN, DIRT, and DANGER, which
hurt, shame, and threaten Ego, tend to move downward toward maximal
Badness. These concepts in turn become pivotal evaluators, pushing and
shoving other, more remote things , like FRIEND vs. STRANGER and GOD vs.
DEVIL, into appropriate positions along this evaluative dimension—simply
by virtue of being associated, positively or negatively, with them in
propositional sentences. Exposed to assertions like My Daddy says Blacks
are lazy or My teacher says policemen protect us from thieves, race
concepts, occupational concepts, nation concepts, and all the rest gradu-
ally acquire values. The underlying principle in this primitive mapping
of semantic values onto things is pressure toward cognitive consonance
(or, if one prefers the negative, avoidance of cognitive dissonance).
It is by such a basic process that the Unfamiliar is assimilated to the
Familiar and thereby given meaning. The Cold War is steadily fired by
application of its own tired rhetoric, which regularly appeals to the
pivotal concepts of GOOD and EVIL for its sustenance— thus being a kind
of Holy War.
Assertions connect topics with commentaries. The connectors (verbs)
may be either associative (A is B, A likes B, A helps B) or dissociative
(A is not B, A dislikes B, A hinders B) . If both topic and commentary
have the same evaluative sign (both good or both bad ) , associative asser-
tions will be consonant and dissociative assertions dissonant. If both
Russia and China are held to be communist and therefore evil, it is
cognitively consonant that Russia should support China—and needless to
say, from the State Department on down, many Americans found the late
President de Gaulle's associative moves toward both Russia and China back
in the mid-1960' s most unsettling. It is also unsettling for some folks
now when there is a developing detente in the relations of the U.S. and
mainland China.
If topic and commentary have opposed signs (one is good and the other
bad), then dissociative assertions become consonant and associative ones
dissonant. In human conflict situations it is easy to believe aggressive
dissociative assertions made by one's opponent {W will bury you) and
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hard to believe his conciliatory associative assertions {We can coexist
peacefully) . It just simply is congruent in Black-and-White thinking for
BAD GUYS to threaten GOOD GUYS, and vice versa. This creates a constant
bias in oredihitity which encourages escalation of conflicts.
Most people, most of the time, create sentences that are consonant
with their own systems of attitudes and beliefs. This is one reason why
they produce only a small subset of possible sentences about the world.
If someone believes that Communism is evil, he is not likely to produce
sentences like I favor the Communist system or like Communists can be
trusted, and so forth for myriads of other potential sentences. But
what happens when a person is constrained to produce assertions that are
inconsistent with his own attitudes and beliefs? What happens when he is
exposed to assertions made by others that are inconsistent with his own
system?
This is where what I call psycho-logic enters the picture. This is
an entirely illogical, but very potent psychological, process. It is
designed to restore the comforting state of mental equilibrium—with all
the Goods and Bads in their right places—whenever this state has been
disrupted by incongruity. Incongruity creates cognitive stress, and the
victim is driven to do something about it; when he does something to the
world or to himself which restores cognitive balance, it gratifies him
and makes him feel secure. Psycho-logic may not follow logical principles,
but it is nevertheless peculiarly significant for an understanding of the
dynamics of international politics.
When a person is constrained by his own selfinterest to talk and act
as if he agrees with certain people and believes certain things, his
behavior is inconsistent with his own values and he is under constant
cognitive stress. One resolution is simply to tolerate the dissonance,
rationalizing it as leading to a larger goal—but people differ in their
tolerance of ambiguity. One wonders if the late Mr. Adlai Stevenson
suffered just such prolonged cognitive stress while functioning as U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations. Another resolution is to change one's
behavior, get out of the situation, say what one really thinks; people in
public life do commit suicide sometimes, politically as well as physically.
The most likely resolution, however, is a form of psycho-logic: the
person gradually and unconsciously changes his values and beliefs toward
consistency with what he feels he must say and do. Men on the accession
routes to power are peculiarly susceptible to such self-induced 'brain-
washing' .
It can be hypothesized that the same dynamics influence relations
among nations. If the people of nations A and B really dislike and dis-
trust each other, but they are constrained by their mutual selfinterest
to repeatedly behave as if they liked and trusted each other, their mutual
perceptions should become more consistent with their mutual behaviors. Is
there any evidence in recent history for such processes at the international
level?
In a significant paper titled 'The Kennedy Experiment', Amitai Etzioni
documents a real-world test of this hypothesis. Beginning with the late
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President Kennedy's speech at the American University on June 10, 1963,
in which he announced the first unilateral initiative (that the U.S. was
stopping all nuclear tests in the atmosphere) , a series of reciprocal
unilateral steps were taken (the Soviets stopping production of strategic
bombers, the Americans approving the sale of $250 million worth of wheat
to the Russians, and so forth), culminating with conclusion of the Test Ban
Treaty—clearly to the self interest of both sides. Did the predicted
psychological side-effects occur? A correspondent to the New York Times
had this to say on June 16, near the beginning of the experiment:
'
. . .
there was a new threat of international peace in the air this
week, the kind of threat that leaves sophisticates smirking and the rest
of us just dumbfounded' ; but on September 22 the same correspondent had
changed his tune: 'We have cleared the air and cleared the atmospheres
and warmed the climate and calmed the winds . ' The Kennedy Experiment came
to an abrupt end—in Dallas, Texas.
When a person is exposed to assertions from others which cause him
cognitive stress, psycho-logic offers a number of defensive mechanisms. He
may simply deny the assertions and stop thinking about them. More subtly,
he may accept the assertions intellectually but deny their emotional impli-
cations; many Americans became quite callous about the use of napalm,
crop-destroying sprays, and other indescriminate weapons against living
things in South Vietnam. For insurance against cognitive stress, one may
selectively expose himself to information that is consistent with his own
belief system and selectively avoid information that is inconsistent.
By attributing different motives to ourselves and our opponents
—
benevolent motives to i'TE and malevolent motives to THEY
—
exactly the same
behavior by both can be rationalized into the value system. Psycho-logic
thus creates a double standard of national morality. During the Cuban
missile crisis, the American government defined the weapons being implanted
in Cuban soil as 'offensive' in nature, whereas essentially similar Ameri-
can weapons in West Germany, Italy, and Turkey were defined as 'defensive'
—and the Soviets, of course, applied exactly the same definitions, but in
reverse. After the signing of the Paris Accords, both the South and the
North Vietnamese flagrantly violated its provisions
—
yet, when the l^fE's
did it, it was practical military realism, but when the THEY's did it, it
was either crass deceitfulness or naked aggression.
Once unleashed, sentences fly about willy-nilly in all directions.
This is praticularly true with modern electronic communications and it
poses particular problems for political messages. From the viexv^joint of
the political speaker , he is always dealing with multiple audiences which
have multiple interests and multiple relations to him. When a head of
state makes a speech, he can be sure that his own party, the opposition
party, labor union members and industrialists, his o\m military and the
opponent's military, to say nothing of general publics both at home and
abroad, are all listening in, and what falls harmoniously on the ears of
one is bound to fall gratingly on the ears of another. Occasionally one
may be able to use a private code for the benefit of some segment of his
audience. Ex-Secretary Rusk used to refer to the capital of Mainland China
not as Peking but as Peiping, the name favored by the Nationalists and
therefore an insult to the Communists—of which the American public was
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quite unaware. From the viewpoint of the political listener
,
there is a
continuous bombardment of conflicting assertions. Within the U.S., one
expects this, and indeed it is one index of democracy. But since the
ordinary citizen, no matter where he may be, tends to identify other
nations as monolithic personalities, conflicting voices from abroad become
most confusing. When the hard-line assertions of a militarist are inter-
laced with the soft-line assertions of a U.N. diplomat, and both are
attributed to the same national entity, that nation obviously is quilty
of deliberate doubletalk.
Now, it may be argued that human individuals of even ordinary intel-
ligence, although susceptible to psycho-logic, certainly are more
sophisticated in their thinking than this analysis implies. This is quite
correct. But when all of the complex interplays among the individuals
who make up nations have worked themselves into the amalgam of national
policy, what appears in the dialogue between nations seems to represent
something close to the lowest common denominator of its individual ingradi-
ents. But even for a sophisticated individual, the remoteness of the
events talked about and his nearly complete dependence upon the mass media
render him peculiarly susceptible to psycho-logic when he thinks and talks
about international affairs.
TOWARD A SEMANTIC REVOLUTION
Rules are made to be broken. It is only through breaking them when
necessary that we can force our language into a more faithful portrayal of
things as they are. When a young lad, accused of a felony, exclaims, 'Ah
ain't nevah done nothin' to nobody nohow!', he is guilty of a quintuple
negative at the very least—but his claim to honorable charactet is being
vividly made. Winston Churchill's coinage of the phrase Iron Curtain
broke pragmatic, if not semantic, rules of English, but it certainly pro-
vided an apt characterization of the Cold War situation at the time. We
need a more lively language to revitalize the stale rhetoric of inter-
national politics.
But if rules are made to be broken, then there must also be rules for
breaking rules—otherwise we have not revolution but chaos. '^^Jhen I use
a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just
what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said
Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The
question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master, that's all.'
There are grains of both truth and untruth here. Being master of one's
words is not synonymous with being arbitrary in one's use of them. Adap-
tation of a language to the rapidly changing world is essential, but so is
continuity of a language with its past.
As to novelty or innovation in language, a continuum can be traced
from monotony, through coinage and metaphor, to verbal magic, and ulti-
mately into chaos. The stale rhetoric of international politics approaches
the nadir of novelty; words and phrases predict each other redundantly,
semantic features are all in rapport, and little new information is commu-
nicated by the parading sentences. If there is too much unpredictability
— if too many semantic features are in conflict—a pinnacle of novelty may
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be approached, but again little is communicated because of sheer chaos.
Just as there is an optimum degree of unpredictability in the arts
—
variations on themes which maximize aesthetic pleasure—so is there an
optimum degree of rule-breaking in language which maximizes communication
of fresh ideas, whether it be in poetry or politics.
Effective metaphors break semantic rules optimally. In the literal
use of English, one cannot say the panther shouted (only humans can shout).
Speaking poetically, however, one might say the thunder shouted down the
mountainside, thereby humanizing the thunder; but I, at least, could not
say the brook shouted down the mountainside—without making it a torrent.
Thunder and shouting share enough features to allov? overriding of the
Humanness distinction, but brook and shouting do not
—
the brook chuckled
down the mountainside would be fine. I use the term 'verbal magic' to
refer to the case where a false context is used to support a semantically
anomalous assertion. My favorite example is a TV beer advertisement:
After dropping bottles of the brew from skyscrapers, running them over
with steamrollers, and flinging them against brick walls—with nary a
scratch to the glass bottles— the assertion is brightly made that this
beer has indestructible flavor!
One ingredient of a semantic revolution is a healthy suspicion of
familiar words and phrases . By way of example, let us analyse the familiar
phrase, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. The assertion A deters B carries the implica-
tions that B must be aggressive (since he requires deterring) and that A
is both nonaggressive (since he merely deters) and actually benevolent
(since he is opposed to a potential aggressor) . The phrase >nJTUAL NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE, demanded by the real-world fact of Soviet nuclear capability,
is a bit more sophisticated— for one thing, it neutralizes A and B with
respect to just who is benevolent and who is potentially aggressive—but
this phrase also has subtle connotations. It has a stable, reassuring
feel to it—almost like being in a medieval suit of armor—but given its
foundations on the shifting psychological sands of mutual fear and dis-
trust, nothing could be much less stable or reassuring. In other words,
the semantic implications of this phrase simply do not fit its referent.
Another ingredient of a semantic revolution is imaginative flexi-
bility with, and tolerance for, unfamiliar words and phrases . Returning
to the concept of MUTUAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, with its illusory assurance
of stability, it is refreshing to note that one well-known strategist
dubbed it 'the delicate balance of terror'. In coining this phrase our
strategist was deliberately violating semantic proprieties; terror is
certainly not something our language implies can be delicately balanced ,
and yet this is precisely the state of affairs, as the Cuban missile
crisis so amply demonstrated. Creating radical phrases is not restricted
to academic types, of course, l-rtien asked by CBS News on February 20,
1967, to explain the latest military escalation in Vietnam, an Adminis-
tration spokesman said it represented a 'calculated outburst of impatience'
on the part of President Johnson!
New words and phrases rush into the spaces left by the mismatch of
language to reality. The greater the rate of culture change the greater
the pressure on speakers to innovate. The nuclear age is creating many
empty spaces in our semantic maps of the world, but linguistic innovation
is more apparent in its technological than its political aspects. In The
Doomsday Dictionary, we find that a heach is a unit of fission energy
equaling 3000 billion tons of dynamite, or enough to kill half the earth's
population by fallout (a term derived from the motion picture. On the
Beach), and that a 'kahn is the more 'modest' quantity of fission energy
required to liquidate the entire population of one major country without
any shelters—300 'kahn equals one beach.
The term kahn, of course, is taken from the name of one of the most
provocative, innovative—and macabre—writers about strategy in the nuclear
age, Herman Kahn. His several books are replete with lively concepts
like aatalytia war (conflict between two major nuclear powers deliberately
started by a third power), exaalation ladder (steps ranging from subcrisis
disagreements to all-out nuclear war and its aftermath) , and stark deter-
rence (capacity of overkill by a factor of 10 or more, so that miscalcula-
tion or wishful thinking by an opponent becomes most unlikely). Of course,
there are apposite coinages, which highlight the truly significant proper-
ties of things, and inapposite ones, which obscure them. The term overkill
is not particularly apposite, suggesting degrees of killing humans when
humans can only die once; it is actually used to refer to the extra inten-
sities of attack required to liquidate a defended target as compared with
an undefended one.
Another ingredient of a semantic revolution is respect for the
distinction between words and things . This, of course, is the central
theme of General Semantics. Actions should speak louder than words, but
in international politics actions are often ambiguous as to interpretation.
They may be expressive as well as instrumental. The assassination of
John F. Kennedy was interpreted variously as a communist, a military-
industrial, a right-wing conspiracy, or a CIA plot—depending on where the
observer stood politically himself. The conflict in South Vietnam, at
the time of U.S. escalation in February 1965, was officially interpreted
as 'aggression from the North' but unofficially interpreted by many
unattached experts as 'civil war'. Nevertheless, we would be wise to pay
more attention to what nations d£ and less attention to what they say .
As long as the feet of Chinese soldiers and their weapons stayed on
Chinese soil, for example, we could afford to shrug off their blustering
words.
Yet another ingredient is substituting empathy for projection in the
effects of our words upon others . Since most of us do most of our talking
to people in a community which shares a common set of meanings and values,
we have usually been successful in predicting their reactions to our words
simply by projecting on to them how we would react ourselves. When we
extend this normal process to people of other cultures using other lan-
guages, however, we inevitably get into trouble. Projection made it easy
for Americans to assume that the South Vietnamese people saw the conflict
there as we did—as part of a massive confrontation between the Free
World and Communism. However, in terms of Vietnamese experience it was
probably, first and most immediately, a struggle for sheer survival in a
war they hardly comprehended and second, but more remotely, a struggle for
national independence from colonialism. Developing empathy for others
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requires exposing oneself to their conditions and experiences—directly
if possible but mediately through well selected descriptions if not—and
then role-playing the effects of our messages while standing in their
mental shoes.
UTien we label other people's needs, the words we choose may reflect
how much projection or empathy is involved. A former official of the
Agency for International Development, Byron Johnson, called the acronym
AID a hypocritical misnomer, charging that American 'aid' consisted
mostly of self-promoting, arrogantly-administered loans that offended the
pride of the people in other nations. Despite the benevolent intent, it
is depressing how often AID has been given or taken away for military
and political reasons, how often it has foisted marginally useful goods
on bewildered people in order to relieve gorged American markets, how
often it ended up in the pockets of the relatively well-to-do in foreign
countries, thereby actually widening the gulf between Have and Have-not
people within the countries being 'aided'. The very term underdeveloped
is an insult to people whose written histories may go back much further
than our own, for it equates material, technological progress with cultural
development in general. We would be wiser to speak about unevenly devel -
oped countries . This phrase at least admits of the possibility that we
Westerners are also underdeveloped in some respects, as well as definitely
overdeveloped in others—to the extent that Mankind could perish from it.
Another revolutionary phrase I would recommend is benevolent subver-
sion: there is no question but what the West—and particularly the United
States in the past few decades—has been the most effective force in
history for subverting the governments, the economies, and the whole ways
of life of other peoples throughout the world. And there is no question
but what we have often been benevolent in intent, at least as we see
ourselves. But when forced into anomalous confrontation, the words
benevolent and subversion bring into mind obscure but significant features
of each— the potential selfishness of benevolence and the potential
altruism of subversion.
Perhaps the most important ingredient in a semantic revolution is
using radical sentences to compensate for conservative words . Although
new words can be coined and old words can change their meanings, they
remain essentially conservative and inept for the fresh purposes of the
moment. Sentences can crunch words together into phrases which highlight
new features and eradicate old; they can formulate assertions about the
world which question tired assumptions and suggest new truths. Of course,
the phrases may be bizarre and the assertions incredible upon close
inspection, but the potential for fresh ways of talking, and hence think-
ing, is there.
For tv/enty years I have been espousing a general strategy for inter-
national behavior modeled upon what I think I know about interpersonal
behavior—a strategy which seems appropriate for a nuclear age. Its
formal and descriptively adequate name is graduated and Reciprocated
Initiatives in Tension-reduction. But early-on I discovered that very few
people, including myself, could easily remember this complex nominal com-
pound correctly. While doodling at a conference one day I came up with
the acronym, GRIT—which not only provided cues for the salient features
of the strategy but also seemed quite appropriate, since grit is exactly
what it requires.
This strategy is a form of calculated de-escalation of conflicts: a
nation caught in a conflict spiral deliberately initiates sequences of
small, tension-reducing moves, these moves being well within its margin
of security and being designed to elicit reciprocating steps from the
opponent. To the extent that reciprocation ±s^ obtained, somewhat larger,
more significant steps can be taken, and both parties move cautiously
toward a political rather than a military resolution.
My original paper on this (Osgood 1962) , appeared in a book sponsored by
a group of Democratic congressmen, titled The Liberal Papers; the Republican
National Committee described nr^. contribution as 'surrender on the installment
plan— to which, in the present context, I can only say 'touche'I Debating the
feasibility of such a novel approach to conflict resolution—at least as
far as sovereign nations are concerned— forced me to question certain
unquestioned assumptions about national security in this nuclear age, and,
in doing so, to create a few radical sentences of my own. They will pro-
vide a final illustration of my thesis.
I had to assert that the primary motive behind the threatening
behavior of nations toward others is usually fear . The traditional assump-
tion, consistent with the dynamics of psycho-logic, is that one's opponent
is always motivated by aggressive impulses. Accepting even the possibility
of fear motivation enables one nation to respond more rationally (and less
fearfully) to the blustering behavior of another.
1 had to assert that there is no real security in military superiority
in a nuclear age . The traditional assumption is that a nation is secure
only when it is so strong militarily that no other nation, or combination
of nations, would dare to attack it. But, of course, the possessor of
such superiority becomes the focus of fear for others and thus the stimulus
for continuing the nuclear arms race—which in our time is an invitation
to commit suicide. I would even go so far as to recommend a strategy of
calculated nuclear inferiority : when two (or more) nations can destroy
each other ten times over, as far as being a viable society is concerned,
a calculated degree of inferiority probably offers more security (by
virtue of being less fear-producing) and certainly gives one an advantage
in initiating arms controlling and limiting agreements, l^ether because of
political intent or economic necessity, I think that this was the strategy
of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States until the past decade or so.
I had to assert that having an invulnerable nuclear deterrent makes
it possible for a nation to take calculated risks, risks designed ulti-
mately to eliminate the need for the deterrent itself . The usual assumption
is that such capability is merely a deterrent against others, and the
possessors stand frozen in their mutual threat. But the simple fact of
deterring others also provides a nation with a margin of security within
which to take calculated risks. Rather than being seen as simply a continu-
ation of the military tradition of discovering bigger and better ways of
destroying opponents, the grisly fact of nuclear weaponsy could be viewed
as the impetus toward eradicating the very tradition that gave rise to it.
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I had to assert that in the reduction of international tensions
,
POST commitment by reciprocation can be substituted for PRIOR commitment
by negotiation . Although in our ordinary relations with wives, children,
neighbors, and colleagues we almost never negotiate a prior commitment
before starting tension-reducing actions ourselves, it has been tradition-
ally assumed that under conflict conditions one nation cannot be decent
to another without first obtaining from the other an iron-clad prior
commitment that it will be decent in return. Not only can patterns of
initiatives and reciprocations (post-commitments) reduce mutual hostili-
ties, they can also create an atmosphere within which serious negotiations
on critical issues can be more successfully undertaken. Both of these
propositions were demonstrated in The Kennedy Experiment, and there have
been some other demonstrations in human history.
And, finally, I had to assert that goodwill among nations is a
result of, rather than a prerequisite for, de-escalation of tensions .
The traditional assumption has been that a nation cannot risk making even
conciliatory gestures toward another unless some degree of mutual goodwill
and trust exists between them— since otherwise such gestures are likely
to be interpreted as 'signs of weakness'. Quite to the contrary, as I
argued earlier, given even a modicum of mutual self-interest , the recipro-
cal actions taken in its service can literally create mutual goodwill
where little or none of it existed before.
Interlocking assertions like these can provide a framework for rethink-
ing our relationships to each other on this shrinking little planet at the
dawn of its nuclear age. The assertions may be proven false, of course,
but so may the tenets of any theory. The important thing is to use the
potential radicalness of our sentences to at least reach for a clearer
perspective on our own time and place. Revolutions do not guarantee a
better world— they only make it possible.
*An earlier version of this talk, with the same title, was published
in Social Psychology and Political Behavior, ed. by G, Abcarian and
J. W. Soule, 1971, Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.
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William S-Y. Wang
University of California at Berkeley
As always, it is both an honor and a pleasure to speak at the forum
of the Linguistic Institute. In the present case, my pleasure is very
much enhanced by the theme of this particular Institute, which is 'Language
form and Language function: A Western and Nonwestern Perspective'.
It is all too tempting for us to draw conclusions about what human
language is like based on the samples of language we most commonly
encounter here in the West.
Let me give just one example of this western bias, one with immediate
importance. Under the impact of Western languages, it is often assumed
that alphabetic orthographies, constructed on phonetic segments, are the
optimal system for representing language. This assumption is mostly made
tacitly, to be sure, and thus it may be all the more misleading. On the
other hand, orthographies based on other units, found outside the West,
such as syllabaries or logographs, are felt in some way to be under-
developed or retarded, and doomed to fall in time to the ultimate and
inevitable triumph of the alphabet.
But clearly this is an issue that is much too important to be assumed
a priori on the skewed sample of just the Western languages. It is
encouraging to note, though, that serious work is beginning to be done on
the question of optimal orthography, based on considerations of language
structure and psychological experiments on reading. 2 Hopefully, an
increasing amount of involvement will be forthcoming from linguists in
such research.
So the moment is long due that we extend our focus beyond the familiar
scene of Western languages in a serious way. In this respect, it is
reassuring to look through the catalog of this Linguistic Institute, with
its rich array of courses on the languages and linguistics of Africa and
Asia. The planners of this Institute deserve our warm thanks for their
effort in highlighting a more balanced perspective on the study of human
language
.
The topic I was assigned to discuss this evening is 'Language Change'.
Change involves the differences between two or more states in time.
Presumably the goal here would be to reveal the principles according to
which these differences are implemented, and to discover the mechanisms
which brought about these differences. I hope to make some observations
on both of these issues of implementation and actuation. But first it is
necessary to distinguish change along several time scales, for it seems
that the questions, the data, and the methods would not be the same for
all these scales.
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MICROHISTORY
For convenience of exposition, I will refer to the three time scales
as microhistory, mesohistory, and macrohistory . They all deal with
change across time and therefore are all aspects of the diachronic study
of language. The microhistory of language is reckoned across a very thin
slice of time, in years or decades. It is concerned with what Wm. Labov
(1972) calls 'change in progress', which offers a diachronic way of look-
ing at synchronic variation.
In the microhistory of language the interests of several research
areas converge. The sociolinguist focuses his attention on groups of
people, as these are divided by age, by sex, by region, and by social
background. Typically, within so short a period we find the model and
the copies, the unchanged and the changed, existing side by side in an
orderly profusion, vying for survival. By correlating the social para-
meters with the noted language differences, we may hope to make some
short-term predictions on which of the various usages of today will
continue into the language of tomorrow (Weinreich et al . 1968).
Closely related to these questions is the study of language contact.
With the rapid increase in population and mobility, the notion of a pure
and homogeneous speech community, whatever credibility it may have once
held, cannot realistically be maintained. Diversity is the fundamental
ingredient of change, as is well recognized for biological systems;
this dogma is no less true for linguistic systems at every level. The
further heterogeneity that contact produces adds yet new dimensions to
the challenges of the student of language change.
Among these various groups of people there is a very special class,
with a unique biological and social status—and these are the very young.
How children learn language—the transmission across generations— is
clearly one of the vital questions in the whole of language change.
Unlike that of the other groups, the language children use changes not
only as a function of differences in environment, but also as a function
of an increasing biological capacity due to neural and motor-sensory
maturation. Ontogeny hardly ever recapitulates phylogeny with fidelity.
Nevertheless, some insights can be gained here that may prove useful
toward understanding the processes of language evolution.
Until recently, theorizing on language acquisition, especially within
the framework of generative grammar, has been often cast in rather global
terms—in terms of whole categories of sounds and the addition and reorgan-
ization of rules. However, more fine-grained work done in this area, by
Ferguson and Farwell (1975), and Hsieh (1972), and others, clearly show
that the real situation is much more complex, both within the case his-
tories of each individual child, and in the strategies and development
across different children.
Some children, for instance, are extraordinarily pliable and are
eager to experiment with new sounds and new sequences. Others are more
conservative in their phonological behavior, and produce only forms that
they have a good chance of getting right; they seem to prefer learning
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and using those words in which they have phonetic confidence, while avoid-
ing others. Linguistic personalities, it would seem, are manifested at
quite an early age, and these differences in strategy may very well have
lasting influences on their adult language behavior. There is reason to
expect that some of the individual differences in the language of adults
can be traced back to the early years. It is an important finding that
these differences can be detected even during the learning of the first
several consonants, as is shown in some recent work of Ferguson for the
acquisition of English laterals, reported in Fillmore, Kempler, and Wang
(1979).
From such fine-grained research, it emerges clearly that there is a
primacy of lexical learning during phonological development. Even a
relatively small scale sampling of the sort done by Ferguson and Farwell
shows that the child does not progress by learning units like phonemes
or allophones, but rather by gradually adding lexical items to his
repertoire. The same sound in similar contexts may undergo altogether
different histories, as this sound appears in different words. This is
clearly demonstrated in Table 1. These data in the table are extracted
from the study of Ferguson and Farwell, who followed with great care the
development of three children who were learning their first fifty words.
The data are of one child's progression in the acquisition of initial b-
across a span of some four weeks. They show how different words exhibit
different patterns of variation according to different schedules. The
unity of the phoneme only emerges at the end of the acquisition process
when mastery is complete.
A CHILD'S ACQUISITION OF SOME i)-INITIAL WORDS IN
FOUR WEEKS (BASED ON FERGUSON AND FARWELL 1975)
between portions of words, is something that comes to different children
in completely idiosyncratic ways, and probably cannot be attributed to
any single uniform stage of development. This theme of lexical primacy
is central to my remarks there, and I will return to it later.
MESOHISTORY
As opposed to microhistory, the great bulk of the literature of
language change actually deals with the middle time scale. Historical
linguistics has traditionally concerned itself with changes that occur
across centuries or millenia. Since it reaches further back in time,
the primary data for language history are much more uneven and uncertain.
Written records of early languages are low in both quality and quantity,
and only in a handful of cases do they extend for more than 2 or 3 thous-
and years. The methods of reconstruction have their intrinsic limitations,
Most of us would probably agree with Kiparsky (1976) when he set the outer
limits at 10 to 20 thousand years 'over which we can hope to reconstruct
anything at all about Proto-language'
.
A classic question in language mesohistory, dating back to at least
the neogrammarians, has been the manner or means by which a change is
implemented. This question has caught the attention of a wide gamut of
scholars through the decades, from Henry Sweet to Alf Sommarfelt and
Sapir, to Hoenigswald and Halle.
The received doctrine on this question has long been one which may
be characterized as phonetically gradual and lexically abrupt . The idea
is, that once a phoneme changes, it changes in all the relevant words
according to the same schedule. By the claim of lexical abruptness, the
regularity of the change, the so-called neogrammarian hypothesis, would
follow as a consequence by definition. But since a change may involve
hundreds of words, and since languages do not seem to effect such whole-
sale changes in pronunciation overnight, the phonetic gradualness becomes
a necessary corollary of lexical abruptness.
So the notion of lexical abruptness is motivated by believing that
changes are always regular, and the notion of phonetic gradualness is
necessitated by believing in lexical abruptness. And it is essentially
this doctrine of historical change, with minor variations, that has
retained the most widespread acceptance in the work in generative phonol-
ogy as well as the structuralist phonology that preceded it.
But here again, as was the case in the microhistory of language,
things are not that simple. Empirical investigations over the past
decade or so on a variety of languages, using large quantities of data,
have shown that there are changes which are implemented in a manner that
is lexically gradual. That is, a change may initiate on a handful of
words in the lexicaon, where these words do not constitute any natural
phonological or morphosyntactic class. Then the change affects an increas-
ing sector of the lexicon in time, perhaps eventually completing its
course on all relevant words. Whether or not a particular change ever
completes its course depends on a whole host of factors, some of which
are outside the linguistic system. We can get at least a rough idea of
the degree of regularity that sound changes exhibit from a study that
C. C. Cheng and I (Cheng and Wang 1971) did on the development of initial
consonants in Chinese over the past 1400 years, shown in Table 2.
Time and again, scholars of sound change have observed that exceptions
to correspondences are embarassingly numerous, frequently the irregular
reflexes outnumbering the regular ones. Table 2 gives a rough quantitative
index for these observations. Each cell in the table refers to the devel-
opment of one Middle Chinese initial consonant (ca. 600 A.D.) into one of
the contemporary dialects. When the development is indeed perfectly
regular, the cell is marked with an 'x'; otherwise it is left blank. Each
blank cell in Table 2, then, is one of the 'embarassingly numerous' cases
where regularity was not reached—and there are indeed many of them.
A particular change, for various reasons, may even reverse its
course. Tore Janson (1977) has studied such a case in the deletion of
final -d in the Swedish of Stockholm, where he attributes the reversal to
the influence of orthography. At any rate, this picture of implementation
which involves a gradual change across the lexicon, which may or may not
result in complete regularity, has been called lexical diffusion (Wang 1969).
Since lexical diffusion is a process via which a change is imple-
mented , it is in principle accessible to any change, however the change is
actuated , i.e. whether the actuation is external or internal to the system
under change, or whether it is phonetically or analogically triggered, etc.
An interesting case of lexical diffusion has been reported by Lyovin
(1977) , where the actuation is due to the avoidance of homophony within
the inflectional paradigm of Tibetan verbs- The study is of particular
theoretical significance because of the intricate relations between a
change that reduced initial consonant clusters, which causes homophony,
and the hierarchy of verb categories which controls the schedule according
to which periphrastic expressions are created to avoid the homophony. The
present tense dominates the past tense, for instance, so when the two
forms become homophonous due to cluster reduction, it is the past tense
form that gets displaced from the inflectional paradigm. Similarly, the
past tense form dominates the future tense form, and it is the latter that
gets displaced when homophony occurs. In each case, the meaning of the
displaced form has to be expressed periphrastically
.
Lyovin' s examination of the data across the various categories of
verbs in Classical Tibetan led him to observe that 'homophony-inducing
sound changes will be blocked from applying to certain lexical items or
classes of lexical items until compensatory developments permit the further
diffusion of the shifts in question' (p. 129).
Another study in lexical diffusion that raises important theoretical
issues is the investigation of 0. Robinson (1977) on Swiss German vowels.
Two historical changes are relevant, as shown in the diagram.
umlaut ^
a * ae
rounding i
I umlaut "
PC wH hJ 60M < CS M (0
H O
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Robinson notes that the 'rounding rule was diachronically much later
than umlaut ' . Both rules continue to operate synchronically in morpho-
phonemic alternations.
Now if the rules applied synchronically in the order in which they
entered the language diachronically, then the /a/'s which are subject to
the umlaut rule should change to /ae/'s, and thus escape the rounding rule.
But in almost all of the northern dialects, these /a/'s actually umlaut to
/o/'s, presumably via /o/. Furthermore, a synchronic rule that rounds
/ae/ into /o/ would not be possible; it would be contradicted by other data.
For this interesting phenomenon, Robinson adopts Kiparsky's interpretation,
that the synchronic rules have reversed their diachronic order, that is,
from umlaut-rounding to rounding-uralaut
.
The data of relevance here have to do with certain northern dialects,
e.g. Kesswil, where many forms exhibit the morphophonemic alternation
/a~ae/, when the reordering hypothesis would expect /a~o/. Robinson's
explanation of these ae-alternations is that rule reordering, though an
abstract change, is diffusing across the lexicon, much as concrete changes
like d-deletion or vowel shift. These ae-alternations, then, are forms
which the reordering has not reached as yet. The theoretical significance
of this explanation is the extension of the process of lexical diffusion
to operate at a relatively abstract level of sound change. To support
his explanation, Robinson gives some exemplary arguments against some
alternative solutions, including the possibility of borrowing these ae-
alternations from other dialects.
Work on lexical diffusion over the past decade has shown that the
traditional view of sound change has been excessively restrictive, and that
the implementation may very well proceed along other paths than one which
is lexically abrupt. This work has been surveyed in Chen and Wang (1975)
and Wang (1976, 1979), and partly anthologized in Wang (1977). At this
stage, there is less need to document additional cases of lexical diffu-
sion. Rather, our next challenge, it seems to me, is to solve the puzzle
of what kind of sound change would travel along which path for its imple-
mentation. In addition to the lexical and phonetic parameters, there is
the additional statistical parameter that must also be considered in
investigating the many paths of sound change.
Two other directions of current research in this area should also be
mentioned, in view of the very promising results obtained so far. One is
the demonstration of the relationship of the relative frequency of words
to their schedules of change, as discussed by Hooper (1977) for English,
and Gerritsen and Jansen (1978) for Dutch. Although such a relationship
has been hypothesized at least since a century ago, it is only recently
that it can be objectively tested as a result of the availability of
frequency dictionaries. It is of special importance that Hooper has been
able to show that high frequency words in English are leaders in a phonetic
change like schwa-deletion, but are laggers in an analogic change like the
weakening of strong verbs. If we can continue to identify independent
variables for the chronological profiles of change (relative frequency
being one such variable) , then perhaps the goal of being able to make short-
term predictions in sound change will be eventually attainable, after all.
3
The other direction that I'll briefly allude to has to do with sub-
grouping languages. Since it has been assumed in the bulk of historical
work that sound changes are all lexically abrupt, it follows that for any
change in question, a particular group of languages either shares the
change or not—a binary yardstick. But once we recognize that diffusion
processes may be at work, then some changes at least can be exploited for
much more information. Indeed, as Hsieh pointed out in his seminal
article (1973), this was the insight underlying Swadesh's method of lexi-
costatistics. Instead of a binary yardstick, quantitative measures can
be made on various subgroupings of the languages on the basis of both
changed and unchanged cognates. Hsieh demonstrated the effectiveness of
this approach on the Wu dialects of eastern China by using a single tone
change.
More recently, Bh. Krishnamurti (1978) and Krishnamurti and his col-
leagues, in some yet unpublished work, have made important progress in
developing a suitable methodology for the subgroup ing problem. Using the
Dravidian Etymological Dictionary as the starting point, they have
analyzed a large amount of computerized data to determine the genetic
relationships among various languages of South India. There is every
indication that their procedures will prove fruitful when validated
against linguistic situations where the answers are known, at which point
they can be used in situations where no answers are available (for unwrit-
ten languages, for example).
MACROHI STORY
In considering language change within the largest time perspective,
its macrohistory, we are faced with the greatest challenges—since the
relevant primary data are mostly not available. Furthermore, the necessary
backgrounds and methods are frequently outside of the typical domain of
linguistics. So we need to look into neighboring disciplines that work on
related questions, such as anthropology, biology, ethology, psychology,
zoology, and so on. An example of the interdisciplinary convergence of
interest in this area is the very successful conference in the origin and
evolution of language and speech, sponsored by the N.Y. Academy of Sciences
in 1975 (Harnad et al 1976) . See the excellent discussion of this confer-
ence by Hill and Most (1978)
.
A useful assumption to make here, one which most investigators accept,
is that language did not abruptly burst into the course of human evolution
fully in the state of intricacy and complexity that we find it today. To
believe the so-called discontinuity theory, that there was some sudden
wholesale genetic mutation that in a fell swoop transformed muteness into
eloquence is to relegate macrolinguistic research to the mystical regions
of miracles and spontaneous creations.^
Rather, there must have been a very long course of emergence, much
longer than the span of time over which current methods of historical
linguistics can take us. During this emergent state, protolanguage
probably at different times shared various developments, by either homology
or analogy, with the communication systems of other species. So it is
likely that sorting out the ingredients of these other systems will
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contribute to our understanding of how the ingredients of human language
were accumulated piece by piece over the hundreds of millenia.
One category of ingredients that has been present since the early
stages of emergence is the use of gestures. Although gestures are used
across a wide range of species, we share many specific ones with other
primates, including several facial expressions, presumably because of the
shared anatomy. Gestures accompany speech in all languages, time-locked
to various extents; they also play a relatively more prominent role in
the early communications of very young children. Phylogenetically , Gordon
Hewes (1973), among others, has championed the view that human language
originated in gestures.
Another category of ingredients that is also widespread in communi-
cation systems is the use of prosodic features—fundamental frequency,
duration, and intensity. These features are probably exploited more
fully in bird song than anywhere else, though recent investigations
on primate calls are revealing a variety of new ingredients, such as
amplitude modulation, frequency modulation, and the use of formants.
In human evolution, there was a correlated development of the increased
use of the hands for fighting and carrying with the increased use of the
mouth for communicating. There are certain obvious advantages that pro-
sodic features have over gestures: Communication can take place over
larger territories requiring no visual contact (such as in darkness or
across foliage) , while the rest of the body can be engaged in other
simultaneous activities (such as running or fighting) . So it is rea-
sonable to expect that the prosodic communication gradually expanded
in importance relative to the gestures.
As the civilization of early man became increasingly complex,
however, he needed larger sets of signals with which to communicate
the expanding vocabulary of messages. Since communication facilitates
the planning and execution of group activities, for purposes such as
hunting for food or defense against predators or other tribes, we can
easily see how groups that have developed better language would have
better chances of survival. Everything else being equal, better language
enables the formation of larger (and hence stronger) groups, the trans-
mission of more precise and varied information across both space and time,
and the perpetuation of the gene pool of the group of users of that
language. Biologically speaking, then, selectional pressures favored
those populations with better tools for communication in probably much
the same way that they favored better tools for digging or fighting.
5
As the message set grew, the three prosodic parameters became insuf-
ficient as carriers for the signals. A phonology that was largely prosodic
(and laryngeal) eventually changed into a segmental one, making use of the
richer possibilities of the supralaryngeal gestures. Whereas other pri-
mates share with us the use of gestures and prosody, it is the transition
from prosody to segmentals that is the critical step which our ancestors
alone have taken. It has been proposed by P. Lieberman (1975) that this
transition was made possible by the phylogenetic descent of the larynx,
and that the descent was a special adaptation for speech. A more plausible
view to my mind is that the descent of the larnyx, as well as a whole host
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of other skeletal restructurings in the head and neck, was one of the
many mechanical responses that the human body had to make in assuming
erect posture. In this latter view, where the structure was largely
available before the linguistic use, it would be more accurate to call
it a case of preadaptation .
In any case, segmental phonology grew dominant over prosody, just as
prosody in an earlier stage of emergence dominated gestures. All three
systems continue to co-exist in every language today, functioning in
mutually supplementary ways. The importance of the transition into seg-
mental phonology is highlighted by recent researches on communicating
with apes. Whereas chimpanzees show remarkable cognitive abilities at
symbolization, including the processing of complex sentence types, they
have next to zero ability at producing controlled segmental sounds. From
an evolutionary perspective, that critical step which early man took in
pairing messages with the particular medium of consonants and vowels was
the start of the journey that led to speech, the 'indispensible foundation'
upon which language is built. Judging from the amount of new brain tissue
in the cortex that appears to be involved with language, that step must
have been taken quite some time ago (cf. A. Liberman 1974).
Although there may never be any way of documenting the transition
directly, we can imagine how it could have come about by referring to
processes of phonological change that can be observed in recent times.
These are of the type that has been called 'phonologization' . Typically
what happens is as follows. At time ti, one group of words is distinguished
from another group in that the former group has the phoneme X while the
latter has the phoneme Y. For reasons of coarticulation, X and Y act upon
their environments in different ways, i.e. XE' but YE", even though at t^
the difference between E' and E" is not considered distinctive, and may not
even be noticed. But should a merger take place by the time t2, when X > Y,
then the two groups of words are no longer distinguished by X and Y, but
now by E' and E". The difference between E' and E" becomes 'phonologized
'
at t2—it has become phonemic.
There are numerous such cases in the literature. Chinese, for one
example, had distinct voiced and unvoiced stops in syllable-initial posi-
tion. Because of coarticulation, the syllables with voiced stops must
have had a different pitch contour from those with unvoiced stops. (Com-
pare the different pitch contours for the English words bin and pin.)
Some centuries ago, however, the voiced stops merged into the unvoiced
ones. Now the two groups of words are kept apart no longer by the voicing
in the initial stop, but by the tonal difference that was once caused by
that voicing.
The transition from prosodic utterances to segmental utterances could
not have been this straightforward, of course, and must have taken place
over a much longer timespan, probably with many false starts in the process.
The segments started as conditioned or spurious accompaniments of the
prosodies, and were only eventually 'phonologized' by transference. Once
the pairing between messages and the segmentals got established, however,
language must have evolved at an explosive pace, given the much greater
signalling potential and physiological economy of a segmental phonology
over alternative media.
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Over the past several years there has been some significant research
into the sign language of the deaf. This work is of fundamental importance
for the light it sheds on language viewed from a different modality, and
thereby giving us a broader perspective on human communication. Experi-
ments have been done on comparing the rates of production and perception
of speech with those of sign language. While such experiments are of great
intrinsic interest, it should be clear that certain questions of linguistic
macrohistory cannot be directly answered from their results. For even if
it can be completely demonstrated that sign language is as effective as
speech in every conceivable way, which I would find totally surprising,
the point remains that the user of the sign language is the direct benefi-
ciary of numerous millenia of language evolution and elaboration that had
in fact taken place via speech. The deaf is deprived of only a minor,
peripheral part of that total neural machinery. The equivalence between
modalities, if it can be demonstrated, tells us that once the full symboli-
zation system has been developed in our brain, a surrogate medium may serve
as well as speech. It tells us nothing on whether the surrogate medium
had enough to recommend it for language to have evolved into its present
state of intricacy and richness, which is clearly a stronger requirement.
In contrasting the three scales of diachrony, I have perhaps put too
much emphasis on the differences between them. Clearly the three must be
related to each other in intimate ways, since they are but three different
time windows through which we are viewing the same phenomenon. At present,
the facts are scanty. There are huge gaps in our knowledge on the steps
in which language evolved through the successive emergent states into the
present steady state. It is obvious that the study of linguistic univer-
sals must be centrally relevant here in providing a base line for the
steady state. Similarly, our understanding of the relation between micro-
history and the classical concepts of linguistic change is spotty at best.
A great deal of basic research needs to be done before a plausible scenario
can be provided for what has been called 'the life and growth of language'.
This paper is prepared while I am a Guggenheim fellow visiting
Osmania University in India. Thanks are due both to the Guggenheim Founda-
tion and Bh. Krishnamurti of Osmania University for their support and
encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge the many years of camara-
derie and collaboration of C. C. Cheng, which were critical ingredients
in the progression from idea to data to knowledge on language change.
2
A good beginning is the Cross-Cultural Conference on Language,
Reading and Orthography, sponsored by the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development, Bethesda, Md
.
, September 1978. The proceedings are
being edited for publication by J. Kavanagh and R. Venezky. An extensive
discussion of Chinese orthography from several viewpoints is available in
the Journal of Chinese Linguistics 6.2, 1978; see especially the contribu-
tion by Ovid Tzeng et al. for recent psycholinguistic work. (See also
Hardych et al. 1977, 1978.)
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Of all the independent variables that influence change, probably
the least stable and therefore most difficult ones to capture are the
social ones. Note the perceptive counsel of a poet on this point, Alexan-
der Pope:
In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold
Alike fantastic, if too new or old
Be not the first by whom the new are tried
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
4
There was, of course, no dearth of proponents for such discontinuity
theories among philosophers working before evolutionary thinking was
developed in biology. See Stam (1976) for a useful historical critique,
especially from mid-18th century through mid-19th century in Europe.
Once languages have reached a more-or-less steady state, these
selectional pressures no longer operate as they did during the emergent
state. Labov's observations on language diversification being dysfunctional
(1972:273) are presumably based on the steady state changes, as indeed
were the remarks by Charles Darwin and Max Muller that Labov referred to.
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ANALOGICAL CHANGE AS A PROBLEM FOR LINGUISTIC THEORY^
Paul Kiparsky
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1. Simplifiaation vs. proportions. Recent linguistics has moved
from the structuralist segregation of synchronic and diachronic study of
language towards a reintegration of the two, based on the idea that
structure can determine change, with the corollary that change can therefore
be diagnostic of structure. This program has had consequences on both
sides of the equation. On the synchronic side, it is mainly through evi-
dence from change that phonologists have argued for such factors as opacity
and recoverability in the evaluation measure, and for the imposition of
restrictions on the abstractness of underlying phonological representations.
On the historical side, the new conception of linguistic structure evolved
through efforts to construct explicit formal generative grammars has pro-
voked some rethinking of the nature of both sound change and analogy.
As an example of the relevance of synchronic work for historical
linguistics we may take the classic issue of whether sound change admits
nonphonetic conditioning. Formal grammar as well as sociolinguistic
research on linguistic variation has shown that phonology is intimately
connected to higher linguistic levels. This undermines the structuralist
concept of autonomous phonology, and thereby in turn casts doubt on the
companion concept of 'blind' sound change. Morphological and other non-
phonetic conditioning of sound change was previously ascribed to grammatical
analogy secondarily acting upon the results of a quasiphysiological process
of sound change. It is now more simply taken to be part and parcel of the
phonological process itself, as a reflection of the inherent contextually
determined and functionally governed variability characteristic of all new
rules. This permits a more restricted and therefore more predictive theory
of analogy.
In general, the theory of grammar has opened up the possibility of
structural explanations as alternatives to be considered in many cases
where so far only a historical explanation was available. Noting a change
(A > A' , B > B') in two classes of items, the traditional historical
linguist would tend to seek its origin in one class and postulate its
analogical spread to the other:
(1) A , B
4-
A', B
4- analogy
A', B'
In many cases, however, there turns out to be a structural explanation in
the form of a shared property of A and B which allows us to assume a common
origin for the phenomenon in both classes:
(2) A , B
4-
A', B'
Thus the investigation of clusters of co-occurring changes becomes an
important method of probing into the organization of linguistic phenomena.
The issue to which I should like to address myself here is analogical
change. 2 Traditionally visualized as the extension of surface patterns (in
terms of proportional schemata) it has more recently been given another
interpretation as the elimination of arbitrary complexity in the linguistic
system (in terms of the evaluation measure developed in the theory of gram-
mar) . At the back of this lies a new view about the nature of the concrete
process of analogical change and how it relates to the acquisition and use
of language. A proportional view of analogy fits naturally into a theory
of language acquisition based on substitution-in-frames techniques and
equivalent 'taxonomic' devices. The idea that analogy is simplification
of grammar jibes better with the idea that language acquisition is based on
a general rule schematism in conjunction with an evaluation measure which
selects the simplest grammar from the set of alternatives compatible with
the data encountered by the learner, and assumes that learners progress to
the adult grammar through a series of intermediate stages of increasing
adequacy and complexity. Analogical changes are then interpretable as
retentions of features of these Intermediate stages into the adult system.
The difference between the views is not so radical in practice as it
seems from the above formulation. Both approaches, to be at all plausible,
require some elaboration, which may take and in fact has taken different
terms. Other factors than simplification have been introduced by propo-
nents of grammar-based theories. An example is transparency (Kiparsky
1971, 1973), which determines the directionality of rule reordering,
indifferent as far as simplicity is concerned. Proposals have been made to
bring in paradigmatic factors independently of simplicity considerations
(Harris 1973; Kiparsky 1972). The general effect of these modifications is
to bring the theory into closer agreement with proportional theories.
Under the radically 'concrete' analyses of Natural Generative Phonology
and Upside-Down Phonology the treatment of analogy as simplification yields
predictions which resemble those of proportional theories.
On the other hand, diverse proposals exist to replace bare proportions
by interpreted ones. Typical is this passage from von Wartburg (1969:59):
'.
. . analogy does not operate blindly. The Neogrammarians, and Saussure
also, made the mistake of regarding analogy as a purely proportional
process. Paul (p. 116) simply asserts that, for a new form to arise, there
must be three elements present in the equation. He cites as an example
animus : animi = senatus : x; x = senati (instead of Class. Lat. senatus)
.
This conception accounts for only a limited number of instances of the
working of analogy. In most cases, analogy does not arise merely as the
result of a formal resemblance; the two words so linked are also closely
linked by their semantic environment.' Similar ideas are found earlier in
Hermann (1931). Another kind of 'annotated proportion' was developed by
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Kurlowicz (1956, 1964, and many other works). Kurylowicz argued that both
the terms of the proportions and the relation between the terms have to
be interpreted in terms of certain abstract structural notions. For
example, the relation between a and b and between a and x in the propor-
tional schema could not be just any relation, but only that between a
'forme de fondation' and a 'forme fondee*. And the terms themselves may
have to be different from what is actually pronounced in the language, as
in the following proportions:
(3) a. R : eR = e : X (X = ee = i)
o
b. ReT : RuT = RewT : X (X = RuwT = RuT)
(3a) was proposed to account for the rise of vrddhi (long grade) in nouns
(Kuryiowicz 1968:298). (3b) was proposed as the explanation of the Germanic
verbs of the type lukan (Kuryiowicz 1970) . These proportions critically
depend on the equivalence within the early Indo-European phonological
systems of syllabic and nonsyllabic resonants (/? = R) and long vowels and
geminate vowels (e = ee)
.
In this way, analogical proportions come look in some ways rather like
the rules of a generative grammar. The relation between forme de fondation
and forme fondee is something like the relation between input and output of
a rule, and proportions where terms are 'virtual' in that they abstract
away from certain overtly present surface features are comparable to rules
which apply to abstract representations at nonterminal stages in deriva-
tions. For example, (3a) and 3b) can be construed as representing the
generalization of ablaut rules at a point in the synchronic derivation of
Indo-Iranian and Germanic which precedes the application of vowel contrac-
tion and of the rules which determine the distribution of syllabic and
nonsyllabic sonorants. Indeed, Kuryiowicz (1964) has explicitly justified
the abstract character of analogical change by the principle that redundant
features or elements are to be disregarded in setting up proportions. In
our terms that translates into the claim that rules can generalize even
when followed by other rules which add those redundant features or elements.
Thus, Kuryiowicz (followed by Watkins (1969)) considers the proportion (2)
a valid account of the replacement of Indo-Iranian mid. 3. pi. ra by nta:
(4) act. 3.sg. t : 3. pi. nt = mid. 3 sg. a : X (X = nta)
Here the suffix -t of the unmarked finite verb form (act. 3.sg.) is to be
stripped away, as it were, in order for the terms to match properly.
Still, even in their modified forms, both theories retain many
inadequacies. Either side can easily adduce examples of indubitable ana-
logical changes which do not agree with the claims of the other. In fact,
much of the debate around analogy over the last ten years or so has con-
sisted of generative linguists showing up various problems for the
proportional theory (such as analogical changes that depend in various
ways on abstract properties of grammatical structure—significantly more
abstract than even the work of Kuryiowicz assumed) and the opposition
countering with cases of analogical processes which complicate grammars
rather than simplifying them. A detailed assessment of some of this
evidence is presented in the fuller version of the present work. It fully
confirms Hock's (1975) conclusion that analogy can involve different
levels of abstraction: there are some changes 'which can be plausibly
explained or motivated only in terms of (the generalization of) sometimes
fairly abstract rules, and not (or only with great conceptual difficulties)
in terms of classical surface-oriented analogy', and other changes which
show a sovereign disregard of those abstract rules and are 'explainable
only in terms of surface analogy'.
Because of space limitations I shall omit entirely any discussion of
the first type of case, which contradicts recent proposals to revive
surface proportions and reaffirms the fundamentally grammar-based, simpli-
ficatory character of analogical change. What follows is a brief outline
of the problems posed by cases of the second type, cases which appear to
show just the opposite. I shall argue that they too can be analyzed as
simplifications provided we take into account certain kinds of interaction
between the language learner and his linguistic environment and certain
kinds of inertia inherent in the process of language acquisition. That is,
the difficulties turn out to be artifacts due to the simplifying idealiza-
tions of the ideal speaker-hearer and instantaneous language acquisition,
which are appropriate in the study of formal grammar but should not be
imported into historical linguistics.
Cases where analogy produces complication in the grammar can be grouped
into two main types, not necessarily mutually exclusive or in all cases
clearly separable, but still broadly distinct in their symptoms and causes:
partial analogy and false analogy .
2. Partial analogy. The characteristic feature of partial analogy
is that an analogical process which would be a simplification if it took
place across the board ends up actually complicating the grammar because it
is not fully carried through. Each type of simplification can be partial
in this sense. As a counterpart to the loss of a rule (and in fact usually
as the first step in that process) we find its curtailment, i.e. partial
loss
. For example, Sadock (1973) finds that the loss of the word-final
devoicing rule in Yiddish went via an intermediate stage at which it
applied in a phonologically restricted context. 'First, it was lost every-
where except in the final cluster- -nd, and then after the loss of final
schwas, the rule was dropped entirely.' Thus 'the Yiddish word-final
devoicing rule in all likelihood was made considerably more complex (i.e.
it became more restricted in its application) before it was lost' (p. 793).
Other cases have been presented in Andersen (1969) , Dressier (1972) , Ralph
(1975:161 f f ) . As a counterpart to the generalization of a rule, we find
its partial generalization in some subenvironment only (Thomason 1976;
Ralph 1975:172ff). As a counterpart to reordering
, we find a new order of
application introduced for only some of the cases (Kiparsky 1973:93-101;
Robinson 1976; Bley-Vroman 1975).
In such cases, the old form of the rule, or (in case of reordering)
the old order remains in the grammar and continues to be applicable to a
subset of forms, which must be identified by a contextual restriction
added to the rule, or by an arbitrary rule feature marked on some lexical
entries—and at worst, by a combination of both. The regularization may.
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for example, go through only:
—in inflection as opposed to derivation
—in some morphological category (e.g. plurals but not singulars)
—in some inflectional subclass (e.g. the most productive declension
or conjugation)
—in some subset of the vocabulary (often the less common words)
—in some phonologically definable circumstances (often in cases
which are in various ways relatively less salient)
—in just one sense of a word (often e.g. in metaphorical use)
In all such cases, the result is a more complex grammar.
Can even such changes be due somehow to the mechanism of simplifica-
tion? The obvious possibility to consider is to reassess the form of
grammars or the evaluation measure (or both) in the hope of discovering
that the grammars which are actually learned by speakers are such that even
in the apparently 'bad' cases the new grammar turns out to be more highly
valued after all. Methodological considerations would recommend this
approach because it would give both the simplest and the most restrictive
theory of analogy
—
provided of course that the required kinds of synchronic
graimnars could be justified in their own right independently of the histori-
cal changes which we wish to explain.
Several such attempts have in fact been made. One is to maintain the
evaluation measure unchanged while assuming grammars of a much 'shallower'
type than generally envisaged. The best-known solution of this type is
embodied in the theory of Natural Generative Grammar (Vennemann 1974;
Hooper 1976; cf. the related ideas of Skousen 1975). As Hooper notes, the
gradual spread of certain kinds of leveling (rule loss) through the lexicon
could be characterized as simplification if phonological rules and repre-
sentations were made very 'concrete'. If, for example, a morpheme was
entered in the lexion as the set of its allomorphs, then any analogical
change which reduces the number of allomorphs—all cases of rule loss, for
example, are of this type—would entail a simplification in the phonological
representation of any item subject to the analogical change. If marked
ordering of phonological rules did not exist, then for example what now are
treated as counterfeeding orderings would really be lexical exceptions to
the counter fed rule, and a 'reordering' into feeding order would really be
the elimination of this exception feature, which one would expect to take
place word by word, as does any idiosyncratic lexical marking. If we could
assume that subrules are not collapsed as is claimed in the theory of
generative grammar, but are to be kept separate, then obviously the inde-
pendent generalization of those subrules would not be a problem. In short,
the fragmentation observed in the problematic cases of change could be
ascribed to the synchronic system in which the change takes place.
This line of thinking, however, destroys the basis for understanding
the normal situation where a rule is generalized in the same way in differ-
ent subenvironments . The splits effected by partial analogy are so varied
that in order to turn them all into simplifications we end up with no
synchronic generality at all, so that each individual case of alternation
is governed by a 'rule' of its own. The result is a synchronically wrong
description and a treatment of analogy which suffers from the same kinds of
defects as the proportional model.
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A more promising-looking attempt to motivate partial analogy in
synchronic theory is sketched out in Andersen (1969) . Though he too pro-
poses fairly shallow underlying forms, he explicitly assumes single
(nondisjunctive) representations related to the phonetics by extrinsically
ordered rules, among which he distinguishes morphophonemic and phonological
rules. The key to his solution is not so much the 'concreteness ' of gram-
mars as the idea that at the stage of the language which immediately
precedes the appearance of the analogical forms, speakers learn as it were
the 'wrong' grammar, which is such that the subsequent spread of the analogy
in fact constitutes a simplification. The scenario for word-by-word
extension of a rule would then be as follows: at some point language
learners acquire the rule in overgeneralized form. 'When this is the case,
lexical items which for historical reasons are not subject to the rule (i.e.
do not constitute an environment for its application) have to be specified
as exceptions to the rule. The extension of the domain of the rule con-
sists in gradual elimination of such exceptions. '. . .'The first phase
can be understood as motivated by the need to formulate grammatical rules
in as simple (general) terms as possible. The second phase follows as the
traditional forms are imperfectly passed on to succeeding generations of
learners. It entails a simplification of the lexical component of the
grammar. The first phase is necessarily abrupt—but it is covert and goes
unnoticed by the speakers. The second phase is gradual and may be more or
less apparent to the speakers as older and newer forms are utilized as
indices of style' (p. 822).
In order to account for word-by-word curtailment , Andersen then sup-
poses that speakers can also undergeneralize ; 'If we suppose that this
rule in its original formulation applied only to morphemes specifically
marked as subject to the rule, then we can understand its curtailment
—
and eventual elimination—as the result of a simplification of the lexicon,
exactly analogous to the one we defined for the extension changes. Here
then, as in the extension changes, we have two phases: first a morpho-
phonemic rule is formulated in such a way that individual lexical items
have to be marked with respect to that rule; then the marking of these
items is gradually omitted. The difference is that where the marked items
are exempt from the rule, the simplification of the lexicon results in an
extension of the domain of the rule; but where the marked items are the
ones that are subject to the rule, the result of a simplification is a
curtailment of the domain of the rule' (p. 823). The idea is, simply put,
that language learners failed to discover the context of the rule and
consequently had to mark the forms subject to it with an ad hoc rule fea-
ture, whose elimination case by case curtails and eventually liquidates
the rule.
The interesting feature of this theory is that it claims to predict
the direction in which a rule will change. Whether a rule is extended
(eliminating the exceptions to the rule) or curtailed (eliminating the
rule) is determined by its status (as major or minor, motivated or unmo-
tivated, etc.). As things stand, this apparent explanatory power is
dubious because there is no theory that tells us independently of the
change itself what the relevant character of the rule in fact is. It is
well enough recognized that the productivity of a rule is not at any rate
a simple function of the frequency with which it is applicable (whether
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counted by types or tokens) . Rules which are originally restricted to a
handful of forms may spread, and conversely, dominant rules may lose out.
Andersen also appeals to the naturalness of a rule: phonetically motivated
rules are extended but phonetically unmotivated rules are curtailed. This
is beset with the same circularity because the status of a rule as motivated
or unmotivated may depend on the choice of distinctive features, which in
turn is made by looking at the subsequent changes that depend on it.
It would appear that this solution does not remove the indeterminacy
but simply shifts it: instead of determinate synchronic systems but
unpredictable alternative possibilities of eliminating points of linguistic
complexity, we have indeterminate synchronic systems of which each alterna-
tive sets a fixed path for future analogical change. In effect, this is
an attempt to reduce partial analogy to false analogy.
There are difficulties with extending Andersen's theory to partial
analogy in general. It does not work where the subset of cases affected is
structurally (phonologically or morphologically) rather than lexically
defined. At the intermediate stage of the loss of final devoicing in
Yiddish, if Sadock is right, the domain of the devoicing rule was cut back
from all obstruents to just -nd. The rule at this stage has added on a
phonological context which unarguably makes it more complex than before.
Even if we suppose that the rule had, before its curtailment, somehow
become a minor rule (which in itself does not seem a justifiable assump-
tion), it surely cannot be maintained that adding contexual restrictions
even to minor rules makes them simpler! Only the kind of curtailment that
comes from eliminating features on lexical items that mark them as subject
to minor rules can be plausibly regarded as simplification. It is also
impossible to suppose that the devoicing rule itself remained in its
original general form and the curtailment was effected by marking lexical
items as exceptions to it. Apart from the difficulty that the prior status
of devoicing as a minor rule again cannot be justified, this would amount
to saying that it is only accidentally true of the words which maintain
devoicing at the intermediate stage that they all end in -nd. How could
such a regularity have arisen if it was not apprehended as a rule by
language learners at some point? The possibility of a purely item-by-item
specification is excluded still more clearly in Thomason's Slavic example.
The class of lexical items to which the rule applies at the two stages
must be specified in a general way in the rule itself since the class of
Animate nouns is an open one. It then follows that the generalization of
the Accusative = Genitive rule results in a more complex rule.
A second general type of approach is keeping more or less orthodox
assumptions about the form of grammars and instead looking for some other
version of the evaluation measure which would reduce instances of partial
analogy to legitimate optimalization.
A plausible scheme for revising the evaluation measure might be to
keep simplicity in it but to have it interact with other parameters in
some way. One such proposal, due to Ralph (1975:179), is to adopt Chen's
(1973, 1974) device of 'metarules' as a regulator of partial analogy.
These are akin to the 'marking conventions' introduced by Chomsky and Halle
(1968:Ch. 9) to account for the 'intrinsic content' of the features, and
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still more to the scales of environments utilized by Foley (1977 and many
earlier writings), but they implement the idea in a rather different way.
Suppose we assign a higher 'index' to the fronting of long and rounded
vowels than to the fronting of the corresponding short and unrounded (or
lower) vowels, e.g. for the special case that is relevant to Old Swedish
palatal umlaut as discussed by Ralph:
(5) 2 o ola a
Then multiplying (or adding) the indices for each feature will give a
ranking of multifeature contexts which corresponds to their historical
order of appearance:
(6) a 1 palatalized first
a,o 2 palatalized next
5 4 palatalized last
Given a general theory of 'metarules', the order of generalization would be
predicted by the principle that rules are generalized in the order of
increasing indices.
In one respect this approach represents a major advance over the
others we have considered so far: it implies, correctly, that the pattern
of partial generalization is not random. It makes the interesting and, I
suspect, correct prediction that no language will be found in which such
a fronting process has unfolded in the reverse order, although from the
viewpoint of the classical simplicity measure that order would be exactly
equivalent to what actually happened in Old Swedish.
No doubt the metarules as conceived by Chen and adopted by Ralph are
lacking in generality. To assume that a table like (5) needs to be specially
set up to index the possible contexts of every phonological process is to
assume that there are no general principles behind the ordering of contexts,
which is scarcely credible. Many cases fall under the rather simple over-
arching principle that assimilation proceeds in the order of increasing
phonetic 'distance' between focus and environment, as measured by the
number of relevantly shared feature specifications between them. The more
alike two segments are, the more prone they are to assimilate, other things
being equal. For example, velars will be assimilated (palatalized) by an
adjacent [-back] segment in the following order: palatalized consonants,
y, i, e, ae. By the same principle, i fronts a before it fronts o. I do
not wish to claim that this is the only principle at work: I would suppose,
for example, that there are other reasons why the short vowels are fronted
before the long vowels. Perhaps the explanation for the ordering of
contexts will turn out to be exceedingly complex. This would still be
better than a list of 'metarules', which can at best claim to be a summary
of the observed facts but not an explanation.
Moreover, neither metarules nor even a more general set of principles
which would predict the order of contexts would yet address the entire
problem of partial analogy. It is hard to see how these ideas could be
extended to cases of partial analogy in morphological subcontexts, and the
lexical cases are evidently quite impossible to handle that way.
For the morphological and lexical cases there does exist another
proposal which is entirely different from metarules in content but resem-
bles it formally in that it involves enriching the evaluation measure.
This is the idea of Harris (1973), Kiparsky (1972) and others that paradig-
matic uniformity has to be recognized as an independent factor in change,
not instead of but alongside simplicity (cf. Schindler 1974 for discussion).
In effect, it says that the evaluation measure is to somehow check the
outputs of grammars (it is impossible to tell just from the rules) and
assign a 'cost' to allomorphic variation in paradigms. That is, it claims
that the language learner preferentially selects grammars whose outputs
have certain ' transderivational' properties. This is a retreat to a much
weaker theory, since evaluation measure otherwise is defined purely on the
grammar. It is also distressingly vague because crucial aspects of the
proposal were left in the air: is allomorphy to be quantified by types or
tokens? What are paradigms? How are the relative contributions of allo-
morphy and complexity in terms of the number of feature specifications
(not to speak of opacity) to be weighted relative to each other (King 1972,
Kiparsky 1974)? In itself, that does not mean that the idea of a complex
evaluation measure relying on allomorphy or some equivalent concept as one
of its several components is necessarily wrong. The vagueness could be
eliminated by exact definitions of 'allomorphy', 'paradigm', and other key
notions of the theory, and some of it may indeed have to be retained as an
inescapable correlate of the indeterminacy of analogical change itself.
A priori there is no reason why there should not be independent criteria
of evaluation in as functionally complex a system as language is, and why
their relative weight should not be in certain respects indeterminate—all
the more so if it can be shown that the weighting varies with linguistic
function, so as to create styles adapted to the special requirements of
speaker, hearer, and learner (Kiparsky 1975).
There is another general consideration which ought to give one pause.
The status of 'paradigm uniformity' and other such criteria in the theory
of generative grammar would be quite different from the role of the cor-
responding notions of analogy in the neogrammarian theory. In the latter,
proportional analogy is assumed to underlie language acquisition and
speech production, and its rule as a mechanism of change is simply a
reflection of its more basic function. In the theory of generative gram-
mar, simplicity has a corresponding role in language acquisition, and its
relevance to analogical change would therefore be expected. Proportions,
paradigmatic uniformity etc. do not figure in the theory of generative
grammar and it would therefore be surprising to find them directing change.
It would mean that there would be no essential relation between the way
language changes and anything else about it.
Although some authors (e.g. Lass 1976) have welcomed the proposal to
introduce paradigmatic notions into the evaluation measure, I believe Bever
and Langendoen (1971) were closer to the mark in criticizing it, or rather
the program of which it formed a part, for treating function as structure:
that is, for attempting to explain within the linguistic system a phenomenon
which originates in the interaction of that system with other systems. The
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commonsense explanation for the uneven progress of analogy is that speakers
resist some kinds of innovations and readily adopt others. To make some-
thing of this idea we surely have to go beyond the formal theory of
grammar to the theory of language use , specifically to that part of it
which concerns the way speakers deploy the variation deposited in their
grammars by ongoing linguistic change (Labov 1972) . I shall consider here
one way in which such a program might be worked out.
One could picture partial analogy arising through the interplay of
language acquisition and synchronic variation by a process somewhat
analogous to that by which the conditioning of sound changes is crystal-
lized out of their initially variable application. A three-part scenario
for it would be:
(1) Language learners can acquire different grammars even when exposed
to the same language, because of random differences in the speech data
they are exposed to, in the order in which they are exposed to it, in the
way they analyze indeterminate cases, and possibly because of other reasons,
Such 'imperfect learning' (along with language contact and other sources
of linguistic innovation) constantly replenishes the language with a
fresh supply of coexisting variants.
(2) Some of the variants arising this way will tend to be avoided in
speech because they are dysfunctional or because they become stigmatized.
Others will be favored in speech because they can be used to make things
easier to say or to understand. These effects will show up in varying
degrees depending on the circumstances.
(3) Some of the bias in the deployment of variants will in turn be
grammaticalized, with favored variants being acquired as obligatory and
disfavored variants being lost.
The assumption is, in short, that the variation due to 'imperfect
learning' which we postulate as the source of analogical change is chan-
neled jointly by the conservative influence of the established norm and by
the functional needs of the system. Their combined effect should, if the
assumption is right, predict whatever is predictable in the patterns of
partial analogy. Let us consider the two factors in turn.
The first way an analogical innovation might end up incompletely
effected would be, then, that it gives way in particular subenvironments
and/or in particular lexical items to the older standard, whether through
self-monitoring by language learners, through explicit correction by other
speakers, or both. Would any general type of pattern be likely to emerge
from such a process? Presumably there could be no completely predictable
pattern, if only because the linguistic data which bring about the partial
adaption of the older system will come to the attention of different
individuals in different orders and at different stages in their evolving
grammars. Still, one would expect some innovations to stick out against
the norm more than others, and thereby to have a diminished life expec-
tancy. The innovations most likely to succeed would be the least 'blatant'
or. 'salient' ones, for they have the best chance of surviving the language
learners' own efforts to accommodate their speech to the community norm.
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and are also least likely to provoke outright correction or ridicule by
other speakers
.
Intuitions on what exactly defines the crucial dimension of relative
saliency are bound to be vague. Fortunately we have some slight empirical
foothold on it, for dialectologists have long operated with the notion of
relative saliency in studies of interdialectal adaptation.
The relevance of certain kinds of saliency in syntactic change has
recently been demonstrated in an important article by Naro and Lemle (1977)
.
They investigate the loss of subject-verb agreement in Brazilian Portuguese
and conclude that the process spreads through the language in order of
increasing saliency. They take the relative saliency of an innovation
against the background of the old form to be a composite function of
distinct factors, of which they name two:
(1) An innovation which is more differentiated from the old form is
more salient than one which is more similar to it.
(2) An innovation is more salient in monitored (formal) speech than
in unmonitored speech.
It is plausible to add to this the following factors:
(3) An innovation in a frequent form is more salient than an innova-
tion in a rare form.
(4) An innovation which alters surface structure or phonotactics is
more salient than one which does not.
This permits us to interpret many types of partial analogy: the tend-
ency for 'small' alternations to be eliminated before 'big' ones (1),
stylistic differentiation (2), frequency (3), and various 'structure-
preserving' effects (4).
In addition to an overall normative pressure which pushes back par-
ticularly the most salient innovations, we are also supposing as another
selective process, in line with traditional functionalist thinking, that
innovations which serve the needs of speakers well or ill will be resisted
or favored accordingly. Here is where the familiar functional factors
find a natural interpretation.
Obviously the factors that control the use of variants in speech,
whatever they turn out to be, can have nothing to do with analogy per se,
for variation from any source must be patterned in the same way once it
is in the language (Samuels 1972:87). This is borne out by the resemblances
in the characteristic profiles of partial analogy and variable rules
(Kiparsky 1972) . We have in effect ended up dividing the explanation of
analogical change between two different theories, one dealing with the
source of the innovations (imperfect learning) and the other with their
selection in speech and eventually in grammar. (A vague parallel might be
the theory of evolution as a function of genetic variation and natural
selection.) The constraints on analogical change are, then, jointly
determined by the properties of imperfect learning and of variation.
This part of my proposal is close in general spirit to Samuels (1972) ,
who also distinguishes between the components of 'variation' and 'systemic
regulation' in change (see especially p. 135 f f ) . He remarks that 'neither
sound-change nor analogy can be regarded as providing any more than the
raw material of change; the process of change, from its initiation to its
acceptance in a system, is considerably more complex than this ..."
(p. 136). Samuels devotes his attention mainly to 'systemic regulation'
and rather underestimates the structural conditions of change. I cannot
agree with him, though, that new variants always reduce information-content
and that subsequent selection is a 'compensatory mechanism' which 'consists
of the restoration of the distances lost in [variation]' (p. 178).
A certain amount of discussion has centered on the question whether
change originates in competence or performance (see Dressier 1976 for
recent discussion) . From the present point of view, the question is rather
misleadingly posed, since change involves both competence and performance.
This is also the conclusion reached through a different line of reasoning
by Vincent (1974:436): "... analogy is neither a competence nor a
performance phenomenon, but rather a sort of line linking these two aspects
of language.
'
3. False analogy. There is a second fallacy in assuming that the
retention of forms from intermediate stages of language acquisition must
simplify the grammar: they might be residual projections from an analysis
which, even though optimal for the restricted linguistic data available to
the learner at some stage, is not part of the optimal grammar of the whole
language. If they are retained anyway, the result is analogy which creates
a complication of the grammar. Everyone knows how the crucial data that
may decide between competing analyses can lurk in obscure corners and
elude the linguist working from a limited corpus. It would not be surpris-
ing to find the language learner occasionally in the same predicament.
Accordingly, the assumption that analogy must represent simplification with
respect to the adult grammar is entirely unwarranted. The most that we can
legitimately claim is that analogical innovations represent analyses which
are optimal at the particular stage of language acquisition at which these
analyses arise and for the particular set of primary linguistic data which
is under consideration by the language learner at that state. Even a
partial retention of these innovations may force a complication on the
grammar when it is reanalyzed on the basis of a fuller set of data.
It is obvious that the sort of paradigmatic leveling which fails to
simplify and possibly complicates the adult grammar is often ascribable to
a simplification at an earlier stage in language development. For a
learner of Latin whose relevant data includes only the oblique case forms
honorem, honoris etc., honor is the simplest projection for the nominative
singular. Never mind that having later learned honestus and acquired an
intervocalic s -> r rule anj^ay for cases like flos'^flDris he might be
better off with the older honos after all: the horses are already out of
the barn. For a learner of Canadian English who has not acquired the
ay '^ By and vowel shift rules, write would simply be underlying /rayt/,
and the simplest projection for the suffixed forms write + er,write + ing
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would be [raydar], [raydlQ]—though once the dependence of ay vs. ey on
the voicing of the following consonant is learned, the transparent order-
ing which yields the older forms [raydar], [raydlQ] might be preferable.
Similarly, cyclic ordering can be a structural accommodation of
analogy which imposes on derived words the surface features of stems they
contain. It is not necessary, if this is so, to suppose that cyclic order-
ing is to be assigned preferred status by the evaluation measure, for the
tendency of rules to shift into the cycle can be explained without it.
This inertia of the language learner's own mistakes is perhaps the
minimal assumption which can be made to account for 'false' analogy. It
should be distinguished from McCawley's (1975) more radical, by no means
implausible idea (cf. Fodor 1978:62) of an inertial effect in the language
learner's own grammars . One version would be that language learners
resort to restructuring only 'under duress', perhaps if the grammars they
have formulated cannot be patched up to incorporate new data in a way
which satisfies some criteria—which remain to be specified by a theory of
language acquisition. Alternatively, one could imagine the degree of
resistance to restructuring depending how great the restructuring would
be, perhaps as weighed against the amount of simplification it would
afford. These hypotheses would entail that the evolving grammar is not
necessarily at any particular stage, including the finished grammar,
optimal for the data it covers, though it of course might be. Even more
severe would be the assumption that all language acquisition is, in effect,
a patchup job, with new data always being absorbed by means of the small-
est possible grammatical adjustments, without restructuring (cf. also
Haber 1975 for some related observations) . That would mean that the
child's first hypotheses always fix the future course for the evolving
grammar. The optimal grammar would on this view be an ideal construct
which was perhaps never realized by any actual language learner.
Similar in spirit is Andersen's (1973) idea of 'adaptive rules'. It
amounts to assuming that the learner may be stuck with a nonoptimal
analysis which in itself generates the wrong output and is mapped into the
right one by 'adaptive' rules. Andersen illustrates his concept with an
interpretation of a sound change which takes palatalized labials to den-
tals. He assumes that at some point language learners began to interpret
palatalized labials as being dentals ([p'] as /t/ etc.). To account for
their actual pronunciation as [p'] rather than [t] they therefore required
an adaptive rule which turned dentals to palatalized labials (/t/ -^ [p'l
etc.). Having thus become 'virtual' dentals by reanalysis, the palatalized
labials changed to dentals phonetically by the loss of the adaptive rule.
I admit to finding this unconvincing as a proposal about sound change. The
thought that language learners would somehow come to analyze palatalized
labials as being really dentals, without any phonological motivation for
doing so, and later start to pronounce them in accordance with this reanaly-
sis is too idealist for my taste. For analogical change Andersen's notion
of adaptive rules might make more sense. Even there, however, they seem
to me to underestimate the flexibility of the language learner.
These hypotheses make different but largely overlapping predictions
about analogy. They share the essential property of allowing for the
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real-time course of language acquisition to determine aspects of the system
that eventually emerges. The precise causes of the inertia, and the degree
to which it is mediated by the structure itself, could well be some
combination of those mentioned here. The essential empirical difference
between my assumption that the language learner freely restructures his
grammar when encountering new data that motivates it, and McCawley's and
Andersen's assumption of more limited adaptive measures for coping with
new data, would seem to be the following. On the assumption of continuous
restructuring, a certain amount of selection and organization would be
expected to be imposed on the innovations by the adaptive system, due to
the efforts of the learner to integrate the new data into his grammar in
the optimal way. If on the other hand the new data is accommodated by
tacking on 'patchup' rules or 'adaptive' rules, to the already formulated
grammar, no such structural effects should presumably show up. Herein
lies the relevance of cases where the result of analogical leveling is
systematically adopted into the language precisely where it can be accom-
modated in a simple way into the system, and suppressed elsewhere. This
would be incomprehensible if we did not assume grammatical reintegration
rather than makeshift 'adaptive' rules.
'Adaptive' rules do appear to be the right mechanism for certain
sorts of cases, hypercorrect forms, for example. They show precisely the
distinction between the ordinary result of language acquisition, where
reanalysis takes place, and the special situations caused by limited access
to the relevant linguistic data, which lead to hypercorrection.
If this view of paradigmatic leveling is right, then it follows that
efforts to combine paradigmatic leveling and 'distinctness' effects in
terms of a unified set of 'paradigm conditions' (Kiparsky 1972) or
'Humboldt's Universal' (Vennemann 1974) were fundamentally misguided.
Paradigmatic leveling is a direct reflex of language learners' tendency
to simplify grammar, whereas avoidance of homonymy, distinctness of gram-
matical categories etc. are imposed on the system by the purposive selection
of speech variants from whatever source, including ordinary sound change.
As a result of their different etiology, they are also implemented in the
grammar in different ways. It is striking that 'distinctness' may be
effected by the most varied structural means. Even for one category within
one grammar it is possible to demonstrate the characteristic 'conspiracy'
situation where the distinction between morphological markers is maintained
by numerous rules and restrictions on rules acting in concert (cf. Kiparsky
1972:214). Hogg (1975) has pointed out that such cases do not seem to
occur with paradigmatic leveling. This is predicted from our assumption
that the selection of variants favors category distinctness but is neutral
as to paradigmatic leveling.
We have argued that 'paradigm' conditions can be eliminated from the
evaluation measure. It is tempting to try a similar reduction for opacity.
Can we interpret shift into transparent rule order as the result of incor-
porating into the language the projections of the simplest grammar for
some set of core data, as we did for paradigmatic leveling? That would
let us pare down the evaluation measure even further by taking even
opacity out of it, essentially restoring it to its original form of a pure
simplicity measure.
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Let Ki, R2 be two opaquely ordered rules which are reordered into the
transparent order R2, Rl- Consider now how the reordering can be analyzed
as the grammatical reintegration of the projection from Ri at a stage when
R2 has not been acquired. Taking first reordering into feeding order,
suppose we have the rules
(7) i. a -» b / _ c
ii. d -* c /
_
e
where (ii) counterfeeds (i) , e.g. /ade/ ^ aee, not *bee . Suppose that the
primary linguistic data under consideration by the language learner at
stage Sjj is enough to motivate (i) but not (ii) . Such instances of the
output ae from (ii) as are encountered are therefore incorrectly analyzed
as derived from Ice/ rather than /de/ at S^. From a+oe the grammar there-
fore projects the 'wrong' output boe by (i) . Suppose that at stage S^+l,
rule (ii) has been learned. The wrong output hae of Sn can be reintegrated
into Sj^+1 simply by ordering the rules in the transparent order (ii,i).
If the analogical bee wins out, reordering has taken place. If correction
to ace prevails, normal language transmission has taken its course. So
it is possible to account for reordering into feeding order by the process
of grammar simplification (imperfect learning) without supposing that
feeding order, or transparency, is in itself more highly valued, if the
entirely natural additional assumption of learners' output inertia is
made and we further postulate an order of acquisition. Note that our
scenario predicts the asymmetry of reordering. A switch from feeding to
nonfeeding order would be inexplicable by the process we have outlined.
The above proposal is extreme in that it reduces assumptions about
the factors governing language learners' structuring of data to the SPE
minimum (simplicity) and puts the whole burden of explaining transparency
effects, as was done with leveling, on the postulated inertia of learner's
own earlier speech forms and on assumptions about the order of acquisition
of rules. There is also a more moderate version of the same general idea,
where the role we have so far assigned to the order of acquisition of
rules is given to a minimal additional assumption about the language learn-
ers' structuring of data:
(8) For any set of data D, learners select the shallowest underlying
representations compatible with the simplest grammar of D.
All that this says is that speakers do not indulge in gratuitous abstrac-
tion over and above what is required for linguistic generalizations.
(8) is of course quite distinct from such constraints as the Alternation
Condition, which limit the abstractness of underlying representations
regardless of any resulting grammatical complications. It has, I think,
been generally accepted even by those who reject these severer constraints,
and would seem to be independently necessary even if these are accepted,
in order to predict the restructuring on nonalternating outputs of neutrali-
zation rules (for example, word-final obstruents restructured as unvoiced
in isolated forms in languages like German, Yiddish, etc., with final
devoicing rules, where the Alternation Condition does not predict the
choice of the devoiced obstruents as basic because the devoicing rule
applies in a derived environment)
.
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Most of the predictions about transparent ordering can be had this
way too. Instead of assuming a stage where only (i) has been learned,
suppose that (ii) has been learned but that those outputs of it (ce) for
which the learner is not (yet) in a position to motivate an underlying
source /de/ are systematically represented by him as /ce/, even though the
more abstract /de/ would be equally simple. (So far we have done without
this assumption) . Then the grammar projects in such cases from a+ae the
output bee rather than aae. If retained, it must be structured in terms
of feeding order in all cases where ce is reanalyzed by the learner as
/de/ on the basis of data encountered later.
Another likely victim of our reductionist rampage is the revised
Alternation Condition (Kiparsky 1973), which stipulates that obligatory
neutralization rules (or, in a milder formulation, obligatory nonautomatic
neutralization rules) apply only to derived inputs.
4. Conclusions. To summarize, we have discussed two recalcitrant
types of analogy, partial and false analogy, and concluded that they too
yield to the interpretation of analogical change as simplification under a
more realistic interpretation of change which allows for inertia in the
acquisition process and for interference between the learner's system and
the target norm of the speech community. This is partly good news and
partly bad news. The bad news is that linguistic change can no longer be
used as a probe into linguistic structure in the direct and naive sense
that many of us used to think. Before we can exploit historical evidence
for synchronic purposes we need a firm theory of the intervening factors
—
the effect which the concrete process of acquisition itself and differen-
tial saliency can have on what is acquired. It follows for example that
the arguments concerning abstractness will have to be rethought in so far
as they are based on historical evidence. The good news is that we can
restore the integrity of the evaluation measure by eliminating from it the
accretions which it had acquired. These accretions have two suspicious
properties in common. First, they require reference not to the form of
the grammar (as simplicity does) but to the relationship of the output
of the grammar to something else—either to other output forms (paradigm
conditions), to rules (opacity), or to underlying forms (recoverability,
Hale's deep/surface disparity avoidance). Second, they were motivated
practically exclusively from historical evidence. Arguments that they are
required to select the synchronically correct grammar have not been forth-
coming. The elimination of these considerations from the evaluation
measure would therefore be a gain rather than a loss.
We wind up with a surprising conclusion. There are two assumptions
of the theory of generative grammar that have been subjected to strong
criticism: the simplicity metric, and the idealizations of instantaneous
language acquisition and the ideal speaker-hearer. What we have seen is
that by eliminating the second from historical linguistics we overcome
the objections to the first. We seem to have found a way of retaining
the simplicity measure without giving up what is right about traditional
functionalist thinking. Structural and functional considerations both
play an essential role but as part of separate systems. This relieves
the evaluation measure of the burdens which purely structural theories
unjustly placed on it and eliminates the unfortunate ' teleological
'
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element of traditional functionalism, as well as its inability to account
for structural patterning in analogical change. The ' teleological' effect
can now be seen to follow from the functionally and structurally determined
'filtering' of the variation generated by the process of imperfect learning,
while the structural patterning follows from the source mechanism of imper-
fect learning as well as from the grammaticalization of the functionally
patterned variation.
This essay is extracted from a monograph on analogy to be published
separately. It presents the main line of argument in a condensed form,
omitting most of the critical discussion of alternative views and nearly
all supporting data. This work was supported in part by the National
Institutes of Mental Health Grant No. 5 POl MH13390-12.
2
There is a terminological confusion to be cleared up. The term
analogy has become established in reference to both a particular type of
phenomenon in linguistic change, whose existence is not in dispute, though
there may be disagreement about where its exact boundaries lie, and a
particular theoretical interpretation of this phenomenon, namely the pro-
portional schema or its equivalent, whose correctness has certainly been
cast into doubt. My own practice earlier was to simply avoid the term,
and to replace it, in both senses mentioned above (the phenomenon and the
process I was proposing to account for it) by simplification . The term
is also avoided by Andersen (who likewise objects the traditional inter-
pretation and speaks of simplification (1969 :82A), though from a somewhat
different point of view): 'The changes with which we will be concerned
would be called analogical by some. We will not use this term, for terms
like "grammatical analogy" as traditionally used are highly ambiguous,
and we need to be specific' (p. 807). Others have continued to use the
term analogy to refer to the mechanism as traditionally understood, that
is, to the extension of surface patterns by the proportional schema or its
equivalent (e.g. Chomsky and Halle 1968:156, fn. 12; Isacenko 1970).
Finally, King (1969) and others maintain the term in ambiguous use both
'as a cover designation for . . . instances of change' (p. 128) and as a
term for the proportional mechanism (e.g. p. 182). The ambiguity would
seem to be easily resolved by context but has nevertheless spawned a
fatuous line of argument where generative criticisms of the surface pro-
portional theory of analogy are called 'attacks on analogy', and their
authors are then, absurdly, denounced for failing to distinguish between
analogy and sound change
!
None of these ways is satisfactory. It is best to have a separate,
neutral term, for the type of historical change whose interpretation is
at issue, and distinct terms for the various processes which have been
proposed to account for it. I will here use analogical change (or some-
times just analogy ) for the historical phenomenon and proportional
analogy for the general class of processes by which it is traditionally
explained (suitably qualified when necessary to devote specific versions
of it), and simplification for the general class of processes which has
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been more recently suggested in its stead (again suitably qualified when
necessary)
.
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MULTILINGUALISM AS OBJECT OF
LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTION
Charles A. Ferguson
Stanford University
In this paper I intend to take a reactionary point of view and say
something quite old-fashioned. I will say that linguists should write
grammars. Then I will add the somewhat radical thought that they should
write multilingual grammars. It may take a considerable number of words
to say that, but you have fair warning that that is what I am going to say.
Writing grammars is a traditional task of linguists, in fact it is
almost a defining task of linguists. It is not the only one, but it is
certainly something linguists are known to do. They attempt to provide
a principled description of a particular language; either the whole lan-
guage or some part of it. They have been doing that for a long time, and
I am suggesting that they should not lose heart, but should continue doing
it, because it is a good thing. To be sure, there are other tasks, such
as the formulation of theories about language in general and theories about
how to write grammars. Some of these tasks are just as important or pos-
sibly more important than writing grammars. But the writing of grammars
is a good thing.
Why do linguists write grammars? I would like to think that the first
reason they do so is simply to extend our knowledge about human languages,
so that we know more things about languages. I realize that in some quar-
ters this is a fairly old-fashioned view of why one would write a grammar,
but it is what comes to my mind first. Second, linguists write grammars
in order to codify languages. That is to say, to prescribe the form of a
standard language for its users. This is also supposed to be not such a
good thing according to the ethos of modern linguistics, but if we think
back to the great linguists in the history of our science, most of them
have written prescriptive grammars. Panini was certainly a prescriptivist,
no matter how else we may characterize him, and he was also one of the
great linguists and grammar-writers of all time. Third, linguists write
grammars in order to have a basis for pedagogy, so that people can teach
the language more effectively and once again, although modern linguists
belittle such a purpose, some of the great grammarians have had exactly
this aim. Sibawihi, the most famous Arab grammarian, certainly wrote his
grammar, at least in part, so that Persians would know how to get their
Arabic right and so that Arabic could be taught properly to Persians.
Next, many linguists are interested in writing grammars so that they can
compare one grammar with another, whether for typological, historical, or
areal comparison or for pedagogically oriented contrastive analysis. In
other words, an important purpose of writing grammars is to learn something
about the nature of language in general by comparing grammars. And then
finally, I put it in fifth place, you can write a grammar merely to check
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out some theory, that is merely to see if you can confirm or disconfirm a
particular theory or theoretical model that you are interested in, or per-
haps modify the theory or extend it in some way to take care of other
kinds of material. People often put this purpose at the head of the list
and say that grammar writing is not worthwhile unless you are checking a
theory. In the present state of linguistics, I prefer grammars. Good
grammars last well and are used by all kinds of theorists, but theories
come and go quickly and too often interfere with balanced coverages in
grammars.
If we agree that linguists, for these various reasons, do write gram-
mars, whether attempts at whole grammars or partial ones, why is it becoming
less fashionable to do so today? I think the chief reason is that the task
is getting harder and harder to do. That is, the more that linguists study
language, the more they find there is to put in grammars. There is also the
basic problem of how to go about writing a grammar, which is becoming
increasingly troublesome, too. But the first problem is that there is just
so much there. Language is a very complex phenomenon, and linguists are
dealing with more and more aspects of it. All you have to think of is how
linguistics programs today have full courses in pragmatics, child phonology,
social dialects, and a host of topics which a few years ago were not in the
catalog. Presumably, these things have to get into grammars, somehow, and
it seems to have become an impossible task to write a grammar. In fact, a
philosophy of despair has emerged. Some linguists say, 'The most you can
do is write some fragment of some possible grammar of some part of some
language (preferably with theoretical significance) .
'
Another problem is the old-fashioned question of what constitutes a
language. How do you know when you have one? This is an important part
of my topic: natural language as the object of description. It is not
easy to define what we mean by a language, i.e., the structural or func-
tional criteria we need for determining when we have a language. Linguists,
by and large, have put that problem aside. It comes up every once in a
while as something that we have to struggle with, but the fact is we have
ready at hand no way of deciding when the object we have is a language, and
not a dialect or two languages or something else.
Let us assume that the notion 'a language' has a natural status of some
kind as an object of description which is highly productive for understand-
ing the nature of human language behavior in general, how it changes, and
how it is processed individually and socially. Such an assumption does not
exclude the study of partial, restricted and marginal language behavior
which is abnormal or pathological, but it accords with the view that whole
languages are the normal object of linguistic description. The criteria for
delineating this natural unit would include autonomy, stability, and func-
tional range. By 'autonomy' I mean the degree to which the object in
question is structurally and functionally distinct from neighboring
phenomena; this may involve such measures as structural coherence, mutual
intelligibility, extent of superposed variety, and attitudes of speakers
(cf. Ferguson & Gumperz 1960). By 'stability' I mean the degree of internal
variation; extremes of diachronic or functional flux in language behavior
seem to represent atypical language situations different in kind from normal
use of language (cf. Ferguson & DeBose 1977). By 'functional range' I refer
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to the degree of restriction in semantic range and acceptable uses; an
object restricted to religious use or lingua franca functions and not
serving as the mother tongue of a social group is not a full language
(Ferguson & DeBose 1977). These criteria are mentioned as illustrations,
not as offering a solution. The identification of the linguist's object
of description is not a trivial issue; it is a tough problem and one that
will not go away just by our ignoring it.
Linguists choose different ways of getting around that problem. One
alternative is simply to select a corpus of some kind, and do your best to
write a grammar of that. This is usually done not just to describe the
corpus itself, but to provide a description that will apply to a larger
body of material. Or you can take the way out of just describing one idio-
lect, and regarding that as the normal object of linguistic description,
without attempting to characterize the larger unit. Or you can try to find
out what langue really is, i.e., find out what is shared by the particular
community, and leave out things that are not shared.
There are other ways: you can even back out all together and say 'the
language that I am writing a grammar of is whatever it is that my grammar
describes', and then the grammarwriter 's decisions are inexplicit but not
subject to debate. Another thing we can do is to take selected fragments
of language and say, 'This is what we are going to write about." Following
this approach, it may be possible to find some kind of useful core fragments
that we would all agree are useful information about any language we wanted
to describe. Examples of this method are the efforts by Bernard Comrie or
the Stanford Phonology Archive to produce a checklist about things you would
like to find out about any language that you start to describe (Ferguson
1978:26).
The next issue is variation. We have all come to recognize the fact
that languages are full of variation. There is just no way that we can
avoid it. An object is not a human language if it does not vary along
many dimensions. There must be dialect variation depending upon where the
users come from or what part of society they are in. There must be register
variation conditioned by the use, the occasion, the addressee, the topic,
or whatever. Also, many languages have superposed varieties which we find
a little awkward to call dialects or registers, as when a standard variety
or even a national standard on top of regional standard is part of a par-
ticular language situation. There are actually a number or recognized
types of language situations, such as diglossia, standard language with
dialects, decreolization continuum, and so on, as well as many situations
which do not fit into those types. Most linguists are getting reconciled
to the fact that they must include an account of variation in writing the
grammar of a language.
Let me give one illustration from my own experience in a diglossic
community: the diphthongs in the kind of Arabic that is spoken in Damascus.
There are two long mid vowels, i and o, and also two dipthongs ay and au
,
and there is some kind of special relation between them, since many words
are pronounced sometimes with the monophthongs and sometimes with the
diphthongs. Standard grammars of Classical Arabic give only ay and aw,
and grammars of colloquial Damascene Arabic give e and 5 with only marginal
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examples of ay and au, yet speakers of Arabic in Damascus show extensive
variation in the pronunciation of these sounds. Control of the appropriate
use of this variation is part of the basic linguistic competence of Damascus
speakers and belongs in the grammar. Even a person who has very little
education in Classical Arabic has learned from very early childhood to
use ay and aw in certain sterotyped expressions, and even the most
scholarly Arab using Classical Arabic pronounces some proper names
and foreign loanwords with e and o. What is of greater interest and
what forces me to say that the phenomenon cannot be described by describ-
ing colloquial Arabic and Classical Arabic and some type of relationship
between them, is that it is possible to pronounce most words in the lexicon
either way, depending on whether speakers want to show that they are
speaking in a classical style or a colloquial style. There is a very
complex system of variation in which some words tend to be more classical,
some tend to be more colloquial and all fluctuate to a certain extent
within the system. An analysis which gives only e, 5 or only ay, aid is
missing an important point about the way people speak Arabic in Damascus.
There are, of course, various ways of including such material in gram-
mars. I do not have to tell you that people have invented things called
variable rules as one way of doing this. There is also an oldfashioned
way of describing one part of a language in the body of the grammar
and putting the other varieties in footnotes or specially marked pas-
sages in the grammar. I am referring to such grammars as Smyth's old
Greek grammar (Smyth 1956), which has 'Classical' Attic in the main
body of the text and footnotes to tell you the Ionic, the Doric, and
so on. Or, let us say, Kellogg's Hindi grammar (Kellogg 1965), which
gives an impressive range of dialect variation in the notes and marginal
comments.
These may be very primitive attempts to cope with getting variation
into the grammar, but sometimes they are much more informative than a
grammar which carefully and purposefully removes a great deal of the
variation and describes only a uniform, isolated part of the language
behavior. One important part of characterizing a language is identifying
the nature and extent of variation in it. That is, one does not only
compare two languages as to phonological structure, syntactic structure,
lexical structure, semantic structure, or other 'structures' or 'compo-
nents' or 'levels' that traditional linguists talk about. Two languages
which are basically similar in phonology and syntax, let us say, but one
of which has a great deal more variation of a certain kind than the other,
differ in a linguistically significant way. We need ways of talking about
the nature and extent of variation in a particular language as a part of
its grammar.
Just as variation within a language is universal, we could almost
say that multilingual ism in speech communities is universal. A great
many speech communities are characterized by such structural discontinui-
ties in the kind of language used in the community that by almost any
criteria one would want to say that several different languages are used
in the community. There are, of course, monolingual speech communities
where the variation is so limited that no one would want to speak of more
than one language. I suspect we would not have to travel very far from
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Champaign, Illinois, for example, to find one of the surrounding towns
that is a monolingual speech community in this sense. In such communi-
ties there will be register variation, dialect variation, and so on,
but it will all constitute unmistakably a single language. However, if
we look around the world, including many parts of the United States,
there are speech communities in which a number of different languages
are part of the linguistic repertoire of the community. Distinct
languages exist side by side and are part of the whole scheme of vari-
ation of the speech community. What 1 want to suggest tonight is that
if we are going to write a grammar of what goes on in a speech community
that uses—let us say—four languages, instead of writing four separate
grammars and then writing rules for when people use one language or
another, we should try to write a unified grammar in which all this '/
variation fits somewhere. Instead of four separate structures which are
variously used, we may have one linguistic structure with complex internal
variation.
Perhaps the easiest way to argue for this suggestion is to give
examples of multilingual speech communities which linguists have tried
to describe. Now, as far as I am aware, linguists have not really tried
to write whole grammars of such linguistic repertoires. In fact, what
they typically do is to write what is essentially a problem paper. They
take some set of interesting facts about a multilingual speech community
and say, in effect, 'See, look how these work in this community, and
isn't that exciting', or 'interesting', or 'doesn't that have implica-
tions for this or that?' But they do not try to say, 'These facts are
part of a whole grammar of several languages operating together. ' The
examples I will use were chosen more or less at random and are not
intended to be typical, but they are all possible examples of multi-
lingual speech communities where repertoires could be analyzed as
unified grammars.
Norman Denison has written a number of articles about a little town
called Sauris or Zahre, an isolated speech community in the Italian Alps
(e.g., Denison 1968). It is a little town of fewer than a thousand
people, but it has been flourishing for a long time and presumably will
continue to flourish for some time to come. Everybody in that town
speaks three languages. The local variety of Standard Italian is the
language of education, the language of school, even kindergarten, and
the language that parents often speak to their children so that they will
do better in education. It is the language in which almost all writing
takes place, the language of certain kinds of formal uses and so on.
Second, there is Friulian, a kind of local regional standard of Italian,
which is very different from Standard Italian. This is the language
everybody uses informally when non-co-villagers of the region are present.
If at least one person from another village in the Carnian region is
there, everyone switches to Friulian. It is also used under other cir-
cumstances. For example, some people who have had high school education
outside of Sauris use it as the familiar conversational idiom of group
solidarity. Finally, there is the German dialect of Sauris/Zahre, a
unique variety of German which is limited to that town in its essential
characteristics and which is used when people are talking to each other
informally as fellow inhabitants of the town. In a way, you might say
that it is the nearest thing to a mother tongue Saurians have. This
brief summary is, of course, an oversimplification. In any case,
Norman Denison's studies of the Saurian speech community offer very
interesting descriptions of sample utterances and the occasions for
code switching. He is concerned with the situational factors which
account for the use of one variety versus another. He identifies
thirteen such situational factors and proposes a tentative hierarchy
of them. His view of the immediately desirable further research is to
improve on that hierarchy, by finding out when one factor outweights
another, when different factors are in conflict, and so on.
Denison takes a big step toward the position I am suggesting
here. He says, 'For Sauris we have to see the three languages as. .con-
stituting, for community-internal purposes, one super-code, as it were.
The choice of one of them as macro-textual vehicle for the linguistic
component of a communicative event is like the selection in a monoglot
community of register at the earliest degree of delicacy' (Denison
1968:585). He even offers some careful parallels between langague
switching in Sauris and register switching within English in Britain.
He does not, however, take the final step in attempting to write a uni-
fied grammar of the phonological or grammatical competence of Saurians.
As a second example, let us take a study done by Peter Trudgill,
who is known to us here as a faculty member of the Institute. He has
written a really excellent article about reduction and simplification
in a community of Albanian speakers in Greece—a community which has
been there for several centuries (Trudgill 1976-7) . The members of
this speech community are all bilingual in Arvanitika and Greek, and in
discussing the differences between Albanian proper and Arvanitika, Trud-
gill notes that in some instances the slack is taken up by Greek. The
simplest example is that of the lexicon; a large niomber of Albanian
words have been replaced by Greek. Apparently an Arvanitika-speaker who
does not remember a word feels free to substitute a Greek equivalent.
The grammatical reductions, substitutions, and adaptations are much
more complex. Arvanitika and Greek are interwoven in fascinating ways.
Trudgill 's concern in the article, however, is with the reduction and
simplification in Albanian under the conditions of restricted use, and
he makes no attempt to treat Arvanitika and Greek within a single gram-
matical framework. The closest he comes to this point of view is the
comment ' . . . the reduction to which Arvanitika is currently subjected
is simply keeping pace with the extent to which Arvanites are now becoming
native speakers of Greek' (Trudgill 1976-7:48).
Another example is Beatrice Lavandera and her study of the kind of
language spoken by Italian immigrants in Argentina (Lavandera 1978)
.
These Italian immigrants are bilingual. Their children typically become
monolingual Spanish-speaking, but a large population of bilingual Italian
immigrants persists because of continued immigration. They speak a kind
of Italian among themselves, in fact several quite different kinds of
Italian because they come from several parts of Italy, and they speak a
kind of Spanish to the Spanish-speakers of Argentina, a 'reduced' form
of Spanish, that is called Cocoliche. This variety of Spanish is very
close to the surrounding Argentinian Spanish but Lavandera has shown that
it differs systematically in certain ways. In particular, the full range
of stylistic variation which the native speakers of Spanish have, is
lacking in Cocoliche. For example, whether you pronounce the final s as
the sibilant, as aspiration, or as nothing at all, is a stylistic device
which can be used in many ways in Argentinian Spanish. But Cocoliche-
speakers either have the full s or they don't, as an all or none proposition.
In fact native speakers of Buenos Aires Spanish use this s variation both
word-finally and preconsonantally within the word, but Cocoliche-speakers
typically drop the final s completely and use the full sibilant pronun-
ciation preconsonantally. Similarly, there are different ways of using
the subjunctive in indirect discourse which the Spanish-speakers have
available and which the Cocoliche-speakers do not use.
In this instance the lack in Cocoliche is not interference from
Italian, since the speakers use the corresponding subjunctives in their
Italian. Lavandera recorded artificially elicited material in the
speakers' 'purest' Italian and 'purest' Spanish, i.e., Cocoliche, ('Tell
me a story in dialect.' 'Now tell me the same story in Spanish.') She
also recorded spontaneous conversations in the home where the language
was sometimes what the speakers later judged to be 'dialect', 'Spanish',
or a mixture of the two. Her conclusion comes close to the position
I am advocating here, although she does not try to write a unified gram-
mar: 'The data indicates that for these speakers Spanish and Italian
are not independent codes, at least not more so than the different
registers of a monolingual speaker' (Lavandera 1978:403).
One final example, the one I find the most interesting, is a quad-
rilingual Indian community in Canada. Ronald Scollon recently studied
a speech community in Port Chippewyan, Alberta (several articles and a
monograph in press; cf. Scollon for the forthcoming) where the people
have for at least a hundred years, been speaking four different languages:
Chippewyan, Cree, French, and English—an Athabaskan language, an Algon-
quian language, a Romance language, and a Germanic language. And over
the times, these languages have come to play particular roles in that
community in a very complex pattern. Everybody speaks all four languages,
but the phonologies and the syntaxes have become remarkable alike. For
example, the phonologies tend to be like Cree and the syntaxes more like
Chippewyan. But there are nice examples of patterns that cut across all
four languages. Particularly interesting is a phonological variable
described by Scollon. Beginning with some variation previously existing
in Cree, there is now quite extensive variation between 's' sounds and
'/' sounds, including affricates of the ts, tj type. It works this way:
in general, the speakers tend to use the 's' kind of sound when they
are unconsciously expressing a modernizing tendency, that is when the
situation is recognized as a modernizing one or a modernizing topic is
being discussed or a modernizing addressee is involved. And the 'J'
kinds of sounds are associated with traditional addressees and so on.
The sound variation which began in Cree has now spread throughout the
system, and so we find such strange anomalies to the observer, as this
example which Scollon gives: one particular woman in this speech com-
munity was heard saying [suz] for English shoes when teaching the
kindergarten, a modernizing locale, and she was heard saying [Ja] for
[sa] the word for 'beaver' in Chippewyan, when she was at home talking
with a group of elders in the community, a traditional setting. So in
both cases, the pronunciation was 'wrong' in terms of what the original
forms should be, but it was right in terms of the total grammar of the
speech community. In this wonderful set of studies by Scollon, does
he talk about a grammar of this whole system? Not at all. His first
concern in one of the papers is performance aspects of traditional
narratives in the society. He is trying to understand the way tradi-
tional narratives are recited, their functions in communication, how
they are framed in the discourse, and so on, and he provides a very
fine exposition of traditional narrative performance. In order to
talk about that, he has a lot about linguistic convergence. The closest
he comes to saying that it all could constitute a single grammar is this:
'The four languages at Port Chippewyan . . . have converged to a con-
siderable extent. . . . The systematicity of discrete historical varieties
is subordinated to the pragmatic needs and personal experiences of the
individual' (Scollon forthcoming).
Incidentally, I would like to point out that all four of the
studies have a diachronic flavor. Whether the authors intended it or
not they all talked about what those languages were like before the
time of description and what seems to have happened and to be happening,
and they all make some cautious predictions about what might happen in
the future. Also, it so happens that these fine linguists in making
these descriptions, at one point or another in each one of the articles,
have acknowledged reluctantly, hesitantly, and in a kind of aside, that
really the linguistic repertoire is one system. What I am saying is,
let's face that openly. Let's try the job of writing grammars of
such complex systems. I know it is hard enough to write grammars,
anyway, and what I am suggesting makes it even harder. But I still
think this is the job of the linguist. As long as we keep kidding our-
selves that there are no situations like this, in some way, that they
are not somehow linguistically significant, then I think we are missing
an important part of linguistics. We are missing an important part of
how languages change through time and how language variation functions
synchronically, essential features about the nature of human language.
And I have a final quotation, this one from a study of mine. Back in
1957, I wrote an article called 'Two problems in Arabic Phonology,' a
somewhat polemic technical description of two questions in Syrian Arabic
phonology. One of the questions was the ~ lo versus aylcoS) that I mentioned
earlier. At the end of the article, I apparently lapsed into a kind of
dreamy mood, because this is the sentence I wrote: 'I like to dream of
a time when the analysis of a uniform, static, autonomous synchronic
system will be regarded as merely a special limiting case in a far more
general linguistics which is prepared to deal with data highly hetero-
genous dialectally and diachronically ' (Ferguson 1957:478).
I still agree with the substance of that sentence but the addition
I am making tonight is that if the variation turns out to include varieties
so different that we would want to call them different languages, we might
still have to put it in the grammar. In other words, I am saying that
multilingualism may be a legitimate object of linguistic description.
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MULTILINGUALISM AS A GOAL OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY
Roger W. Shuy
Georgetown University &
The Center for Applied Linguistics
In his introduction to one of the most recent collections of articles
on the amazingly diverse and emotional topic, bilingualism in America,
Hernan LaFontaine notes that educational policy development is difficult
to articulate and even more difficult to change. In the case of the recent
flurry of interest in multilingualism in this country, LaFontaine (1978 :xi)
observes: 'In addition to the normal inertia resisting any educational
change, we have had to face political, social, and economic issues raised
as barriers to the effective implementation of bilingual education pro-
grams' . Such issues are not new to education for this constitues a field
which has been characterized by decades of searching mindlessly after every
new method or gimmick which comes along. Now that language has surfaced
as the focus of the developing policy, the inertia which so characterizes
education is of immediate concern to linguists.!
Recent events in educational legislation are instructive about the
process of change in American schooling. In January of 1974, after four
years of litigation and appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of
a San Francisco Chinese family named Lau who claimed that the local school
system had violated their constitutional right to access to education by
providing that education in a language which was foreign to the learner,
English. By ruling in favor of Lau, the Supreme Court said, in effect,
that it is the right of every American citizen to expect the strong and the
educated to deliver learning in such a way as to address the beginning
points of the weak and the uneducated. Education has claimed to be doing
this for years, usually referring to it as 'starting with the child where
he is'. Although this principle is widely proclaimed, in reality it is
clearly absent, for major American educational policy continues to follow
a clearcut compensatory education model which places little value on diver-
sity and great emphasis on making every child as much like main-stream
children as possible as soon as it can be done. Lau vs. Nichols suddenly
challenged all this and, with one stroke of legislation, brought legisla-
tive power to what had been almost empty verbiage in teaching and learning.
This bilingual education legislation, like much of educational legis-
lation was actually an expression of a moral value derived from a great
deal of intuition and from very little empirical research or theoretical
clarity. Social scientists had not provided Congress with a clear date
base for bilingual education any more than they had in the past offered
ample evidence that busing would lead to better learning for the educa-
tionally disadvantaged. In fact, when confronted with the assertion that
bilingual legislation preceded the knowledge upon which it could be based,
the lawyers for both Lau and Aspira2 readily admitted that such was the
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case, noting further that without such legislation, the knowledge base might
never be started.^ This does not mean that no knowledge base existed prior
to legislation; only that this knowledge base was far from adequate. Nor
is this to cast criticism on the legislation, for it was undoubtedly well
motivated and much needed. It is called to attention here rather as a hum-
bling reminder that educational theory and research, in many instances,
tends to follow the legislation rather than precede it.
In fact, the developmental model might be said to look something like
the following:
Application Clarification
of Concept
Legislation Materials,
Methods
-i
Theory
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somewhat inaccurate representation of generative grammar) , educators stopped
seeking out linguists and most linguists didn't seem to care. We went off
to our own issues and let education find other easy 'believisms' to adopt.
It was not to the credit of the field of linguistics that multilinguism
came into prominence with the passage of the Title VII Amendment to the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Act. Embarassing as it may be, the turn toward the
direction of favoring more than one language in American education (and thus
in American life) did not grow out of suggestions from the field which calls
such practice its own. Since linguistics also has had little to do with
stimulating other national language movements in recent years such as Ver-
nacular Black English and the resurgence of interest in Native American
languages, one might speculate about why we haven't pushed our own field,
our own interest, our own expertise area. At least seven factors, individ-
ually or together, could cause linguistics to be slow in this matter.
1. Energy. Perhaps linguists have too much to do. We teach, write,
research, and appear to work very hard but, as fields go, we are few
in number. Our problems to address are endless. Some will remember
when an LSA meeting seemed to have participants who believed that we
were only ten years or so away from writing a complete grammar of
English. The more we learned, the farther away that point seemed to
get. Today there is hardly a linguist alive who feels that we are
anything short of light years away from such a goal. Perhaps we do
not participate in developing multilingual policy because we lack
energy, but this does not seem to be the total cause.
2. Belief. A second possible reason why linguistics has been slow to
influence educational policy is that we may not really believe in what
we are doing. This is an extremely difficult suggestion to accept
since there is probably no more fanatic discipline in all of academics
than linguistics. Nevertheless, the question remains that if linguists
practice multilingualism and if we believe in it, why is it that we
have had so little influence on educational policy? Do we believe it
in our heads but not in our hearts?
3. Academic Neutrality. With the academic stance of neutrality we
may be getting closer to the reason why linguistics is slow to influ-
ence educational policy. This neutrality gets reflected in many ways.
Some linguists are above getting involved with making their theory
move toward practical reality. It smacks of the academic proletariat.
It seems too much like getting one's hands dirty or working in the
kitchen. There was a time, not too long ago, when applied linguistics
was frowned upon because it cast off the stance of neutrality and
entered the political, social, and economic world. The ineffective-
ness of such a stance was brought home to me clearly a few years ago
when a colleague and I had presented to an author cogent, academic
reasons why the reading test which he had developed was in error and
dangerous. His response to our linguistic argumentation was direct
and simple: 'The test sells well and as long as it sells well, I'll
keep it on the market.' Clearly our academic neutrality would do
nothing useful for the thousands of children who were being misdiag-
nosed by this test. The issue was an economic one as far as the author
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was concerned and the best way to address an economic issue is not with
linguistic reasons but with an economic weapon such as systematic boy-
cott.
Linguists who do not want to get involved, who just want to do
their specialty and avoid advocacy have a legitimate right to do so, of
course. And as a field, we can simply describe multilingualism, show
how it works and develop theories about it, remaining neutral about it
all. If we do this, however, we will not be doing much toward develop-
ing educational policy related to multilingualism. We will be leaving
it to other people, many of whom know little about multilingualism.
4. Vision. A fourth reason why linguists have been slow to effect
educational policy of multilingualism stems from a myopic perspective
of our field. In contrast to the previously noted academic neutrality,
this position is one of academic isolation which leads to a severe type
of intellectual myopia. The field of bilingual education in America
suffers badly from such myopia. Linguists tend to think of bilingual
education as language. Social scientists think of it as culture. Law-
yers consider it law. Educationists see it as materials, methods,
curriculum, and teaching. All are right, of course, but it is clear
that few see it from the perspective of the other.
If the lawyers for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund had seen bilingual education from the perspective of education and
linguistics, for example, they would never have argued for a consent
decree which required the New York City schools to develop, administer,
and score tests in English and Spanish for over 200,000 Puerto Rican
children in writing, reading, listening, and speaking to determine in
which language these children could 'most effectively participate in
the classroom. ' Linguists could have told the lawyers that such a test
does not exist and that it would take a great deal of research to dis-
cover what it means to 'effectively participate in the classroom.'
They could also affirm that it is rather difficult to test for speaking
ability in a paper/pencil group test. Educators could have told the
lawyers that New York teachers do not look with favor on losing a week
of class for such testing and that the teachers union, being generally
opposed to bilingual education in the first place, would not neces-
sarily discourage lost or falsified data.
It is difficult to imagine how this disciplinary isolation could
be averted. Universities foster it and many efforts at building inter-
disciplinary programs have yielded products which know a little about
the various disciplines but are competent in none of them. It would be
far better to be fully trained in a given field such as linguistics,
then work on problems in education along with educators, not in opposi-
tion to them. Team research, team teaching, and a general cooperative
spirit seems to be the answer here. It is clear, however, that disci-
plinary isolation has slowed linguistics in its effort to influence
educational policy related to multilingualism.
5. Snobbishness. Closely allied with the vision problem is that of
snobbishness. Perhaps what we really mean is insecurity since it is
Ioften quite difficult to tell one from the other. Disciplinary isola-
tion seems to go hand in hand with one-ups-manship of this sort,
however, and it is not difficult to see evidences of such unhappy
behavior among our own numbers.
Sometimes this snobbishness is not even recognized. Clear evi-
dences seem to be easier to locate in crimes against linguistics rather
than crimes of linguists against other fields. It is no secret, how-
ever, that among the social sciences there are different research
paradigms and techniques. Many experimental psychologists, for exam-
ple, seem to be unaware of the legitimacy of such nonexperimental
approaches as participant observation or ethnographic analysis.
Recently, in fact, the NIE sponsored a workshop which addressed the
conflict between quantitative and qualitative approaches to research
in education. This was a very important first step since quantitative
research has dominated government research funding in recent years. A
story is told, in fact, of an experimental psychologist who was intro-
duced to a classicist. The psychologist asked the classicist what he
was doing and the latter responded that he was spending the year in
research. The psychologist looked surprised and replied, 'I didn't
know that classicists did research.'
Such snobbishness is not limited to the field of experimental
psychology or to quantitative techniques. It is safe to say that lin-
guistics is perceived as abstract, esoteric, jargon-ridden, and
impractical by many school people. Linguists are often thought to be
irritable, excited, unhelpful, and one-track minded. It is not dif-
ficult to see how such an impression could develop if we do no more
than tell educators that they need linguistics and that, to get it,
they need to take our introduction to linguistics courses. IVhile
their concerns are on reading, writing, speaking, and listening, ours
are on phonology, grammar, semantics, and universals. It is easy to
be thought of as snobs under such circumstances.
6. Knowledge. Perhaps linguistics has not affected educational
policy in the area of multilingualism simply because we do not have
the knowledge base with which to do it. We know some things about
first language acquisition (at least up to age ten or so) and a few
things about code switching and second language learning. But we are
practically helpless in answering questions of the schools and the
courts which concern fluency (what does fluency mean anyhow?), the
effect of cognitive growth and language switching, the exact dimen-
sions of literacy and the language of literacy. Even more embarassing,
we do not have answers to the educators' questions on the most basic
issues such as what really matters most in learning a second language.
Does a nonnative really have to learn to speak a new language like a
native? Won't the nonnative lose something important if he speaks the
target language the way native speakers do? These and many other
potential research questions are unanswered. The courts believe that
someone has the answers to these questions. Linguists clearly do not.
When asked, we admit it. Then the schools have to act as though the
answer were clear. Since linguists haven't given the answer, the
schools muddle along as best they can. They make policy without us
because someone has to do it.
7. Internal Controversy. However much linguists might consider
internal controversy to be a healthy thing which enables us to grow
and expand, we are often perceived by educators and others to be con-
stantly argumentative and undecided. As we all know, linguistics is
a field in which people engaged in bitter public disagreement can turn
around and, unexplainably, go to lunch together as friends. This is
not always the case, of course, but it is clear that others do not
always perceive us in the same way that we may perceive ourselves. In
addition, the fact that our field seems to have theoretical revolutions
with great regularity leaves other fields in a quandry about how to
relate to us.
Of these seven factors which one might suggest to explain why lin-
guistics has been slow in affecting educational policy with respect to
multilingualism, five stand out. It is easy to reject the suggestions that
we lack energy or belief. We can probably be faulted when we attempt to be
academically neutral. We have undoubtedly been myopic about multilingual-
ism, seeing it only as a linguistic phenomenon. Accurately or not, we have
been perceived as snobbish and prone to excessive internal controversy. It
is the factor of our inadequate knowledge base which should concern us the
most, however. Multilingualism is clearly within our territory. Linguis-
tics may not own the field but it can hardly be said to be marginal to it.
That we have so few answers to offer the courts or the schools as proof of
what works or even what is^, is no credit to our discipline.
In general, linguistics has not taken an active role in trying to ini-
tiate language policy in this country. We have not anticipated what is
coming next. We have not analyzed our market. We have not tried to fore-
cast. Indeed, linguistic involvement in language issues has tended to be
responsive rather than interactive or formulative. We have let other forces
of society set the stage and make mistakes. Then we come on the scene and
complain bitterly about how stupid the schools are to have set their current
courses.
Our involvement with educational issues relating to Black English Ver-
nacular in the sixties is a case in point. School problems of Black
children were recognized first in the schools by people like Ruth Golden
in Detroit. It is not possible at this time to know whether or not Ruth
Golden asked linguists for help when she attempted to develop standard
English teaching procedures in that city. In a way it is immaterial for,
if she had asked, she would have found little of use to her. So she went
ahead on her own. She developed the Golden Tapes, a set of audio tapes
which addressed certain Black English pronunciations. Mrs. Golden found
it particularly troublesome that students at Central High School pronounced
it Cintral High School. So she developed tape drills to correct this. The
point here is not that Ruth Golden selected a poor feature to focus on. It
is, rather, that there was no linguistic help for her to rely on. She had
to go it alone. Five years later, by 1968, linguists could tell her that
the /I E/ collapse before nasals does not really matter. Other features
count considerably more heavily. Why couldn't linguists have anticipated
the Black English development and geared up for it in advance? We had to
be responsive rather than interactive or formulative. What is worse, we
were not even anticipatory.
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Other fields have developed an anticipatory capacity with some
degree of reliability. We are all familiar with difficulties involved
in weather-forecasting and economic predictions but even something as
prosaic (is this snobbishness again?) as sales forecasting may be able
to offer insights. Business is not merely responsive; it interacts to
change societal conditions to its own liking through advertising, lobby-
ing, bribing, three-martini lunches, and many other ways. Lest there
be any confusion on this matter, let me state clearly that 1 am not
suggesting that linguists begin advertising or bribing, or having three
martini lunches, but I think it might be useful for us to consider two
of the common processes of sales forecasting.
One process simply looks at the past and notes recurring cycles
and locates the current situation somewhere in that cycle. This is a
bit like projecting language change based on a developmental line from
as far back in time as we can go to the present then extended (perhaps
a dotted line) into the future, based on past development.
The second process of sales forecasting is the careful analysis of
market conditions. Sales forecasters predict future conditions by
matching controllable and noncontrollable factors. The controllable
factors are things like what we know, how much equipment we have, our
financial condition, our personnel, and our reputation and image. The
noncontrollables are the social forces at work, demographic factors,
ethical forces, political forces, cultural environment, international
issues, and the development of new technology. For example, if tech-
nology should suddenly create a way to make congenitally deaf people
hear normally, the political issues involved in the signing (ASL) vs.
oralists camps of deaf education would suddenly seem less critical.
Without such technology, however, linguists have been stoking up the
controllable resources to try to make oralists understand that signing
is the native language of deaf people.
^
The point here is that linguists will continue to find it difficult
to affect educational policy involving multilingualism as long as the
field is merely responsive to developments created outside of linguis-
tics. In order to be anything other than responsive, linguistics must
develop ways of anticipating societal needs in advance and gearing up
for them before they happen. The rest of this paper will provide five
suggestions about what linguistics must do to become more active in
developing educational policy involving multilingualism.
1. Beoome accepted by education groups. Work with educators (in
team, if possible) . If linguistics is to be recognized as an ally
of education, we will need linguists who can communicate with
educators. We should be writing in their journals, speaking at
their conventions, and serving on their panels. If one wants to
do something useful about doctor-patient communication, one says
it where it will be heard by the right people. One writes for
a medical journal or speaks at a medical convention. If we
reject the idea of speaking at an education convention on the
grounds that such conventions are of low calibre, we are either
guilty of the snobbishness discussed earlier or we have picked
the wrong convention. Two very important considerations must be
kept in mind when one engages in this sort of activity. First,
there is a pecking order in education just as there is in lin-
guistics. Failure to cite the perceived acceptable literature
can limit outsiders' positive reactions considerably. Secondly,
educators will be interested in their own problems primarily and
it is up to us to show them how linguistics can contribute to
their problems. Administrators face the problem of how to assign
pupils to bilingual programs or regular programs. They frequently
rely on tests, such as language dominance tests, to make such deci-
sions. Linguists can argue effectively that language dominance is
a peculiar concept in search of a definition but this will not make
the administrator's problem go away. Eventually we will need to
do more than debunk current practice. We will need to offer a
viable alternative to the administrator's problem. Writing in
education journals, appearing at education conventions, and serv-
ing on education boards provide the evidence of our concern.
Such evidence will enable us to be accepted by the education
groups through which policy on multilingual ism will likely be made.
2. Get involved with the power structure. Earlier I commented
that lobbying might not be appropriate for all people. Neverthe-
less the business of influencing educational policy requires a
broker of some sort. It is possible to get oneself appointed to
textbook selection committees, to write to the NIE Director, to
read proposals, or to sit on evaluation panels. Those of us lin-
guists who read proposals in areas related to language in education,
speech, or humanities realize full well that our job is not only to
evaluate a proposal but also to represent linguistics to our fel-
low panelists (who are most likely to be psychologists) and to
actually teach them about research designs, strategies, and know-
ledge from our field.
3. When possible, get involved with advocacy. To make multilin-
gualism become education policy it would appear that linguists
will need to become considerably more activist than we ever were
before. A linguist who is accepted by education and who is
involved in the power structure stands a better chance of being
asked to serve as an expert witness in a law suit involving
bilingual education than one who is not so involved. The decision
to be an advocate in such circumstances opens one to considerable
complication, however, as the following incident will indicate.
In December of 1976, the New York City School System had just
entered into a consent decree with a New York Puerto Rican rights
group, Aspira of New York. As noted earlier, the consent decree
specified that the school system test to determine in which lan-
guage, Spanish or English, the over 200,000 New York Puerto Rican
children could most effectively participate in the classroom. The
test was to be developed, administered, and scored by the following
June. It was to measure ability in both languages in reading,
writing, listening, and speaking. The department of research in
the schools called on the Center For Applied Linguistics to develop
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the test. One quick look at these impossible requirements prompted
CAL to suggest a different strategy. Rather than to do a job which
had to be based on an as yet unidentified and unresearched know-
ledge base, CAL suggested that New York throw itself at the mercy
of the federal judge and tell the truth: that nobody really knows
how to do this as yet and that it would take a year or two of
solid research and development to be even near ready to carry
out the task.
CAL was not effective in convincing the director of research,
however, and New York went at it on their own. Approximately
two weeks later, the test was completed and the director of
research happily claimed that he could do in two weeks what CAL
projected would take a year or so.
At this point, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund, legal council for Aspira, called CAL to request help in
determining how good this new test, the Language Aptitude Bat-
tery, actually was. CAL took great delight in this request for
it gave linguistics a golden opportunity to address the issue of
bilingual placement. Part of the work was to explain to the
judge, in court, the weaknesses of a test which claimed that dis-
crete point items such as the /s/ vs. /c/ contrast in words like
shoes and choose are the critical measurements of language abil-
ity. Another task was to explain to the judge that a test written
in English would not be equally valid when translated into Spanish.
In addition to these validity issues, CAL pointed out to the court
many of the ambiguities in the wording of both the questions and
the instructions.
A second incident involving CAL advocacy work took place in
Chicago where, in 1976, the Office of Civil Rights declared that
the city schools were out of compliance with the Equal Rights
Amendment, largely in the area of minority language speakers.
The procedure for identifying bilingual children was again the
case. Chicago represented itself at the crucial hearing as iden-
tifying children in need of bilingual education by administering
a fifteen minute video tape to Chicago teachers. They observed
three minutes of five different children of varying English lan-
guage ability. Each child was said to represent one grade on a
five point scale of English competence. The teachers were to see
this performance, then use it as a model and guide for classifying
all of their limited English speakers. Again it was not very dif-
ficult to write an affidavit describing what was wrong with this
procedure. The complex part, however, was that the director of
bilingual education in that school system is an extremely competent
person who sincerely wanted to improve the situation. To make
matters worse, the attorneys for the Chicago schools did not put
Chicago's best foot forward. Chicago was doing better things than
this court performance showed. The business in advocacy roles often
puts the linguist into a very touchy situation. Should we continue
to help OCR attack what Chicago has been doing even though we know
that they are in competent hands and making steady progress? We
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gambled to go ahead on the assumption that by exposing the school's
presentation we might ultimately strengthen the program and the
director's hand at the same time. As it turns out, this is exactly
how it worked. OCR won the case and the Chicago schools were
threatened with having all federal funding withheld. There was a
quick change in strategy shortly after, however, and the program
became stronger than ever.
Once one enters into policy development such as this, however,
one runs certain risks. I was personally frightened that my good
relationship with the director of bilingual education might dete-
riorate because of the court case. I gambled that it would not and,
fortunately, I was right.
Getting involved with advocacy in this way is something which
few academics ever think they will do when they first get seduced
by their field. My own personal dreams of living a tweedy, halls
of ivy existence vanished like vapor as soon as I realized that if
I really believed in what I was teaching, I might also be expected
to do something about it. This doing can be interpreted as talking
or teaching, at least for a while—or maybe even writing papers
ang giving speeches. But eventually these things come to seem
oddly preliminary and removed from the real arena. At such times
one does not stop being a linguist and start being a salesperson.
Instead one continues to be a linguist and tries to determine ways
to influence policy. If the linguist does not do this, others who
know our field less well most certainly will. And this is exactly
what has happened far too often in the past. The friends of lin-
guistics, those who had a little knowledge, are the ones who did
us in, who promised the moon and who saw linguistics as the answer
to education's problems. Obviously that tack has not worked. Edu-
cational policy is no better for it and it has certainly not been
enlightened by it. Perhaps it is time to try it from the obverse
side of the coin. If educators do not understand language well
enough to lead in the areas of educational policy related to lan-
guage, perhaps linguists can develop strategies toward understanding
education well enough to do it. To do this there is probably no
better subject matter than multilingualism. And there is no
quicker way to find oneself in the middle of the policy issue than
to become involved with an honest-to-goodness law suit involving
multilingualism.
4. Research needed problems. A fourth way for linguists to become
involved in the educational policy of multilingualism is to direct
our research toward the needed problems . At this time we still do
not know what matters most and what matters least in learning a
second language. We need a much broader and deeper research base
for bilingual education than is now available. To date, research
in bilingual education has been considered more an education issue
than a linguistic one. The tendency of the research has been to
compare one methodology with another or one curriculum with another.
However, we have now reached a period in the development of the
field when people are demanding evidence of success or failure of
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the AIR evaluation of Title VII programs is that it did not under-
stand the basic principles of language variability .6 It is difficult
to put faith in any assessment of the effectiveness of bilingual
education which does not distinguish between acceptable and unaccept-
able variation and which does not address language variability as it
manifests itself in the dimensions of social, regional, age, sex,
race, education, occupation, intention, genre, topic, etc. It is
also growing increasingly difficult to accept the discrete-point
criteria used over and over again as evidence for language ability
in either language.
Recent research in linguistics has focused more and more on
the importance of core syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic pro-
cesses and less and less the isolable phonological, morphological,
and lexical items. It has focused on the holistic more than on
the segmental skills. Bilingual education programs need to focus
more on this holistic view and more the sort of variability involved
in asking questions, making requests, seeking clarification, taking
a conversational turn, and reporting what others have said, for
example, than on pronunciation accuracy or inflectional perfection.
This direction is not merely a tag-on to existing programs; it is
the starting point for language learning.
Any effective research on language in bilingual education pro-
grams will need to have, at its base, an adequate linguistic theory
of language learning. Whether by accident or by design, there is,
at the core of bilingual education, a satisfying theory of language
learning. From research on first or native language learning we
know that infants communicate ideas first, then later they perfect
their phonology, lexicon, and grammar. Traditional language pro-
grams cause second language learners to try to reverse this process,
getting the phonology, lexicon and grammar first and hoping, later,
for the development of language use. When subject matter is taught
in a second language, the focus gets put right back on the idea of
subject again, just as it is for infants. The resulting learner
language is, in comparison to that of a mature speaker, rather
sophisticated, just as it is for infants. But it is the process
that is sophisticated and thousands of years of experience have
shown it to be the superior method. Thus, bilingual education,
for this very reason, has at its disposal an adequate language
learning theory: a deep to surface structure sequence which has
been proved successful by millions of infants as they learn their
native tongues. Such a theory contrasts sharply with the surface
to deep structure sequence found in most second language classrooms.
With the advantage of this deep to surface theory, bilingual
education research could easily capitalize on the advances made
recently by other first language learning research. We know, for
example, that pronominalization is learned early and easily by
children whereas preposed adverbials are learned rather late.
Nancy Yanofsky (1978) has recently shown, however, that reading
instruction does not take advantage of this knowledge. A number
of texts analyzed in her research show that preposed adverbs are
frequent in beginning reading instruction while pronouns are intro-
duced rather slowly.
The areas for research into language variation and bilin-
gualism are many. Careful descriptions of the production of such
variability need to be made in order to determine how the speakers
actually talk. Likewise, sociolinguistic attitude studies need to
be made in order to determine community values toward the various
language varieties used in school programs. We desperately need
some clarity in the area of language assessment, particularly as
it reflects a learner's sequential progress in a number of school
and non-school settings. We need a dose of realism in the develop-
ment of curricula in language teaching as well, with a focus on
the contributions which linguistics can make in bringing about a
radical restructuring of language learning classrooms by focusing
on core syntactic, semantic and pragmatic units of language rather
than the minute, phonological, morphological, and lexical aspects.
5. Become well-placed. A fifth way for linguists to influence the
educational policy of bilingualism is to get ourselves well placed.
One of the few benefits of the depressing job market in linguistics
today is that it is forcing us to think of working outside of aca-
demia. And where is educational policy often forged? Outside of
academia. It will do our field, and the subject of multilingualism
a great deal of good if folks who know about language are placed in
government agencies in which language issues are directly or indi-
rectly addressed. Likewise it may do multilingualism good to have
linguists working with speech therapists, helping to sort out speech
problems from multilingual differences and as lawyers, litigating
cases involving language issues. It may do multilingualism good
to have linguists working in the advertising agencies in New York,
monitoring language issues on television ads and it will most cer-
tainly do the field of multilingualism good to have linguists
working for publishers. All of these positions, however promising
they may be for influencing educational policy, require a sacrifice.
Marcia Whiteman has had to learn to be a bureaucrat in order to
exercise her linguistic judgment on language issues at N.I.E. Andy
Garfinckel has had to learn the advertising business as a trainee
in order to work in television advertising. George Williams, Mary
Levy, and others have actually gone to law school in order to be
able to better apply their language knowledge toward policy issues.
Faye Vaughn-Cooke , a linguist, works in speech therapy saving
minority speakers from being designated as having severe patholo-
gies. And as of September we will have, as far as I know, our
first Ph.D. in linguistics enter Georgetown University's medical
school where Johnnie Smelz will get the necessary medical creden-
tial to serve her consuming interest in neurolinguistics . To
become well-placed will require sacrifices of a sort which linguists
have not had to make in the past. It may be easy for me to say,
since I don't have to make such a sacrifice, but I think our field
will be far better for it in the long run.
By carrying out these five suggestions: becoming accepted by edu-
cators, getting involved in the power structure, becoming advocates,
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researching the needed areas, and getting ourselves well placed, lin-
guistics can improve its anticipatory capability. We need to do more
than to forecast the next language-related thrust, for there is a mul-
titude of language-related issues in education already before us.
Almost all aspects of testing (multilingual or monolingual), language
learning, reading, and writing are deeply involved with our field.
The issue of multilingual ism, however, is perceived by the public as
closer to linguistics than these other matters and for this reason,
multilingualism is a prime candidate for a strong push from our field.
Taking our cue from sales forecasting, we can most certainly address
the controllable issues: what we know and need to know, our equipment,
materials, personnel, and reputation. But we can also give considerably
more attention to the uncontrollables : economic factors, political
developments, demographic changes, ethical forces, and new technology.
Obvious economic factors may suggest that we gear up for knowing Arabic.
Demographic changes may suggest that we gear up for teaching Samoan in
Los Angeles. As social changes go, we addressed issues of language and
sex a bit faster than we got to language and race. Linguists got a late
and rather disastrous start in the bilingualism push and we soon found
ourselves thought to be marginal to the education departments of the
country. Our inability to affect educational policy is a direct result
of our failure to anticipate the movement before it happened and our
lethargy in gearing up after it did.
Worse than that, linguistics has not articulated some of its own
roost basic premises in such a way that the education world can see and
react to. It is patently obvious to anyone who has learned language,
for example, that there is no way in God's earth to try to speak a new
language without making mistakes in it. Progress can sometimes be
noted, in fact, by the increasingly sophisticated kinds of mistakes which
learners make. Years ago Labov referred to this concept as 'stages in
the acquisition of Standard English.' All linguists know that children
learn their native language in much the same fashion. Somehow this con-
cept has not come through clearly to educators, who seem to feel that
speakers should be assessed on some sort of right-wrong binary scale.
Likewise, linguists have not well articulated their own basic pre-
mise that variation in language is a healthy, necessary, human, and
beautiful thing.
In addition, in bilingual education programs, language variability
will need to be displayed as a resource rather than as a handicap. Edu-
cators, monolingual or bilingual, have been very slow to grasp this
principle. Journalists seem to accept it, at least partially, when they
argue that a good writer must write one way for one audience and a dif-
ferent way for another. Poets have also seen the principle or they would
never be able to vary, to twist or to torture language in a poetic fashion.
The openness of poets to this principle is rather apparent in a poem
about bilingualism written a few years ago by Ogden Nash:
There are countries where being multilingual is of no
advantage to the tourist.
Because no matter how impeccable his grammar and idiom the
natives refuse to understand him unless his accent and
inflection are that of the purist
They tell of an American diplomat who lost his suavity
never to be restored
When a Paris taxi driver denied the very existence of
his destination because he pronounced Place de la
Con-corde instead of Place de la Con-corde .
(At this point I must for the justly maligned Manhattan
hackers interpolate a kindly word;
None of them to my knowledge has ever rebuffed a Parisian
asking to be taken to the corner of Sird Avenue and
Sirty-sird.) (Nash 1971
)
Whether or not Nash is right about the contrastive attitudes of the
Americans and French concerning language variability, he has captured
something about what we need to know about bilingualism if we are to
affect educational policy in any significant way. And there is a
great deal more.
One might add, however, that if linguists were on top of the
situation, issues of reading, language arts, testing, and equity would
also be our concerns.
2
The Aspira Consent Decree is a similar piece of legislation
relating to New York City Puerto Rican children.
3
These assertions were made at the TESOL meeting in Los Angeles in
March, 1975.
As a matter of precedent for policy, Georgetown University
has recently accepted English as satisfying the foreign language
requirement of an American congenitally deaf student. Likewise
Georgetown has accepted Sign Language as meeting the foreign lan-
guage requirement of a native English speaker.
however, that there are many other reasons
to criticize this evaluation, some of which have to do with design
and instrumentation, regardless of language unsophistication.
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FOWIAL VS. FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PHONOLOGY*
Morris Halle
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
In his highly instructive paper 'Functional Explanations in Genera-
tive Phonology' Michael Kenstowicz (to appear) distinguishes two kinds of
explanation in phonology, 'internal' and 'external'. According to
Kenstowicz, 'an "internal" explanation attributes the presence of some
(part of a) rule or other aspect of phonological structure to another
independently motivated portion of the grammar, while an "external" expla-
nation seeks motivation in terms of something that exists outside of and
independently from the grammar.' Appeals to simplicity, to feature count-
ing, or to the fact that certain rules are cyclically ordered would be
examples of 'internal' explanations for certain phenomena, whereas appeals
to ease of articulation or to avoidance of ambiguity however defined might
be viewed as examples of 'external' explanations. It is the latter kind
of explanations that traditionally have been labelled 'functional'. In
what follows I examine a number of such 'external' explanations and attempt
to show that in each case an alternative 'internal' explanation is not
only available, but also preferable. IJhile I do not wish to be understood
as claiming that these examples prove that the search for 'external'
explanations should be abandoned forthwith, the discussion below does cast
doubt on the claims that have been advanced by proponents of 'functional'
explanations.
It is an obvious fact that many languages have rules that neutralize
contrasts between distinct lexical items or morphemes. Every beginning
student has no doubt been told several times that Russian, German, and a
host of other languages have a rule that devoices word-final obstruents.
As a result, hearing the utterance [zenskij rot], a Russian does not know
whether the speaker is referring to a female's mouth (/rot/) or to femi-
nine gender (/rod/) . This ambiguity might in principle present difficul-
ties for communication, and languages might, therefore, be expected to
avoid rules that result in the neutralization of distinctive contrasts.
As a matter of fact, neutralization rules are attested in practically
every language and the phonetic ambiguities which they produce do not
appear to have great practical effects. It might, therefore, appear that
the ambiguity resulting from neutralization of contrasts plays no role
whatever in phonology.
This conclusion, however, does not seem altogether justified in the
light of interesting observations made by Jonathan Kaye (1975) that degree
of ambiguity (or its complement 'ease of recoverability ') can explain
certain otherwise quite puzzling phonological phenomena. I discuss here
the simpler of the two examples analyzed by Kaye, that of Maori. In this
language word final consonants were deleted in the alternations illus-
trated in (1)
:
Verb
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in the language. Arrayed against this is, of course, the additional cost
of a complicated and ad hoc rule governing the distribution of the two
suffixes. Although there does not exist at present a proposal of how to
convert these considerations into a mechanical evaluation procedure, such
an evaluation is surely not unimaginable and has implicitly been utilized
quite widely. Consider, for example, the treatment of the verb to be in
phonological descriptions of English. It is invariably treated as totally
exceptional and attempts are not made to integrate it into the phonological
and morphological rules of the language. IJhatever simplicity considera-
tions underlie this decision—which to most linguists is so uncontroversial
as not even to merit serious discussion—will also correctly handle the
case of the Maori passive.
Thus, it would appear that the Maori case cannot be taken as evidence
that functional explanations are to be sought in preference to formal
ones. While this claim was not explicitly advanced by Kaye it is specifi-
cally made by Zimmer (1975) who draws attention to very interesting facts
in Turkish phonology which according to him 'highlight a kind of problem
that the old simplicity measure signally failed to address itself to, and
that is not solved by most recent proposals' (p. 556). I shall attempt
to show here that Zimmer is mistaken in this assertion, that the old
simplicity measure does not only address itself to this problem, but in
fact forces the solution that Zimmer regards as the correct one. The
facts of interest are as follows. Turkish has a rule devoicing stops and
affricates in syllable final position:
(2) absolute
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It will be noted that this analysis is abstract in the sense that it
requires underlying representations in which a distinction is made between
/k/'s that undergo rule (2c)—these are represented as /g/,—and /k/'s
that do not undergo rule (2c)—these are represented as /k/.
This analysis of Lees' is contested by Zimmer who argues that an
observationally adequate description of the Istanbul dialect requires
instead of (2c) the rule (2d) , which deletes intervocalic velar obstru-
ents in the third and subsequent syllables of the word:
(2) d. [-son, -cor, -lab]
In particular, Zimmer cites such Western loan words as:
(2) e. bek beki 'back'
kartotek kartote-i 'cardfile'
and refers to experiments with nonsense words all of which show that dele-
tion depends on position in the word rather than on underlying phonological
representation. Zimmer views this result as evidence in favor of func-
tional over formal considerations, and he is understood in this way also
by Kenstowicz, who writes: 'Turkish speakers have thus opted for a more
concrete analysis of ^-deletion. The reason appears to be that from the
point of view of the language learner, it is easier to distinguish the
two different kinds of /c-final morphemes on the basis of an observable
property (the number of syllables) rather than on the basis of a property
(underlying /g/) whose existence follows from rather sophisticated reason-
ing. '
I do not believe that this conclusion is justified. What Zimmer has
shown is not that Actual Speakers, unlike Ideal Speakers or linguists,
are unable or unwilling to engage in 'rather sophisticated reasoning'.
Instead, Zimmer has shown that the solution proposed by Lees is wrong,
simply because it fails to characterize the data, especially the data in
(2e)
.
It hardly needs to be said that from an incorrect rule no theoreti-
cal conclusions whatever can be drawn.
In his paper Zimmer observes that the abstract analysis (one includ-
ing rule (2c)) can be made to work by adding a morpheme structure condition
that 'post-vocalic morpheme-final /k/ occurs only in monosyllabic mor-
phemes, and post-vocalic morpheme-final /g/ only in polysyllabic ones'
(p. 561). This condition, which must explicitly be added to the grammar,
can be formally expressed as shown in (2f)
:
I
(2) f,
-son
-cor
-lab
[-voice] / // ([-syl]) [+syl] -1-
[+voice] / [+syl] [-syl]Q[-l-syl]
In other words, Lees' solution can be made observationally adequate if in
addition to rule (2c) it contains also the morpheme structure condition
(2f ) . It is this adequate solution which must be compared with Zimmer's
alternative; i.e. a solution in which deletion takes place in accordance
with rule (2d). The latter solution will also require a morpheme structure
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condition which, however, will state a simpler fact than (2f ) , namely
that all morpheme final postvocalic velars are voiceless. We represent
this condition formally as in (2g)
:
(2) g. [-son, -cor, -lab] -> [-voice] / [+syl] +
We thus have two alternative descriptions that cover the same range of
facts: one including the rule (2c) and the morpheme structure condition
(2f); and the other composed of rule (2d) and morpheme structure condition
(2g) . We observe that while rule (2c) is simpler than (2d) the difference
amounts to just a single feature. On the other hand, morpheme structure
condition (2f) is considerably more complex than its counterpart (2g)
.
Thus, on purely formal grounds the solution advanced by Zimmer must be
chosen over the empirically adequate version of the solution a la Lees.
In other words, the issue is not between a solution requiring no sophis-
ticated thought and one that demands elaborate reasoning, but rather
between two solutions that require the same amount of sophistication,
where one is somewhat simpler than the other; simplicity being measured
by the old feature-counting metric of SPE. I conclude that the Turkish
example provides no evidence whatever for the proposition that purely
formal considerations may be overridden by considerations of a functional
sort.
It is important to be clear about the fact that simplicity considera-
tions are relevant only in a restricted class of cases— i.e. in cases like
the Turkish velar deletion just discussed where the same theory admits
two or more alternative formulations that cover the exact same body of
facts. Appeal to the simplicity metric is irrelevant where alternative
descriptions either cover different sets of facts or where they employ
different theoretical devices. Thus, appeals to simplicity—in the
narrow technical sense of the term employed here—cannot decide, for
example, between a description that admits reference to metrical trees
of the kind exemplified in Liberman and Prince's (1977) recent article as
against one based on a theory like that of Chomsky and Halle (1968) that
has no place for such theoretical constructs. The fact that simplicity
considerations are irrelevant in such cases does not mean that there are
no rational ways of choosing between alternative theories but only that
this choice has to be made on grounds other than simplicity.
In several papers which deservedly have attracted wide attention Paul
Kiparsky (1973) has suggested that certain limitations be imposed on the
characterization of phonological facts. In the earliest of these papers
'How Abstract is Phonology?' written in 1968, Kiparsky proposed that
phonological theory should be so constrained as to rule out 'the diacritic
use of phonological features and the phonologic use of diacritic features.'
The latter use, according to Kiparsky, is exemplified by rules that 'have
the form of phonological rules but operate on diacritic features' (p. 16),
and I have nothing further to way here about rules of this kind. The
diacritic use of phonological features, on the other hand, is illustrated
by cases where two forms are given different underlying representations
'for the sole purpose of classifying segments into those that do and those
that do not meet the structural description of a rule' (p. 15). Such
rules—of which the /g/-deletion rule (2c) in Lees' account of Turkish is
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a typical example—result in what Kiparsky terms 'absolute neutralization',
and in his 1968 paper Kiparsky proposed to exclude rules of absolute
neutralization by imposing the so-called alternation condition which
requires 'that morphemes which are always phonetically identical must have
the same underlying representations' (p. 18).
Kiparsky 's condition is said to render grammars more easily learned;
since the relationship between underlying and surface representations is
more direct, the learning of the underlying representations requires much
less of that 'rather sophisticated reasoning' which many linguists appear
to be uneasy about attributing to the average man or woman on the street.
I should like to remark that while Kiparsky 's condition renders grammars
less abstract and hence, perhaps, more easily learned, it does not speak
directly to the question of what role 'formal' vs. 'functional' considera-
tions play in the functioning and development of languages. Kiparsky 's
proposal is a proposal about the form of underlying representation of
morphemes and is thus on a par with every other condition imposed on the
form of grammars. What differentiates it from some of those— e.g. from
the conventions on rule ordering— is that we have difficulty in thinking of
a functional motivation for the latter, but can readily think of one for
the alternation condition.
As is well known, Kiparsky 's paper gave rise to an extended discus-
sion, and as a result of this discussion as well as of additional independ-
ent work, Kiparsky has modified his views to a considerable extent. The
modified position is outlined in the paper 'Abstractness, Opacity and
Global Rules' (1973). Its most important feature is that whereas previ-
ously 'the Alternation Condition (had) been formulated ... as a limitation
on underlying forms,' the new proposal reformulates it 'as a limitation on
the application of phonological rules' (p. 65). Specifically, Kiparsky
proposes the requirement (3)
:
(3) Nonautomatic neutralization processes apply only to derived forms.
One of the most important facts that led Kiparsky to revise the Alter-
nation Condition in the above manner was his discovery that there exists
a class of examples where absolute neutralization is blocked in certain
contexts and admitted in others. In particular, rules of this class apply
only in 'derived' contexts; i.e. either across morpheme boundary, or
morpheme-internally, if a crucial part of the context triggering the rule
is itself derived by an earlier rule. They do not apply morpheme-
internally where the triggering context is present already in the under-
lying representation. I regard the discovery of the existence of rules of
this kind as one of the most significant empirical finds in modern phonol-
ogy.
Kiparsky illustrates how such rules operate with the help of the
following two rules of Finnish phonology:
(4) a. e ^ i I
__
#
b. t ^ s I
__
i
c. i) /halut+i/ ^ /halus+i/ 'wanted'
(4b)
ii) /vete/ ^ /veti/ -» /vesi/ 'water'
(4a)
iii) /tila/ 'place'
/itikka/ 'mosquito'
/neiti/ 'Miss'
It should be noted here that in Kiparsky's formulation restriction
(3) does not apply to all phonological rules but only to phonological rules
which are neutralizing and which, moreover, are nonautomatic, i.e. which
admit specific exceptions. In their recent book on phonological theory,
Kenstowicz and Kisseberth (1977) raise cogent questions about this restric-
tion: 'Why should automatic neutralization rules apply in both derived
and nonderived contexts, but nonautomatic neutralization rules just in
derived contexts? . . . Suppose that there are one or two items that are
exceptions to [a] rule of neutralization . . . Why should the existence of
such random exceptions have the consequence that "an alternation . . .
cannot be accounted for" by appealing to a rule of absolute neutralization'
(p. 212). As a matter of fact, Kenstowicz and Kisseberth adduce two
examples where a nonautomatic neutralization rule must be permitted to
apply in nonderived contexts. I briefly sketch one of these examples. In
the Yawelmani dialect of Yokuts vowels are shortened in closed syllables.
This shortening rule is a neutralizing process since it results in the
merger of long vowels into their short counterparts, which otherwise are
distinct phonemes in the language. The shortening rule is also nonauto-
matic: it does not apply before the causative-repetitive suffix /Isa/.
In view of this, restriction (3) should block the application of the
shortening rule in nonderived contexts. This, however, is not the case.
Kenstowicz and Kisseberth cite the form [?aml + al] 'might help' which must
derive from an underlying [?a:ml + al]. Thus shortening, which is a non-
automatic neutralizing rule, must be allowed to apply in a nonderived
context, in violation of (3).l Moreover, in his dissertation, Mascaro
(1976) develops 22 rules for Catalan phonology: he shows that 14 of these
22 rules apply only in derived contexts (he states that they are cyclic
rules, but as we shall argue below, cyclic rules are restricted to apply-
ing in derived contexts only). Each of these 14 rules is neutralizing,
and several of these are automatic (see pp. 17-18). Thus, (3) cannot be
understood as a biconditional for there exist automatic processes that
apply in derived contexts exclusively.
In the light of the preceding, one is strongly tempted to accept
Kenstowicz and Kisseberth 's pessimistic conclusion that 'it is not immedi-
ately clear that there is a way to predict which rules will apply only in
derived contexts and which rules will apply in nonderived contexts as
well. If no general principle is at work, the structural descriptions of
particular rules would have to be global in nature' (p. 214). Fortunately,
however, there is an interesting alternative to this. It has been argued
by Mascaro (1976) that given independently motivated constraints cyclic
rules will be limited to applying in derived contexts only. In order to
see this we must examine what is meant by the assertion that a grammar
contains rules which apply cyclically. As Mascaro remarks, at a minimum
this requires that such rules obey convention (5):
(5) Given the nested constituents
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a set of cyclically ordered rules C will apply to the domain
[.....] only after having applied to the domain [._i.--. - ] •
Convention (5), however, is not sufficiently restrictive for it allows
for types of rule interactions that are much more complex than those
actually observed. For example, convention (5) as stated admits a rule
that applies in even-numbered constituents but not in odd-numbered constit-
uents. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that convention (5) allows
a feature switching rule to reapply on each successive constituent. Thus,
it is conceivable that in a language with a feature switching rule like
the vowel shift of Modern English, a word consisting of a single constit-
uent with the stem vowel /i/ would appear on the surface as [ay]; if the
same stem were part of a word consisting of two nested constituents, its
vowel would be manifested as [ey]; if it were part of a word consisting of
three nested constituents, its vowel would be manifested as [iy] on the
surface. Moreover, the same series of outputs would be repeated in words
consisting of four, five, six nested constituents, etc.
2
Such repetitive reapplications of rules could be blocked by a restric-
tion that would prevent rules from returning 'to earlier stages of the
cycle after the derivation has moved on to larger, more inclusive domains'
(Chomsky 1973:2A3). Chomsky, who encountered a similar problem in his
work in syntax proposed the restriction (6a)
:
(6) a. No [cyclic - MH] rule can apply to a domain dominated by a
cyclic node A in such a way as to affect solely a proper subdomain
of A dominated by a node B which is also a cyclic node.
The consequences of this restriction for phonology were explored by
M.-L. Kean (1974). Although one of Kean's two examples was subsequently
shown by M. Allen (1975) to be amenable to a simpler solution that did not
require recourse to restriction (6a) , the paper was immensely instructive
in that it demonstrated in detail how general abstract restrictions on the
applicability of rules such as (6a) can serve to account for rather subtle
surface facts. To illustrate what is involved consider the effects of the
rules (i) and (ii) on the strings (iii) in (6b) below:
(6) b. i) X Y / Z ...]
iii) [...[PX]Z...] [
i)
ii)
It will be readily observed that rules (6b i) and (6b ii) are struc-
turally identical with the Finnish rules (4a) and (4b) respectively.
Suppose that we assumed, therefore, that the Finnish rules are cyclic and
attempted to apply them to the strings in (6c) in accordance with constraint
(6a):
(6) c. [//[vete]#] [//[neiti]//] [#[halut]+i#]
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specifically mentioned in the structural analysis of a cyclic rule R. Con-
vention (7b) does not require this, but R must be preceded by a rule which
applies by virtue of (7a) and which, therefore, cannot apply to the inner-
most constituent of a string. Thus, since neither of the conditions in
(7) can be met by the innermost constituent of a string, no cyclic rule
can apply to the innermost constituent. It follows from this that if a
particular phonetic property—e.g. stress—is assigned by a cyclic rule,
the rule cannot assign it to root words; instead stress on root words will
have to be supplied directly in the lexical representation. It is, there-
fore, of considerable interest that Mascaro was able to show that in
Catalan, where stress is assigned by cyclic rules, the attempts to extend
these rules so that they would also supply stress to root words in their
lexical representations have been failures and that stress must be supplied
directly in lexical representations .
3
Upon reading an earlier version of this paper G. N. Clements has
suggested to me that convention (7) might be replaced by the following:
(9) a. A cyclic rule R applies properly on cycle j if and only if
there is an immediately preceding cycle j-1 such that R must make
specific use of information not present in the string at the end of
that cycle.
This convention differs from (7) in that it requires cyclic rules to apply
in the following two types of underlying strings which are ruled out by (7)
:
(9) b. i. [.Z[._^...] XABY]
ii. [^XA [^_^]...BZ)
I note that since application of rule R to the string AB would be ruled out
if AB were part of the innermost constituent, it would seem plausible that
the rule R should not be allowed to apply to the string AB when the string
first appears on the jth cycle.
The only difference between the strings (9b i) and (9b ii) is that the
units A and B to which the cyclic rule applies are adjacent to one another
in the first, and nonadjacent in the second. I would guess that this
difference between adjacent and nonadjacent constituents should not make
an essential difference for a convention on rule applicability such as (7)
or alternative (9). I, therefore, prefer (7) to the alternative (9).
Unfortunately, neither Clements nor I have been able to think of actual
examples of strings of the forms above. The difference between the formu-
lations (7) and (9) must, therefore, remain moot at this time.
To conclude it would appear that the special conditions on rules dis-
covered by Kiparsky are unconnected with the automatic or nonautomatic
character of the rule. Their relationship to the abstractness of lexical
representations is indirect: since cyclic rules cannot apply to innermost
constituents they cannot be the source of phonetic properties within root
morphemes, such properties will in many instances have to be directly
present in the lexical representation. What is crucial about the conditions
discovered by Kiparsky is that they are perfectly natural conditions on
the application of the class of rules that make reference to the internal
constituent structure of words and phrases. Such rules have received some-
what less attention in phonology than they deserve, especially in recent
years. Mascaro's dissertation is particularly instructive in this respect
for it demonstrates in detail the important role that cyclic rules play in
the segmental phonology of Catalan.
I have examined here three typical examples in which it was claimed
that 'functional' rather than 'formal' considerations must be invoked in
order to account for the facts, and have shown that in each case the
standard 'formal' considerations provide an account that is not only
adequate, but also superior to the other alternative. It would be hasty
to conclude from this that 'functional' considerations are totally irrele-
vant in phonological research. Apart from the fact that negative results
do not warrant such an inference, there is no question that 'functional'
factors play a role in linguistics. If their influence is often hard to
discern clearly, this is due to the fact that they are just one type among
a host of factors that determine the course of linguistic evolution. By
disregarding them in our research we, therefore, run the risk of missing
potentially promising and enlightening lines of inquiry. The search for
these factors, however, does not warrant a disregard of other— in particu-
lar, formal—factors in phonology.
NOTES
*To be published in a Festschrift for Oswald Szemerenyi, Amsterdam
Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science: Current Issues
in Linguistic Theory (John Benjamins B.V., Amsterdam). (Preliminary
Version). This work was supported in part by the National Institutes of
Mental Health Grant #5P01 MH 13390-12.
Kiparsky (personal communication) contests Kenstowicz and Kisseberth's
analysis of Yawelmani, in particular their rule of /i/-epenthesis on which
the above example crucially depends.
That cyclic rules might function in this fashion was suggested by
T. Bever and T. Langendoen (1963), who attempted in this manner to account
for the e/o ablaut in Greek and other Indo-European languages. This
ingenious idea unfortunately failed to be confirmed by the facts and has,
therefore, been abandoned.
The above raises questions about the SPE analysis of English stress.
It should be noted that the only cases where stress needs to be supplied
to the innermost constituent are the deverbal nouns of the type aondensa-
tion.
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FUNCTIONALISM AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS IN PHONOLOGY
Jonathan Derek Kaye
Universite du Quebec a Montreal
0. In this paper I will do my best to shed a little light on the
rather murky area of functionalism as it is applied in phonology. In part
one I will briefly sketch two of the major currents in the functional
approach. In addition I will attempt to show what relationship each of
these functionalist approaches bears to current phonological practice.
The first variety of functionalism to be considered (all too briefly)
is what I call 'natural functionalism' in the sense of Donegan and Stampe
(1978). 1 The second type of functionalism is, I will argue, a mixture of
two rather different elements: questions of substantive conditions in
phonology and a posteriori functional explanations. This latter sort of
functionalism is associated with Kiparsky's phonology ca. 1970. It is
also to be found as applied to syntax in Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) and
Chomsky (1977) . For identification purposes and for lack of a better label
I will call this 'a posteriori functionalism' recalling its essentially
parasitic status with respect to normal linguistic hypothesis formation.
These approaches will be discussed from the point of view of genera-
tive phonology. Naturally my conclusions should be understood in this
context. Other theoretical frameworks may lead to quite different results.
Because of the above-mentioned orientation I will devote more attention to
the question of a posteriori functionalism.
Part two of this paper will illustrate the way a posteriori functional
explanations figure in phonological analyses. A problem from Algonquin
(Kaye 1978a, b; Kaye and Nykiel 1978) is discussed and a substantive condi-
tion on evaluating phonologies is proposed. A functional explanation is
then suggested to account for the substantive condition.
1. One of the major problems in discussing functionalism is that
there are just about as many different functionalisms as there are lin-
guists who use the term. 2 I do not wish to embark on an exhaustive
historical study of the origins, varieties and evolution of functionalism
and so I will sketch what I hope is a reasonably accurate, albeit of
necessity much abbreviated description of natural functionalism. Since
definitions of this approach are exceedingly difficult to find I will
present my own. Natural functionalism is characterized by the assumption
that there is a direct and clear link between what is judged to be an
essential feature of the object of study (such as its function) and theo-
ries about that object. Expressed somewhat differently it is claimed that
starting from this essential element we may deduce aspects of the theory
which is to describe it. This position may be summed up by the expression,
'form follows function '.^
The functionalism of Andre Martinet seems to me to be a good example
of this position. Martinet (1972:7) states '. . . le langage humain est,
au fond, fait pour la communication, et qu'il se faqonne du fait qu'il sert
a la communication. ' For Martinet the essential feature or function of
language is communicative. This notion can be seen in his discussion of
push chains. Potential mergers are avoided by successive phonetic shifts,
each shift creating another potential merger and provoking a further
phonetic shift. This state of affairs follows from the idea that the function
of language is communicative and the fact that a merger would run counter to
this function to a greater or lesser extent. A phonological opposition once
lost is no longer available to a language to express semantic distinctions
and communication is accordingly rendered more difficult.
A similar situation is found in functional syntax. When English lost
case endings as a means to express grammatical relations, word order came
to fulfill this role. It was reasoned that grammatical relations need to
be expressed in order for communication to take place. If one means of
accomplishing this (inflexional endings) ceased to be available for one
reason or another, it was necessary that another mechanism be brought in
(word order)
.
The theory of 'natural phonology' as proposed by Donegan and Stampe,
while differing enormously from Martinet's functionalism in both the nature
of its claims and its internal organization, seems to me to share with it a
certain philosophical base. In describing their theory Donegan and Stampe
(1978:1) state that, 'its basic thesis is that the living sound patterns
of languages, in their development in each individual as well as in their
evolution over the centuries, are governed by forces implicit in human
vocalization and perception. ' The essential feature of language mentioned
in the characterization of natural functionalism given above is not its
function for Donegan and Stampe. Strictly speaking their theory is not
functional in the above sense. The term 'essential feature' rather than
'function' was intended to be broad enough to include natural phonology
within the domain of natural functionalism. Precisely what this essential
feature is, is made clear in the following passage: 'The natural subject
matter of an explanatory theory includes all and only what the theory can,
in principle, explain. In the case of natural phonology this means
everything that language owes to the fact that it is spoken' (1978:4).
\'Jhile communication is the key element in Martinet's functionalism,
Donegan and Stampe focus on the oral nature of language.'^ The relation-
ship between these key concepts and the theories associated with them
appears to be quite similar. As the communicative function of language
is supposed to be evident in the theory of Martinet so the oral nature of
phonology should be evident in Donegan and Stampe 's natural phonology.
^
In their discussion of the question of innateness they give a further
indication of the functional nature of their theory: 'The issue of
innateness, despite all the debate it has aroused is entirely besides the
point. What we want to know, whether it is innate or whether it is uni-
versally acquired, is why . . .' (1978:5, original emphasis).
The natural functionalist seeks to construct a theory which provides
its key concept as the answer to all the questions of the sort raised in
the above citation, i.e., natural phonology is expected to explain the
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universal presence of a given trait (innate or not) because of the oral
nature of language; Martinet would presumably respond to the question with
a theory offering language's communicative functional as at least part of
the reply.
Certain anthropological and sociolinguistic approaches appeal to
extralinguistic features as being essential to the formulation of adequate
linguistic descriptions. Thus, it is often claimed that language cannot
be properly analyzed outside of its cultural context, or else that language
must be considered as a social instrument and theories which purport to
explain it cannot ignore this fact. The details of language's social
function or its cultural context are not always clear, nor is their exact
status in the formulation of linguistic hypotheses evident. Such notions
appear to play a similar if not identical role to those mentioned in the
discussion of Martinet functionalism and natural phonology.
A number of questions are raised by the sort of functionalism sketched
above. First, the metatheoretical status of natural functionalism and its
accompanying essential features is open to at least two interpretations.
One may view the problem of functionalism as essentially methodological.
Natural functional considerations of the type discussed above may serve
as heuristic aids in formulating linguistic hypotheses. Under this inter-
pretation the functionalism of Martinet, to take one example, would
instruct us that language's communicative function is a useful concept to
keep in mind when formulating linguistic hypotheses. The second interpre-
tation is to consider the function (essential feature) of language to be
the object of study. A theory is evaluated on the basis of the extent to
which it explains or reflects the essential feature that is supposed to
characterize language. Thus, a theory explaining why or demonstrating
that language is a social, cultural, or communicative instrument would be
considered as more highly valued than one which treats such notions as
irrelevant. A phonological theory which does not reflect the essentially
phonetic nature of language would be regarded as inadequate. I will
argue that neither interpretation of natural functionalism constitutes a
viable alternative to standard generative phonological practice. There
are two general problems associated with both of these interpretations.
First, it is not at all obvious what function a functional theory of
language is to be based on. Indeed, one encounters almost as many brands
of functionalism as there are writers on the subject. Furthermore, if
the function of a language is all that crucial either for methodologi-
cal reasons or as an object of study, it follows that functional theories
should differ wildly according to what has been chosen as language's
function. But then how are we to evaluate these competing theories?
Surely this must be done in exactly the same way that any nonfunctional
theory is to be evaluated.
It must be remembered that even the most intuitively 'obvious' notion
of language function is not uncontroversial. Thus, Martinet's position
that the function of language is communication is contested by Chomsky
in several recent works. Although not taking a strong position on the
question, Chomsky has suggested that the expression of thought is at least
as strong a candidate as communication. It is not my purpose here to
try and settle this issue, rather I wish to point out that the function
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of language is still a very open question and one is by no means constrained
to accept any given definition in the absence of supporting evidence. Up
to now it is just such evidence that has been lacking.
The second general objection to natural functionalism is more serious.
Even if somehow we could all agree on what the function of language
really is, it is not at all clear that this would change anything about
the way we would do linguistics. There is no reason to suppose that
there is any clear or direct line between form and function in language.
If this is so, then using language function as a starting point would
appear to be methodologically unsound. Evaluating theories on the basis
of their shedding light on an a priori defined linguistic function (e.g.
rejecting the EST because it is unrevealing of language's social function)
seems misguided.
It is instructive to study the formulation of theories in other
disciplines to emphasize this point. One can immediately exclude many of
the 'hard' sciences from discussions of functionalism as defined above.
It would be absurd to think of a priori functional explanations for astro-
nomical, physical, or chemical phenomena. These sciences have survived
without requiring natural functionalism either to guide them to fruitful
hypotheses or to form the framework for eventual explanations of the
phenomena within their domain. It is only when we approach the biological
sciences that a discussion of functionalism makes any sense at all. Here
the discovery of the structure of DNA is quite illuminating. In reading
Watson's account of how he and Crick came up with their proposed structure
(Watson 1968) , it is evident that not only did the function of DNA play no
role in its analysis but that one of Watson and Crick's preoccupations was
that its structure would not be 'pretty': 'pretty' in the sense of reveal-
ing something about how DNA worked. Thus, Watson writes (1968:188),
"There had been far too many days when Francis (Crick/JDK) and I worried
that the DNA structure might turn out to be superficially very dull,
suggesting nothing about either its replication or its function in con-
trolling cell biochemistry" (emphasis mine/JDK). To the delight of Watson
and Crick, DNA's structure turned out to be quite pretty indeed. What I
wish to stress here is that there was a chance that DNA's structure could
have been 'dull' in Watson's sense of the word. This case is interesting
because there was general agreement about DNA's function before its
structure had been discovered and this knowledge was not particularly
helpful in its analysis. The application of this point to linguistics is
clear: there is no reason to suppose in advance that linguistic structure
bears any direct relationship to any function, real or imagined. I will
now turn to specific criticisms of the two interpretations of natural
functionalism.
Natural functionalism may be interpreted as requiring or suggesting
that a language's function be taken into account in formulating hypotheses
about its structure. From an epistemological point of view the above
statement is to be rejected. In evaluating hypotheses the method that
was used to arrive at them is irrelevant. Hypotheses are evaluated as to
how well they explain the phenomena found within their domain and how they
compare to other hypotheses with similar domains. How one came by these
hypotheses does not figure in the evaluation."
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We could also consider this methodological interpretation as a heuris-
tic device: while not being absolutely necessary to the formulation of
linguistic theories, it may be a good idea or a useful suggestion to
follow such a procedure. I have not seen any evidence that such is the
case. The theory of generative phonology has progressed normally over
the years without any particular emphasis on functional considerations ,7
and no clear examples come to mind where functional considerations have
helped to overcome a particular problem in this framework. I conclude that
the case for natural functionalisra as a methodological tool remains unproved,
indeed without any apparent support of any kind. We may now turn our
attention to the claim that linguistic theory must explain or incorporate
the particular function or essential feature assigned to language by the
brand of functionalism in question. Natural phonology requires that
linguistic theory include 'everything that language owes to the fact that
it is spoken. ' It is perfectly appropriate that one should choose this
as the object of study of phonology. I fail to see, however, that one
should accord this approach some prior claim to legitimacy. It seems to
me that natural phonology is a reflection of the research that happens
to interest its adherents. Failure to share one's research interests is
hardly a crushing criticism. In as much as natural phonology and gener-
ative phonology share common objectives, one may compare them. If they
seek to achieve fundamentally different goals, any comparison or criticism
is pointless. Language can certainly be described from a social, cultural,
or communicative point of view. It does not follow that such descriptions
or theories have anything to do with a linguistic theory that seeks to
describe whatever internalized knowledge characterizes the set of speakers
of some language and what universal principles underlie the set of all
languages. The functional approach described by Heath (1978:89) attempts
to ". . . describe a set of functions which, by means of different combi-
nations of formal units and with inevitable variations in (sociocultural)
environmental detail, play fundamental roles in shaping the formal gram-
mars of individual languages.' There is no more reason to accept this
view of linguistic theory than any other. Ultimately the results emanating
from such programs and further lines of research suggested by them will
determine their success. Again, I can see no reason to accord any prior
claim to research programs incorporating functionalist orientations. To
conclude this extremely brief discussion of natural functionalism, I see
no role for such an approach in the development of phonological theory.
It appears epistemologically unsound and offers no clear methodological
advantages. A priori theoretical constraints of this sort seem unduly
confining or else too vague to be of much use. As for their role in defin-
ing research areas, natural functionalism has not proved any more fruitful
than nonfunctional approaches. Finally, functionalism has not played any
obvious role in the development of other (nonsocial) sciences.
A rather different functional approach has come into prominence in
the last ten years. P. Kiparsky has been the dominant figure in this
approach with C. Kisseberth, M. Kenstowicz, Y.-Ch. Morin, K. Hale, and
many others normally associated with generative phonology also making
contributions to this area.^ I will show that this current is radically
different from natural functionalism and for the most part is really a
confusion of several distinct questions.
^
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Generative phonology attempts to explain, among other things, how a
child exposed to a limited set of primary linguistic data arrives at an
extremely rich phonological system in a remarkably short period of time.
It has been assumed that the child had an enormous 'head start' in the
acquisition process: a way of selecting a phonological grammar from the
set of all those that are compatible with the primary linguistic data to
which he/she was exposed. This 'head start' was characterized in genera-
tive phonology by the evaluation metric: a diverse set of properties that
were reflected by the theory's notational system such that more general
or natural rules and systems were less costly (required fewer symbols to
express) in this system. Towards the end of the sixties Kiparsky came
up with several properties that were not conveniently reflected in the
notational system but that also seemed to characterize more natural
linguistic systems. It was claimed that such properties were also used
by children acquiring a language in ways analogous to the evaluation
metric. Kiparsky (1971) termed these conditions substantive as opposed to
formal. These substantive conditions which included such notions as
opacity, abstractness, and paradigm regularity were no more functional in
nature than natural classes, feature hierarchies, and markedness conven-
tions. The latter could be read off directly from the notational system
while the former could not. Nothing in principle would prevent the even-
tual refinement of the notational system so that say, opacity could
likewise be directly represented. At that point opacity would be a formal
rather than a substantive condition on phonologies but it would in no way
change any functional characteristics it might have. It just so happens
that functional explanations became associated with these substantive
conditions although there is no logical link between them. To take one
example, Kiparsky showed that rules became less highly valued to the extent
to which they had become opaque. Kiparsky's definition of rule opacity
naturally accompanied this claim. At this point there is nothing whatever
that would lead one to consider Kiparsky's contribution as functional.
Kiparsky went on to speculate as to why language should favor transparent
rules over opaque ones and suggested that transparent rules are easier to
learn. It is at this point that a functional element entered the discus-
sion. Since functional notions of this sort are made only after the
postulation of substantive conditions on phonology, I have called this sort
of functionalism, 'a posteriori functionalism' . In fact, as I will try to
show below, this is not a distinct theoretical orientation from normal
generative phonology.
To begin with, two points must be made clear: the conjectural nature
of the functional claims and the fact that the validity of the hypotheses
on which they are based is completely independent of such functional
statements. Functional statements along the lines of Kiparsky's assertion
that transparent rules are easier to learn, are generally offered as a
sort of 'coda' that follows normal phonological arguments justifying the
substantive conditions in question (in this case rule opacity) . There is
an (implicit) appeal to common sense but no effort is devoted to justifying
these sorts of claims. Notice also that the validity of the functional
statement has no bearing on the validity of the theoretical status of the
substantive condition on which it was based. Suppose, for example, that
we could somehow prove that opaque rules were not more difficult to learn
than transparent ones. This would in no way imperil the claim that
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grammars with opaque rules are less highly valued than those without them.
This latter claim was based on evidence completely independent of any
functional considerations. 10 The data for which rule opacity was set up
to account would remain untouched by the success or failure of any func-
tional explanation. The lack of any functional motivation for a substan-
tive condition would simply indicate that this particular aspect of
linguistic structure was not 'pretty' in the sense of Watson discussed
above.
Susumu Kuno was one of the early practitioners of a posteriori
functionalism. Kuno (1972) suggested that many of Greenberg's word order
universals follow if language processing involved a push-down storage
device at some point. Again, notice that this claim was made only after
Greenberg had postulated his universals. Greenberg's observations about
word order were not made with functional considerations in mind, nor
does their validity rest on the success of a posteriori functional explana-
tions.
Chomsky and Lasnik make repeated reference to functional explanations
of this kind. For example they state (1977:470), 'As we have observed,
"functional" considerations are quite appropriate in the study of language
evolution. We have pointed out that these filters have at least one
striking effect: they sharply reduce the range of possible outcomes from
well-formed base-generated structures, while still permitting at least
one in each case. Thus they narrowly restrict the association of deep and
surface structures.' Chomsky and Lasnik certainly did not set out to
devise a linguistic system with the above-mentioned property (i.e. reduc-
ing the range of possible outcomes from well-formed base-generated
structures). This result was the result of normal syntactic research.
It just so happened that the resulting model was pretty enough to allow
these functional properties to be read off of it. Even in this case,
however, the explanation is not quite functional. One could propose a
general condition on grammars to the effect that they are more highly
valued if they possess the property of having reduced ranges of outcomes
from well-formed structures. Predictions involving linguistic change,
interference phenomena and perhaps some absolute limits on the range of
possible grammars could follow from such a condition on grammar. It must
be noted that there is no a priori reason to believe that such a condition
exists. It could only be justified in the same way that the opacity con-
dition, the subjacency condition for movement rules or the filters them-
selves were justified. Given the existence of this substantive constraint
one might then offer a functional explanation (it makes processing easier,
etc.) to account for its presence. In any event the position of those
functional explanations in linguistic theory is quite tenuous. 'The
functional explanation . . . holds, if at all, at the level of evolution
of the species. It does not relate to explanatory adequacy ..."
(Chomsky and Lasnik 1977:437).
Returning to phonology, Halle in his contribution to this volume has
suggested that all functional considerations should reside in the simpli-
city metric. In other words, the destinction between formal conditions
on phonology (say, rules involving natural classes are more highly valued
than those without such classes) and substantive conditions (say, rule
142
opacity) should be eliminated. This could be interpreted to mean that all
conditions ranking phonologies should be formulatable in the notational
system, either in the traditional way, higher ranking phonologies being
less 'costly' in terms of the number of symbols needed to express them, or
by extending the formalism and adding ancillary conditions.
The former conditions include the natural classes, abbreviatory
devices and so on. The system was subsequently enriched to include mark-
edness, rule variables, metric structures, and so on. There appears to be
no reason to distinguish these two classes and in that sense I agree with
Halle's suggestion. Furthermore, it seems a reasonable proposal to attempt
to incorporate substantive conditions such as rule opacity and recovera-
bility into the notational system. I see no problem in such an endeavor
and at worst it would have as a consequence the elimination of an arbitrary
distinction in current generative phonology. Functional explanations may
be just as easily proposed for, say, markedness, which is currently con-
sidered a formal condition, as for rule opacity, which is a substantive
one. Thus Halle's proposal would leave unchanged the functional status
of generative phonology. It would have the beneficial effect of disentan-
gling functionalism from substantive conditions on phonology. In the
following section I will illustrate the sort of a posteriori functionalism
discussed in the previous paragraphs.
2. In this section I will discuss a substantive condition on phonology
and show its role in the analysis of a particular phonological problem.
I will indicate how such questions relate to the a posteriori functionalism
discussed in the preceding section.
In some recent articles (Kaye 1974; 1975) I discussed the notion of
recoverability in phonology. Very roughly, recoverability is a limit on
the amount of surface ambiguity of a phonological form. What this means is
that given a phonetic form and the rules, the inventory of phonemes and
(deep) phonotactic constraints of the language in question, the number of
possible sources of the phonetic form may be computed. For example, in
German given a phonetic string ending in [-t], given the rule of final
devoicing and given the fact that morphemes may end in -t or -d, the string
has two possible sources, viz. /-t/ or /-d/. Only comparison with morpho-
logically related forms containing suffixes will indicate which source is
to be chosen. In the absence of such related forms one would choose /-t/
as the underlying final consonant since German final devoicing is a neutra-
lization rule. Recoverability then evaluates phonologies as more highly
valued if such ambiguity falls within certain limits. In the example
below I will illustrate the application of this principle to (deep) phono-
tactic constraints. Lac Simon Algonquin contains both a word structure
constraint (WSC) which is rendered completely opaque by a phonological
rule. 11
Lac Simon Algonquin has the WSC given in (1) below.
(1) Algonquin WSC: No word may begin with a cluster or a voiceless
consonant.
In addition the following data (2) indicate that Algonquin has acquired a
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rule of initial devoicing (3).
(2) pi:goska: 'it breaks ki:bi:goska: 'it broke'
ka:zo:tiw 'he hides' niga:zo:ta:n 'I hide'
te:si>biwa:gin 'chair' kide:sibiwa:gin 'your chair'
sigiswa: 'he smokes' ta:zigi>swa: 'he would smoke'
6i:ma:n 'canoe' oji:ma:n 'his canoe'
so:skose: 'it slides' nizo:skose: 'I slide'
(3) Initial Devoicing C -^ [-voice] /##
While not altogether a complete justification for the analysis (which is
irrelevant in any event for the point under discussion), the following data
indicate that we are dealing with a rule of initial devoicing rather than
medial voicing.
(4) a. kitiga:n 'cultivated field' kici 'much, big, great'
a:sibi: 'net' pi:sa:dik 'in height'
a:nipi:c 'when?' n4>do :z4,to:n 'I make it'
b. ni-kin 'my bone' o-se:z-in 'his brother'
ki-sogona: 'your nose' ni-ka:t 'my leg'
c. a:sibi: 'net' a:sibi:-ka:k 'in the net'
pa:pa:se: 'woodpecker' pa:pa:se:-s4>s 'little woodpecker'
(4a) shows that both voiced and voiceless obstruents occur word-medially
although only voiceless obstruents occur word-initially at the phonetic
level. (4b) shows that dependent noun stems may also begin with voiceless
obstruents. These forms are preceded obligatorily by prefixes and thus
cannot violate (1). Finally, (4c) shows that suffixes may also have initial
voiceless obstruents.
The status of nonalternating (i.e. always initial) morphemes is crucial
for this analysis. If one assumes that rule (3) is neutralizing, nonalter-
nating obstruent-initial morphemes as in (5) would be required to have
initial voiceless obstruents in their underlying representations. If, on
the other hand, rule (3) is assumed to be allophonic, even nonalternating
obstruent-initial morphemes would have underlying Initial voiced obstruents.
(5) Obligatorily initial morphemes with initial obstruents
ki- '2nd person pa-inime: 'it is ka:- 'relative marker'
prefix' necessary
ki:spin 'if te:digo: 'much' pi:a 'and then'
This situation is somewhat reminiscent of the much discussed German case.
The two languages are compared in (6) below.
(6) The status of rule IV
LAC SIMON GERMAN
INITIAL NON-INITIAL FINAL NON-FINAL
voiceless voiced /voiced/ /voiced/ voiceless voiced
po:de: ki:bo:de: vat vzd'dr
'he makes a fire he made a fire' 'wheel' 'wheels'
voiceless voiceless /voiceless/ /voiceless/ voiceless voiceless
NO FORMS EXIST rat retd
'counsel' 'counsels'
voiceless always initial /???/ /voiceless/ voiceless always final
pa:nime: 'it is necessary...' unt 'and'
Both German and Algonquin have voiced-voiceless alternations and both
have forms which always occur in the suitable context for the devoicing rule
to apply (i.e. initially in Algonquin and finally in German). Algonquin
differs from German in that there are no examples where a voiceless
obstruent occurring in initial position is also voiceless when the same
morpheme follows a prefix. This is, or course, simply a reflection of (1).
The question now centers around the forms of (5) . In (7) the two possible
solutions are sketched. Solution I assumes that the forms of (5) have
underlying voiced obstruents initially while solution II assumes they are
voiceless. Since both solutions are compatible with the data we must look
elsewhere for evidence in support of one or the other analysis. Further-
more, we must find a principled basis for preferring or requiring one
solution over the other.
(7) Solution I
/gi:spin/ /de:digo:/ /bi:c/
Rule IV: [+cons, -son] —
>
[-voice] /////
Word Structure Constraint: No word may begin with a voiceless
consonant
.
Solution II
/kirspin/ /te:d±go:/ /pi:c/
Rule IV: [+cons, -son] — [-voice] /////
The principle difference between the two solutions is the presence or
absence of the WSC. Evidence from the nativization of loan words favors
the former solution.
(8) Loan Word Behaviour
a. pa:na:n 'banana' (<banana) n<i>ba:na:nim 'my banana' /ba:na:n/
pa.'stone: 'American' (<Boston) ka:ba: stone :na:goni6 'he who
looks like an American' /ba: stone:/
b. pitik 'potato' (<petac) nibitikim 'my potato' /bitik/
toma:do:s 'tomato' (<tomatoes) nidoma : do : zim 'my tomato'
/doma:do:z/
ko:fi:ke: 'he makes coffee' (<coffee) nigo:fi:ke: 'I make
coffee'/ go:fi:ke:/
In (8a) loan words with an initial voiced obstruent in their source
language are presented. Iften preceded by a prefix the initial obstruent
retains its voiced status. In absolute initial position it is realized as
voiceless. These forms have no bearing on the status of the WSC (1) but
rather show that rule (3) is still operative. The forms of (8b) begin with
voiceless consonants in the source language. In Algonquin they are voice-
less in initial position. In noninitial position, however, they are voiced.
Since we have already stated that there is no rule of medial voicing, we
must assume that these forms were interpreted as having an initial voiced
obstruent. The only apparent reason for such an interpretation is the
existence of the WSC (1), ruling out word-initial voiceless obstruents as
possible underlying forms.
Evidence from loan word phonology favors solution I over solution II.
What feature of this solution renders it more highly valued than the other
solution? Both solutions require the presence of rule (3). The only
difference in the formal structure of these solutions is the presence of
a phonotactic constraint in solution I. By incorporating a substantive
condition into our phonological theory we can require the selection of
solution I over solution II. The substantive condition in question is
given below:
(9) All things being equal, phonologies with phonotactic constraints
on possible underlying forms are more highly valued than those without
such constraints.
If this turns out to be a correct observation about ranking phonologies
one may well turn to the question of why phonological theory has a condi-
tion like (9) : why should analyses with phonotactic constraints be
selected in the acquisition process over those without such constraints,
even in the face of apparently contradictory surface forms? In other
words, is there a functional explanation for (9)? One striking property of
this condition is to limit the number of underlying forms and consequently
to facilitate the task of associating a given phonetic form with its
lexical representation. Indeed we may view (9) as simply a special case
of a more general condition of recoverability. Note that the case for
phonotactic constraints as well as other manifestations of recoverability
may simply be another aspect of Chomsky and Lasnik's functional explanation
mentioned above. Filters had the property of reducing the number of out-
comes associated with a given base-generated structure. Phonotactic
constraints have the property of reducing the possible underlying sources
associated with a given phonetic string. It would be most tempting to
look for a general functional explanation which would incorporate both
cases.
The purpose of the above illustration was to show the role of (a pos-
teriori) functional explanations in the current practice of generative
phonology. It should be noted that things go on pretty much as they did
in the past with functional considerations playing no role in the quest
for explanatory adequacy. Like Watson and Crick, phonologists will go on
with their analyses with the hope that what results will be pretty.
'This is a natural theory in the sense established by Plato in the
Cratylus , in that it presents language (specifically the phonological
aspect of language) as a natural reflection of the needs, capacities, and
world of its users, rather than as a merely conventional institution'
(1978:2; original emphasis).
2
See Baron (1974) for discussion of the problem.
Heath (1978:92). '(Although) in this framework we take function
as prior to form . . .
'
4
It must be stressed that Donegan and Stampe are only talking about
the phonological aspect of language. Martinet is dealing with all aspects
of language.
If my understanding of natural phonology is correct, anything remotely
resembling a phonological component in a sign language such as ASL should be
pure coincidence.
See Feyerabend (1978) for a discussion of this question.
Cf. the discussion of a posteriori functionalism below.
See also Morris Halle's contribution to this volume.
9
I am one of the parties guilty of this confusion. See Kaye (1975).
Kiparsky's arguments for this rule opacity involve evidence from
sound change, specifically rule reordering.
This analysis has proved to be rather controversial. The reader is
referred to Kaye (1978a; 1978b) and Kaye and Nykiel (1978) for the
argumentation.
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INTENTIONALITY AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE
John R. Searle
University of California at Berkeley
It is possible to make a reasonably clear distinction between inten-
tionality with an s and intentionality with a t. Without putting too fine
a point on it one can say that intensionality-with-an-s is a property of
a certain class of sentences. A sentence is intensional if literal utter-
ances of it have at least one interpretation where they fail to satisfy
one or more of the standard tests for extensionality. The two tests most
relevant to the present discussion are these: if existential generalization
over the occurrence of referring expressions is not a valid form of
inference or if the sentence fails to allow the substitution salva veritate
of expressions which normally have the same reference, then it is inten-
sional-with-an-s. Thus for example, the sentence 'John is looking for the
lost city of Atlantis' has at least one literal use to make a statement
which does not entail that there is a lost city such that John is looking
for it. And the sentence 'The sheriff believes that Mr. Howard is an
honest man' has a literal use to make a statement which together with the
true statement that Mr. Howard is identical with Jesse James does not
entail that the sheriff believes that Jesse James is an honest man.
Because intensional sentences normally derive their intensionality from
the occurrence of certain expressions it is possible to speak not only of
intensional sentences, but also of intensional verbs, intensional contexts,
etc. It is also possible to speak of intensional statements and inten-
sional propositions. No doubt these two tests need some refinement to
enable them to cope with sentences other than those used to make statements
but the basic idea of intensionality-with-an-s seems reasonably straight-
forward.
When it comes to intentionality-with-a-t it is much harder to say
exactly what it is we are talking about. It is common to say that inten-
tionality-with-a-t is not primarily a property of sentences, but a property
of some or perhaps even all mental phenomena. It is the property which
mental states have of being directed at objects or states of affairs. Thus
for example, a belief is always a belief that such and such is the case,
a fear is always—or at least in general—a fear of^ something, a desire is
always a desire to have something or that something be the case. Just so
we have some fairly clear idea of what it is we are talking about, I pro-
pose the following as a rough preliminary test for intentionality-with-a-t.
A mental state is an intentional state if and only if the specification of
the content of that mental state requires the specification of some object
or state of affairs which is not identical with that mental state. On
this test pains and aches and at least some cases of anxiety are not inten-
tional, whereas beliefs, hopes, expectations, and desires are. A specifi-
cation of the content of my pain is just a further description of the pain;
but the specification of the content of my belief, hope, expectation, or
desire must specify what it is that I believe, what I hope for, what I
expect, and what I desire. All that a pain has to have to be a pain is to
have a certain feel to it, certain phenomenal qualities, but for belief,
hope, expectation, and desire, something more is required: the questions
'what do you believe, what do you hope for, what do you expect, what do
you desire?' must have answers, if the agent can be said to have a belief,
hope, desire, or expectation at all; and those answers will specify
objects and states of affairs that are not identical with the mental states.
In Wittgenstein's jargon, pains and aches have causes but not targets,
whereas love and hate, belief and desire have both causes and targets,
and in each case the cause may or may not be identical with the target. I
will call such mental states intentional states, and the objects and states
of affairs at which they are directed intentional objects. The notion of
an intentional object is a frequent source of confusion in philosophy and
I will have more to say about it later on. We will see that for the so-
called propositional attitudes it is not really necessary at all. For
the present it is important to note that on this criterion not all mental
states are intentional states; only those which require the specification
of an intentional object are intentional states. It is also important to
note that this criterion is not intended as an analysis of the notion of
intentionality. If so, it would be hopelessly inadequate since it rests on
several unexplained and obscure notions: in what sense does a mental state
have a 'content' and what is meant by saying the 'specification' of that
content 'requires' the specification of something else?
This test for intentionality-with-a-t is designed to isolate those
mental states which are in some sense directed at objects and states of
affairs from those which are not; but even assuming that it is successful
in doing that, it raises but so far leaves unanswered the hard questions
about intentionality. The two most pressing questions raised by the
criterion are these: the statements specifying the object or state of
affairs in the specifications of the intentional state are not like
ordinary statements containing specifications of objects and states of
affairs because they do not require the existence of the objects or state
of affairs in order to be true. It can, for example, be true that John
expected it would rain and that he worships God without it being true
either that it rained or that God exists. Indeed, the sentences which
specify intentional states are themselves intensional-with-an-s on both
our criteria for intensionality-with-an-s . So our first question is: why
is that so? How does intentionality-with-a-t give rise to intensionality-
with-an-s? The second question is this: what exactly is the relation
(or set of relations) between intentional states and their objects, and
what is it about this relation that requires the specification of an
intentional object in the specification of an intentional state? I think
an answer to the second question will enable us to answer the first and
to clarify the notion of an intentional object.
In discussing the second question, Wittgenstein frequently makes
remarks like the following 'If someone could see the expectation itself
—
he would have to see what is being expected' and 'The representation of a
wish is eo ipso the representation of its fulfillment' (cf. Wittgenstein
1967a, 1967b) • Wittgenstein himself and Kenny in his book on Wittgenstein
claim that there is an 'internal relation' between the intentional state
and its intentional object. But this characterization is not much help
to us unless we are told exactly what is meant by the notion of an internal
relation. If for example, someone tells us that there is an internal
relation between being a triangle and being three-sided, it is possible
to make some fairly clear sense of the notion of an internal relation: a
logically necessary condition of being a triangle is being three-sided.
But in that sense there clearly is no internal relation between my belief
that it will rain on Wednesday and the state of affairs of its raining on
Wednesday. The proposition that it will rain on Wednesday neither entails
nor is entailed by the proposition that I believe that it will rain on
Wednesday. It seems that the only sense we can give to the notion of an
internal relation in this case is one we have already spelled out in our
test for intentional states—the specification of an intentional mental
state requires a specification of its intentional object. But that still
leaves us with our second question unanswered. What is it exactly about
intentional states that relates them to their objects? Mackie (1975:48)
poses our second question as sharply as anyone: 'At last we are beginning
to get into focus the real puzzle about intentionality, ' he writes, 'Is
it not strange that there should be one state of affairs (Tom's state of
believing, hoping, fearing, or whatever it may be) that requires for its
adequate description the partial, incomplete, selective, indeterminate,
description of a quite different and so far merely possible state of
affairs?' I think there is a fairly simple answer to Mackie 's question.
To see this answer imagine a parallel question about statements and speech
acts generally. Suppose someone said, 'Is it not strange that there should
be one state of affairs (Tom's statement that it is raining or his order
to Bill to leave the room) that requires for its adequate description the
partial, incomplete, etc., description of a quite different and so far
merely possible state of affairs (the state of affairs that it is raining
or that Bill leaves the room) . ' But there is nothing puzzling about this
requirement once you recognize that a statement is precisely a representa-
tion of a state of affairs that is asserted to exist and an order is a
representation of a state of affairs which the hearer is ordered to bring
into existence. Any speech act with a propositional content contains a
representation of some object or state of affairs; and in the same way, I
wish to argue, all intentional states are representations of objects and
states of affairs. The reason that the specification of my belief that
it is raining requires a specification of the state of affairs that it is
raining is exactly the same reason that the specification of my statement
that it is raining requires a specification of the state of affairs that
it is raining: in each case the one is a representation of the other.
The answer to our second question then, how does the intentional state
relate to the intentional object and what is it about the relation that
requires that a specification of one involves a specification of the other,
is simply that the intentional state contains a representation of the
intentional object in the same sense that speech acts contain representa-
tions of objects and states of affairs.
Because an intentional state contains a representation we can now give
a clear sense to the notion that it is 'internally related' to the object
it represents: Any representation is internally related to its object in
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the sense that it could not be that representation if it did not have that
object. Thus for example, an identity criterion of my belief that it is
raining is that it must have as its intentional object the state of affairs
that it is raining.
I don't much like having to invoke the notion of 'representation'
here because it has so little explanatory power, but it is at least correct
and it does enable us to answer both our second and now our first question.
How does intentionality-with-a-t give rise to intensionality-with-an-s?
Sentences about intentional states are at least in part about representa-
tions. That being the case, their truth conditions will sometimes depend
on features of the representation and not entirely on features of—or even
on the existence of—the object represented. To be looking for the lost
city in Atlantis is to have a representation that one seeks to instantiate,
and the statement that one has such a representation can be true even where
there is no such instantiation. And similarly to believe that Mr. Howard is
an honest man is in part to have a mental representation associated with
the name 'Mr. Howard' which may be quite different from the mental repre-
sentation associated with the name 'Jesse James', hence the failure of the
substitutability of such names even where Mr. Howard is identical with
Jesse James.
This conception of intentionality as representation will also enable
us to get clear about the nature of intentional objects. People often talk
as if intentional objects had some peculiar ontological status and had to
be distinguished from actual objects. But the intentional object of a
mental state is just the actual object or state of affairs represented by
an intentional state. If there is no such object or state of affairs then
the intentional state does not have an intentional object though it does
still contain a representation. We need therefore to distinguish the
representative content of a mental state from the intentional object of
that mental state. If John loves Sally and believes that it is raining
then the intentional object of his love is Sally, the actual flesh and blood
Sally and not some mental phenomenon, and the intentional object of his
belief is the state of affairs in the world that it is raining and not the
proposition that it is raining. In order that his love should be of Sally
and his belief be that it is raining he must have some representation of
Sally and of the state of affairs that it is raining. But the object of
his intentional states is not these representations, rather the intentional
states are directed at their objects by way of their representative content.
A proposition one might say is not the object of a belief, it is the content
of the belief. The oscillation between the extensional and the intensional
reading of statements about intentional states is precisely an oscillation
in the extent to which the statement is committed only to facts about the
representative content or to facts about the intentional objects.!
The distinction between the representative content and the inten-
tional object is parallel to Frege's distinction between sense and reference.
Just as a definite description refers to an object in virtue of its sense,
but does not thereby refer to its sense, so an intentional state is
directed at an object in virtue of its representative content, but is not
thereby directed at its representative content. Both sentences describing
intentional states and sentences describing acts of referring are subject
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to extensional and intensional interpretations and both for the same reasons,
Thus 'John referred to the King of France' and 'John thought about the King
of France' have both extensional and intensional readings, depending on
whether they are construed as about objects of representations or solely
about the representations themselves.
The reason that many authors have failed to see that the intentional
object is identical with the actual object is that the specification of
the intentional object is by way of the aspect under which it is represented
by the representative content, and for that reason it is an intensional-
with-an-s specification. To put it crudely, it has seemed to them that
the intentional object is incomplete in ways that actual objects are not
incomplete and that therefore intentional objects can never be actual
objects. How can the actual object be identical with the intentional
object when the actual object has all sorts of features the intentional
object does not have? Thus Davidson (1968:81-82) writes:
What is less obvious, at least until we attend to it is that
the event whose occurrence makes 'I turned on the light' true
cannot be called the object, however intensional, of 'I wanted to
turn on the light'. If I turned on the light, then I must have
done it at a precise moment, in a particular way—every detail is
fixed, but it makes no sense to demand that my want be directed
at an action performed at any one moment or done in some unique
manner. Any one of an indefinitely large number of actions would
satisfy that want, and can be considered equally eligible as its
object.
But one might as well argue that a description can never be a descrip-
tion of an actual event because events have all sorts of features not
included in the description, and any number of other possible events could
have satisfied the description. I want to argue on the contrary that
since the specification of a want will specify an intentional object under
certain aspects, namely those under which it is wanted, it follows only
that the specification of the want is intensional-wlth-an-s . For example,
from the fact that I want E, and E is identical with F, it does not follow
that I want F.
But it does not follow from the fact that specifications of wants are
intensional that actual events and states of affairs cannot be the objects
of wants. To conclude otherwise is to confuse properties of the specifica-
tion of wants with properties of wants, a common confusion which we will
explore in a moment.
If we were to generalize the form of Davidson's argument in a way I
am sure he never intended, it would come out as an invalid derivation of a
false conclusion from two true premises.
1. An intentional state represents its intentional object under
certain aspects only.
2. Actual objects (states of affairs, etc.) have all sorts of fea-
tures under which they are not represented by intentional states.
3. .*. Actual objects can never be intentional objects.
But 3. does not follow from 1. and 2. An exactly parallel argument would
be
1* A description of an object represents the described object only
under certain of its aspects.
2* Actual objects have all sorts of features under which they are
not represented by descriptions.
3* .'. Actual objects can never be described objects.
But why has the first form of argument seemed so plausible in a way
that the second has not? And why in general do philosophers say such weird
things about intentional objects? A large part of the answer I think is
that discussions of intentionality suffer from a confusion of levels which
is somewhat analogous to a use-mention confusion. Because sentences about
intentional states are (often) intensional-with-an-s, it is tempting to
conclude that somehow the intentional states themselves are intensional-
with-an-s, that somehow they are not really directed at objects but at
their own representative content. But this is to confuse properties of the
description of intentional states with properties of the state described,
to confuse the 'mention' of the mental state with its 'use'. Specifica-
tions of intentional mental states are indeed (in general) intensional-with-
an-s because they are about representations. But intentional mental states
are not about representations, they are representations. In exactly the
same way the description of a description of an object may be intensional
but it does not follow from that, nor is it generally the case, that
descriptions of objects are intensional. Just as ground floor descriptions
of objects are extensional, so ground froor intentional states are exten-
sional. That is, insofar as it makes sense to apply the terms 'intensional'
and 'extensional' to mental states, 2 there is nothing inherently intensional
about intentionality. Just as my statement that Caesar was Emperor of Rome
is extensional, so my belief that Caesar was Emperor of Rome is extensional
and for the same reasons. Of course your statement that I stated that
Caesar was Emperor of Rome is intensional; just as your statement that I
believe that Caesar was Emperor of Rome is intensional and again for the
same reason: the first pair represent a state of affairs, the second pair
represent representations of a state of affairs. This confusion between
representations and representations of representations is quite pervasive.
Thus, it is often said that propositions are intensional entities. But
there is nothing intensional about, say, the proposition that Caesar was
Emperor of Rome. It is as extensional as it can be. Of course the
expression 'The proposition that Caesar was Emperor of Rome' is intensional
on both our criteria. But it is a use-mention confusion to confuse fea-
tures of the expression with features of what the expression is about.
Sentences about propositions are intensional and sentences about mental
states are intensional but propositions are not in general intensional and
mental states are not in general intensional.
In favor of the view that there is something intrinsically intensional
about intentionality, it is sometimes pointed out that a man can have an
intentional mental state even though no object or state of affairs satis-
fies the content of his intentional mental state. A man can expect rain
and worship God even if it does not rain and God does not exist. But
analogously a man can predict rain and assert the existence of God even if
it doesn't rain and God does not exist. Just as his expectation may be
unfulfilled and his worship directed at nothing, so his prediction and his
assertion may be false. For the case of so-called propositional inten-
tional attitudes what corresponds to the truth conditions of a statement
is the state of affairs which satisfies the representative content of the
attitude, what I have been calling the intentional object. For the non-
propositional cases, like love and hate, what corresponds to the object
one refers to in the use of a referring expressions is the intentional
object that one's attitude is directed at. And just as the fact that one
may make a statement which is false does not show that one's statement is
intensional or one may fail to refer does not show that reference is
intensional, so the fact that one's intentional states may not have inten-
tional objects does not in the least show that they are intensional.
The picture of intentional states that is emerging from this discus-
sion is this: Every intentional state consists of a representative content
in a certain mode. The same content can occur in different modes, as for
example, when I believe it will rain, hope it will rain, want it to rain,
etc. It is necessary to distinguish the representative content from the
intentional object. An intentional state will have an intentional object
if and only if its representative content is satisfied by an object or
state of affairs. I have so far said nothing about how these representa-
tive contents are realized, whether by words, images, dispositions to
behavior or neurophysiological states, or what not, and I do not think it
matters much for the purposes of the discussion so far. On this account,
there is nothing ontologically peculiar about intentional objects; they
are just ordinary objects and states of affairs at which our mental states
are directed. To say that Sally is the intentional object of Bill's love
of Sally is just like saying Sally is the described object of Bill's
description of Sally, it assigns no ontological peculiarity to Sally.
Intentionality-with-a-t and intentionality-with-an-s are not even remotely
in the same line of business. Intentionality-with-a-t is so to speak a
ground floor property of the mind. It is how the mind grasps other things.
But intensionality-with-an-s is primarily a property of sentences and
other forms of representation. Some though not all intensional sentences
are about intentionality-with-a-t.
Broadly speaking, we can divide intentional states into two kinds
those like belief and desire that represent states of affairs (the so-
called propositional attitudes) and those like love and hate that can also
represent objects, events, etc. I have so far been speaking of the inten-
tional objects as if they could be either particulars or states of affairs.
But that can be misleading. States of affairs are not particulars, nor
are they anything like particulars. If my belief that it is raining is
correct, then what stands to my belief as 'intentional object' is the same
as what stands to my true statement that it is raining as truth conditions.
We can if we like call that an object, but to do so encourages a mistake
analogous to the mistake of assimilating stating to referring. John's
love for Sally has a genuine object, viz., Sally. John's belief that
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it is raining will be correct under certain conditions, but those conditions
are not an object like Sally, and it does not represent those conditions
in the way that 'Sally' represents Sally, but rather in the way that the
statement that it is raining represents those conditions. We can continue
to talk of intentional objects of propositional attitudes but it is not
essential to do so, anymore than it is essential to talk of objects of
statements or orders, and if we do so we must avoid confusing these with
particulars.
A brief digression about 'desire' and 'want' before we continue:
Desires are propositional attitudes; they always have states of affairs as
'intentional objects' and never simply objects. In the formal mode:
'desire' and 'want' are like 'believe' and unlike 'love' and 'hate' in that
they must take a sentential complement as a grammatical direct object.
There is a very simple syntactical argument in favor of this conclusion.
Consider the sentence 'I want your house next summer'. What does 'next
summer' modify? It can't be 'want', for the sentence does not mean 'I next
summer want your house'. It means 'I now want your house next summer ',
and the meaning of that can be represented as 'I now want that I have
your house next summer'. Since any sentence of the form 'I want x' admits
of similar adverbial modifiers, it would seem that wanting requires a
propositional representative content.
II
Because there are so many close connections between intentional states
and speech acts, it is tempting to suppose that the explanation of inten-
tionality must be linguistic. That is, it is tempting to suppose that the
representations which intentional states contain must be themselves sen-
tences or at least part of some languagelike system of representation.
It is in this spirit that various philosophers have analyzed belief in
terms of dispositions to assert or assent to sentences and that others
have proposed that to have an intention to do A is to say to oneself 'I
will do A'. On this view (a large part of) the philosophy of mind is a
branch of the philosophy of language. And clearly there is much plausibil-
ity and indeed some truth to this approach: for all but the simplest
intentional states, a being could not even have the state unless he had
the linguistic capacity to give expression to the state, as Wittgenstein
is constantly reminding us. But it seems to me equally clear that this
view cannot be right. Beings without language and without language-like
systems of representation can have beliefs, intentions, desires, and
expectations. Only those in the grip of a philosophical theory would deny
that dogs and small children can, say, desire bones and milk respectively.
Furthermore, the direction of explanation seems to be wrong. Among other
things what the possession of language enables us to do is give expression
to beliefs, desires, and other intentional states. True, given the system
of representation provided by language, we can have vastly richer and more
complex intentional states than we could without language. But language
does not create intentionality; rather, as I shall argue, in an important
sense intentionality provides the foundation for linguistic acts. On this
view the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind.
As a step toward arguing in favor of this view, let us begin by
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making explicit several of the analogies and connections between inten-
tional states and linguistic acts.
First, the distinction within the theory of speech acts between prop-
ositional content and illocutionary force carries over to intentional
states. Just as we can say that my prediction that you will shut the door
and my order to you to shut the door both contain the same propositional
content, namely that you will shut the door, so we can say that my belief
that you will shut the door and my desire that you should shut the door
both contain the same representative content, namely that you will shut
the door. Furthermore, the state of affairs that makes the statement true
or the order obeyed is exactly the same state of affairs that makes the
belief correct and the desire fulfilled. Let us introduce the notion of
satisfaction to describe what is common to the notions of an order being
obeyed, a statement being true, a desire being fulfilled, and expectation
coming to pass, etc.: a mental state or linguistic act is satisfied if
and only if the state of affairs specified in the propositional content
actually exists. We can then say that the conditions of satisfaction of
speech acts are closely paralleled by the conditions of satisfaction of
intentional states. More about this parallelism in a moment.
Secondly, the distinction in direction of fit that applies to speech
acts also applies to intentional states. The distinction in direction of
fit between an order and a statement can be characterized by saying that
in the case of an order, it is the responsibility of the person ordered to
make his behavior match the propositional content of the order (and hence
orders have the world-to-word direction of fit);^ whereas in the case of a
statement, it is the responsibility of the speaker to make the propositional
content of his statement match the world (and hence statements have the
word-to-world direction of fit). Apologies, thanks, and congratulations
have no direction of fit because in their performance the speaker takes
for granted that the propositional content is already satisfied. When I
apologize for stepping on your toe, I neither assert that your toe has been
stepped on, nor do I try to get your toe stepped on. Rather, I presuppose
that it has been stepped on. These distinctions carry over exactly to
intentional states. Belief, one might say, has the mind-to-world direction
of fit, because if my belief is mistaken it is the belief and not the world
which is at fault. Desire has the world-to-mind direction of fit because
if my desire is unfulfilled it is so to speak the world and not the desire
which is at fault. Sorrow, gratitude, and pleasure have no direction of
fit, rather each of them contains a corresponding belief that the proposi-
tional content is satisfied. Thus in order to be sorry for stepping on
your toe I must believe that I did in fact step on your toe.
A third connection between intentional states and linguistic acts
underlies the first two. In general, a speech act with a propositional
content is an expression of the corresponding intentional state, and the
propositional content of the speech act is identical with the representa-
tive content of the intentional state. Thus when one states that p one
expresses (whether sincerely or insincerely) the belief that p, when one
orders that H does A one expresses a wish or desire that H does A, when
one promises to do A one expresses an intention to do A, when one apolo-
gizes, thanks, or congratulates one expresses sorrow, gratitude, or
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pleasure about the states of affairs for which one is apologizing,
thanking, or congratulating. Furthermore, the expression of the inten-
tional state is not a mere accompaniment: there is an internal connection
in the strict sense between the performance of the speech act and the
expression of the corresponding psychological state, as is shown by
Moore's paradox. One cannot say, 'It's raining but I don't believe it's
raining', 'I order you to leave but I don't want you to leave', 'I promise
to come but I don't intend to come', 'I apologize but I am not sorry',
'thanks for giving me the money, but I am not glad you gave me the money'.
In each case the absurdity derives from the fact that one is denying the
presence of the intentional state which was expressed in the immediately
preceding portion of the utterance. Of course one may express an inten-
tional state one does not have, and that is how insincerity in speech
acts is possible. Indeed, each of these intentional states is the sin-
cerity condition of the corresponding speech act, because its presence
or absence determines what constitutes sincerity or insincerity in the
performance of the speech act. When one makes a statement, for example,
one necessarily expresses a belief but one does not necessarily have the
belief one expresses.
These three connections show the close parallelism of speech acts
and intentional states. Both speech acts and intentional states present
a propositional content in a certain mode, a psychological mode in the
case of intentional states and an illocutionary mode in the case of speech
acts. But in the performance of the speech act, there are not two things
going on, the performance of the act and the expression of the corresponding
psychological state. Rather the performance of the act is eo ipso, an
expression of the corresponding intentional state and the propositional
content of act and state are identical. Where there is a direction of fit,
the speech act will be satisfied if and only if the intentional state is
satisfied. Thus the order that p will be obeyed if and only if the desire
that p is fulfilled, the statement that p will be true if and only if the
belief that p is correct, the promise that p will be kept if and only if
the intention that p is carried out, etc.
Intentionality-with-a-t thus infects nearly all uses of language and
this fact requires explanation. A tempting but obviously false explanation
is to say that speech acts just are expressions of psychological states
and that is all there is to it. While this explanation has some plausi-
bility for the expressive class of speech acts—such as apologizing,
thanking, congratulating, etc. it is obviously false for statements,
orders, promises, and a large number of others, false because there is
more to a statement than just an expression of belief, more to a promise
than just an expression of intention, and more to an order than just an
expression of a desire. But what more is there? And what is the relation
between this 'more' and the underlying intentional states?
As a way of getting at the answers to these questions, imagine a
class of beings who were capable of having intentional states like belief,
desire, and intention but who did not have a language. What more would
they require in order to be able to perform linguistic acts? Notice that
there is nothing fanciful in the supposition of beings in such a state,
since as far as we know the human species once was in that state. Notice
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also that the question is conceptual and not historical or genetic. I am
not asking what additions would need to be made to their brains or how
language did evolve in the history of the human race.
When we have ascribed to our beings the capacity for having inten-
tional states we have already ascribed to them the capacity for relating
their intentional states to objects and states of affairs in the world.
The reason for this is that a being capable of having intentional states
must be capable of an awareness of the conditions under which its inten-
tional states would be satisfied. For example, a being capable of having
desires must be capable of an awareness of the satisfaction or frustration
of its desires, and a being capable of intentions must be capable of recog-
nizing the fulfillment or frustration of its intentions. And this can be
generalized: For any intentional state, a being that has that state must
be able to distinguish the satisfaction from the frustration of that state.
^
This follows from the fact that an intentional state is a representation
of the conditions of its satisfaction. This does not mean that such beings
will always or even most of the time get it right, that they won't make
mistakes; rather, it means that they must have an understanding of what it
would be to get it right.
Now back to our question: what more would such beings have to have
in order to have a language? The question needs to be made narrower,
because there are all sorts of features of actual languages that are
irrelevant for our present discussion. Presumably such beings would need
a recursive device capable of generating an infinite number of representa-
tions, they would need quantifiers, logical connectives, modal and deontic
operators, tenses, color words, etc. The question I am asking is much
narrower. What would they need in order to get from having intentional
states to performing illocutionary acts?
The first thing that our beings would need to perform illocutionary
acts is some means for externalizing, for making publicly recognizable to
others, the expressions of their intentional states. A being that can do
that on purpose, that is a being that does not just express its intentional
states but performs acts for the purpose of letting others know its inten-
tional states, already has a primitive form of a speech act. But it still
has nothing as rich as our notions of a statement, a request, or a promise,
etc. A man who makes a statement does more than let it be known that he
believes something, a man who makes a request does more than let it be
known that he wants something, a man who makes a promise does more than
let it be known that he intends something. But again, what more? The
primary extra linguistic purpose of having the institution of assertion is
to give information, the main purpose of having the institution of request-
ing (ordering commanding, etc.) is to get people to do things, and the
main purpose of having the institution of promising is to create stable
expectations of people's behavior. These facts will, I think, provide a
clue to the relations between the speech acts and the corresponding inten-
tional states. As a preliminary formulation one might say that our beings
would be capable of making a primitive form of assertion when they could
perform actions which were expressions of belief for the purpose of giving
information, 'requests' (in this primitive form) would be expressions of
desire for the purpose of getting other people to do things, 'promises'
(again in primitive form) would be expressions of intention for the purpose
of creating expectations in others.
The next step would be to introduce conventional procedures for doing
each of these things. However, there is no way that these extra linguistic
purposes can be realized by a conventional procedure. They all have to
do with the effects which our actions have on our audiences, and there is
no way that a conventional procedure can guarantee that such effects will
be achieved. The perlocutionary effects of our utterances cannot be
included in the conventions for the use of the device uttered, because an
effect which is achieved by convention cannot include the subsequent
responses and behavior of our audiences. What the conventional procedures
can capture is so to speak the illocutionary analogue of these various
perlocutionary aims. Thus for example, any conventional device for
indicating that the utterance is to have the force of a statement (for
example, the indicative mood) will be one which by convention commits the
speaker to the existence of the state of affairs specified in the proposi-
tional content. Its utterance therefore provides the hearer with a reason
for believing that proposition and expresses a belief by the speaker of
that proposition. Any conventional device for indicating that the utter-
ance is to have the force of a directive (request, order, command, etc.)
will be one which by convention counts as an attempt by the speaker to get
the hearer to do the act specified in the propositional content. Its
utterance therefore provides a reason for the hearer to do the act and
expresses a desire of the speaker that the hearer do the act. Any conven-
tional device for indicating that the utterance is to have the force of a
commissive (promise, vow, pledge) counts as an undertaking by the speaker
to do the act specified in the propositional content. Its utterance
therefore creates a reason for the speaker to do the act, creates a reason
for the hearer to expect him to do the act, and expresses an intention by
the speaker to do the act.
The steps then necessary to get from the possession of intentional
states to the performance of conventionally realized illocutionary acts
are, first, the deliberate expression of intentional states for the purpose
of letting others know that one has them, second the performance of these
acts for the achievement of the extralinguistic aims which illocutionary
acts standardly serve, and third the introduction of conventional proce-
dures which conventionalize the illocutionary points that correspond to
the various perlocutionary aims.
Ill
Throughout this paper I have used the concept of representation as an
unanalyzed notion. But as we have already noticed statements about repre-
sentations are intensional-with-an-s and the reason for that is that
representation is intentional-with-a-t . So, by describing intentional
states using the concept of representation I have described intentionality
in intentional terms. Is there any way out of this circle? I do not
believe there is. I do not believe there is a nonintentional explanation
of intentionality. That is, there is no analysis of intentionality into
logically necessary and sufficient conditions of the form 'X is in
intentional state S if and only if p, q, and r,' where 'p, q, and r' make
no use of intentional notions.
This does not mean that there is not a great deal more that can be
said by way of describing and explaining how intentionality works. The
point is rather that such descriptions and explanations will necessarily
employ intentional notions. Our characterizations, descriptions and
explanations of intentionality will themselves not be reductive, they will
presuppose some understanding of intentionality. We might call this
pattern of explanation, where intentionality is used in its own characteri-
zation, the circle of intentionality or simply, the intentional circle.
It is interesting to observe the forms which efforts to eliminate
intentionality take. The standard behavioristic analyses of mental states
blandly use the concept of intentional behavior as if it were somehow less
mentalistic than the other mental notions, but to say that a man is walking
to the store or eating a meal is to attribute to him mental states which
are no less mental than to say that he wants to get to the store or he
believes that the stuff on his plate is food. We have the illusion that
behavior is not a mental notion because we can observe bodily movements,
but the bodily movements only constitute human actions given the assumption
of the appropriate intentions and beliefs. Thus either the behavioristic
analysis assumes intentionality in the analysans, in which case it is
another instance of the circle of intentionality; or it doesn't in which
case the analysis is inadequate because no behavior, in the sense of
human action, is mentioned in the analysis at all. Behavioristic analyses
of meaning suffer from this dilemma in an acute form. There have, for
example, been efforts to explain semantic notions in terms of the notion
of assenting to a sentence. But assenting and dissenting are full-blown
illocutionary acts, every bit as rich as promising or stating. To use
these notions in the analysis of meaning, or of any other semantic notion,
is to presuppose an understanding of speech acts, and since the speech
acts concepts contain the semantic notions that the theory was supposed to
analyze, the theory is hopelessly circular. Here, the situation is worse
than in the circle of intentionality, because the notions of assent and
dissent require more than just intentionality, they contain the notion of
meaning .
The problem is not, as is sometimes alleged, that sentences asserting
that someone assented or dissented are intentional-with-an-s, nor even
that assenting and dissenting are themselves intentional-with-a-t , but
that assenting and dissenting are both illocutionary acts and thus under-
standing them presuppose an understanding of the crucial semantic notions,
especially meaning.
But to say there is no nonintentional explanation of intentionality
is not to say there is no nonlinguistic explanation of language. If we
allow ourselves intentional notions in the analysans, then it seems to me,
we can give an analysis of the basic linguistic acts in terms which do not
themselves employ any semantic notions, but do indeed employ intentional
notions. The key to this analysis is that the intentional notions already
contain the notion of their own satisfaction, and we can graft our semantic
notions onto the intentional notions using this nonsemantic notion of
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intentional satisfaction. I have not given that analysis in this paper
but have only sketched the direction it might take. It seems to me not
at all paradoxical that there should be nonlinguistic analyses of the
linguistic but not nonintentional analyses of intentionality . Speaking
a language is, after all, a part of human behavior and of human conscious
life. It would be surprising if we could not describe it in terms derived
from human behavior and human conscious life. But in the way that inten-
tionality underlies the possibility of linguistic acts there is nothing
that conceptually underlies intentionality. Intentionality is precisely
that feature of mental states, human' or otherwise, that enables those
states to represent other things.
It is a mistake to say that there are different senses of 'belief,
a 'notional' and a 'relational' sense. Rather there are different kinds
of reports of belief. One and the same belief can be reported in several
different ways, e.g., 'John believes truly that fa', 'John believes of a
that fa', and 'John believes that fa'.
2
It is fairly easy to extend our criteria of intensionality to apply
to intentional states. If the satisfaction of the state requires the
existence of the objects represented and if the satisfaction value of the
state is not altered by the substitution of other representations of the
same object, then the state is extensional.
3
For an explanation of the notion of direction of fit, see Searle
(1975).
4
This looks like it leads to an infinite regress, but it doesn't.
The understanding of the conditions of satisfaction of our intentional
states is not an additional intentional state.
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ON SURFACE FORM AND LOGICAL FORM
Edward L. Keenan
University of California at Los Angeles &
The University of Tel Aviv
The body of this paper, sections 2 and 3, presents two quite general
correlations between the surface forms (SFs) of natural languages and their
logical forms (LFs) . Section 1 discusses briefly the nature of SFs and
LFs, and section 4 assesses the significance for linguistic theory of
establishing relations between SFs and LFs.
1. The Nature of SFs and LFs. I will assume a SF (= a surface
structure) can be represented by a labelled tree (phrase marker) of the
sort usual in generative grammar. Subtrees of a tree represent constitu-
ents of the SF and are themselves SFs (since they are also labelled trees)
.
The labels on the nodes of a tree represent the grammatical categories and
subcategories of expressions of the language.
It is worth emphasizing that the SFs of a language are defined by a
complex set of rules which may be empirically validated (judged descrip-
tively adequate) according as (1) the phonologically interpreted SFs they
define are judged grammatical (the soundness criterion) and (2) according
as all the forms speakers judge grammatical are in fact defined (generated)
by the rules (the completeness criterion) . In addition a set of rules may
be judged explanatorily adequate according as it is useful in explaining
other facts about the language, such as that children learn languages
quickly on the basis of limited exposure.
Consequently there can be no simple direct argument concerning the
correctness of a particular assignment of SF to a particular expression of
a language. We can only assess the descriptive and explanatory adequacy
of the entire set of rules, and it is this set which determines assignments
of SFs in particular cases. Further, as we modify the rules to make them
descriptively more adequate our assignments of SF will change (as the
history of generative grammar amply demonstrates).
The nonobvious nature of structure assignment is something linguistic
theories share with all scientific theories. There is for example nothing
obvious, or given, or natural, about the atomic structure which physical
theories assign to oxygen. Our representations here are part of a theory
which assigns structures to many compounds and elements and whose correct-
ness is determined by its predictions of the chemical and subatomic
properties of these elements and compounds. Further, our assignment of
structure in particular cases has undergone massive changes over time as
our understanding of the chemical and subatomic properties has grown.
What holds of SFs and atomic forms also holds of LFs. Thus given a
set of expressions of a language (e.g. English, elementary arithmetic, etc.)
a logical theory defines a set of LFs (logical structures) whose descrip-
tive adequacy is determined by the correct predictions they make concerning
the logical properties of the expressions of the language. For example it
is a logical property of (1) below that it entails (logically implies)
(3) , whereas (2) does not have this property.
(1) Both John and Mary can swim
(2) Either John or Mary can swim
(3) Mary can swim
(To say that a sentence S entails a sentence T is just to say, informally,
that in any state of affairs in which A is true, B is true. That is,
whenever the world is the way A says it is, it is also the way B says it
is.)
Furthermore, logical theories for a natural language can also be
assessed as more or less explanatorily adequate according as the set of
LFs the theory defines is useful in the explanation of other properties of
the language. For example, in Logical Types for Natural Language (Keenan
and Faltz 1978, henceforth Logical Types) it is argued on several different
grounds that the LFs that theory provides is explanatorily more adequate
(in addition to being descriptively more adequate) than those provided in
'The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English' (Montague 1973).
We argue for example that our LFs make fewer demands on the logical compe-
tence of speakers (and hence learners) of the language.
As with SFs then there is nothing obvious or given about the assign-
ment of LF to a particular expression of a language. The assignment
depends on the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of the logical theory
which defines the set of LFs. And as with SFs, as we modify our logical
theories for a natural language in the direction of increasing descriptive
adequacy the assignment of LFs to expressions of the language will change.
For example, a purely sentential logic for English is not rich enough to
show that the a-sentences below entail the corresponding b-sentences:
(4) a. All men are mortal and Socrates is a man
b. Socrates is mortal
(5) a. All horses are animals
b. All heads of horses are heads of animals
First order logics, which distinguish a predicate argument structure in
simple formulas and which allow quantification over arguments can represent
the entailment relations given above. And recent work in natural logic,
such as Montague Grammar generally (cf. Partee 1976) and Logical Types
distinguishes more structure than the classically-given first order predi-
cate calculus (CL) and is descriptively more adequate for English than is
CL. (Richness of logical structure does not necessarily correlate with
being a higher than first order logic. See section 4 for discussion.)
In addition to the theoretical and methodological properties which
scientific theories in general share, syntactic theories and logical
theories have some additional properties in common. Namely the structures
which both define are representable by labelled trees. That is, they are
linguistic objects, having a constituent structure, etc. It thus makes
sense to ask to what extent the SF a syntactic theory assigns to an
English expression corresponds or 'looks like' the LFs assigned to that
expression by a logical theory. Is there for example a one-one correspon-
dence between the constituents of the SF and those of its LFs? Do
constituents of different grammatical categories correspond to logical
constituents of different logical categories? And so on.
Answers to these questions depend of course on the exact nature of
the SFs and the LFs the two theories define. Consider for example the
English SF in (6)
.
The example is for illustrative purposes and does not for example repre-
sent the nonsegmented Auxiliary or the verb agreements. Further we do not
insist on the label CNP, common noun phrase , but we do insist that evevy
student and student in (6) be assigned different category labels, a distinc-
tion recognized both by traditional grammar and X-bar notation. We shall
henceforth for clarity refer to expressions like student, fat student, etc.,
as CNPs and expressions like every student, a student, John, he, etc. as
DNPs, determined noun phrases.
A plausible LF for (6) in CL would be:
(7) FM.
write X
Clearly the correspondence between (7) and (6) is none too good. (7) for
example contains five properly embedded formulas (FMs) , the category which
corresponds to Sentence, whereas (6) has no properly embedded sentences.
Further the category distinction in English between CNP and VP is lost in
CL, both being represented as one-place Predicate symbols.
By contrast the LF for (6) given in Logical Types is:
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(8)
Obviously the correspondence between constituent structures is close to
one-one here, and all the category distinctions in English are preserved
in the LF. Log-ioal types does not represent Auxiliaries or verb agreements
however and further the trees are unoriented. That is, left-right order is
not represented in (8). (8) is in fact a set of two expressions, the DNP
every man and the VP read and write. The DNP is itself a set of two
expressions whose members are every and man, and the VP is a set of three
expressions: read, and, and write.
On the other hand, (9) below would be, if I am not mistaken, a LF
assigned to (6) in Montague Grammar. (I have used where possible 'standard'
names for categories rather than those actually used in MG.)
("P)(x) write
Clearly the correspondence here is less good than in CL. Not only do we
lose the distinction between CNP and verb but (9) presents seven properly
embedded formulas.
Given a set of SFs and a set of LFs for a natural language we may now
say that a property P defined on the SFs corresponds to a property P'
defined on the LFs just in case a SF has P iff some (all) of its LFs have
P'. And in general SFs will correspond to LFs to the extent that their
properties correspond. Further, this notion of correspondence can be
naturally generalized in several ways. We may replace P and P' by n-place
relations R and R' and we may allow the arguments of R and R' to be not
simply SFs and LFs themselves but sets of SFs and LFs.
To support our claim that in general there is a significant correspon-
dence between the SFs for a natural language and their LFs we shall consider
here two relations defined on SFs, the agreement relation and the left-
right order relation and argue that in a large class of syntactically
specifiable contexts these relations do correspond to relations defined
on LFs.
2. The Agreement Relation. We observe across a wide range of languages
that certain constituents of SFs 'agree' with certain others. For example
in a SF for a sentence consisting of a VP and a DNP (regardless of their
relative order) the VP may agree with the DNP. That is, a given expression
of the VP will vary in form according as expressions for the DNP are drawn
from different gender classes and have different numbers. In the same
sense we find that transitive verbs (TVs) and in fact transitive verb
phrases (TVPs) sometimes agree with their DNP objects (the DNP they combine
with in whatever way to form a VP) , though this agreement is less common
than VP agreement with subjects. Another common case is that of adjective,
and more generally adjective phrase (AP) agreement with their CNP 'heads'.
But we don't expect that just any constituent of a SF may agree with
any other. It is then an interesting problem in Universal Grammar to
specify the pairs of SFs <A,B> such that A may agree with B in a syntactic
structure E. (By may agree I mean that there are possible human languages
in which they do agree.)
To define the problem somewhat more precisely, let us consider here a
syntactic structure (and so in particular a SF) to be a labelled tree of the
usual sort less the terminal symbols, that is, less the actual expressions
of the language. We may then say of two expressions in a language that they
have, or express , a same SF. Arguably for example both some tall man and
every woman express (10a) below, though only some tall man expresses (10b)
.
(10) a. DOT b.
Det CNP
I I
We may now define:
(11) Given A and B distinct constituents of a syntactic structure
E in a language L, A agrees with B iff the form of expressions of
A varies with the choice of expressions of B.
(To say that A and B are distinct is to say that neither is a subconstituent
of the other.) And our problem may now be stated thus:
(12) For which choices of E, A, and B as above is it the case that
there exist languages in which A agrees with B?
A reasonable starting point is the common cases of agreement cited
above: VPs may agree with their DNP subjects; TVPs with their DNP objects;
and APs with their CNP heads. Do these cases have anything in common? I
think so. Namely, there is a sense in which how we semantically interpret
the item which agrees varies with how we interpret the item it agrees with.
This claim is not obvious and will be justified below. Specifically, let
us consider the Meaning-Form Dependency Principle as a first attempt to
characterize the class of possible agreement phenomena.
THE MEANING-FORM DEPENDENCY PRINCIPLE (MFDP)
Given A and B distinct constituents of a syntactic structure E,
A may agree with B iff the semantic interpretation of expressions
of A varies with the semantic interpretation of expressions of B
in the interpretation of E.
Loosely, the form of A's varies with that of B's just in case the interpre-
tation of A's varies with that of B's. Which is to say that a surface
relation holds of A,B pairs just in case a certain semantic relation holds
between their interpretations. And this is just the kind of correspondence
we are looking for, although the MFDP does not specifically mention a
relation defined on LFs to which the agreement relation on SFs corresponds.
We will state such a relation shortly, but as it is the MFDP which gives
the intuition behind the principle, let us first see what justification
there is for it.
Consider first the case Adjective Phrases. If the principle is correct
it should be the case that how we interpret modifying adjectives varies
with the interpretation of the CNP they modify. And this is in fact the
case. Consider for example an ordinary adjective like flat. In expressions
like a flat road, a flat table, etc. flat means something like 'without
bumps or depressions'. And this in general seems to be the interpretation
of flat when the CNP it modifies refers to a class of objects with extended
surfaces. But if the CNP refers to a normally tasty liquid, as in flat
heev/champagne then flat means something like 'lacking its normal taste,
having lost its "zip"'. And if the CNP refers to a class of objects which,
in their usable state, are inflated with a gas of some sort, as in a flat
tire/balloon then flat means something like 'deflated'. And if the CNP
refers singing or voice quality, as in a flat voice, flat sopranos , then
flat means something like 'too low in pitch'. In short, our interpretation
of flat is adjusted to, or varies with, the kind of thing we are predicating
it of.
And this is commonly the case for common adjectives. Thus strong tables
or fortresses are ones which can withstand much force, whereas strong
wrestlers or weightlifters are ones that can exert much force; and strong
tea or tobacco are substances which produce a marked effect on those who
ingest them. Similarly solid buildings or tables are basically strong ones;
but solid bars or cubes are ones which are not hollow, solid gold or silver
are substances of a high degree of chemical purity, and solid lines or rows
of buildings are ones without a break.
We may infer then that how we interpret modifying adjectives, and thus
APs in general, varies according to the meaning of the CNP they modify.
Analogous claims hold for basic transitive verbs. Consider for example
cut. If its object is (roughly) an animal or a largish body part of an
animal, cut means something like 'to make an incision in the surface of.
Note that the integrity of the object cut is understood to be preserved. A
finger which has been cut is still a finger, and can be cut again. Thus cut
when applied to animals or body parts does not imply cutting all the way
through. Nor does it imply intentionality or a purpose on the part of the
agent. I may cut John either accidentally or on purpose, and in each case
the adverbial phrases accidentally, on purpose add information not present
in the meaning of cut itself. On the other hand, if the object of cut is
a prepared foodstuff, as in to cut a cake, the Toast, out is now inter-
preted as something like 'to divide into portions for the purpose of
serving'. So the action cut specifies in these cases is an intentional or
purposive one. Further, the integrity of the object cut is seriously
affected and normally destroyed as we do now cut all the way through. On
the other hand, if the object of cut refers to the kind of object consisting
of many uniformly elongated objects, as in to cut the lawn, your hair, one's
fingernails, out is interpreted to mean something like 'trim'. In distinc-
tion to the first sense of cut above (cut a person), we do cut all the way
through in that parts of the whole are cut off. And in distinction to the
second sense above (cut the cake) we do preserve the integrity of the whole.
Once we have cut the lawn there is still a lawn there. And further, some
notion of purpose is implied. We cut the lawn or our hair to make them
more regular, pretty, or something like that.
Further, if the object of cut is a concrete mass noun, as in to cut
alcohol or cut heroin, out means something like 'diminish the potency of by
admixing a physically comparable substance'. Thus we may cut whiskey with
water, marijuana with tea, etc. No notion of making an incision is present
in any sense in this interpretation of cut. And if the object of cut is
an abstract one of certain sorts, as in to cut working hours /production
quotas /prices, cut means something like 'to decrease the value of along a
numerically continuous dimension (the dimension in question of course is
one appropriate to the nature of the object cut). And matters are still
more varied. Thus to cut a class or a meeting means to not attend when
supposed to; to cut a path (through a field) or a tunnel (through a moun-
tain) means to create a path or a tunnel by cutting something else and
removing it; to cut a film or a dissertation proposal means to eliminate
parts of it (destroying integrity) and put the result back together again
(restoring integrity) yielding a shorter and presumably better work (notion
of purpose involved)
.
In short then, the action we interpret cut as specifying is one appro-
priate to the object affected. And what holds of cut here holds as well
of other common transitive verbs. To drive cars or buses is a different
action from driving cattle or sheep; and both actions are different from
driving a motor or a generator. To drill means something different in
to drill recruits than in to drill metal, etc. Thus transitive verbs, and
so transitive verb phrases in general, vary in their interpretation with
the interpretation of the object affected.
Finally, intransitive verbs, and so VPs in general, behave similarly.
Thus to say of an animal that it is running is to say both that the animal
is moving its parts (internal movement) and that it is changing location
however momentarily relative to other things (external movement) . But to
say that a watch or a car motor is running is at best only to make a claim
concerning internal movement; no external movement is implied. If you are
running with your watch it does not follow that your watch is running.
And to say that your nose or the faucet is running implies neither internal
nor external movement on the part of the nose or the faucet. Rather it
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implies that liquid, of a sort appropriate to the referent of the subject
phrase, is moving out of that referent. And to say of a play or an exhibi-
tion that it is still running is to say that it is still available for
public enjoyment, with no implication of physical movement at all. In
short, how we interpret run in a context 'DNP is still running' depends on
what sort of object the DNP refers to.
Note that the dependency here is clearly semantic. If we
say it is still punning how we interpret the verb depends on what it refers
to. And if I ask you to cut them the action I'm asking you to perform is
different according as them refers to production quotas or salamis. And
the interpretation of flat in a flat one or flat ones depends on the class
of item referred to by one or ones.
It does appear then that the MFDP holds for the common cases of agree-
ment considered. But many questions concerning this dependency still need
to be answered. At what level of linguistic description should this meaning
dependency be represented? Semantic? Pragmatic? (We have remained non-
committal on this point.) Does the same sort of form-meaning dependency
obtain for other cases of agreement phenomena? And is there any correlation
between what varies in meaning with what and the logical structures assigned
to agreement pairs?
Let us consider the last question first. Within Classical Logic
there seems no complete description of the agreement pairs (VP and NP, TVP
and NP, AP and CNP) . Simple VPs correspond to one-place predicate symbols,
and a limited class of DNPs, such as proper nouns, corresponds approximately
to individual constants (0-place function symbols) , so we may consider
that simple cases of [gDNP, VP] structures correspond to atomic formulas,
in which, semantically , the VP is interpreted as a function taking the DNP
interpretation as an argument. But the correspondence breaks down when
more complex DNPs in English are considered. Thus every man is running
does not correspond to a formula with a function-argument structure even
grossly isomorphic to that of John is running. The two cases may be
compared as follows:
(13) a. John is running
b. R(j)
(14) a. Every man is running
b. (Vx)(M(x)-^R(x)
In fact, nothing in (14) corresponds to (interprets) the English DNP
every man at all.
Transitive verbs correspond somewhat to two-place predicate symbols
in CL, but a VP in English consisting of a transitive verb plus object
does not correspond to any logical category in CL. On the other hand, it
is easy to reformulate CL without changing the entailments of any of the
formulas in such a way that transitive verbs do correspond to something
which combines with a simple DNP to form a VP . A classical two-place
predicate is semantically interpreted as a function u2, the set of ordered
pairs on U, the universe of discourse (i.e. the entities which exist in
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that state of affairs) into the set of truth values, represented as
(false) and 1 (true). Given such a function f, there is a unique other
function g which maps members of U onto VP meanings, that is functions from
U into {0,1} such that for all x,y in U, (g(x))(y) = f(x,y). So CL could
be trivially reformulated so that, for a very simple class of DNPs,
transitive verbs in English would correspond to functions taking DNP
meanings as arguments, and thus, for this limited class of DNPs, there
would be a similarity between VP and TVP representations in CL. Namely,
both would be functions taking DNP meanings as arguments.
But when the AP,CNP pairs are considered CL has nothing to offer us.
Expressions like flat road are not directly assigned any logical category.
Nor is there anything in CL equivalent to a modifying adjective. The best
translation in CL of (15) below would be (16)
.
(15) Every happy man is laughing
(16) (yx)(man(x) & happy {-x.) -^ laugh(x))
So the correspondents of 'happy' and 'man' do not form a logical constituent,
and are in fact of the same logical category (one-place predicate) , and
that category is the same as that for simple VPs (laugh) .
Montague Grammar might appear to offer a more promising set of logical
structures since at least the formal English (which is 'translated' into
the formulas of an intensional logic and only then interpreted) does have
categories of AP and CNP. However, even ignoring the fact that the distinc-
tion between CNP and VP does not survive the translation into the set of
logical structures, I can still find no basis for a similarity between the
three agreement pairs we have considered. It is the case that APs and
CNPs form logical constituents, and the APs are interpreted as functions
taking CNP meanings as arguments. And it is also the case that TVPs and
DNPs form a constituent in the logic and TVPs are interpreted as functions
taking DNP meanings as arguments. So for these cases we can say that English
item which shows agreement is in each case interpreted as a function taking
as argument the (interpretation of) the item it agrees with. But the
similarity breaks down when the NP,VP pairs are considered. For here, while
such pairs are a logical constituent (formulas), it is not the case that the
agreeing item, the VP, is interpreted as a function taking as argument the
item it agrees with. Rather the DNP is interpreted as a function taking
the VP meanings as arguments
.
On the other hand, in Logical Types there is a uniform function-
argument assignment. VPs are interpreted as functions on their DNP Subjects,
TVPs as functions on their DNP objects, and APs as functions on their CNP
arguments. Further, the function-argument assignment holds regardless of
whether the NPs in question are simple ones like proper nouns, or complex
ones like every flat road. Thus the LF assigned on that theory to every
handsome man loves a beautiful woman is:
every handsome
AP CNP
I
beautiful woman
We should stress here that (17) is itself a LF in Logical Types; that is,
it is directly interpreted, not mapped onto a formula in some intensional
logic, that is, a different structure, and then interpreted.
Assuming the LFs defined in Logical Types we may directly characterize
the correspondence between agreement pairs and LFs by:
TEE FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCY PRINCIPLE (FDP)
Given A and B distinct constituents of a SF E, A may agree with B
iff in the LF of expressions of E, the LFs of expressions of A are
interpreted as functions taking the interpretations of expressions
of B as arguments
.
In such cases we shall refer to expressions of A as functional expressions
and expressions of B as argument expressions .
Further, as Logical Types defines a rather large number of function-
argument structures involving DNPs and CNPs, we have at hand a ready set of
predictions concerning possible agreement phenomena involving these cate-
gories. Let us note the following assignments given in Logical Types:
(18) Functions taking DNP arguments:
a. VPs
b. TVPs
c. Possessive Phrases (e.g. the father of, 's father)
d. Prepositions
(19) Functions taking CNP arguments
a. APs
b. Relative Clauses
c. Articles (the, a)
d. Quantifiers (every, no)
e. Numerals (one, two, etc.)
Considering the second category first, the FDP predicts the existence of
languages in which APs agree with CNPs, which we have already seen to be
correct. Second, it predicts agreement between Relative Clauses and their
CNP heads. This is also correct, for recall the definition of agreement.
A agrees with B iff the form of expressions of A varies with the choice of
expressions of B. Now a great many languages form Relatives by presenting
in the position relativized a personal pronoun agreeing in noun class with
the CNP head of the Relative, as illustrated below from Hebrew:
(20) a. ha- ish [she- natati lo_ et ha- sefer]
RC
the-man that-I+gave to-him 1)0 the-book
'the man that I gave the book to'
b. ha- isha [she- natati la^ et ha- sefer]
RC
the-woman that I+gave to-her DO the book
Clearly the forms of the Relative Clauses vary (one contains to where the
other has la) according to the gender class of the head CNP. Similarly
languages which use special forms of pronouns in Relatives, so called
relative pronouns, often present cases where the relative pronoun agrees
in gender and number with the head CNP, as thus the form of the entire RC
varies with certain choices of expressions for the CNP. So the prediction
is verified. Note however, that the FDP does not predict in this case
which part of the Relative Clause will vary in form but only that the Rela-
tive Clause as a whole will vary.
Third, the FDP predicts that articles may agree with the CNPs they are
functions on, and such cases (e.g. Romance) are well known, though perhaps
less widespread than the accessibility of confirming cases would indicate.
Fourth, the FDP predicts that quantifer words like every and no will
agree with the CNPs they combine with, and again confirming instances are
easy to come by:
(21) a. tous les homnes b. toutes les fermes
all the men all the women
And finally, the FDP predicts that Numerals may agree with their CNPs.
Again this is correct; though it is very common that the internal structure
of numerical DNPs is complex and nonuniform from one number to another.
Nonetheless Russian provides a confirming instance. The numeral 'one' has
four forms, one plural form (odnix, used before inherently plural CNPs of
the sort pants, saissors, etc.) and three singular forms, one for each of
the three genders of CNPs. The amount of agreement decreases rapidly as we
consider the higher numbers, but still 'two' in the singular makes at least
two gender distinctions.
Recalling now that the motivation for the function-argument assignment
given in Logical Types (or any logic) is semantic—that is, given that
function-argument assignment we get many right and few wrong predictions of
entailments, the fact that all the predictions in (19) are correct is
rather striking confirmation of the FDP.
Consider now (18). The FDP predicts, correctly as we have already
seen, that VPs may agree with their Subjects, and TVPs with their Objects.
Further, within the logic, heads of possessive constructions are assigned
a logical category and are semantically interpreted as functions on the
Possessor NP. E.g. John's father and the father of John would be assigned
the following LFs:
(22) a. DNP b.
the-of father
(FNP )reviates Function Noun Phrase, a primitive category in the system.)
And the FDP predicts, correctly, that heads of possessive constructions,
Possessive Phrases in Logical Types, may agree with their possessors. This
in fact is massively common in Amerindian languages, and is evidenced in
many others as well, e.g. Turkish, Arosi (Melanesian) , Daga (New Guinea),
and Hebrew. (23) below from Hebrew is illustrative:
(23) beit-o shel Dan
house-his of Dan
'Dan's house'
b, beit-a shel Miriam
house-her of Mary
'Mary's house'
It is perhaps fair to mention here that while the form of possessive
agreement cited above is very widespread—my impression is that it is as
widespread as is adjective agreement with CNPs and TVP agreement with their
NP Objects—there are some limited cases in which the agreement goes the
other way. One obvious case are the pronominal possessives in Romance.
Thus we have son frere 'his/her brother' and sa soeur 'his/her sister'.
The possessives here behave in fact like adjectives as regards agreement,
and are traditionally called possessive adjectives. The paradigm however
is limited to the pronominal possessive forms. The productive possessive
construction shows no such agreement, e.g. le frere de Jean 'the brother of
John' and te frere de Marie 'the brother of Mary'. A somewhat larger class
of 'wrong' agreements can be found in certain Slavic languages where a DNP
with a possessor reading may, in certain cases, be constructed with an
adjectival ending and thus agree with the head CNP as an adjective would.
Comrie and Thompson (1978) cite the following from Czech:
(24) a. vedcova kniha
scientist-f .sg. book
'the scientist's book'
h.lkniha vedce
book scientist-gen
'the scientist's book'
Note that (24a) clearly has a possessive meaning, not something like 'a
scientific book' (which would be v'ideaka. kniha). And contra the FDP the
logical possessor shows agreement with the CNP head. Again however the
productivity of this paradigm is limited, in fact listable (though the list
would be much longer than for the Romance cases cited above) . Thus only
definite, singular, unmodified possessors can be construed as adjectival.
To say the old scientist's book, the (many) scientists' hooks, or a scien-
tist's book we could only use the 'proper' possessive construction illus-
trated in (24b) . Bob Rothstein (personal communication) points out however
that at least certain proper noun possessives, as Newton's theories, may
also be constructed with the possessor as an adjective.
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It would seem then that to maintain the FDP as stated we should weaken
it to allow for listable exceptions. And this is not unreasonable. If we
establish a correlation between the most productively generated SFs and
their LFs we have surely established a correlation between SF and LF in
general. Exceptions to the general pattern will have to be learned as
special cases. Indeed for other types of correlation between SF and LF,
such as some version of the Fregean Principle (meaning of the whole is a
function of the meaning of the parts) various types of fixed expressions
—
proverbs, idioms, etc.—will clearly be listable exceptions.
Finally, FDP predicts that prepositions may agree with the NPs they
govern, although the LFs in Logical Types axe less clear here, as Preposi-
tions have multiple categories.! Thus in addition to combining with DNPs
to form various classes of modifiers they may also combine directly with
VPs and TVPs to extend the class of DNP arguments they take. Thus in
Logical Types {sleep, in) is a derived TVP requiring a DNP object to make
a VP again (so [{sleep, in), {the bed)] is a derived VP) . Further, cases
of Preposition agreement with DNPs are harder to find across languages, but
some cases do exist. (25) below from Arosi (Melanesian; see Capell 1971
for supporting details) is one example:
(25) 'ini- a mada
with-it club
'with a club (he hit me)
'
Worth noting here is that not all prepositions show agreement with the NP
they govern, and those that do, show an agreement paradigm similar (perhaps
identical) with that that transitive verbs show with their Objects.
However, given the similarity in function-argument structure between tran-
sitive verbs and their Objects and Prepositions and their Objects it is
perhaps not surprising that transitive verbs can historically become reduced
to function as dependent forms, i.e. Prepositions. Note as well that
another very common source for prepositions is possessive constructions.
Thus for example behind it will in many languages be something like at its
back. If the language were such as to have agreement between possessive
heads and Possessors we could expect that prepositions so derived histori-
cally might show such agreement as well. Something like this may be the
explanation for the postposition agreement in Daga (New Guinea; see Murane
1974 for details) . In any event there are several clear cases of post-
positions agreeing with their DNP Objects, and the agreement suffixes are
the same as the intimate possessive agreements with possessors:
(26) ge orup ame ena- m ak
you fellow that with-their go+2sg+imp
'(You) Go with those fellows'
Thus for all the function-argument structures in Logical Types which
concern either DNPs or CNPs , the Functional Dependency Principle correctly
predicts the possibility of agreement. And as these nine cases represent
a reasonably large sample of the possible agreement phenomena known to me,
I feel that even if the FDP were restricted to hold for just these cases
it would still represent a very significant correlation between SF and LF
and thus support the general claim that there exist correspondences between
SF and LF. On the other hand, a large number of questions concerning the
FDP remain. In section 2.1 below we raise some of these questions.
2.1 Refining the FDP.
2.1.1 We have replaced the original intuition expressed in the Meaning-
Form Dependency Principle by one, the FDP, stated in formal logical terms.
It is reasonable to ask how well the original intuition behind the MDFP
carries over to the larger range of cases. The results here are mixed and
interesting, and suggest some additional correlations between SF and LF.
Consider first the Possessive Phrases. Do the heads of such construc-
tions vary in their interpretation with the reference of the Possessor in
anything like the same way in which say flat varies with the interpretation
of the CNP it modifies or cut varies with the semantic nature of its Object?
Here there does seem to be some variation, though it is not clear that it
is of exactly the same sort as the very idiosyncratic variation exhibited
by flat, out, and run. Thus consider a PossPh like the middle of. If its
argument, the Possessor, denotes an activity, such as the performance of a
play or a radio program, then the middle of picks out that part of the
performance which occurs at a moment, or period, of time midway between the
beginning and the end of the activity. Analogous claims hold for arguments
that denote specified periods of time, such as day, night, etc. But if
the argument refers to a concrete physical object the middle of has different
senses. Thus the middle of the Earth is a physical point, or region, more
or less equidistant from all the points on the surface of the Earth. So
the middle of may have a temporal or physical interpretation according to
the nature of the Possessor—a fact which is well known. But this varia-
tion is not wholly similar to that evidence for flat, out, etc. That is,
the same variation shows up for a few other such expressions, e.g. the end
of, the length of, whereas I don't expect (but haven't in fact checked)
that any other adjective besides flat would have exactly the four senses
attributed to it earlier. On the other hand, the middle of does show
further different senses which do seem more idiosyncratic when applied to
different sorts of physical objects. Thus if the Possessor refers to
something conceived of in two dimensions, the middle of may pick out a
point at the geometrical center, as in the middle of the stage or the
middle of a sheet of paper. But if the two dimensional object is notably
elongated, the middle of picks out a line more or less equidistant from
the edges, as in the middle of the road. Further, if the object is con-
ceived of in three dimensions, then differences in the interpretation of
the middle of show up according as the object is solid or one habitually
entered by human beings. Thus the middle of the Earth (the Sun) consists
of molten iron (Helium atoms) means that the space at the geometrical
center is filled with molten iron, etc. But John is sitting in the middle
of the room does not suggest that John is suspended in midair. Rather the
middle of the room defines a region of space with reference to the center
of the (two dimensional) floor.
In addition, many overtly possessive constructions lend themselves
easily to 'metaphorical' interpretations of the head (or PossPh). Thus
one might argue that the head of in the head of the animal is interpreted
literally, and picks out a certain body part of the animal. But the head
of the table or the head of the department force the head of to be under-
stood in a nonliteral (metaphorical) way. This sort of metaphor is what
Reinhart (1976) calls nonpoetic metaphor and is characterized, in our
terms, by a reinterpretation of the function expression given a 'nonordinary
'
argument expression (the Possessor)
. But whether we take one sense as
basic and the others as metaphorical or not, it is still the case that it
is the function expression which is subject to various interpretations
depending on the (literal) meaning of the argument expression.
In addition we might note that nominalizations of various other sorts
of functional expressions (adjectives, VPs, etc.) commonly take the form of
possessive constructions, and some, but not all, of the sense variation in
the original may be preserved under the nominalization. Thus the strength
of has a similar range of senses to strong (person, fortress, tobacco, etc.).
On the other hand, the solidity of loses some of its senses. Thus while
the solidity of the chair presumably does refer to its capacity for with-
standing force, the solidity of the bar or the cube is unclear in meaning,
referring most likely in my opinion not to its quality of being not hollow
but to its capacity of withstanding force. And the solidity of the gold
or silver cannot be used to refer to its chemical purity but must refer to
its capacity to withstand force, if indeed it refers to anything at all.
Nor can the solidity of a line or a row of buildings naturally refer to
their quality of being 'perceptually unbroken' . Note also that solid loses
its chemical purity sense when used predicatively. This gold is solid does
not mean it is chemically pure. These observations suggest:
im FUNCTIOML DEPTH PRINCIPLES
(i) The meaning range of functional expressions decreases in propor-
tion to their internal function-argument complexity, and
(ii) for f a functional expression and e an argument expression,
the meaning range of f(e) is less than or equal to that of e.
Thus (i) says basically that more derived items exhibit less meaning varia-
tion than less derived items of the same category. And (ii) says that a
derived item exhibits less (or at least not more) meaning variation than
the item it was derived from.
Thus (ii) would predict for example that run slowly should have a
narrower (or at least not greater) meaning range than run, given that
slowly is interpreted as a function on the interpretation of run. And this
appears to be correct. While we can understand John/the motor/the faucet
is running slowly using run in the same sense as if slowly were absent, we
cannot say My Fair Lady or the Braque exhibition is running slowly, so
run has lost one of its senses.
(i) would predict that VPs consisting of a TVP plus object would
exhibit less meaning variation than simple lexical intransitive verbs. And
this also seems correct. It is not easy to find TVP - DNP combinations in
English which exhibit the gradient, idiosyncratic variation exhibited by
run, though some variation still does exist. Thus to cross the river here
is interpreted as an activity if the subject is animate (e.g. the soldiers) ^
but it is interpreted as denoting a state or a locative relation with
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various choices of inanimate subject, e.g. the bridge, the telephone lines,
etc. The Depth Principle also suggests that a predicate adjective may have
fewer senses than its modifying use since, e.g., he solid is functionally
more complex than solid. And at least for solid this appears to be correct.
The Depth Principle very likely has something right about it then,
though much more work investigating particular cases would be needed to
place it on firm ground. Furthermore there are other restrictions on the
meaning range of functional expressions besides those covered in the Depth
Principle. Thus some lexical adjectives (intransitive verbs, etc.) simply
exhibit much less meaning variation than do others. Thus the Random House
College Dictionary (1973) lists only one sense for eleemosynary, two for
perspicacious (one archaic), and three for melancholy, whereas it gives 23
for flat, 23 for strong, and 26 for solid.
A kind of limit case here may be logical constants, items like every
and not whose interpretations do not vary from state of affairs to state of
affairs. And as Articles, Quantifiers, and Numerals are logical constants
in this sense we would perhaps not expect them to exhibit meaning variation.
And that appears correct. We shall not here present and substantiate a
principle which would predict that however. Prepositions, few in number in
any language compared to for example CNPs and VPs, seem to lie somewhere
between ordinary 'content' items and logical constants. And it is unclear
to me whether we want to say that with in to fill the tub with Harry/with
water/with Joy exhibits meaning variation or is simply multiply ambiguous.
So more research is needed here. But it does seem to me likely that
some version of the MFDP, suitably restricted to allow for inherent restric-
tions on the meaning ranges of specific items, can be made to work.
2.1.2 It is reasonable to query whether functional expressions taking
items other than DNPs and CNPs as arguments also show agreement. If not,
the FDP should be restricted to only cover nominal agreement. But our
linguistic knowledge is limited here, so we shall not at the moment impose
such a restriction. Further, we can find cases where adverbs and PPs
inflect for categories that the VPs (and TVPs) they are functions on also
inflect for. In Malagasy for example locative complements of verbs are
marked for tense, and their marking must be the same as that of the verb:
\:^ho- J
(27) a.
n- andeha V'-0- I any Antsirabe Rabe
past-go
. there Antsirabe Rabe
Rabe went to Antsirabe'
And in Avar (NE Caucasian; see Anderson 1977) certain adverbial construc-
tions agree with the subject, as do the verbs:
(28) a. emen roq'o-ve v-us:ana
father home- m m-returned
'Father returned home'
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b. ehel roq'o-je j-us:anax
mother home- f f-retumed
'Mother returned home'
But in the Avar case it is 'surely' more natural to consider that it
is the entire VP returned home which is agreeing in gender with the sub-
ject. The apparent agreement between the VP and adverb is an artefact of
how VP agreement is internally realized and not a case of the form of the
adverb varying with the choice of verb, as would be required by the FDP.
The Malagasy case is perhaps less easily explained away. Given sen-
tences like John works and has always worked very hard, where plausibly
VPs with different tense marking occur within the scope of the adverb, it
is reasonable to think that tense marking is a property of verbs, and so
the adverbs or PPs which must have the same tense marking may well be
instances of agreement as per the FDP. But it is also not implausible to
think that tense marking is a property of the whole VP or even the entire
sentence, in which case apparent agreement in tense internal to the VP
would be a result of spreading of the marking on the VP as a whole and not a
case of the form of the PP varying with the choice of verb.
A clear case of feature spreading rather than agreement is given by
case marking on modifying adjectives. While it would be tempting to
consider, with traditional grammar, that modifying adjectives agree in case
with their CNP heads, it seems clear (see 2.1.5 below) that case marking
is a process which takes the entire DNP in its domain and that in certain
languages the case marking on the DNP spreads onto adjectives and deter-
miners. So agreement in case, as opposed to agreement in gender class, is
not a case of the form of one expression varying with the choice of another
as the FDP requires.
The cases of feature spreading above neither support nor refute the
FDP, but they do in certain cases support the phrasal as opposed to the
merely lexical nature of agreement phenomena. Thus the FDP claims that
VPs in general, not just lexical VPs (intransitive verbs) may agree with
their DNP subjects. The claim is not falsified if only lexical VPs show
agreement since variation in form of part of the VP is variation in form
of the whole VP, but the FDP still does suggest that other parts of the VP
may vary in form since it does not restrict agreement to lexical VPs.
Thus the examples of verb and adverb agreement with subjects cited for
Avar above clearly illustrate full VP agreement as opposed to merely
lexical VP agreement. (29) and (30) below from English also illustrate
full VP agreement.
(29) a. He is behaving himself
b. She is behaving herself.
c. They are behaving themselves
(30) a. He has lost his way
b. She has lost her way
c. They have lost their way
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Note that the VP agreement is still evidenced in cases where the lexical
verb itself does not agree, as in (31) below:
(31) a. They should/might/must/won' t/behave themselves (*himself/
*oneself)
b. She may/must/should/have lost her way (*his way/*their way)
c. She tried/promised (Bill) /wanted/to lose her way
Similarly both copular verbs and predicate adjectives and predicate nomi-
nals show agreement with Subjects in many languages.
(32) a. John is a doctor
b. John and Mary are doctors
(33) a. Marie est intelligent^
b. Marie et Francoise sont intelligentes
c. Jean et Marie sont intelligents
(33b, c) show as well that what the form of the VP varies as a function of
is the entire DNP Subject and not just the 'head'. To know whether intel-
ligent is feminine plural, (33b), or masculine plural, (33c), we must in
principle check the gender of each conjunct of the Subject. The point is
perhaps even more obvious in languages in which full verbs agree in gender,
as the Hebrew examples below illustrate:
(34) a. Miriam v-Ruti medabrot
Mary and Ruth are speaking (f.pl)
b. Miriam v-Dan medabrim
Mary and Dan are speaking (m.pl)
Overall then the fundamentally phrasal (rather than merely lexical)
nature of the agreement phenomena that the FDP predicts seems to us basi-
cally correct. On the other hand, whether the FDP makes correct predictions
concerning function argument structures not involving DNPs and CNPs must
await further logical and linguistic research.
2.1.3 But what about further function-argument structures which do
involve DNPs and CNPs? A few plausible cases do come to mind. Thus we
strongly expect that ditransitive verbs like give and hand will be treated
semantically as functions taking, at some level of analysis, their Indirect
Objects (lOs) as arguments. Assuming that, the FDP would predict the
possibility of ditransitive verb phrase agreement with lOs, and this is in
fact correct. E.g., Spanish, Basque, and Daga (New Guinea) all evidence
such agreement
.
What about the logical functions represented by and, or, and noti In
Logical Types these operators do directly form derived DNPs, but they are
treated as operators of a different sort from those already considered.
The main difference is that they also combine directly with Formulas, VPs,
TVPs, and APs to form derived members of those categories. Further, and
and or are two-place functions rather than the one-place ones considered
so far. Linguistically, relative to the category they combine with, a
certain minimal variation is known. That is, many languages, for example,
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use different morphemes for and according as the category of items conjoined
is different. The examples below from Malagasy are illustrative, and
Payne (1978) provides large numbers of other examples.
(35) a. miniham-bary Robe ary (*sy) misotro taoka Easoa
eat- rice Rabe and drink booze Rasoa
'Rabe is eating rice and Rasoa is drinking booze'
b. mihinam-bary sy (*ary) misotro taoka Rabe
eat- rice and drink booze Rabe
'Rabe is eating rice and drinking booze'
c. mihinam-bary Rabe sy (*ary) Rasoa
eat- rice Rabe and Rasoa
'Rabe and Rasoa are eating rice'
On the other hand, I know of no language in which the form of and
varies with the choice of conjuncts within a category. Thus, as far as I
know, if a language has an overt conjunction for DNPs at all then it uses
the same form for John and Bill as it does for Mary and Susan.
2.1.4 We have considered a rather large number of function-argument
structures and at least those which involve DNPs and CNPs are commonly
enough expressed in SF by items which satisfy the agreement predictions of
the FDP. But are there cases of agreement in SF which are not expressed
by function-argument structures of the right sort? There would appear to
be at least one: That of pronominal agreement with full DNP 'antecedents'.
As 'bound pronouns' can occur in constituents in which their antecedents
do not occur, the pronoun will not in general be represented as a function
taking the interpretation of the full DNP as an argument. This at least is
not the case for pronominal representation in Logical Types, nor is it the
case in any of the commonly used versions of LFs for natural languages or
formal languages. Rather pronominal co-reference is represented by the use
of Variable Binding Operators (VBOs) , illustrated in (36) below from
Classical Logic and (37) from Logical Types.
(36) a. Every student laughed and cried
b. (Vx) (student (x) -* laughed (x) and cried (x))
(37) a. Every man loves his mother
b. ((every, man) ,(Xx(x, (love, (x's mother)))))
The use of such VBOs seems 'unnatural' in the sense that they do not seem
to correspond to anything in SF. Indeed we count it as an advantage of
Logical Types that very many SFs using quantified NPs which bind the
reference of more than one position can be represented without the use of
VBOs. For example, (36a) above would be represented in Logical Types by:
(38) ((every,man) (laughed, and, cried))
However in the LF for (37a) there is no way to bind his without using the
lambda operator. And it is clearly not the case that what corresponds to
his, namely the bound occurrence of x, is interpreted as a function taking
the interpretation of {every, man) as an argument. Similarly the position
relativized into in the representations for Relative Clauses in Logical
Types is represented by a bound variable.
The best tentative conclusion I can reach concerning these phenomena
is that the kind of agreement we see between pronouns and full NP ante-
cedents is different in kind from that that we have considered so far, and
a logical characterization of it should proceed along lines different from
those in the FDP. I would propose then that the FDP be restricted so as
to require that the distinct constituents A and B of E are further required
to be of distinct categories (not merely subcategories of one and the same
larger category). Since pronouns and full NPs are all DNPs, the FDP would
then make no prediction about their agreement possibilities. An additional
principle would be required then to characterize pronominal agreement. The
principle is in fact easy to state, though we shall not be concerned with
its details or justification here. But roughly, if A and B are of the same
major category, then A is represented in LF by a bound variable and B is
what binds it (i.e., in Logical Types, B is the argument of the structure
created by that VBO)
.
2.1.5 A final potential restriction on the FDP concerns case marking
of DNPs. In many languages a DNP Subject may have one case marker, the
absolutive, if the main verb of the VP is intransitive, and another marker,
the ergative, if the main verb is transitive. So the form of the DNP
would vary with that of the VP, in violation of the FDP. Similarly in
many languages Experiencer 'Subjects' will be marked like lOs (that is,
dative) whereas Subjects of activity VPs will be nominative (or unmarked).
Appearances then might suggest that the FDP should be restricted so as
to cover just the traditional agreement cases and not, as Emmon Bach points
out to me, traditional cases of government . To impose such a restriction
we might for example stipulate that the variation in form mentioned in the
FDP be restricted to variation with respect to inherent nominal properties
such as number and gender. Even so restricted the principle would correctly
account for a large number of specific correspondences between SF and LF
and so still support the general conclusion that there exist correspondences
between SF and LF.
I doubt however that such a restriction need be imposed. Even a brief
look at case marking properties of languages shows, as I shall briefly
argue below, that case marking is a sentence-level phenomenon. That is,
case marking, despite the fact that it sometimes (see below) shows up
morphologically bound to DNPs, is a property of sentences or more exactly
a relation between a DNP and the entire sentence in which it occurs, and
not a property of DNPs given as a function of the verb in the clause in
which they occur.
To support this claim, I shall summarize a very large number of cases
in which DNP case marking is independent of the choice of the verb. Thus
for a given choice of verb a given DNP may have any of several case markers
(CMs) , and the conditioning factors appear to be almost any conceivable
property of the sentence containing the DNP. (The latter claim is surely
too strong, but a quick look at case marking systems reveals an astounding
variety of such conditioning factors.)
First, it is obvious that locative cases are not predictable from the
verb generally. Thus in the same way that in English we may say John fell/
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on the sidewalk/near the station/in the bathroom, etc., so in case marking
languages in the narrow sense, such as Finnish, a given verb like fall may
take DNP complements in any of various locative cases. We may then dis-
miss locative cases, and indeed all the semantically rich oblique cases
(e.g. instrumentals) from consideration and concentrate on case marking
affecting Subjects and Direct Objects.
But even here there are a massive number of cases where the CM on a
DNP may vary with the verb held constant.
First, consider the very widespread use of 'definite DO marking'.
Many languages, such as Hebrew, Turkish, Persian, Spanish, Malagasy, etc.,
present DOs of the same verb in different cases according as the DO is ±
definite and/or ± animate, the exact conditioning factors varying from
language to language. (39) from Hebrew is illustrative:
(39) a. ani ohev yeladim
I like child-pl
'I like children' (no CM on the DO)
b. ani ohev et_ ha- yeladim ha- ele
I like DO def-child-pl def-those
'I like those children'
A second, very widespread phenomenon among case marking languages
concerns differential marking according as the DNP is understood to be
partitively or wholly affected. Thus the differences discussed in Anderson
(1971) as between chew the meat/ahew on the meat, shoot Bill/shoot at Bill,
etc., show up in the case marking in many languages. The case of Finnish
is well known. DOs of many affirmative transitive verbs may be partitive
in case if they are only partially affected by the action (and so the
action may be understood as incomplete). If they are wholly affected, the
CM may be either 'accusative' or nominative depending on other factors to
be discussed shortly (see Timberlake (1975 and 1977) for detailed discus-
sion) . Edith Moravcsik (1978) points out furthermore that this distinction
exists in a great many languages and includes Subjects of intransitive
verbs as well. She cites, for example, (40) from Russian:
(40) a. kash-a ostalas ' na stole
kasha-nom remained on table
'Kasha remained on the table'
b. kash- i eshc'e ostalos'
kasha-gen still remained
'Some kasha was still left'
Similarly many of Fillmore's pairs show up in the case marking of
heavily case marking languages. (41) below from Hungarian is also taken
from Moravcsik (1978):
(41) a. Janos beultette a kertet fakkal
John planted (def) the garden(acc) trees+with
'John planted the garden with trees'
b. Janos fakat ultetett a kevtbe
John trees planted (indef) the garden+into
'John planted trees in the garden'
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(Note that as per the FDP, the verb in (41a) agrees with the def initeness
of the DO, but does not agree with indefinite DOs as in (41b).)
Third, note that in some ergative languages intransitive subjects
may sometimes take either the absolutive case or the ergative case,
with a difference in meaning: the ergative indicating Subject intention
or responsibility, the absolutive indicating accidental action. E. Pomo
(Uto-Aztecan; Moravcsik 1978) and Bats (Caucasian; Comrie 1973) are
examples. (42) below is from Bats:
(42) a. so woze
I-abs fell
'I fell (not implied that it was my fault)'
b . as woze
I-erg fell
'I fell (it was my fault)'
Further, even a bare animacy distinction may occasionally trigger
different CMs on transitive Subjects. (43) from Gugu-Yalanji (Australia)
is cited from Gary and Keenan (1977)
.
(43) a. dingkar-angka kaya kunin
man- erg+anim dog hit
'The man hit the dog'
b. kalka-bu kaya kunin
spear-erg+inanim dog hit
(= instr)
'The spear hit the dog'
The above cases are all ones in which semantic properties of the marked
DNP are reflected in the CM but are not predictable from the verb itself.
Some of these properties, such as def initeness, may also have a syntactic
characterization, in which case it is not easy to decide whether the condi-
tioning factor is semantic or syntactic. But other cases are more clearly
syntactic. Thus, as is well known, many languages may case mark full DNPs
and pronouns differently. Thus English does not mark full DNPs but does
mark pronouns. And Dyirbal (Dixon 1972) and many other Australian languages
may case mark full DNPs on an ergative-absolutive basis but pronouns on a
nominative-accusative basis.
Furthermore, if a language distinguishes noun classes and also case
marks, the form of the case marking may vary with the noun class. E.g.,
Russian and Latin case marking varies according as the nominal marked is
masculine or feminine, singular or plural, etc.
The above collection of facts shows that case marking is sensitive to
a large number of syntactic and semantic properties of the DNP affected by
the marking, where these properties are not predictable from the verb.
Further case marking will also be sensitive to whether the DNP in question
forms a logical constituent with a VP or a TVP, and will need to have
information regarding the semantic and/or syntactic subclass of the verb.
Yet even with all this information the CM is not completely predictable.
It still might, for example, mark the DNP as partitive or not, as in the
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Russian cases above, or it might mark it as ergative or absolutive, as in
the Bats cases above. In either case the CM itself brings in new informa-
tion (partial af fectedness, purposive activity, etc.). All this rather
suggests the in fact quite intuitive view that case marking is both
syntactically and logically a relation between a DNP and a VP or TVP. And
if case marking is treated as a two-place function taking DNPs and verbs
of various sorts as arguments then the FDP simply has no prediction to
make, except the correct one that the form of the CM may vary with the
nature of the arguments (stative vs. activity VP, definite vs. indefinite
DNP, etc.).
Even this rather appealing picture however is very badly oversimpli-
fied. Evidence from very many languages shows that case marking must have
much information available concerning the structure of the entire sentence
in which the marked DNP occurs.
Thus, for example, several different cases are available where the
CM on a given DNP varies with properties of other DNPs in the clause.
Recall the Finnish cases mentioned above. The Object of many affirmative
transitive verbs if not semantically partitive, and so marked by the parti-
tive case, may still be either nominative or 'accusative'. The conditioning
factor here is whether the transitive verb presents an overt subject or
not. Thus, using the traditional case labels, we note the following
examples from Comrie (1978) (see Timberlake 1975 for a thorough discussion):
(44) a. Maija-0 soi kala-n
Maija-nom ate fish-acc
'Maija ate the fish'
b. Syo kala-0 .'
eat-imp fish-nom
'Eat the fish!
'
Similarly objects of impersonally used (i.e. subjectless) transitive verbs
also take nominative objects. On the other hand, if the subject of the
(affirmative) transitive verb is present, the nonpartitive object is
'accusative' ( 'antiergative' in Comrie's terminology, but in any event
different from the nominative) . So case marking of one DNP then is contin-
gent on the presence or absence of another.
A different type of dependency between DNPs is illustrated in Dalabon
(Australia; Silverstein 1976, cited in Comrie 1978): Here case marking is
contingent on the 'chain of being' relations between the transitive subject
and the object. Thus if the subject is animate (as in (45) below) and the
object inanimate the subject is not case marked. But if both are animate
the subject takes an ergative marker:
(45) 5uZ.ur)an-0 ga'manbunir)
my-father he-made-it
'My father made it'
(46) Buluryxn- yi wuduwud ga 'nan
my-father- erg baby he-looks+at-him
'My father is looking at the baby'
A third related type of example is given by case marking in ergative
languages when a 'normally' transitive verb is used 'absolutively' as He
wrote and wrote as opposed to He wrote the letter. Some ergative languages
cited in Comrie (1973) use an absolutive ending for the absolutive use,
and others, like Hindi use the ergative. In the former case then, case
marking of the subject is not predictable from the identity of the verb.
It appears then that the domain of case marking must not only include
the DNP and the VP or TVP but also other DNPs in the clause. And yet we
have only begun to touch upon the other properties of the sentence to which
case marking must be made sensitive. Thus in many languages (Hindi,
Georgian) case marking is sensitive to Aspect. Subjects of perfective
sentences are marked in one way, subjects of imperfectives another. And
since the same verb can occur in many different aspects this property of
case marking is not predictable from the verb.
Further, it is quite common that case marking of DNPs is different
according as the sentence they are in is negative or not. Thus, as is
well known, DOs in Russian and Czech may be genitive if the sentence they
occur in is negative. This is also true for Finnish and Lithuanian, as
Moravcsik (1978) points out, and further the same holds for certain intran-
sitive subjects. Compare (47a, b) from Moravcsik:
(47) a. proexal avtomobil' (Russian)
went-by car (nom)
'A car went by'
b. ne proexalo avtomobilga
neg went-by car (gen)
'Not a car went by'
Analogous claims again hold for Finnish and Lithuanian. Worse, in Kawaiisu
(S. Numic, Uto-Aztecan; see Munro 1976 for details) Subjects of negative
sentences are marked (overtly) like DOs, whereas in nonnegative sentences
they are not overtly case marked. In fact. Subjects of embedded clauses
generally take object-marking. So it may be the case that case marking is
not independent of whether the sentence the DNP occurs in is a main clause
or an embedded clause. In Wappo (Li and Thompson 1975, cited in Gary and
Keenan 1977) the overt case marking on Subjects is simply lost in finite
subordinate clauses:
(48) a. oe kew-i ew toh- ta?
that man-Subj fish catch-past
'That man caught a fish'
h. Ah ce kew-0 ew toh- ta? hatiskhi?
I that man fish catch-past know
'I know that that man caught a fish'
It appears then that case marking is fully clausal in nature. And on
reflection this is not surprising. In very many languages pre- or post-
positions not only mark DNPs, they also mark various types of subordinate
clauses. Thus subordinate clauses like on arriving at the station, John
went straight to the ticket counter; The meeting began upon John's arrival,
etc., may well be translated in heavily case marking languages by ordinary
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morphologically bound case markers. Recall in this connection the wide-
spread use of the 'absolutive' construction in the IE languages. (49)
from Ancient Greek below is illustrative (diacritics omitted)
:
(49) elthont-a eis ten potin, ho didaskal-os edeixe ton paid-a
coming-acc into the city, the teacher- nom showed the child-acc
to sokrat-e
the Socrates-dat
'Coming into the city, the teacher showed the child to Socrates'
The nonfinite verb on the (subjectless) subordinate clause is case marked
accusative, which indicates that the understood Subject of coming is coref-
erential with the DNP marked accusative in the main clause, namely the
child. Had aorrring been marked nominative, it would have been the nomina-
tive DNP, the teacher, who was coming; and had it been marked dative it
would have been Socrates. And had it been in the 'absolutive' form, the
genitive case (ablative in Latin, Dative in Gothic, Locative in Sanscrit),
the understood Subject of coming would have had to be different from any of
the major participants in the main clause and thus already understood from
the prior discourse.
The general point here is that case marking commonly has a variety of
clausal and cross clausal functions. The domain of case marking then, even
restricted to DNP marking, is properly the entire sentence in which the
DNP occurs.
Note finally, that if case marking is a sentence level property we
might expect reflexes of it to show up elsewhere than on the DNPs. And
this in fact is correct, at least where case marking is understood broadly
enough to cover markings on indirect objects and obliques. Recall the
Latin paradigms in which 'prepositions' may show up either on the DNP, or
on the verb, or both. Thus from a verb like ferre 'to carry' we may form
derived verbs such as inferre 'to carry into', transferre 'to carry across',
ex+ferre 'to carry from', ad+ferre 'to carry to', etc. The DNP 'Object' of
such verbs may or may not also carry the preposition. Thus Caesar may
carry the war into Italy, he may 'incarry' the war into Italy, or he may
"incarry' the war Italy. Similar double markings occur in Hungarian and to
a lesser extent Modern Russian. (50) below from Hungarian is illustrative.
(50) Janos ra-0- te- tt- e a kalap-ot az asztal-ra
John on-it-put-past- 3sg3sg the hat- ace the table- on
'John put the hat on the table'
Further, it is in fact quite common to find that that element which marks
the relation a DNP bears to the action expressed by the verb may be marked
exclusively on the verb. Such cases arise commonly in Caucasian languages,
Penutian languages (Chinook, Totonac) , Ancient Greek (see Keenan 1976 for
examples), Arawakan languages (e.g. Machiguenga; see Gary and Keenan 1977
for examples) and Bantu languages. (51) below from Kinyarwanda (see Kimenyi
1976 for a thorough discussion) is illustrative:
(51) Yohani y- a- andik-iish-ije-ho ameza ikaramu
John he-past-write-inst-asp-loc table pen
'John wrote on the table with the pen'
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We may conclude then that syntactically speaking case marking is a
function taking the entire sentence as its domain and thus the only predic-
tion made by the FDP is the correct one, namely that the form of case
markers may vary with the properties of the sentence it applies to.
3. The Left-Right Order Relation. The function-argument structures
concerning CNPs and DNPs distinguished in Logical Types turn out to support,
quite unexpectedly, another correlation between SF and LF: Namely, the
characteristic left-right order of the constituents which express these
structures. Thus:
THE SERIALIZATION PRINCIPLE (SP)
Different functional expressions taking the same class of argument
expressions tend to serialize on the same side of their argument
expressions.
THE DISSIMILATION PRINCIPLE (DP)
2
Functional expressions taking DNPs as arguments and functional
expressions taking CNPs as arguments tend to serialize on the
opposite side of their argument expressions.
The SP predicts that VPs, TVPs, PossPhs, and Adpositions (= Prepositions in
English) will all occur on the same side bf their DNP arguments. Similarly,
APs, Relative Clauses, Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers will tend to
occur on the same side of their CNP arguments. And the DP says that these
two sides are different. Thus there should only be two characteristic word
order types with respect to functional expressions of DNPs and CNPs: Either
Function + DNP and CNP + Function or DNP + Function and Function + CNP.
Although these predictions are too strong in one respect and so will be
weakened slightly below they do make a very substantial number of correct
predictions as we shall show and thus do constitute evidence in support of a
general correlation between SF and LF,
Thus consider the characteristic word order patterns in Verb Final
(SOV) languages, easily the most widespread word order type across different
geographical areas and genetic groupings. The relevant word order correla-
tions are:
(52) a. Subject + VP (e.g. John sings; John Mary kissed)
Object + TVP
DNP + Postposition (e.g. the garden-in)
DNP + PossPh (e.g. John's father)
b. Adjective + CNP (e.g. tall man)
Relative Clause + CNP (e.g. the apple eating man)
Article + CNP (the man; this man)
Quantifier + CNP (every man)
Numeral + CNP (two man)
Clearly all the functions on DNPs occur on the same side of the DNP, the
right, and all the functions on CNPs occur to the same side, the left. So
the SP is fully supported. And these two sides are different, so the DP is
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fully supported, at least as far as our current knowledge of the word order
correlates goes. Specifically, we know more about some of the word order
patterns than we do about others. In particular, as indicated earlier,
the internal construction of numeral expressions is complex, nonuniform,
and not well known across languages. Further, in all cases here, and below,
it should be recognized that we need large scale studies of the word order
correlates to make our claims more accurate, and the few such studies we
have (see e.g. Hawkins 1979a and 1979b) will surely show that the internal
analysis of word order patterning is more complex than indicated above.
Nonetheless, relative to the current state of our ignorance, the above
mentioned correlates are (with the serious hedge regarding numerals) the
best gross statement we have for the structures referred to. (Other
correlates, such as the position of Auxiliaries and Main Verbs are not
considered here.)
With these qualifications then, consider the second word order type
predicted by the SP and DP. It would be:
(53) a. VP + Subject
TVP + Object
Preposition + DNP
PossPh + DNP (e.g. the father of John)
b. CNP + Adjective
CNP + Relative Clause
CNP + Determiner (= Article, Quantifier, or Numeral)
The first two claims in (53a) predict that a language of this type will have
VOS as a basic word order. In fact, such languages are rare, although
about 12 such cases are known. See Keenan (1978) for a study of their
typological properties. On the other hand, though the VOS type is rare, the
predictions re word order above are correct (modulo the hedges given above
for SOV languages)
.
But what about the word order types, SVO and VSO not predicted by the
two principles? Not only do they exist, but they are both more widespread
than the VOS type, though very significantly less so than the SOV type.
(54) below summarizes the knovm word order types characterized in terms of
the relative order (where fixed) of Subject, Object, and Verb:
(54) SOV > SVO > VSO > VOS > OVS
The chart below gives a rough breakdown of the distribution of word order
types across the major genetic-areal grouping of languages. A major heading
is understood to mark a single genetic group unless indicated otherwise.
Subheadings mark genetically coherent subgroups.
GENETIC-AREAL DISTRIBUTION OF WORD ORDER TYPES
1. Australian
SOV with much freedom of word order
2. Indo-Paaific (6 genetically independent groups)
SOV
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3. Austro-Tai
SVO and VSO both prominant orders. (Some SOV in New Guinea)
4. Austro-Asiatic
4.1 Munda—SOV
4.2 Mon-Khmer—SVO
5. Sino-Tibetan
SOV
6
.
Dravidian
SOV
7. 'Boreo-Oriental ' (possibly four genetically independent subgroups)
7.1 Altaie (Turkic, etc.)—SOV
7.2 Uralia (Samoyedic and Finno-Ugric)—dominantly SOV with some SVO
7.3 Japanese, Okinawan , Korean—SOV
7.4 Paleo-Siberian—dominantly SOV
8. Indo-European (extant groups)
8.1 Baltio—SVO
8.2 Slavic—SVO
8.3 Germanic—SVO ISOV
8.4 Italic—SVO with hints of VSO
8.5 Indo-Iranian
8.5.1 Iranian—SOV
8.5.2 Indie—SOV
8.6 Dardic—SOV
8.7 Greek—SVO
8.8 Albanian—SVO
8.9 Armenian— (modern) SOV
8.10 Celtic—VSO
9. Caucasian (perhaps 2 genetic groups)
SOV dominant, scattered SVO
10. African (4 genetically independent subgroups)
10.1 Khoisan—SOV
10.2 Nilo-Saharan—VSO, SVO, and SOV all attested
10 .
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Niger-Kordofanion—SVO
10.4 Afro-Asiatic
10.4.1 Semitic (modern)—SVO
10.4.2 Berber—VSO
10.4.3 Chadic—SVO
10.4.4 Cushitic—SOV
11. Amerindian (13 genetically independent subgroups)
SOV probably the dominant order (e.g. Eskimo-Aleut, Na-Dene (Athapas-
can), Hokan, Aztec-Tanoan, Andean-Equatorial, Macro-Chibchan)
VSO heavily attested: (Salish, Wakashan, Penutian, Oto-Manguean)
SVO is only rarely attested
OVS is known in one case (Hixkaryana, a Carib language in Brazil,
see Derbyshire (1977) for discussion)
It is clear from the table that SOV is clearly the dominant order among
the world's languages. The relative proportions of SVO vs VSO are hard to
evaluate given that I cannot accurately assess just how widespread it is
among the Amerindian, though it is clear that it is a dominant order in
the genetic groups indicated above. So VSO occurs as a dominant order in
several Amerindian phyla, it is one of the dominant orders in Austro-Tai
(Polynesian, Philippines, Formosan) , and occurs as the dominant order in
genetic subgroups of Indo-European (Celtic) , Nilo-Saharan (Nilotic) , and
Afro-Asiatic (Berber) . As well it was likely the historical order of
older Semitic languages: Classical Arabic, Biblical Hebrew, Babylonian
Aramaic. SVO on the other hand, is the dominant order in Europe (ignoring
Celtic) though in the phylum as a whole, SOV is a very significant order
(Armenian, Dardic , Iranian, Indie). In addition SOV is the dominant order
in the extinct IE languages (Hittlte) and is the most likely reconstructable
order for Proto-IE. SVO is the dominant order in Niger-Kordofanian, a
very large group, and occurs as a dominant order in many Austro-Tai lan-
guage groups (Tai, Indonesian, Javanese). It is the dominant order in
Chadic and modern Semitic and occurs sporadically in groups that are other-
wise dominantly SOV. I consider it more widespread then than VSO.
VOS only occurs rarely, and then mainly in Phyla which independently
present Verb Initial as a major order—Austro-Tai and Amerindian. OVS as
noted is cited for only one case, though others related to it may have the
same order. We shall not further consider this case here.
What about the word order patterns in SVO and VSO languages other than
those involving the subject? Essentially they pattern like we predict for
the VOS languages, though more 'doubling' (Hawkins 1979b) occurs, especially
in SVO languages (e.g., such languages may have both prenominal and post-
nominal possessors, as English; both prenominal and postnominal adjectives,
as French, etc.). Further and large scale study would be needed to justify
that articles and demonstratives occur significantly more frequently post-
nominally than prenominally, as they are generally considered to do (e.g.
Indonesian, Yoruba, Batak, etc.). These observations suggest the following
condition:
SUBJECTS FRONT (SF)
The Subject occurs to the left of other major constituents of Ss
.
Thus SF is maximally satisfied in both SOV and SVO languages, less satisfied
in VSO languages, and still less in VOS and OVS languages. Note further
that the SF is a much more specific principle than either the SP or the DP,
as the latter quantify over classes of functional expressions, whereas the
SF only mentions one specific argument expression—the Subject. If we take
then the possible word order types for human language to be those obtained
from the set defined by the general principles SP and DP, namely SOV and
VOS, and modified in the direction of satisfying Subject Front we obtain
(pending of course a more rigorous formulation) a surprising number of
correct preditions:
(i) The possible types are SOV, VOS, VSO, and SVO. Just the well
attested cases, with the exception of the one OVS language cited.
Note what a strong prediction (i) in fact is. There are 9 function-argument
structures considered and thus in principle 2^ = 512 possible word order
types. Of which only four are predicted to occur, and they do.
(ii) The principles predict that the SVO, VSO, and VOS languages
will evidence the same serialization in their function-argument
structures with the exception of the placement of the Subject.
But all the others should be the same, and this is correct.
(iii) The combined effect of the three principles would appear to
correctly predict the observed genetic-areal distribution of
the word order types.
Thus the rigorous SOV type satisfies all the principles and is in fact the
most widely distributed word order type. SVO fully satisfies Subject Front
and fails the Serialization Principle (and the Dissimilation Principle) at
just one point: the Subject should follow the VP, that is the TVP + Object.
VSO also fails the SP (and thus the DP) at this point, and in addition
satisfies Subject Front to a lesser extent than the SVO type and so is less
widely distributed. Independently VSO yields a less good correspondence
with LF since the TVP + Object does not form a constituent in SF. Finally
VOS (and OVS) maximally fail Subject Front and might then be expected to
have the least wide distribution.
Despite the logical looseness of prediction (iii) above it does seem
to me that the approach we have taken to the word order correlates more
successfully relates them to function-argument structure than earlier
attempts. Vennemann (1972) is perhaps the first (but see note 2) attempt
to systematically correlate word order types with function-argument struc-
ture. His approach however is not based on an independently justified
logic. He takes for example DNPs as functions with VPs and Prepositions as
arguments, and their outputs are supposed to somehow have the same category
as the argument. But no natural logic treats, for example, in and in the
garden as having the same type of denotation. Further, Vennemann 's approach
must rule out the Subject-VP relation in principle, so predictions like
(iii) above, however loose, cannot in principle be stated in his framework.
More recently Gil (1979) relates function-argument structures to word
order types in the framework of a prosodic theory. His approach assumes our
SP and has an analogue of the DP, though much more elaborate. The two
approaches are sufficiently different to resist quick comparison, but it
is noteworthy that his approach does yield several predictions concerning
distinctive prosodic structures in SOV and SVO languages, one of which
(greater consonant /vowel ratios in the SOV group) he rigorously supports.
To conclude this section, we might wonder whether the Subject Front
principle is anything other than an ad hoc device to get the word order
types correctly predicted. Is there any independent reason to expect this
principle, and is there any independent justification for it? The answer
to both questions I feel is yes, although more work than can be presented
here would be needed to justify this claim. So briefly:
As regards motivation, the Subject-VP constituent is the major function-
argument structure of simple sentences and might well be expected to have
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more perceptual or cognitive salience than the function-argument structures
embedded within either the Subject or the VP. Thus, recall from the
Meaning-Form Dependency Principle that how we interpret VPs may vary with
the choice of Subject. Thus if the VP preceeds the Subject, hearers will
have to suspend an exact interpretation for it until the Subject is enun-
ciated. For example, if English were a VP first language there would be
sentences beginning with is flat . . . , is strong . . . , etc., where the
exact sense of the VP could not be interpreted until we knew whether the
speaker was talking about roads, beers, voices, or whatever. Further, the
problem would quite obviously be more serious in a VOS language than in a
VSO language, since more material in a VOS language would be present before
the Subject was enunciated. To say for example in a VOS language that
nobody loves both his father and his mother, we would begin with, loves
the father of his and the mother of his . . . , without being able to
identify the referent of his. And if the language allowed sentential
objects (the most likely position for complements of verbs of saying) we
could begin sentences like thinks that hurt himself he . . . before the
Subject phrase was enunciated, requiring the hearer to 'hold in temporary
memory' himself and he until their referents can be established by the
Subject. (See Keenan 1978 for further discussion of the disadvantages of
placing the Subject at the end of the sentence.)
The motivation suggested above for presenting Subjects to the left of
the other major constituents in a sentence does in fact suggest some
independent motivation for Subject Front. In the first place, in those
languages which do use a VOS order, we in fact never find that the Object
position can be filled in surface by a full sentence. To say in those
languages (e.g. Malagasy, Fijian, Toba Batak, Ineseno Chumash, etc.) things
like John thinks that Fred will win a variety of alternatives are available,
one of which must be used, and all of which present the thinker before the
embedded clause. Thus the language (e.g. Malagasy) may sinply use a VSO
order here, in violation of the normal word order. Or it may passivize
(Malagasy, Toba Batak) yielding an order like thought by John that will win
Fred. Or it may utilize any of various devices (clef ting, topicalization)
for presenting the Subject before the VP.
In the second place, all VSO languages and all VOS languages present
means of fronting the Subject. Some of these may be clearly marked struc-
tures, e.g., a particle may be inserted after the fronted Subject and before
the remaining VP, but such options always exist and, in all cases where I
have relevant data (Malagasy, Fijian, K'ekchi (Mayan) and Toba Batak) such
fronting devices are more commonly used than, for example, the 'backing'
devices (e.g. Right Dislocation) in SOV or SVO languages.
In the third place, even in VSO languages, there will be a variety of
ways to form complex (intransitive) verb phrases, e.g. by conjoining two
independently intransitive verb phrases. The expected order then would be
sing and danoe John. And sometimes this order can be realized (Malagasy,
Isthmus Zapotec, Tamazight (Berber)), but in general it seems more common
to break open the VP yielding 'dissonant' structures like sing John and
danoe, where we have a surface coordination between a VP and a full Sen-
tence. And if the VP is a TVP plus Object it is even harder to maintain
the VP-Subject order, despite the highly dissonant structures that result.
194
That is, we would expect to get [kissed Mavy and danced]'[j-p John. (And
sometimes we do, as in Malagasy.) But the more usual order is [kissed
John Mary]^ and danaed.
These cases do then provide independent evidence for Subject Front
as a constraint in Universal Grammar on the class of possible word order
types.
4. Theoretical Signifiaanoe of Correlations between SF and LF. Why,
as linguists, should we be interested in establishing a correlation between
the properties of SFs and those of LPs? The answer lies in our goal of
trying to represent the linguistic competence of speakers of a language.
To know, and thus to learn, a language is to know (learn) much more than
simply what the class of grammatical SFs are. Even children from the
youngest age do not randomly produce approximations to well formed SFs.
Rather they use them with logical (and other) effect. That is, they use
them to assert—to make true statements (or statements they intend as true)
.
They use them to deny, and they readily make inferences from what others
have said. In other words, in practice, speakers use SFs as LFs , It makes
sense to say that what someone has said entails something else, or that it
contradicts what someone else has said.
If we represent at least the logical properties of an SF by a set of
LFs we may say that what someone knows when he knows a language is a set of
pairs <s,t> where s is an SF and t is an LF which represents one of the
meanings of s. We may represent the entire language as the set of pairs
<s,t> such that s is in SF, t is in LF and t represents one of the meanings
of s. (So the language will be a very proper subset of SF x LF.)
(To be sure this idealization abstracts away from much else we know
when we know a language, such as most everything we might call 'sociolin-
guistic', but for the moment this abstraction is sufficient for our
purposes.)
To know a language on this view then requires that we know what the
class of SFs is, what the class of LFs is, and most important that we know
which SFs are paired with which LFs. This last claim can be represented
by saying that the ideal speaker knows (in the sense of having Internalized)
a function which associates each SF s with the set Tg of LFs, each of which
expresses one of the meanings of s.^ In fact, one of the explicit goals
of current linguistic theory (at least the Revised Extended Standard
Theory, EST) is to define such a function, although work specifically on
that topic has in fact been rather scant.
Thus, to account for the linguistic competence of the (ideal) native
speaker we shall want to characterize the set of SFs, the set of LFs, and
the interpreting function which relates the two. And we shall want to use
this characterization to explain what it is that people learn when they
learn a language and how it is that children, with a limited and imperfect
exposure to the language, nonetheless learn to identify a substantial
subset of the pairs (s,t) which constitute the language.
Part of the explanation for this latter fact within generative grammar
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has been that humans come biologically equipped with a certain syntactic
potential. So the child, or anyone else, is not prepared to accept as a
possible set of SFs a very large number of the sets of expressions which
can be formally defined. We rightly do not expect that somewhere in the
unexplored wilds of New Guinea we will run across a language all of whose
sentences have prime length. Thus much work in generative grammar has,
rightly to my mind, been concerned to constrain the class of possible
grammars the learner can potentially accept. These general constraints
would then directly reflect our innate syntactic potential.
Analogous claims hold for the class of possible interpreting func-
tions. We cannot believe that the way humans associate meaning with form,
or LFs with SFs, is random. Given a set of SFs for a language, not just
any function into a (power) set of LFs is a possible interpreting function
for that language. Imagine for example a function F which, for every
surface fomi s, maps s onto a set of LFs none of which mentions any of the
LFs which F associates with any of the constituent parts of s. So the LFs
which F might associate with John acme early and left late could be just
those that a 'right' interpreting function associated with ISIot all
vmicoms have horns. Mathematically it is easy to construct such nonadmis-
sible interpreting functions.^
So to characterize our competence we want to define the class of
possible interpreting functions, and to explain (at least in part) the
learnability of human languages, we want to define the class of possible
human languages, that is the possible sets of pairs (s,t), as narrowly as
possible. Clearly the most constrained class of interpreting functions is
the set of identity functions. That is, for any language L, the set of
LFs for L would be identical to the set of SFs for L. This would directly
explain why speakers can use SFs with logical force (assert, deny, infer,
etc.)
.
Unfortunately this identification does not seem possible on any theory
of SF ever propounded. The reason is that in all theories, at least some
SFs will be semantically ambiguous and thus correspond to more than one
LF. Note that the objects on which the entailment relation is defined (LFs)
cannot be ambiguous in the sense of having more than one truth value in
some state of affairs. If p were such a formula then we could argue both
that p entails p and that p does not entail p, which is to say that the
entailment relation itself is not well defined. (To see this, note that
given the existence of a state of affairs in which p is true on one reading
but false on another it follows that p does not entail p. On the other
hand, 'for any state of affairs M, if p is true in M then p is true in M'
is itself trivially true. Which is to say p entials p.)
But how badly must the identification of SF with LF fail? Which is
to say, how ambiguous are SFs? The question has no obvious answer since it
depends at lease on what SFs our theory defines, and as we have seen, that
is a complicated matter. Still, one kind of SF which is semantically
ambiguous in all theories are those containing semantically ambiguous lexi-
cal items of the same grammatical category and subcategory. Thus John is
a bachelor we are told is four ways ambiguous according as John is a male
seal, a knight's helper, etc. And since it can be true on one reading and
false on another, we will need distinct LFs to correspond to each of these
readings. Notice however that each of those LFs could be structurally
isomorphic to the SF. They might just differ in that within the logic
would be four distinct logical common nouns, baahelori, bachelor2, etc.
This type of ambiguity then, while serious, still permits a very strong
form of correspondence between SF and LF. Namely, identity up to lexical
disambiguation.
But of course linguists and philosophers have been much concerned
with nonlexical ambiguities. Many of these however will be eliminated in
a reasonably rich theory of SF. Thus most theories would assign flying
planes aan be dangerous two distinct surface forms. (On one, flying
would be the head of the Subject, and on the other it would be a modifier.
On one the head would be marked + plural, and on the other not, etc.) And
it appears that many of the classical structural ambiguities are in fact
not ambiguous at a level of SF. Note that even a subcategory difference in
a lexical item yields a different labelled node in SF. Thus very possibly
the shooting of the hunters can be naturally assigned to SFs according as
the underlying verb shoot is transitive or a derived intransitive.
It is worth noting in this regard that elaborating the base, as by
proliferating the number of categories and subcategories, does not seri-
ously complicates the grammar as a whole. That is, the class of context
free or even context sensitive languages is a very constrained class. If
all of English could be given in a context free (sensitive) form the learn-
ability problem would be solved. On the other hand, the class of languages
generable by context free bases plus length decreasing filters is enor-
mously larger. Thus to constrain the class of grammars we have an interest
in enriching the base and limiting as much as possible the filters used.
On the other hand, there are several sorts of 'possible' ambiguity
which have been studied by philosophers and linguists alike which are much
less likely to be represented by dintinct SFs. The major cases known to
me are the following: (1) cross-reference ambiguity, as in John told Bill
that he was clever \ (2) Quantifier scope ambiguity, as (supposedly) in
Every man loves a woman', and (3) transparency /opacity mabiguity as in
Suzie wants to marry a Swede or John believes that the author of Waverly
was the author of Waverly.
Just how far from isomorphism these cases will force the interpreting
function is unclear at the moment. A serious part of the reason is that
we have no really clear pretheoretical intuition of what shall count as
semantic ambiguity . ^ Thus the position that the he in John told Bill that
he was elever is simply freely generated and its interpretation depends on
the context of utterance is at least defensible. So on that view the
sentence would not be logically ambiguous. Its 'pragmatic' potential would
have to be explicated within a theory of pragmatics or speech usage.
However, while many are working in this area, there is not yet, to my
knowledge, a sufficiently developed body of science here to be called a
theory, and the claim that our sentence is only pragmatically one way
rather than logically one way is only a possibility. Similarly one might
want to sweep quantifier scope ambiguity under the rug of pragmatics, and
reduce the transparency/opacity ambiguity to one of scope of variable
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binding operators (an approach which has been reasonably successful for
some of the classical opacity cases; but many unsolved problems remain),
thus reducing it in effect to the quantifier scope cases.
So it appears thinkable that there could be, at least in principle,
something like an isomorphism between an SF and any of its LFs. However,
it seems more likely that the mismatch between SF and LF will be greater
than that. The ambiguity issue only stated one in principle condition
that required a mismatch. But just because a SF is semantically unambigu-
ous it will not follow that, say, its constituent structure corresponds
point for point to that of its LF. And further, on some approaches to SF,
many surface forms would be generated which would correspond to the null
set of LFs. Examples might be the man was hitting themselves, John loves
each other y etc. So on this view the interpreting function itself would
in effect act as a kind of filter on the SFs.
So it seems to me then that the best assessment of the relation between
SF and LF lies somewhere strictly in between isomorphism and randomness.
How close to one pole or the other is an open question, but an important
one, since our answer to the problem will determine how successfully we can
characterize our linguistic (semantic + syntactic) competence. We should,
it seems to me, be looking for theories of SF and LF in which the correspon-
dence is as close as possible, while still accomodating the ambiguity
'facts'. For the closer the correspondence the more we have accounted for
a speaker's competence in asserting, inferring, denying, etc. Further, a
close correspondence theory gives us perhaps an additional means of explain-
ing how children learn quickly with limited exposure. It not only limits
the ways the child may attempt to assign meaning to form but it gives an
additional reason for the child's quick learning. Namely, we may assume
the child is motivated both to express his needs (and in fact his under-
standing of the world) and also to understand what others say. That is,
there is an intense motivation to be able to perform and comprehend
'semantic' acts. So if SFs are directly useful in coding and in decoding
meaning the child is motivated (or at least pushed) into learning the
semantically significant properties of SFs. In more concrete tenns, the
child is motivated to learn the grammatical distinctions between common
nouns and intransitive verbs if these distinctions are useful in expressing
meanings and understanding the meanings others communicate. If on the
other hand, that distinction had no semantic value the child would be less
motivated to learn it, and so presumably slower in acquiring it. The lazy
child might relapse into conjugating nouns or putting determiners on verbs.
We know in fact from psychology (though the cases studied are not directly
comparable to the case we are considering) that people learn meaningful
material more quickly than meaningless material. To the extent that SFs can
be directly interpreted, that is, treated as LFs, the distinctive properties
of SFs are meaningful and can be expected to be learned more quickly than
if these properties were meaningless.
5. Conclusion. Unfortunately, it seems to me, much of the post-
aspects work in generative grammar has, in different ways in different
cases, moved away from a conception of SF in which it is closely related
to LF.
The original conception of syntactic theory in Syntactic Structures
however asemantic in conception, lent itself very nicely to a close rela-
tionship between LF and syntactic form generally. The kernal sentences on
that view represented a finite amount of information a language learner had
to learn by brute force. The unbounded set of derived structures however
could naturally have their meanings represented as a function of what they
were derived from since the generating functions (the transformations)
were in a naive sense semantically interpretable. Thus a child could learn
the meaning of Yes-No Question Formation (one of the generating functions)
by learning how the meaning of a small sample of questioned kernal sen-
tences differed in meaning from the kernal sentences they were derived from.
Then the meaning of any yes-no question can be ascertained relative to the
declarative it is formed from simply by recognizing that it is, syntacti-
cally, a yes-no question. Analogous claims held for most of the major
transformations in Syntactic Structures. A proper semantic theory at this
time would have 'simply' faced the task of indicating how the output of a
transformation varied in meaning as a function of its input. And this is
the sort of thing that logical theories do. Logical derivations by
conjunction, disjunction, quantification, and negation do not preserve
meaning. Rather we state the meaning of the output as a function of that
of the input. Needless to say of course the semantic operations of
English would have been at a higher level of complexity than in Classical
Logic, but not in principle different.
But as is well known linguistic theory did not develop in this way.
By 1964 and 1965 assigning meaning representations to SFs was a recognized
goal of the theory, but the theory was reorganized in such a way that
only base structures and lexical items were to be semantically interpreted.
Taking off from the point. Generative Semantics attempted to argue that
the putout of the Base differed very significantly from SFs, and that in
fact the base structures (modulo a few differences as regards quantified
expressions) resembled the LFs of the classically given first order logic
(CL) ! This is a terribly negative view of the relation between SF and
LF, although that was perhaps not so apparent at the time.
But consider that the entire syntax of LFs in CL can be given in a
single paragraph. Here it is: CL has a denumerable set of variables,
x^, X2, etc. each having the category of Name. It has a set of function
symbols each of unique degree n ^ 0, and a rule which says that the con-
catenation of an n-place function symbol with n occurrences of names is a
name. The language also has a set of relation symbols each of unique
degree n >^ 1, and a rule which says that the concatenation of an n-place
relation symbol with n names is a formula. And it has two rules for
deriving complex formulas. One says that if S and T are formulas then
(not S)
,
(S and T) , and (S or T) are formulas. And the other says that if
S is a formula and x a variable then (for every x, S) and (for some x, S)
are formulas. And that's all.
Now the best generative grammars of English we have (Stockwell,
Schachter, Partee 1973) run into hundreds of pages, and they are clearly
inadequate. Assuming that the meanings expressible in English can be done
in CL or a slight extension thereof, we are saying that almost all of
English syntax is needless as regards the expression of (logically
representable) meaning. That is, we could have done with a one-paragraph
grammar rather than the massive thing we apparently require. And since
the diversity of structure present in SFs vastly exceeds the primitive
syntax of CL, this view forces a massive correspondence failure between
SF and LF. I find this a discouraging view, a kind of modern Babel
theory in which Man is punished by God by having to use an absurdly
complicated grammar when he could have done with a sleek one-paragraph one.
Nor does this view conform to my experience as one who has been con-
cerned to represent the logical properties of natural language. The more
I have looked at natural language the more I have found that almost
everything in surface Is relevant to the logical interpretation of SFs.
One might expect on the other hand that there would be a more opti-
mistic view of the relation between SF and LF within EST syntax. It is
clearly a goal of that theory to map SFs onto LFs, and the closer the
correspondence between the two the easier it will be to define the mapping.
But I am uneasy about the relation between SF and LF within this theory.
On the one hand, in 'Questions of Form and Interpretation' Chomsky (1974:
16) espouses the view that there is a close relation: '. . . the thesis
of "absolute autonomy formal grammar" . . . would not imply that there are
no systematic connections between form and meaning. No one, I am sure,
has ever doubted that there are highly systematic connections and that a
major problem of linguistic theory is to determine them. ' On the other
hand, Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:429) assert that they believe, 'There is
. . . some empirical support for the belief that the syntax of LF is close
to that of standard forms of predicate calcalus . . . ' (though that assump-
tion does not appear to me to play an important role In the article)
.
Given our earlier discussion that an assignment of LFs to natural
language expressions is nonobvious in the same sense in which assignment
of SFs is, it is certainly unwarranted to assume that LFs have one or
another particular shape. To my knowledge no specific attempt has been
made within EST syntax to define a function mapping SFs onto descriptively
adequate sets of LFs drawn from Classical Logic. We cannot then assess
the feasablllty of defining such a function nor the demands it would make
on the language learner.
I can think of only two reasons why, as generative grammarians, we
might want to assume prior to an investigation that the LFs of CL are an
appropriate range for an Interpreting function for natural language SFs.
I shall argue here that these reasons are in fact only apparent.
The first is that according to a certain well defined metric of
logical complexity (the degree of recursive unsolvabillty of the predicate
logically true ) CL is reasonably simple, though not absurdly so. Thus in
CL logically true is a recursively enumerable predicate, whereas in second
or higher order logics this is not the case. Thus for example in second
order logic there can in principle be no complete syntactic characteriza-
tion of the entailment relation. So if the child (or whoever) only has
to know things of first order difficulty, he has to know less than if he
has to know things of second or higher order difficulty. This point is
surely correct. To claim that the natural logic for English has the full
expressive power of second order logic is to make a stronger claim about
our logical competence than to claim that first order logic is sufficient.
However, the order of a logic is not tied to any particular syntactic
instantiation, such as that in CL. The order of a logic is strictly
determined by the set theoretical type (relative to the universe of dis-
course) of the variables in the logic. What makes first order logic first
order is that we can only quantify over members of the universe of dis-
course U. In second order logic we can quantify over subsets of U, and so
we can say things like 'For every object x there is a property P such that
P(x)' and so on. So a logic which only allows quantification over U is
first order, and that commits us to very little concerning the class of
LFs the logic defines. It only requires that we have variables of a
certain type but otherwise we are free to construct the rules defining the
LFs as we please. For example, the extensional logic proposed in Logical
Types is in all essential respects a first order logic. (The range of the
variables in that logic appears to be sets of higher types, but in fact
they are so constrained as to be in a one-one correspondence with the
members of U.)
Secondly, the question of close correspondence between SF and LF is in
principle independent of the question of autonomy of syntax. I take the
autonomy thesis to be essentially that our syntactic capabilities are
innately determined up to some level of specificity and that these capa-
bilities are independent of other things, such as the semantic ends we
make them serve. In fact construed in this way the autonomy thesis seems
to me clearly true. There is to be sure a serious empirical matter as to
how much of say English syntax is innately determined and how much repre-
sents a 'free' choice within the bounds of our innately determined
possibilities. But the in principle question seems clear: only humans
use language, so what more natural explanation than that humans differ
biologically in this respect from other mammals?
But from the autonomy thesis alone nothing follows concerning the
relation between SF and LF. It certainly does not follow for example that
agreement pairs do not correspond to function-argument structures in the
way we have claimed in this paper. Nor will it follow that certain
function-argument structures are not commonly expressed by SFs which
exhibit regular left-right order relations among their parts. Nor will
it follow that the interpretation of complex SFs is completely unrelated
to the interpretation of their constituent parts.
Whether correspondences exist between SFs and their LFs is an empiri-
cal matter. To say that there is a massive correspondence failure is to
say that man has made very poor use of his syntactic endowment. It is to
say that man makes very many syntactic distinctions which are in fact
irrelevant to the expression of meaning; and that he fails to code in his
syntax distinctions which are semantically relevant. I can believe that
we have not made perfectly efficient use of the syntactic instrument we
come endowed with; that idioms for example do present meaningful parts
whose meaning is (synchronically) irrelevant to the meaning of the entire
idiom. And I can believe that there may be certain systematic ambiguities
in language, such as the opacity/transparency ones cited earlier, which are
not regularly coded in SF.
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But I cannot believe that the syntactic elaboration present in each
language can be collapsed into the pitiful sjnitax of CL. How will we
represent the voicing systems of the Philippines? The tense systems of
Bantu? The switch reference systems of New Guinea and the Americas?
Where shall we put the deixis systems present in all languages? Where
will imperatives and hortatives go? And subjunctives? And gerunds?
What about the rules which most if not all languages have which convert
Ss and VPs into NPs and Adjectives? And Adjectives into abstract nouns?
Where to put the mass nouns, and noun compounds? And do we really not
logically distinguish common nouns from intransitive verbs? And adjec-
tives from adverbs?
Surely if we have all this syntax in our heads we will use it for
some semantic effect. It may to be sure be difficult to explicate just
what the semantic effect is in particular cases, but rather than accept a
punishment theory—all that syntax is useless— I would recall the German
proverb often cited by Einstein: 'The Lord is subtle but he is not mean',
Several alternatives for the analysis of PPs are in fact suggested
in Logical Types. The version fully presented there was one in which
Prepositions combined with either intransitive verbs (VPs) or transitive
verbs (TVPs) to extend the class of DNP arguments they take. The analysis
in which this semantics is presented with Prepositions as functions taking
DNPs as arguments has been worked out by Faltz (Dept. of Linguistics, UCLA).
For simple DNPs that analysis is equivalent to the one in Logical Types.
If the DNPs are properly quantified there may be relative scope differences
between the DNP object of the Preposition and the Direct Object of transi-
tive verbs.
2
It is interesting to note that perhaps the first scholar to investi-
gate word order correlates, Abel Bergaigne, in 1875, arrives at a very
similar analysis: they can be expressed by a 'double formule: le terme
qualifiant precede le terme qualifie et le terme regi precede le terme
regissant'. The quote is cited in Holland (1976:413).
We need not require that Tg be the entire set of LFs each of which
expresses one of the meanings of s. It is sufficient that Tg be a set of
LFs such that any logical form which represents a meaning of s is logically
equivalent to one in Tg. Tg then can be expected to be finite for any s.
Note incidentally that whether the set of pairs <s,Tg> is recursive
is completely independent of whether an arbitrary chosen logical form is
valid, that is, true in all interpretations of the logic.
4
For example, let I be a correct interpreting function for a set of
SFs. So for each SF s, I(s) is the set of descriptively adequate LFs for
s. Enumerate the set of SFs (so for each SF we may associate a unique
natural number n) . Pick any wierd numerical function, say the function f
which maps each natural number n onto 100 + n3. Define a 'wrong'
interpreting function I* which maps each surface form s onto I(f(n)),
where n is the number in the enumeration of s, and I(f(n) is the set of LFs
which I associates with the SF whose number is f(n).
5For example, as regards entailment we do have a good pretheoretical
intuition. Namely, an (unambiguous) sentence S entails an unambiguous
sentence T iff T is true in all the cases in which S is true. Model
theoretic semantics is an attempt to formalize this notion by formally
representing the notion 'true in a state of affairs'.
The best pretheoretical intuition behind the notion 'ambiguity' which
I can come up with is at best only a necessary condition for a sentence to
be ambiguous. Namely, if S is ambiguous between meanings A and B (how-
ever represented) then a speaker on a literal, sincere, etc., use clearly
intends either A or B but not both. Thus the speaker cannot respond. 'I don't
know' to the query 'Do you mean A, or B? ' We may attempt to formally represent
this intuition by designing an interpreting function for SFs which maps
the pretheoretically judged ambiguous ones onto a set containing non-
logically equivalent LFs. But the descriptive adequacy of the mapping is
only as good as is our pretheoretical intuition of ambiguity, and that
in fact is not very good.
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LANGUAGE UNIVERSALS IN LINGUISTIC ARGUMENTATION
James D. McCawley
University of Chicago
1. Introduction. 1 will begin this not very comprehensive survey
of the ways in which language universals have figured and/or ought to
have figured in linguistic argumentation by outlining certain assumptions
and prejudices that will color what I say below.
First, I take the position that all language universals are impli-
cational universals. Only under that assumption can one avoid arbitrary
decisions as to what will count as a language. Most work on language
universals has systematically ignored child language, written language,
sign language, nonnative language (pidgins, Roman Jakobson's English,
etc.), and the language of aphasics and schizophrenics. For example,
linguists happily accept the claim that all languages have nasal conso-
nants^ even though they are perfectly aware of languages that do not,
for example, American Sign Language. It is of course reasonable for
linguists to ignore ASL here: the universal relates to the vocal medium
of spoken languages. However, the irrelevance of ASL to some language
universals does not make it irrelevant to all discussion of language
universals— it clearly is relevant to discussions of universals of con-
stituent order or of semantic distinctions in the lexicon. If 'language'
is understood broadly and universals are taken to be implicational,
exclusion of any types of language from the domains of universals must
be for cause: the antecedent of the implicational universal must give
the grounds on which the particular varieties of language are to be
excluded (e.g., 'If the medium of expression of a language is vocal,
it will have nasal consonants, excludes ASL by virtue of its medium of
expression being nonvocal), and the linguist must attempt to state
universals in their greatest generality, i.e., by specifying as narrowly
as possible the conditions that would remove a variety of language from
the applicability of the putative universal.
Second, I wish to dissociate myself from an assumption that is so
popular among linguists that it is difficult to find anyone who disputes
it, namely the assumption that people who talk the same have the same
linguistic competence. I have recently been advocating (McCawley 1976a;
1977) a conception of language acquisition in which many details of
acquisition are random or are influenced by ephemeral details of one's
linguistic experience. Such a scheme for language acquisition need not
lead to gross inhomogeneity in a linguistic community, since there is
ample opportunity for revision of learning that has made the speaker
grossly divergent from his neighbors. Moreover, it is easy to think
of alternative linguistic rules and underlying forms that yield exactly
the same well-formedness data and exactly the same pairings of meaning
and expression; indeed, linguists are perpetually arguing about such
alternative analyses, e.g., the analysis in which the English regular
plural ending is /iz/ and a rule deletes its vowel under one set of
circumstances, versus the analysis in which the ending is /z/ and a
rule inserts a vowel under other circumstances. Maybe some people
have learned plurals the one way and other people the other way. The
assumption that all normal adult members of a linguistic community have
the same internalized analysis in such cases is gratuitous. In the
rare cases where linguists have looked for interpersonal variation in
language, they have generally found it. For example, Haber (1975)
reports that speakers who ostensible form English plurals the same way
give a broad range of responses on tasks requiring the formation of
plurals of novel words, with each speaker having his own ways of
dealing with novel plurals. There is also considerable individual
variation in the morphemic relations that speakers of English perceive,
as one can readily verify by asking one's friends whether pulley is
related to pull or tinsel to tin.
Third, and closely related to the last point, I claim conscien-
tious objector status in the ongoing war against 'excessive power' of
grammatical devices. We have all been taught to limit our descriptive
devices as tightly as possible, preferably to those that were good
enough for our scientific forefathers, since seemingly innocuous devices
may turn out to harbor within them the dread Turing machine. It has
accordingly become common for linguists to attempt to resolve disputes
among competing analyses by drafting sweeping restrictions on grammars
so as to give one of the competing analyses a legal monopoly. I will
argue below that many proposed language universals have served only to
allow linguists to construct cheap arguments for their favorite analyses
and that those arguments have given the illusion of significance only
because their alleged role in the war effort against 'excessive power'
has obscured important respects in which they are extremely implausible.
2. Universals as self-serving legislation. I will begin this
largely negative survey of the use of language universals in linguistic
argumentation by criticizing and recanting a couple of particularly bad
arguments that I have offered in earlier works. In McCawley (1973a),
I presented a number of arguments for treating vowel height in terms
of a single 3 or 4 valued feature rather than in terms of two binary
features such as Chomsky and Halle's (1968) [+ high] and [+ low]. The
bulk of my arguments were based on phenomena in which constant incre-
ments of height played a role, e.g., the raising of the first element
of a long vowel by one degree of height in eastern Finnish dialects and
the lowering of the second element of a long vowel by one degree in
certain Lappish dialects. I then introduced my final argument by saying
'What would give a really crushing case for the nonbinary proposal would
be to show some major restriction on rules which could be imposed under
the nonbinary proposal but not under the binary proposal' and proceeded
to discuss a supposed example of such a restriction: a requirement that
phonological rules have a unitary 'structural change', i.e., a restric-
tion excluding rules that specify changes in more than one feature
specification at a time. Under the binary proposal, that universal
would be violated by rules such as the Finnish and Lappish rules just
discussed, whereas a nonbinary alternative involved a unitary structural
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change:
(1) Eastern Finnish 'breaking'
a, binary version
-
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paper that I published under the title 'English as a VSO language'
(McCawley 1970). 3 I pointed out there that a number of transformations
require an additional step if they apply to SVG structures that is
unnecessary if they apply to VSO structures.^ For example, if theve-
insertion applies to an SVO structure, it must both move the underlying
subject into a postverbal position and insert there in subject position,
whereas if it applies to a VSO structure, it need only insert a there
before the subject (the underlying subject will remain in postverbal
position in surface structure, since only the first of the verb's sis-
ters is moved into preverbal position by the rule that yields the
surface SVO order)
:
(2) SVO there- Insertion
S
.' z\ ', -
VSO t^zere-insertion
S
a man in the garden
there
I ought to have argued against the SVO formulation of there-\nseTti.oxv
on the grounds that it misses a generalization: all rules that create a
new subject also demote the old subject to nonsubject status, and the SVO
formulation of t/igr-e-insertion makes the demotion of the old subject seem
like an added complication of the phenomenon rather than a predictable
side effect of the other part of the structural change. ^ What I did
instead was argue for the VSO formulation on the grounds that it allowed
one to enforce a universal restriction that transformations must have
unitary structural changes. Besides sharing the implausibility of its
phonological analogue, discussed above, this putative universal has the
further defect of committing one to an analysis of the passive that has
nothing to recommend it. As I pointed out in 'English as a VSO language',
the SVO version of passive requires an extra part to its structural
change that is unnecessary in the VSO version: not only must it move
the underlying subject into the i)i/-phrase but it must also move the
underlying postverbal NP into subject position. However, if Passive is
to have a unitary structural change, the markers of the passive (passive
be and the by) must not be inserted by the Passive transformation but
must be present as such in the input to Passive. Underlying structures
in which those elements are present have in fact been proposed widely
(an underlying by is proposed in Chomsky 1965 and assumed in Chomsky's
subsequent works; an underlying be is adopted in Hasegawa 1968, Lakoff
1971, and, I am ashamed to say, McCawley 1970). However, the arguments
that have been given for such underlying structures rest on preposterous
premises, particularly the assumption that transformations cannot 'build
structure'. Thus, for example, the argument that Chomsky (1965) seemed
to find the weightiest for having passive by present in deep structure is
that, given his policy on where node labels come from (namely that they
must be the labels of corresponding deep structure nodes) , that is the
only way he can get the fci/-phrase to be a prepositional phrase or even
a syntactic constituent. What little substance these arguments might
have vanishes if one adopts Anderson's (1976) position that principles of
syntactic category assignment relate not just to deep structure but to
all stages of a derivation (e.g., anything consisting of a preposition
and a NP is a PP, regardless of what it is derived from) and the further
position that transformations apply so as to achieve conformity with the
language's surface target configurations.^
Another highly dubious universal that has been pressed into service
in arguments for linguistic analyses that allow that universal to be
enforced is the putative universal that no quantifiers need be used in
formulating rules. For example, in Bach's (1970) otherwise superbly
argued case for deriving the surface SOV word order of Amharic from an
underlying VSO order, the following argument appears. In Amharic,
restrictive relative clauses precede the head noun and are marked by a
prefix yd- on the final verb of the relative clause. Bach maintains
(and let us grant him these assumptions, since it is a different point
of the argument that I wish to attack) that, regardless of whether
Amharic has underlying VSO, SVO, or SOV word order, in deep structure
the relative clause must precede the noun as it does in surface struc-
ture (a reasonable assumption) and i/9- must precede the relative clause
(a not so reasonable assumption) .7 Bach notes that VSO underlying
order allows one to formulate the yd- attachment rule without the use
of quantifiers (its structural description is simply [X J/9 V Y], whereas
with SOV word order the structural description of yd- attachment must
make use of a quantifier to specify that the material after the verb to
which yd- is attached contains no verb, i.e., that yd- is attached to
the last verb (the last verb in SOV order being, of course, the first
verb in VSO order). (3) gives a sample derivation according to Bach's
preferred analysis:
betV NP bet NP Y
yd- y ato kdbbddd ato kdbbddd yd ndbbdrdw
ndbbdr
ndbbdr 'The house that Mr. K9bb9d9 had'
A restriction excluding rules whose formulations include quantifiers
would of course significantly narrow the class of possible grammars.
However, it would narrow the class to such an extent as to make language
impoverished in comparison with other cognitive domains, such as visual
perception. A condition such as 'where X contains no V' in a rule with
a structural description [... X V Y] or [Y V X ...] amounts to an instruc-
tion to match the symbol V to the first V or the last V in the given
domain. The sketches of perceptual mechanisms given in Miller and
Johnson-Laird (1976) involve wide reliance on searches through structured
domains, especially searches for the first or last element that meets a
given condition. While I am in no position here to propose any specific
integration of psychological mechanisms in perception and in language use,
I hold that it is implausible to suggest that organizational features that
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figure widely in perception and in nonlinguistic knowledge are systematic-
ally excluded from language.
3. Universals and underlying constituent order. A much more promis-
ing use of language universals in argumentation, one also illustrated in
Bach's Amharic paper, is the use of implicational universals and tenden-
cies as the basis for assigning to languages that appear to violate the
universals an underlying order different from their surface order. For
example. Bach makes much of the atypical status of Amharic among surface
SOV languages, e.g., that it has more propositions that postpositions
and that it has forwards Gapping. Amharic can be made less of an anomaly
by treating it as having VSO word order for the bulk of its syntax (and
thus acting like a VSO language with regard to most of its syntactic
rules), with only relatively superficial syntactic rules presupposing
an SOV order that is derived from VSO order by a transformation moving
each verb to the end of its clause.
I have one serious objection to such invocations of language univer-
sals in establishing deep constituent orders, namely that they involve a
gratuitous assumption that there ts^ a deep constituent order. I attribute
the prevalence of that gratuitous assumption to two principal causes:
first, a hasty and mistaken judgement that unordered structures are out-
landish abominations (this judgement may in many instances be a symptom
of DENDROPHOBIA, a malady that is manifested in a tendency to think in
terms of strings rather than of trees whenever possible, and at times
even when not possible; Chomsky appears to suffer from chronic congenital
dendrophobia) , and second, a mistaken application of Postal's (1968)
'naturalness principle', according to which underlying linguistic struc-
tures have the same formal nature as superficial structures. Postal's
principle provides a rationale for taking underlying forms of morphemes
to be composed of segments and for taking those segments to be composed
of specifications of values for features that also occur in surface
phonology, rather than, say, having underlying segments be indivisible
units or involve 'abstract' features that have no phonetic correlates.
However, the principle only excludes units and structural characteristics
that do not figure in superficial linguistic structure— it does not
require that all the units and structural characteristics found in
superficial structures also occur at deeper levels of linguistic struc-
ture. Thus, for example, the principle does not rule out underlying
forms in which some or all phonological segments are unspecified with
regard to voicing or length. In McCawley (1976b) , I have argued that
constituents of underlying syntactic structures must be allowed to be
unspecified for morphological characteristics (such as person, number,
case, or def initeness) that they must have determinate specifications
for in surface structure. For example, I argued that underlying struc-
tures must be allowed in English in which nouns are indeterminate with
regard to number, in view of the fact that while there is as much reason
to derive (4a) by conjunction reduction from conjoined NP's as there is
to employ conjunction reduction in anything else, corresponding NP's in
which conjunction reduction has not applied must be determinate as to
whether each of the two composers wrote one or more than one quartet:
(4) a. The quartets of Eierkopf and Misthaufen
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b. The quartet (s) of Eierkopf and the quartet(s) of Misthaufen
By all applicable tests for ambiguity, (4a) is unspecified rather than
ambiguous as to whether each composer wrote more than one quartet, and
thus the nouns in the structure to which conjunction reduction applies
to derive (4a) must be unspecified for number, though if conjunction
reduction does not apply there must be a number specification on each
noun. Postal's naturalness condition, as I understand it, would not
exclude an underlying structure for (4a) in which both conjuncts are
unspecified for number. Nor would it exclude analyses involving under-
lying structures that are unspecified for anything else for which surface
structures are determinate, such as, in particular, constituent order.
Thus, a fair proportion of arguments that have been offered for
underlying word orders different from surface word order are at best
arguments that if the language has an underlying word order at all, it
is the one that the argument claims to give support to. Accordingly,
there is a serious question as to what claims about underlying word or
order can be justified without reliance on the gratuitous assumption that
there is one, and the concomitant question of whether proposed implica-
tional universals about word order can be given interpretations that will
make them applicable to underlying structures that in some cases are
wholly or partially unordered. I will make no attempt to answer the
latter question here, though I commend it to the attention of my fellow
linguists. On the former question, the best I can do at the moment is
to cite two reasonably clear cases, one of an argument for an underlying
word order different from surface order that is independent of the assump-
tion that there is an underlying word order, the other of a well-known
argument for a specific underlying word order for which an alternative
analysis is available that requires no linear order of constituents at
any level other than surface structure.
Of Bach's arguments for underlying VSO order in Amharic, the fol-
lowing are the strongest, in that it is difficult to attribute the
distrubution of the morphemes in question to anything other than the
underlying constituent order that Bach proposes. Bach argues that the
yd- relative clause marker and the yd- genitive marker are the same
morpheme, on the basis of a shared morphological idiosyncracy, namely
that both delete when preceded by a preposition. While yd- is prefixed
to the last verb of a relative clause, it is prefixed to the first word
of a genitive NP:
(5) yd-yohannis bet 'John's house'
[yd-tillik ^um] bet 'the house of a big chief
GEN-big chief house
This is predicted by Bach's proposed underlying word order as long as
his hypothesized relative clause reduction in genitive NP's (i.e.,
deletion of 'which . . . has', e.g., 'which John has' -> 'John's')
applies before i/3-attachment .^ After deletion of the hypothesized
'have' and before movement of the verb to the end of the relative
clause, the first word of the relative clause is the verb in the case
of a full relative clause, but is the first word of the genitive NP if
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the relative clause has been reduced to a genitive NP. Furthermore,
no factor other than word order appears to be shared by the words to
which 1/8- is attached; for example there is no generalization in terms
of the notion 'head', since while the verb can most plausibly be
regarded as the head of the full relative clause, the first word of
a multiword genitive NP is never the head of either the genitive NP
or the relative clause from which the genitive NP is derived. The
facts are exactly parallel for the definite accusative marker -n,
which is suffixed to the first word of a NP that begins with anything
other than a (full) relative clause but is suffixed to the last word
(the verb) of a relative clause that begins the NP:
(6) liju-n 'the child'
tilliku-n konjo lij 'the big beautiful child'
tillikinna konjo ydhondwi-n lij 'the child who is big and beautiful'
Under Bach's proposed analysis, the word to which -n is suffixed is the
word with which the NP begins after relative clause reduction but before
movement of the V to the end. Again, no alternative factor such as the
head/adjunct distinction provides any apparent basis for a generalization
as to what word gets the suffix.
On the other hand, the considerations that Koster (1974, 1975)
gives as grounds for analyzing Dutch as having SOV deep constituent
order can be reconciled with an analysis that agrees in essentials
with Roster's but makes no reference to constituent order in anything
but surface structure. In Dutch, adverbs and prepositional phrases
following the verb in a main clause can often occur in either order
(7a) , though when they precede the verb in a subordinate clause they
can occur in only one of the two orders (7b)
:
(7) a. Jan daaht tijdens de pauze aan zijn vader.
Jan daaht aan zijn vader tijdens de pauze.
'Jan thought of his father during the intermission'
b. Piet zei, dat Jan tijdens de pauze aan zijn vader daaht.
*Piet zei, dat Jan aan zijn vader tijdens de pauze daaht.
'Piet said that Jan thought of his father during the intermission'
Koster explains this odd fact on the basis of the possibility of these
elements following the verb in subordinate clauses. Specifically, either
or both may follow the verb, but when both do they are in the opposite
order to that which they exhibit when they precede the verb:
(8) Piet zei, dat Jan aan zijn vader daaht tijdens de pauze.
Piet zeiy dat Jan tijdens de pauze daaht aan zijn vader.
Piet zei, dat Jan daaht aan zijn vader tijdens de pauze.
"•'Piet zei, dat Jan daaht tijdens de pauze aan zijn vader.
With SOV deep constituent order, the facts about main clauses can be seen
as parallelling those about subordinate clauses: the second sentence in
(7a) arises not through permutation of the prepositional phrases but
through movement of one of them to the right of the (basically final)
verb, as in the first sentence of (8). Movement of the verb into second
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position then leaves the two prepositional phrases adjacent but in the
opposite of their original order.
However, the generalization that the word order possibilities in
main clauses reflect the possibility of putting material after the verb
in subordinate clauses can be incorporated into an analysis that involves
unordered constituents in all derivational stages but surface structure.
Suppose that, as in de Haan (1976) and in distinction to Koster, we
treat adverbial elements as sisters of their respective VP's and treat
the occurrence of tidLjens de pauze after the verb and the occurrence of
aan zijn voder after the verb as resulting from two different processes:
in the one case an analog to English adverb placement, allowing an adverb
to either precede or follow its sister VP, and in the other case an analog
to English heavy-NP-shif t , allowing a sufficiently 'heavy' daughter of a
VP node to appear at the end of that VP. In terms of Koster' s underlying
constituent order, the derivational possibilities could then be summed
up in the following diagram:
(9)
NP
Jan
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explanation purports to show why things are the way they are, i.e., to
show why some range of alternative states of affairs are not manifested.
Any purported explanation of linguistic phenomena thus carries with it
implications to the effect that certain types of language are impossible,
e.g., Koster's explanation of the Dutch facts implies the impossibility
of a language that allows the same possibilities as Dutch for word order
in subordinate clauses, but only allows adverbs in main clauses to occur
in an order that they could have if they preceded the verb in a subordi-
nate clause. Thus, the status of a putative linguistic explanation should
be regarded as shaky unless an appropriate cross-linguistic survey has
been done, in which languages sharing the factors allegedly responsible
for the given phenomena are investigated to determine whether they also
exhibit those phenomena.
Regrettably few supposed explanations of linguistic phenomena have
been accompanied by appropriate cross-linguistic data. One well-known
'explanatory' device that comes to grief when one tries t^ test it cross-
linguistically is rule schemata such as Chomsky's (1970) X -> Spec^ X,
which collapses several phrase-structure rules in a single formula (NP
-> Det ¥, 'Pred P' -> Aux VP, AP -> Degree T) . The claim that language
is acquired in terms of such rule schemata supposedly explains the fact
that determiners, auxiliaries, and degree expressions in English all
occur to the left of their heads. If the notation (as part of a language-
acquisition faculty) provides a real explanation of that fact, then a
cross-linguistic survey should reveal a tendency for determiners, auxil-
iaries, and degree expressions all to occur on the same side of their
heads (i.e., either all before the head or all after the head). There
is in fact no such correlation. While there are many languages in which
determiners precede nouns and auxiliary verbs precede main verbs, as in
English, there are also many languages where determiners precede nouns
and auxiliary verbs follow main verbs (for example, Japanese and Turkish)
and many languages where determiners follow nouns and auxiliary verbs
precede main verbs (for example, Malay and Swahili) , but there are few
languages in which determiners follow nouns and auxiliary verbs follow
main verbs (Somali is one such language) . This suggests that what Chom-
sky's schema supposedly explains is not really a 'fact' but a conjunction
of several unrelated facts that by accident share similarities.
One exemplary instance in which a cross-linguistic survey is used
to verify an explanation of language-particular facts is provided by
Cole (1974). Cole disputes Postal's (1972) claim that the question (10a)
and the relative clause in (10b) are bad for the same reason, namely that
an item is moved over something coref erential to it:
(10) a. *Who-i^ did the claim that he^^ is a fraud surprise?
b. *The man who^ the claim that he^^ is a fraud surprised has
left town.
Cole maintains that (10a) is ungrammatical because its derivation involves
a stage in which there is backwards pronominalization with indefinite
antecedent and is thus ungrammatical for the same reason as are such
examples as (11)
:
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(11) *The claim that he^ was a fraud surprised
member 1 of the
:tee
{
someone £•
every l
committ*
That cannot be the reason for the ungrammaticality of (10b) , since
relative pronouns are presumably definite and thus at no stage of the
derivation of (10b) is there backwards pronominalization with an indefi-
nite antecedent. Cole proposes to account for the ungrammaticality of
(10b) by invocation of a device that linguists have tended to reject
out of hand as a cop-out and a failure to capture a generalization,
namely a 'rule of analogy' whereby relative clauses like that of (10b)
are ungrammatical simply by virtue of their looking like ungrammatical
questions. Indeed, if only facts about the variety of English treated
by Postal are considered, it is hard to see how any support for Cole's
analysis could be found. However, Cole's proposal carries with it
cross-linguistic implications that Cole proceeded to investigate and
which yielded extremely solid support for his analysis. Specifically,
if Cole is correct as to what is responsible for the ungrammaticality
of (10b) , then in languages that have WH-movement and do not allow back-
wards pronominalization with indefinite antecedent, sentences like (10a)
should always be bad, but sentences like (10b) should be bad only if the
language provides a basis for the analogy to which Cole attributes the
ungrammaticality of (10b), i.e. analogs to (10b) should be good in lan-
guages in which relative clauses do not look like questions (and thus,
all such languages should provide counterexamples to Postal's putative
explanation of the English facts) , whereas they may be bad in languages
whose relative clauses do look like questions (though they need not be
bad in all such languages— the fact that a language provides the basis
for a given analogical rule does not imply that the language must have
the rule). And in fact, in languages whose relative clauses do not look
like questions, e.g., German and Chinese, relative clauses like that of
(10b) are good. Moreover, the split does not go along genetic lines,
e.g., English behaves like French and unlike German.
5. The cleansing power of universality. The most common responses
to embarassing facts have generally been to ignore them and to dispute
them. In recent years a third response has in certain linguistic circles
come to rival those two responses in popularity, namely the response of
claiming that the embarassing facts are universal. This ploy, which
might be summed up in the slogan 'Make the dirty stuff universal' is
illustrated by the following passages:
(12) 'Notice that if the filter in question belongs to U[niversal]
G[ranmiar], then its proper formulation is irrelevant to the
theory of filters; that is, it will have no bearing on the
question of the proper format for presenting filters and
restrictions on possible filters'. (Chomsky and Lasnik 1977:
451) 'Notice, incidentally, that this conclusion [that the
Specified Subject Condition requires a formulation in terms
of the semantic notion of 'Agent' rather than the syntactic
notion of 'Subject'], if correct, would not affect the hypo-
thesis that transformations do not refer to semantic relations
but only to bracketing of phrase markers (see the opening
discussion) even if the semantic notion of 'agency' plays a
role in determining the applicability of transformation'.
(Chomsky 1973:124)
Chomsky (both solo and with Lasnik) is willing to allow the applicability
of transformations to depend on nonsyntactic factors and is willing to
admit filters of grossly different types from those countenanced by the
'theory of filters' that he promises to develop, just as long as the
otherwise offensive conditions and filters are universal.
I take Chomsky at his word when he suggests elsewhere that language
universals are genetically determined. Note, though, that both universal
characteristics within a species and individual variation involve genetic
determination. Typically, gross anatomical structures are universal but
fine details of structure are subject to genetically determined individual
variation, e.g., all normal human beings have two arms involving humerus,
ulna, and radius, connected to hands having the standard numbers and
arrangement of carpals, metacarpals, and phalanges, but on the other hand
no two persons have the same fingerprints. Williams (1956) provides a
useful survey of details of human anatomy in which there is considerable
genetically determined individual variation, e.g., the shape, capacity,
and location of the stomach. The moral to be drawn from these considera-
tions is that genetically determined universals provide loci for individual
variation, even of genetically determined individual variation, and no
realm of structure can be regarded as immune to individual variation in
its finer details. I conclude from this that if biology is as deeply
implicated in language as Chomsky says it is, then individual variation
(and presumably also differences between populations) should be possible
in any realm of linguistic structure. If, for example, Chomsky's sugges-
tion is correct that a version of the Specified Subject Condition involving
the notion 'agent' is universal and if that universal is genetically
determined, then it would be surprising not to find variation among
individuals or between populations as to its fine details, e.g., as to
how broadly 'agent' must be interpreted.
6. Benediction. In this paper, I have suggested at several points
that there may be more diversity in language than linguists generally allow
for. This does not mean that there are fewer interesting linguistic
universals than linguists have generally suggested there are or that there
is any conflict between the search for universals and the search for diver-
sity. Indeed, the characteristic of language universals that I regard as
most valuable is that they make it possible for the linguist to focus his
attention in such a way as to identify specific types of diversity that
would otherwise go unnoticed.
For expository purposes, I ignore here a couple of languages
indigenous to the state of Washington that may in fact be real counter-
examples to this claim.
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Compare here the fact that a putative universal that all grammars
must contain an even number of rules could be enforced simply by adopting
a policy of adding a vacuous rule to any grammar that has an odd number
of rules.
It could more appropriately have been called 'English as not an
SVO language' : the bulk of the arguments were at best arguments that
certain rules applied to structures in which the subject and the remaining
material were not on opposite sides of the verb; thus the arguments were
consistent with SOV order. The one argument that was specifically directed
towards establishing verb-initial order does not provide a clear case for
that conclusion (see McCawley 1973b: 226-7 for details).
'SOV structures' instead; cf. n. 3.
This is in fact the insight that lies at the bottom of the relational
grammar treatment of relation-changing transformations; see Perlmutter and
Postal (1977).
Under this position, as contrasted with the 'structure preserving'
framework of Emonds (1976), there can be gross discrepancies between the
allowable deep structure configurations and the allowable surface con-
figurations. My principal criticism of Emonds' approach is that it rests
on a gratuitous assumption that language-particular combinatoric restric-
tions (= 'base rules') relate to deep structures rather than e.g., to
surface structures and that it thus forces one to adopt highly specific
and otherwise unmotivated deep structures in order to account for phenomena
to which, as far as I can see, deep structure is irrelevant. For example,
the phenomenon of Affix-hopping is a reflection of the morphological fact
that English verbal affixes are suffixes. Emonds' position requires him to
set up deep structures containing empty affix positions so that Affix hop-
ping can be structure-preserving, which, by elimination, it must be in his
rule typology. (I should, by the way, say 'the phenomena of Affix-hopping',
in view of Akmajian and Wasow's (1975) demonstration that -en and -ing must
be attached to verbs by a rule that applies under different conditions and
at a different stage of derivations than the rule that attaches tenses to
verbs.)
Bach in this argument displays the common tendency of transformational
grammarians to place disproportionately heavy emphasis on whether an affix
is a prefix or a suffix. I maintain that the status of a bound morpheme
as a prefix or suffix is a matter of its morphology rather than of syntax
and that syntactic rules should be neutral as to whether morphemes that
they introduce or move are prefixes or suffixes: the rule should attach
the bound morpheme to the relevant item, with its morphology determining
whether it emerges as a left sister of a right sister of the item to which
it is attached. Indeed, while Bach underplays the suffix -n, to be dis-
cussed below, and concentrates instead on the prefix zy9-,the facts about
-n provide an even solider argument for underlying verb-first order, since
the argument about -n does not rest on a possibly vulnerable claim of
morphemic identity the way that the argument about i/9- (as we will see in
section 3) does.
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Note, incidentally, that a suffix may be positioned in terms of the
beginning of a complex constituent with which it is combined. For example,
Latin -que 'and' is suffixed to the first word of the conjunct in which it
appears, as in senatus populusque romanus 'the senate and the Roman people'.
This fact provides one of several arguments that
-que, like et, basically
precedes the conjunct but is adjoined to the immediately adjacent word of
that conjunct but is adjoined to the immediately adjacent word of that con-
junct and, by virtue of its morphological status as a suffix, appears at
the end of that word.
It is of course ambiguous with respect to another distinction, that
between individual authorship (cf . the operas of Verdi and Puoaini) and
joint authorship (cf. the operettas of Gilbert and Sullivan) . This ambi-
guity is manifested more clearly in the NP the operas of Verdi and Boito.
9
This condition need not involve any extrinsic rule ordering: it is
equivalent to the condition that i/3- must appear on a word that appears
overtly in the relative clause.
This sketch is an oversimplification, e.g., I have not taken up word
order in questions. The rule of Verb-raising (Evers 1975), which adjoins
a nonfinite verb to the next higher verb, requires some complication in
this analysis, since the lower verb must become a right sister of the higher
verb. This means that if the imposition of a word order is to be postponed
until surface structure, the word order rules must have access to informa-
tion distinguishing the roles of the two sister verbs, e.g., identification
of one of them as head and the other as adjunct.
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LINGUISTICS IS ABOUT LANGUAGES
Bernard Comrie
University of Southern California
The claim that linguistics is about languages might seem, at
first sight, to be a truism, following from the etymology of the word
linguistics. At the time when I was a graduate student, however, in the
late sixties and early seventies, for a student of linguistics to be inter-
ested in languages was almost a vice. The then-prevalent paradigm within
transformational-generative syntax, though ostensibly interested in
language universals, argued that the best way to study language universals,
to hypothesize and test claims about language universals, was via the
detailed study of a single language. For rather obvious practical and
social reasons, this one language was usually English.
The most cogent argumentation in favor of this approach to language
universals was given by Noam Chomsky, and the following may serve as a very
much abbreviated, but I believe essentially correct, account of this argu-
mentation. Linguists working within this paradigm were not unaware of the
apparent conflict between 'language universals' and 'detailed work on a
single language'. Chomsky's view of language universals was, and is,
intimately connected with his views on innate ideas, i.e. species-specific
genetically transmitted abstract structural properties that severely
delimit the class of possible languages that human beings can learn natur-
ally. There is thus an isomorphism between language universals and innate
ideas. Chomsky claims that these innate ideas are extremely abstract in
nature, relating to properties that are not typically manifested directly
in the surface structures of sentences. Thus the study of language univer-
sals would involve, at least as a first step, the construction of the
appropriate set of abstract principles and, since these are not readily
observable in surface structure, this must depend on detailed in-depth
study of a limited area: broader, but more superficial, investigation
would probably fail to uncover the very abstract generalizations in which
transformational grammarians were typically interested.
Moreover, it was claimed, these abstract principles are not for the
most part expected, i.e. not the sort of restrictions one would expect a
priori to find in a communication system. This led to a parallel argument
justifying the equation of abstract principles hypothesized on the basis
of detailed work on a single language and language universals/innate ideas.
If a given structural principle is sufficiently abstract, i.e. sufficiently
removed from generalizations that can be made directly about the surface
data, then it is unclear, so the claim would go, how the child could induce
such generalizations from the data with which he is presented as a first-
language learner. In this sense, the abstract generalizations would be
unlearnable, therefore, if they exist, they must be innate. Since children
are able to learn equally well whatever human language is spoken in their
community, these innate ideas must be common to all humans, whence universal.
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In this lecture, I wish not to attack directly the bases of this line
of argument, but rather to present, in summary form, some recent pieces of
research in language universals which, it seems to me, argue strongly for
a very different methodology, since they point to claims about language
universals that can only be verified or disconfirmed by examining data
from a wide range of languages. Several of the pieces of research dis-
cussed are my own, although I have also included other research, in
particular word order typology. Although most of the pieces of research
in question relate to problems rather different from those posed during
the heyday of transformational-generative grammar, some of them are very
similar to such problems, for instance the discussion of nominalizations
in section 3. The discussion of individual points is necessarily very
brief in this lecture, although I have included references to more detailed
treatments.
1. Word Order Typology. Starting with the publication of Joseph H.
Greenberg's paper on word order typology (Greenberg 1966), one topic that
has been of great interest to linguists working on language universals
has been word order typology. In particular, it seemed at one time that
of the six logically possible ways of ordering the elements Subject,
Object, and Verb of a sentence (as in (1)), certain did not occur in the
languages of the world, i.e. it might be possible to establish a language
universal restricting the possible orderings of S, 0, and V admissible in
a human language.
(1) (a) SOV (b) SVO (c) VSO
(d) VOS (e) OVS (f) OSV
Greenberg (1966) noted that almost all human languages have as their
basic word order one of the first three types listed in (1), i.e. either
SOV (like Japanese and Turkish) or SVO (like English and Swahili) or VSO
(like Welsh and Classical Arabic); of these three, VSO is itself consid-
erably rarer than the first two. Greenberg, as always being careful in
his formulation of language universals, did not exclude the possibility of
types (d)-(f), and indeed cited some languages that had been claimed in
the literature to have these word orders. However, it did seem that some
kind of generalization was lurking among these data, suggesting a univer-
sal of the type: 'in basic word order, subjects always precede objects'.
Since the languages cited by Greenberg as possible exceptions to this
generalization often turned out, on closer inspection, not to be exceptions
—often in the sense that it was simply difficult or impossible to tell
what their basic word order is
—
, this putative universal soon gained
widespread acceptance.
Subsequent work on a variety of languages, however, reduced the class
of non-occurring basic word-order types. The investigation of Malagasy
syntax carried out in greatest detail by Edward L. Keenan suggested that
Malagasy has as its basic word order VOS, i.e. type (d) of (1), as in the
following example:
(2) nahita ny mpianatra ny vehivavy.
saw the student the woman
'the woman saw the student' (not: 'the student saw the woman')
Although some attempts were made to exclude the relevance of Malagasy and
other VOS languages, for instance by claiming that the clause-final noun
phrase is a topic rather than a subject, these objections were success-
fully countered by Keenan (1976) , which establishes that Malagasy does
indubitably have a noun phrase with the range of properties one expects
a subject to have, and which indubitably occurs sentence-finally in basic
word order.
At this stage, with types (a)-(d) attested, there still remained a
possible generalization concerning word order, namely: 'in basic word
order, the object is never initial', since this is the single feature
separating (a)-(d) from (e)-(f). The question that thus arises is whether
or not there exist object-initial languages. Again, only work being car-
ried out on a wide range of languages enabled an answer to be given to
this question. Desmond C. Derbyshire, in answer to a polemical statement
by Geoffrey K. Pullum to the effect that object-initial languages do not
exist, suggested that Hixkaryana, a Carib language of Brazil, is an OVS
language, as illustrated in:
(3) toto yonoye kamara.
man he-ate-him jaguar
'the jaguar ate the man' (not: 'the man ate the jaguar')
Detailed justification of this claim was presented subsequently in Derby-
shire (1977), countering possible arguments that OVS is a nonbasic order
in Hixkaryana. Further collaboration between Pullum and Derbyshire, con-
centrating on languages of the Amazon basin, suggests that the sixth
logical possibility may well also be attested, for instance in Apurina,
as in example (4) (Pullum & Derbyshire 1978):
(4) kema Pedro na- nika.
tapir Pedro NEG ate
'Pedro didn't eat the tapir' (not: 'the tapir didn't eat Pedro')
What this research on word order typology, covering a range of lan-
guages, shows is that a certain putative universal is in fact untenable,
the universal being either that subjects must precede objects, or that
objects may not be initial. Either of these universals could, inciden-
tally, have been given a ready psychological interpretation, for instance
in terms of the primacy of agents over patients in the conceptualization
of situations. Although the strong form of the universal proves to be
untenable, there is still a weaker version that may be valid, namely that
basic word order in languages tends to follow the following principles :
(i) subjects tend to occur sentence-initially; (ii) subjects tend to
precede objects. As tendencies (statistical universals), these two
principles are quite salient.
2. Ergativity. One problem that has long intrigued linguists
interested in syntactic systems different from those found in the majority
of European languages is the problem of ergativity. In its original sense,
the term ergative system refers to a system of noun phrase case-marking
where one case (absolutive) is used for both intransitive subject and
transitive direct object, whereas another case (ergative) is used for the
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subject of a transitive verb, as in the following examples from the Austra-
lian language Dyirbal (Dixon 1972)
:
(5) yava baninju.
raan-ABS came-here
' the man came here
'
(6) djugumbil baninju.
woman-ABS came-here
'the woman came here'
(7) djugumbil yara-qgu batgan.
woman-ABS man ERG hit
'the man hit the woman'
The ergative (or, more fully, ergative-absolutive) case-marking system
differs from that found in most European languages that have case-marking
of noun phrases, where the same case (nominative) is used for both intran-
sitive and transitive subjects, and a different case (accusative) for
direct objects. Even in English, where little case-marking of noun
phrases remains, this system (nominative-accusative, or simply: accusa-
tive) remains for pronouns:
(8) he (NOM) oame here.
(9) she (NOM) aame here.
(10) he (NOM) hit her (ACC)
.
Although the existence of ergativity as a morphological phenomenon
has been known since the late nineteenth century, its implications for the
rest of the syntactic structure of languages with this morphological
system has only recently begun to be understood. In earlier work, quite
far-reaching hypotheses were built upon the morphological facts, such as
the claim that the notion of subject is quite irrelevant to ergative
languages, or the claim that speakers of ergative languages have a quite
different way of thinking from speakers of accusative languages (or even
that the former are incapable of thinking properly at all) ! VThen detailed
work was begun on the syntax of languages with morphological ergativity,
mainly from the middle of the twentieth century, it seemed at first that
the syntax of these languages did not reilect the morphological opposi-
tion absolutive/ergative, but rather followed a nominative/accusative
(subject/direct object) opposition as in nominative-accusative languages.
Thus in such languages as Basque, Georgian, and Hindi, a number of syn-
tactic processes refer to the subject of a sentence, and the reference of
the term subject of the sentence is essentially the same as in English or
Latin, although in ergative languages this goes against the morphology
of noun phrases. Thus ergativity appeared to be a purely morphological
quirk of certain languages.
The publication of R. M. W. Dixon's grammar of Dyirbal, however,
shattered this complacent view (Dixon 1972) . This was the first detailed
syntactic account to be published of an Australian aboriginal language.
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and from this account it emerged that, where English (and Basque) have a
range of rules referring to subjects (transitive and intransitive),
Dyirbal has a range of rules referring to absolutives (i.e. intransitive
subjects and direct objects, but not transitive subjects), i.e. that in
Dyirbal the syntax mirrors the ergative morphology. As an illustrative
example, I shall use coordination reduction. In both English and Dyirbal,
if two clauses contain an identical noun phrase, it is sometimes possible
to delete the occurrence of this noun phrase in the second clause (in
English, joining with a conjunction, e.g. and; in Dyirbal, usually by
simple juxtaposition) . Both languages have a syntactic condition on this
deletion, but, as will be seen from examples (11)-(12), the condition is
different in the two languages:
(11) the man hit the woman and (sc. he/*she) came here.
(12) djugumbil yara-^gu balgan, baninju.
woman-ABS man ERG hit came-here
'the man hit the woman and she/*he came here'
In English, if one conjoins a transitive sentence and an intransitive
sentence, then the subject of the intransitive sentence may be deleted if
it is coreferential with the subject of the preceding transitive sentence;
thus the omitted subject of the second clause of (11) must be interpreted
as the man, not as the woman. In Dyirbal, on the other hand, if one con-
joins a transitive sentence and an intransitive sentence, then the intran-
sitive subject of the second clause may be deleted if it is coreferential
with the object of the first clause, i.e. with the noun phrase in the
absolutive case. Thus in example (12), the omitted subject of the second
clause must be interpreted as the woman, and cannot be interpreted as the
man, any more than the English sentence the man hit the woman and came
here can be given the interpretation 'the man hit the woman and she came
here'
.
On the basis of this general difference between English and Dyirbal
syntax, Dixon at first hypothesized that the syntax of a given language
would be either entirely on a nominative-accusative basis (as in English)
or entirely on an ergative-absolutive basis (as in Dyirbal) , with no
possibility of combining the two systems within a single language. How-
ever, further work on ergative languages—including work by Dixon himself
on other Australian languages— showed this strict dichotomy to be unten-
able. This may be illustrated by some examples from Yidinj , another
Australian language, which happens to be a geographic neighbor of Dyirbal,
although it is very different from Dyirbal in a number of respects (Dixon
1977). Case-marking of noun phrases in Yidinj is on an ergative-
absolutive basis, as can be seen in the following examples:
(13) wagu:d4a mar^gainj
man-ABS laughed
' the man laughed
'
(14) bunsa marjga:nj.
woman-ABS laughed
'the woman laughed'
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(15) bunja:r] wagu:dja wiira:nj.
woman-ERG man-ABS slapped
'the woman slapped the man'
There are, however, some exceptions to this generalization. In particular,
personal pronouns have rather a nominative-accusative case-marking system:
(16) r)aju mar)ga:nj.
I-NOM laughed
'I laughed'
(17) njuntu mar^gacnj.
you-NOM laughed
'you laughed'
(18) oaju njuninj wura.'nj.
I-NOM you-ACC slapped
'I slapped you'
(In Dyirbal too, pronouns have a nominative-accusative case-marking
system, but syntactically they behave exactly like other noun phrases, i.e.
according to the ergative-absolutive system.) As in English and Dyirbal,
there is a syntactic restriction on deletion of noun phrases in coordi-
nate constructions in Yidinj
:
(19) bunja:r) wagu:dja wura:nj , mar\ga:nj.
woman-ERG man-ABS slapped laughed
'the woman slapped the man, and he laughed'
(20) QajM njuninj wura:nj, maqga:nj.
I-NOM you-ACC slapped laughed
'I slapped you, and I laughed'
Examples (19) and (20) differ in that the former has nonpronominal noun
phrases (ergative case-marking) , while the latter has pronouns (accusa-
tive case-marking). VJhat is interesting, however, is that the syntactic
possibilities for deletion exactly mirror the case-marking system: in
(19), the omitted intransitive subject is interpreted as coreferential
with the absolutive direct object of the first clause (as in Dyirbal),
whereas in (20) the omitted intransitive subject is interpreted as corefer-
ential with the nominative subject of the first clause (as in English).
In other words, Yidinj combines aspects of both accusative syntax and
ergative syntax within the one language (and indeed within the one con-
struction—coordination reduction) . Thus a strict dichotomy between
languages with ergative syntax and languages with accusative syntax is
untenable. Indeed, one finds that even in a radically ergative language
like Dyirbal there are traces of accusativity (case-marking of pronouns;
deletion of the addressee in imperatives, where deletion may be of the
second person subject, intransitive or transitive), while radically
accusative languages like English have traces of ergativity (such as the
suffix
-ee, forming nouns that refer to intransitive subjects, e.g.
esaapee 'one who has escaped' or objects of transitive verbs, e.g.
emptoyee 'one whom someone else employs').
The work described in this section on ergativity in a range of
languages might seem to have been essentially negative in terms of estab-
lishing language universals, since at each stage a stronger hypothesis
has had to be replaced by a weaker one: the first hypothesis was that
all languages are syntactically nominative-accusative; the second that
each language is either completely nominative-accusative or completely
ergative-absolutive in syntax; the third that a given language can combine
aspects of accusativity with aspects of ergativity, i.e. essentially the
null-hypothesis with regard to ergativity. However, more recent work
on how aspects of accusativity are combined with aspects of ergativity
suggests that, once one recognizes the existence of 'split ergativity' of
this kind, there are several generalizations that can be made concerning
the possibilities for combining ergativity and accusativity. For instance,
if the case-marking system of a language is split by the pronominal/
nonpronominal distinction, then it is always the pronouns that have accu-
sative case-marking while other noun phrases have ergative case-marking.
If some morphological or syntactic feature is split by tense or aspect,
then it is always the case that the past/perfective/perfect tense/aspect
correlates with ergativity while the nonpast/imperfective/nonperfect
tense/aspect correlates with accusativity. These and other generaliza-
tions, which significantly reduce the range of possible human languages,
are discussed in greater detail in, for instance, Comrie (1978b).
3. Nominalizations . From the very inception of transformational-
generative grammar, one construction that has attracted widespread
attention was the action nominal, as in English the enemy's rapid destruc-
tion of the village, because of the apparent discrepancy between surface
syntactic structure and deep syntactic structure. In surface structure,
such constructions are clearly noun phrases: the head constituent
destruction is a noun, and its attributes are genitives (in English,
prenominal with 's or postnominal with of) and adjectives. More
abstractly, however, such action nominals must be related to sentences
like the enemy rapidly destroyed the village, despite the differences in
surface structure: in the sentence, we have a verb with arguments in
the nominative and accusative (in English, distinguished only for some
pronouns), and qualified by an adverb (e.g. rapidly) rather than an
adjective (e.g. rapid). Early transformational work concentrated on the
parallels between action nominals and sentences, deriving both from the
same, essentially sentential, deep structure. It was Noam Chomsky himself
who suggested abandoning this transformational analysis for action nomi-
nals, pointing out that previous work had neglected the fact that the
internal syntactic structure of an action nominal exactly parallels that
of other noun phrases, a fact ignored, or treated as accidental, by the
transformational approach to this construction (Chomsky 1970). Under
Chomsky's revised analysis, action nominals would have throughout their
derivation the internal syntactic structure of noun phrases, and there
would be no question of transforming sentential syntactic structure into
nominal syntactic structure.
A corollary of this revision is that there should be a rigid distinc-
tion between sentential syntax and nominal syntax, since Chomsky's
proposal rests on the assumption that action nominals should either have
the internal structure of noun phrases in toto, throughout the derivation.
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or (as is indeed the case in some languages) that they should have the
syntax of sentences in toto, throughout the derivation. In a more wide-
ranging study of action nominals in a variety of languages, I came to
the conclusion that, despite some initial plausibility, this consequence
of Chomsky's analysis is not tenable, which in turn calls into question
the motivation for his analysis in English (Comrie 1976).
If Chomsky's analysis were correct, then one would expect that where
languages differ in the internal structure of noun phrases, they would
differ in the same way in the internal structure of action nominals, even
where they do not differ in basic sentence structure. There are indeed
examples of this situation. In English, the sentences and action nominals
(21)- (24) are all possible; note that none of the nominals violates the
general restriction that a head noun may have up to one prenominal geni-
tive attribute (usually in 's) and up to one postnominal genitive
attribute (with of)—both may also occur simultaneously:
(21) the enemy destroyed the village.
(22) the enemy's destruction of the village
(23) the village was destroyed by the enemy.
(24) the village's destruction by the enemy
In Russian, the basic sentence structure is the same, at least in basic
word order, with the addition that subject and direct object are usually
distinguished by the nominative/accusative case distinction:
(25) vrag razrusil derevnju.
enemy-NOM destroyed village-ACC
'the enemy destroyed the village'
(26) derevnja by la razrusena vragom.
village-NOM was destroyed enemy- INSTR
'the village was destroyed by the enemy'
With action nominals, Russian has in common with English the general rule
that both 'subject' and 'direct object' of an action nominal appear in the
genitive, e.g. prij'ezd pojezda 'the arrival of the train' (pojezda is
genitive of pojezd 'train'), razrusenije derevni 'the destruction of the
village'. However, Russian does not, in general, share with English the
possibility of having distinct prenominal and postnominal genitive attri-
butes: Russian has only one genitive position, which is usually post-
nominal. Chomsky's account of action nominals would thus predict that
Russian should have no literal translation of English example (22) {the
enemy's destruction of the village), although it should have a literal
translation of (24) {the village's destruction by the enemy), involving
only one genitive. This prediction is in fact borne out:
(27) *razrusenije derevni vraga
destruction village-GEN enemy-GEN
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(28) razrusenij'e derevni vragom
destruction village-GEN enemy-INSTR
(Example (27) is grammatical in the sense 'the destruction of the enemy's
village', with stacked genitives, though this is irrelevant to the present
issue.
)
Unfortunately for Chomsky's approach, there are other languages
where the parallelism between noun phrase and action nominal syntax does
not go through. One such language is Turkish. In Turkish sentences, the
subject appears in the nominative, the direct object (at least, if definite)
in the accusative, and the verb appears sentence-finally, agreeing with
the subject:
(29) Hasan mektuplar-z yaz -d%
Hasan-NOM letters ACC write PAST-3SG
'Hasan wrote the letters.'
In noun phrases which are not action nominals, there can be one genitive
attribute, which stands before the head noun; the head noun takes a posses-
sive suffix agreeing with the genitive:
(30) Hasan-zn haba -s^
Hasan GEN father his
'Hasan's father'
Turning now to the internal structure of action nominals in Turkish, we
observe that they have one feature in common with other noun phrases:
the 'subject' noun phrase stands in the genitive, not the nominative, and
the head noun takes the appropriate possessive suffix. However, the
'direct object' of the action nominal stands in the accusative, just as
if it were an argument of a verb:
(31) Hasan-tn mektuptar-t yaz -ma -st
Hasan GEN letters ACC write ACTNOM his
'Hasan's writing of the letters'
In Turkish, then, the action nominal combines features of sentential syntax
with features of nominal syntax, and there is no rigid distinction between
the two. In passing, we may note that the English construction often
called the gerundive nominal evinces a similar structure, at least in the
written language, since its subject takes the genitive ending 's, whereas
its object remains prepositionless:
(32) John's reading the book (surprised us all).
As with the discussion of ergativity in section 2, it might seem
that the conclusion to this section is essentially negative, having served
to destroy a universal rather than to establish one. However, the
account of action nominals given in Comrie (1976), of which this section
is a summary, still leaves for the most part intact the generalization
that action nominals can combine, in different proportions in different
languages, sentential syntax with nominal syntax, rather than having
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some radically different third kind of syntactic structure. So this
account, which is required by the data in preference to Chomsky's, still
significantly restricts the range of possible syntaxes for action
nominals vis-a-vis the null-hypothesis.
4. Definite Direct Objects. One criticism that is often made of
work looking at language universals on the basis of data from a wide
range of languages is that, in achieving breadth of coverage, accuracy in
the description of the individual languages is sometimes sacrificed, i.e.
analyses are proposed for a given language on the basis of a cursory
examination of the facts for that language, where more in-depth analysis
of the language might well lead to rejection of that analysis. This is,
of course, a methodological point, rather than one of principle: ideally,
one should have in-depth studies of a wide range of languages. Since the
individual researcher or even research team disposes of only a finite
amount of time, research on universals in practice requires a weighting
between depth and breadth of investigation, since the perfect combination
of full depth and full breadth is unattainable in practice. One of the
main claims of this lecture is that the pendulum should swing more in the
direction of breadth of coverage.
Moreover, there are some instances where a broad coverage, of several
languages, can suggest solutions to problems in the description of indi-
vidual languages that might otherwise have eluded the linguist looking
only at one language in depth. I shall illustrate this with a problem
involving so-called definite direct objects; for further details, see
Comrie (1978a). In a number of languages, of which Turkish is one, there
is a special morphological case used for direct objects, but only if the
direct object in question is definite; otherwise, direct objects stand in
the same morphological form as subjects, i.e. in the citation form. Thus
with the noun phrase okuz 'ox' in Turkish we have the following contrast:
(33) Hasan bir okuz ald%.
Hasan an ox bought
'Hasan bought an ox'
(34) Hasan okuz-'u aldz.
Hasan ox DEFDO bought
'Hasan bought the ox'
In (33), the direct object is indefinite (note the indefinite article
bir in Turkish, an in the English translation), so there is no 'definite
direct object' suffix. In (34), the direct object is definite (note the
definite article in the English translation), so we have the definite
direct object ending -t (with vowel harmony variants -i , -u, -u; in
certain environments, this vowel is preceded by y or n)
.
In general, those direct objects which are case-marked in this way
in Turkish correspond to our intuition of what constitutes a definite
direct object, to the usual general linguistic definition of def initeness.
However, there are some exceptions, such as the following, where the
direct object is clearly not definite in the usual sense:
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(35) Hasan hangisi-ni aldz?
Hasan which DEFDO bought
'which one did Hasan buy?'
(36) Hasan bir okuz-u aldz.
Hasan an ox DEFDO bought
'Hasan bought an ox'
Traditional grammars of Turkish, in particular those written for English-
speakers, are well aware of examples of this kind, and the solution they
usually adopt is to say that in Turkish 'def initeness' means something
different from what it means in English. If one were to take this line
to its logical conclusion, then we would be defining technical terms ad
hoc for each individual language; although we might use the same term
(such as definite) in speaking of two languages, the two uses of the term
would be effectively mere homophones, since 'definite' in one language
might have nothing in common with 'definite' in any other. This would
obviously put an end to any study of language universals, since terms
would have no meaning outside the discussion of an individual language,
but its implications would be even more far-reaching: under this
approach, there could be no substantive theory of general linguistics.
The overall negative effect of this assumption would thus be very far-
reaching.
An alternative approach, and one that turns out to be promising both
for the general theory of definiteness and for the uniform analysis of
the Turkish examples, would be to try and isolate similarities between
definiteness in its strict sense and the so-called definite direct object
in Turkish, these similarities then being what control the identity of
morphological form of the direct object in Turkish examples (34)- (36).
Following the approach to definiteness proposed by John A. Hawkins, we may
embed the discussion of definiteness within a general pragmatic model of
speaker-hearer interaction (Hawkins 1978). In the interchange of infor-
mation between speaker and hearer, one of the important factors is that
the hearer should be able to know, with regard to noun phrases used by
the speaker, whether he, the hearer, can already identify the referent of
that noun phrase on the basis of previous discourse or current situation,
or whether the referent is not (at least: not yet) identifiable. Many
languages allow or require that the speaker leave cues in his sentences
guiding the hearer in the solution of this problem, the referent identifi-
cation problem. In English, the definite article the is an explicit
signal from the speaker to the hearer that the speaker expects that both
speaker and hearer can identify the referent of the noun phrase bearing
the definite article; thus if an English-speaker says Hasan bought the
ox, then he expects the hearer to know which ox is being talked about,
and claims to know himself which ox is being talked about. This applies
equally to the object noun phrase in Turkish sentence (34).
In sentence (35), although the referent of the direct object is not
identifiable by both speaker and hearer (if it were, the speaker would
not be asking 'which one?'), yet still the use of hangisi? 'which?'
rather than ne? 'what?' implies that the set to which the referent belongs
has already been delimited. More accurately: the use of hangisi? in
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Turkish and of which? in English implies that there is a definite (in the
strict sense) set to which the referent of the noun phrase belongs; this
set is identifiable by both speaker and hearer, although they cannot both
identify which individual member of the set is being spoken of. The
reference is thus to an indefinite member of a definite set. Although
the referent identification problem is not solved, it is partially solved,
since the identif lability of the set to which the referent belongs signi-
ficantly reduces the range of possible referents. Thus we might say that
the so-called definite direct object marker in Turkish indicates that
the referent identification problem is at least partially solved; in
English, the definite article indicates that the problem is completely
solved.
If we now turn to the contrast between Turkish sentences (33) and
(36), both of which are glossed in English as 'Hasan bought an ox',
although (36) contains the seemingly contradictory combination of indefi-
nite article and definite direct object marker, then an even more
specifically pragmatic solution is called for. In terms of (truth-
functional) semantics, there is no distinction between (33) and (36), but
once we ask about their roles in discourse, they turn out to be very
different. Sentence (36), with the so-called definite direct object
marker, would only be appropriate in a discourse if the referent of this
noun phrase (in our example, the ox) is to recur subsequently in the
discourse. If the ox is not to recur, for instance if the speaker is
just listing Hasan's activities for the day, then only (33) would be
appropriate. The function of the so-called definite direct object marker
in (36) is thus to draw the hearer's attention to the importance of
establishing the referent of the noun phrase; when introduced into the
discourse, the referent of the noun phrase is not identifiable (whence
the indefinite article) , but the hearer is being told to bear in mind its
reference for the purposes of the rest of the discourse. If the ox does
not recur in the rest of the discourse, then he will feel that the speaker
has cheated him. This use of the so-called definite direct object
marker can be called: relevance of referent identification.
To summarize this section, the so-called definite direct object
marker in Turkish serves to indicate that the referent identification
problem is at least relevant and/or at least partially solved. The uni-
fying factor is the referent identification problem, part of the pragmatic
interaction between speaker and hearer. By refusing to be satisfied with
the view that 'def initeness' can mean different things in different
languages and to reject the possibility of finding language universals
in this area, we are led not only to uncover the core that is common to
'def initeness' in English and Turkish, but also to provide a unified
account of the definite direct object marker in Turkish. In this way,
language-specific studies can sometimes directly benefit from work in
language universals.
5. Impersonal Passives. So far, I have been arguing that work on
language universals should take account of data from a wide range of
languages in the establishment of language universals. I would like now
to take this one step further, by claiming that statements about language
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universals should be empirically testable (and thus potentially disconfirm-
able) statements about the possible occurrence of constructions across the
languages of the world. This contrasts somewhat with the view prevalent
within transformational-generative grammar, where universals are usually
predicated of abstract underlying structures or of the abstract mechanisms
required to convert these underlying structures into surface structures.
A universal predicated of an underlying structure is no stronger than
the validity of the underlying structure on which it is based, and given
the immense range of disagreement over the nature of underlying syntactic
structures, this basis seems very flimsy indeed. On the other hand,
universals predicated directly on surface structures and relations among
surface structures are much more readily testable. I shall illustrate
this by contrasting two possible analyses of the so-called impersonal
passive construction; this discussion is an abbreviated version of that
presented in Comrie (1977).
In the English passive, as compared with corresponding active sen-
tences, the subject of the active appears as an oblique object (with the
preposition by ) (as in (38)) or is omitted (as in (39)); while the object
of the active appears as subject of the passive:
(37) Nopman hit Oscar.
(38) Oscar was hit by Norman.
(39) Oscar was hit.
This kind of passive construction, with a referential noun phrase as
surface structure subject, may be called the personal passive.
In a number of languages, however, in place of or in addition to the
personal passive there exists an impersonal passive: in this construction,
there is no referential surface structure subject (though there may be a
dummy subject, e.g. like English it), and if there are any objects in the
active these remain as objects in the passive. The following examples
are from German, Latin, and Welsh, respectively:
(40) es wurde gespielt.
it was played
'there was playing'
(41) aariter a militibus pugnatum est.
fiercely by soldiers fought is
'there was fierce fighting by the soldiers' (literally: '(it)
was fought fiercely by the soldiers')
(42) lladdwyd y dyn gan ddraig.
was-killed the man by dragon
'the man was killed by a dragon' (literally: '(it) was killed
the man by a dragon')
A fairly traditional analysis of such constructions is to say that,
in relating active and impersonal passive, the subject of the active is
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either deleted or becomes an oblique object, while the subject position
either remains empty or is filled by a dummy pronoun, such as German es
'it'. Proponents of Relational Grammar, in particular Paul M. Postal and
David M. Perlmutter, have claimed that this analysis is incorrect, in
particular that it violates a universal restriction against spontaneous
demotion to oblique object: in other words, they claim that a noun phrase
that is subject, direct object, or indirect object can only be demoted
to oblique object if some other noun phrase is inserted into its grammati-
cal relation, in which case the noun phrase formerly occupying that
grammatical relation is automatically made an oblique object. With the
personal passive, this gives no problems: in (38), Osaar has been
promoted to subject, thereby displacing Norman to oblique object. Postal
and Perlmutter 's analysis of the impersonal passive, where apparently a
subject has been spontaneously demoted to oblique object, is to claim
that what actually happens is the following: a dummy noun phrase is
inserted into subject position, and the insertion of this dummy noun
phrase (just as of a referential noun phrase) demotes the original sub-
ject to oblique object.
This analysis has some plausibility for German, where in surface
structure there is indeed a subject pronoun es 'it'. In Latin, although
there is no subject pronoun, one could argue that the third person singu-
lar verb form (est '(it) is') contains a reflex of a third person subject,
subsequently deleted as third person neuter subject pronouns usually are
in Latin. The analysis runs into problems, however, V7ith the Welsh
example: in Welsh it is not possible to insert any subject in the
impersonal passive construction, moreover the verbal form found in this
construction is distinct from each of the six possible person-and-number
combinations (e.g. third person singular lladdodd '(he/she/it) killed').
Thus in Welsh, there is no evidence in favor of positing any stage of
derivation in which there is a dummy subject in the impersonal passive.
Let us now ask about the repercussions of the Welsh data for Postal
and Perlmutter 's putative universal banning spontaneous demotion. It
seems to me that there are only two ways of reconciling the universal
with data like these from Welsh. Either the universal is invalidated,
since Welsh has an impersonal construction in which the subject is
demoted to oblique object position without any noun phrase being inserted
into subject position. Or, if we accept Postal and Perlmutter's analysis
whereby a dummy subject is inserted and subsequently deleted (realized as
null) without leaving any trace, then the universal is vacuous: there
can be no possible counterexample to this universal, since it simply
represents a decision on the part of the analyst to analyze all data in
a certain way, and tells us nothing about possible sets of data. If the
study of language universals is to have any empirical validity, then
vacuous universals of this kind must be excluded.
6. Conclusions. In this lecture, I have argued that the study of
language universals, contrary to the widespread view within trans-
formational-generative grammar, should be based on the study of a wide
range of languages. Going further, I argued that language universals
should be predicated more directly of data and sets of data, rather
than of abstract analyses, if the study of language universals is to
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be an empirically testable undertaking.
In passing, I noted that this approach, though essential to the
construction of a valid theory of language universals, does bring with
it a methodological difficulty: ideally, the linguist working on lan-
guage universals should both cover a wide range of languages and have
detailed familiarity with each of the languages he uses. In practice,
however, increase in breadth of coverage inevitably brings with it a
decrease in depth, and vice versa. As my final point, I would like to
suggest one possible way out of this methodological dilemma. Together
with Norval Smith, I have devised a questionnaire, or rather framework,
for providing a detailed description of the syntax, morphology, and
phonology of an arbitrary language in such a way that the material con-
tained in this description can be readily accessible to linguists
working on language universals— this latter point is guaranteed by the
uniform framework of presentation (Comrie & Smith 1977) . The first
language description following this framework, a description of Hix-
karyana by Desmond C. Derbyshire, is to be published in 1979 to
inaugurate the Lingua Descriptive Series . My hope is that the suc-
cess of this series will help to make practicable a goal—the study of
language universals based on investigation of a wide range of languages
—which I believe to be so desirable as a matter of principle.
ABBREVIATIONS
ABS Absolutive; ACC Accusative; ACTNOM Action nominal; DEFDO Defi-
nite direct object; ERG Ergative; GEN Genitive; INSTR Instrumental;
NEG Negative; NOM Nominative; Object; S Subject; SG Singular; V Verb.
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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE?!
Susan Ervin-Tripp
University of California, Berkeley
0. Psyoholinguistic view. The first formulations of psycholinguistics
were derived from studies of rote learning, from information processing,
and from Bloomfieldian linguistics, which was attentive to the language of
reference. The social nexus of language acquisition and use was considered
irrelevant to the study of language and unrelated to its structure. In
the subsequent decade, the predominance of Chomskian perspectives in
American linguistics guaranteed that autonomous syntax would be the center
of attention in linguistics and allied fields.
1.0 Communicative eompetence. The term 'communicative competence'
was first used by Dell Hymes to embrace all modes of competence in communi-
cation, to which speaking competence and linguistic code competence might
be subsidiary. 'A child capable of any and all grammatical utterances,
but not knowing which to use, not knowing even when to talk and when to
stop, would be a cultural monstrosity' (Hymes 1967:16).
'The acquisition of competence for use, indeed, can be stated in the
same terms as acquisition of competence for grammar. Within the develop-
mental matrix in which knowledge of the sentences of a language is acquired,
children also acquire knowledge of a set of ways in which sentences are
used. From a finite experience of speech acts and their interdependence
with socio-cultural features they develop a general theory of the speaking
appropriate to their community, which they employ, like other forms of
tacit cultural knowledge (competence) in conducting and interpreting
social life.
'
'In sum, the goal of a broad theory of competence can be said to show
the ways in which the systematically possible, the feasible, and the appro-
priate are linked to produce and interpret actually occurring cultural
behavior' (Hymes 1972:286).
Hymes was at pains to point out the distinction from narrower notions
of competence and performance: 'The chief difficulty of present linguis-
tic theory is that it would seem to require one to identify the study of
the phenomena of concern to us here with its category of performance.
. . . Indeed, language use is equated with performance: "the theory of
language use—the theory of performance" (Chomsky 1965:9)' (Hymes 1972:
279). There was evidence that developing skill, errors, self-corrections,
norms, and interpretations of violations applied not only to the growth
of syntactic knowledge but sociolinguistic knowledge. It is an interest-
ing coincidence that while a paradigm shift was being proposed from the
perspective of a socially situated view of language on the part of
anthropologists and sociologists, linguists and philosophers would
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eventually push linguistics out again to include more semantic and prag-
matic considerations.
1.1 Field Manual. This is the tenth anniversary of a significant
event in the sociolinguistic revolution. In the sixties, the Social
Science Research Council's Committee on Sociolinguistics sponsored summer
workshops on Language, Society, and the Child in Berkeley. These were
the outgrowth of an earlier informal seminar in which students and faculty
participated including Hymes while he was still in Berkeley, John Gumperz,
Dan Slobin, and I. Graduate students in the ethnography of communication
joined us in producing a Field Manual fov Cross-Cultural Study of the
Acquisition of Cormruniaative Competence, edited by Slobin in 1967. This
was a first attempt to bring together the findings, types of issues,
methodological proposals, and procedures which might arise if one took
a 'communicative competence' perspective on the task of the child in
developing language. Four dissertations grew directly out of that
enterprise (Blount 1969, Kernan 1969, Mitchell-Kernan 1969, Stress 1969).
In 1968 with the addition of Charles Ferguson we reexamined the issues
and field results in workshops and seminars with 32 additional graduate
students and a parade of visitors on the forefront of sociolinguistics
(Ervin-Tripp 1969b) . In this paper I propose to review the purposes of
the Field Manual, briefly assess where we stand now on some major issues
it raised, and look in some detail at problems in modeling the compre-
hension of situated speech—an issue which lies at the heart of the
current convergence of the two historical streams I mentioned earlier.
The Field Manual set forth a specific series of purposes summarized
in the introduction as follows:
a. 'The variety of systems in natural languages is so great that
the study of language acquisition in varying languages can be regarded as
a natural experiment which it would be extremely difficult to simulate
artificially' (Ervin-Tripp 1967 :ix). Were there universal generalizations
to be made about the acquisition of syntax, phonology, and semantics?
Since fundamental meanings are the same, what differences might appear
because language provide differentially obvious maps for the communica-
tion of these meanings?
b. We wanted to know how changes in the social milieu might alter
acquisition. We thought values about language and its uses might change
how the child is spoken to and the types of speech promoted. There has
been considerable controversy about the rola of the social milieu in
language development. 'It is not clear whether the order of acquisition
of grammatical or sociolinguistic rules might be altered either by their
place in the adult system or by specific values and practices of the
child's caretakers. These practices include prohibiting or encouraging
the child's presence when various speech events occur, and stimulating
or responding to his speech' (Ervin-Tripp 1967 :xi).
c. A more focused task in the same domain is the examination of
the relationship between learning sociolinguistic rules and the learning
of the basic code, or the impact of pragmatic context on code learning.
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d. We wanted to examine the development of social competence and
appropriateness in language. This was the most radical and innovative
part of the program, for which there was least precedent in earlier work
either with adults or first or second language learners. Children learn
'when to speak, when to be quiet, when to use ritual language, when to
use baby talk, when to use polite forms, and when to shift language in a
multilingual community.
'
In addition, the choice of appropriate forms in sequence, and alter-
natives with proper social meaning, was to be included. 'To qualify as
a native speaker in a speech community one must learn these rules as
well as the rules of grammar. That is to say, of course, that one must
learn to behave as though one knew the rules. Assessment of the acquisi-
tion of this competence should be as fundamental to the study of language
development as the study of the formal grammatical code' (Ervin-Tripp
1967:x).
2.0 Comparative grammar research. Of these goals, the easiest to
achieve would be the goal of discovering universals in grammatical
development. From earlier work with a variety of (primarily) European
languages we already knew a good deal about the development of syntax
and phonology, the findings summarized in the Field Manual. We thus had
tentative hypotheses based on the earlier experiments and diary studies,
and a continually improving set of research methods.
Dan Slobin has been the principal advocate of the comparative
approach, despite opposing claims that in-depth studies of English would
accomplish more with less cost. He has pointed out that comparative
studies of the same semantic structures can reveal what strategies
children undertake when the available languages differ in the structural
means they suggest for mapping (Slobin 1973)
.
2.1 Word order research. One important consequence of comparative
studies is the disconfirmation of anglocentric theories of naturalness.
It has been claimed that word order—a principal syntactic device in
English— is so strongly dominant a natural strategy that it even pre-
cedes inflection in such languages as Russian and Finnish without support
from the language spoken to the child. It has been claimed that English
SVO (subject-verb-object) order, or at least SO, reflects the natural
order of events in which agents exist before acts or objects. These
assumptions appear to arise from the early use of telegraphic sentences
in English.
If English order were easier, we would not expect to find Turkish
children entirely ignoring word order as a potential syntactic device for
understanding elementary semantic relations, as we have found they do.
Nor would we expect to find Kaluli (New Guinea) children producing OSV
sentences more often than SOV. Bambi Schieffelin however found that they
were very common in family interaction. The argument before the verb is
foregrounded in Kaluli, so that OSV is likely in claims, accusations,
requests, and assertions about roles and rights, which are frequent in
both adult and child speech in families (Schieffelin 1979)
.
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If word order were easier than inflections, we would expect to find
children who speak inflecting languages would be at a disadvantage in
recognizing basic semantic relations in sentences. A large collaborative
project directed by Slobin compared four languages. Turkish children do
best, and Serbo-Croatian speaking children next best, in tasks requiring
them to understand case relations at two.
The language spoken to Turkish children is, to be sure, not wholly
random in word order; in the samples of adult speech, about half were in
SOV order and a quarter SVO. But Turkish, as an agglutinative language,
gives particularly clear and consistent mapping for case information.
A child who consistently hears the same suffix for transitive objects
can know that in the plural the same suffix will also be heard. And there
is no gender to provide complexity, or in the case of gender of inanimates,
an arbitrary disruption of case information.
In one study, children were presented with pairs of animals or dolls
and asked to act out sentences such as 'squirrel scratches dog'. In
Turkish these were presented in the six possible orders and with (0) or
without (N) accusative suffixes. English children at two years of age
essentially interpreted the various orders randomly. On Table 1 we see
that Yugoslav children were able to interpret the inflectional informa-
tion better than chance for NVO and NOV order but for no others, but
Turkish children were essentially relying purely on suffixes and were the
most successful. Where no suffixes were present (in the NVN, VNN, and
NNV conditions) they did not differ from chance, displaying no order
preferences, like the speakers of other languages at that age.
CORRECT OR SUBJECT-OBJECT INTERPRETATIONS
OF SENTENCES BY TWO YEAR OLDS
TURKISH SERBO-CROATIAN
NVN^ 57% 62
NVO 77* 76*
OVN 74* 52
NNV 65 54
NOV 84* 71*
ONV 74* 61
VNN 50 36
VNO 76* 60
VON 77* 59
*Approximately statistically significant (Slobin in press)
.
^N indicates a suffixless nominal, a noun with accusative
suffix.
Table 1
2.2 Question comprehension. In another procedure with the same
children, we asked them to answer questions. In this study, we sought to
extend an earlier English finding (Ervin-Tripp 1970) which showed that
there is a developmental order of ease in interpreting question words and
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that error strategies were based on supplying sentence arguments missing
from the questions. What and who questions were asked with two dolls,
one on a vehicle, so that we could discover with one question confusions
of case and animacy. Who bumped him? might be asked when a man in a car
bumped a boy. The answer might be car, hoy, man. In questions of the
type What pushed it? Who did she push? and What bumped him? we found
that case errors were common in English, Italian, and Yugoslav two-year-
olds' replies, but not in the replies of the Turkish children. So again,
we see that the agglutinative system, which supplies very clear, distinc-
tive, and consistent marking for case relations, is learned early. We
cannot simply assume the Turkish children were better at the task for
other reasons, because they did make animacy errors.
These two studies confirm the basic principle that ease of learning
depends on mapping simplicity . They suggest also that word order is more
difficult than affixation
,
for case semantics. One hypothesis may be
that agglutinative affixes are treated like lexical items, which are
acquired easily by two if the meaning is not difficult.
2.3 Univevsals. The comparative studies, then, have disconfirmed
some common assumptions about syntactic naturalness. They have shown that
differences in linguistic structure result in differences in ease of
acquiring language. But they have also revealed some cross-language
generalizations beyond those known before such as similarity of early
semantic relations expressed in sentences (Bowerman 1973, Brown 1973,
Ervin-Tripp 1973, Slobin 1973). For example, the question comprehension
study shows that questions are ordered in difficulty. In all languages
studied, when questions are the hardest even when any temporal reply is
accepted. Where questions, though structurally similar, are easier. The
difference is one of cognitive development, of understanding of time con-
cepts, rather than of language.
For the same reasons, in the four languages locational terms developed
in a similar order. In all four languages in, on, under, and beside,
which relate two objects, were learned first. Between, back, and front
(for inherent back and front of houses and trucks) were next, and front
and back of unoriented objects last (Johnston and Slobin 1977).
These comparative studies have been based on the assumption that the
referential world to which children's earliest speech refers is common to
the speakers of different languages. The difficulties experienced by
children with respect to conceptual difficulties in apprehending time and
complex spatial relationships will be similar. What differs then is the
set of categories and mapping rules required to enter the semantic and
syntactic expression system. In respect to fundamental cognitive develop-
ment we can expect to find universals across language; the means of
expressing those universals differ. The comparative studies reveal that
languages are not equal in difficulty.
3.0 Effects of milieu. The studies of structural development were
conservative in purpose. They were not especially affected by the social
facets of the research program. There is a widespread belief that milieu
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does not affect structure. Milieu supplies raw material for a robust
innate gift for formal analysis. The innate language propensity is more
sensitive to pattern than to frequency, to form than to reinforcement.
3.1 Autogenous syntax. The most dramatic support for this position
came from a cross-modality study within the United States. Feldman and
Goldin-Meadow located six deaf children whose hearing families were
committed to an oralist education, to not consciously using natural ges-
tures or sign language. Apparently doomed to noncommunication by their
families, these children started with the spontaneous gestural system
which is the nexus of all children's first language (Carter 197A) and
each developed a consistent multigesture 'syntax'. They began to use
pointing in combination to convey semantic relations between referents,
and developed 'motor-iconic gestures that seemed to specify predicates of
various kinds'. As the signs combined it became apparent that they were
not random and not combined by sign type, but contained regular semantic
sequences of the form patient-act, patient-recipient, or act-recipient.
Patients were both first and most frequent. In the case of intransitive
acts, the order was actor-act or referent-attribute (Goldin-Meadow 1975).
These findings suggest both a robust innate propensity for formal regu-
larity, and the low claim of English order on naturalness.
3.2 Correlational research. The strongest data on milieu effects on
syntax have come from experimental and correlational studies within Ameri-
can families. Elissa Newport et al. (1975, 1977) collected syntactic
samples from infants at two ages and compared changes in various measures
to features of the mother's speech at the first testing. She found a
series of finely tuned correlations which fit neatly with predictions
about children's use of environmental information. Speech audibility
was the strongest predictor of the rate of growth in English inflectional
suffixes. Yesino questions with modals, which front auxiliaries, brought
faster rates of growth in the use of auxiliaries. In general, imperatives
depressed language growth. Presumably the percent of imperatives is a
reflection of very general differences in when and how language is used.
Syntactic counts merely assess a consequence of higher-level decisions
(Newport et al. 1977, Ervin-Tripp 1976b) to regulate, elicit, teach, and
so on.
3.3 Ethnographic description. One consequence of cross-cultural
studies has been the development of detailed description of the milieu of
language use. As Ben Blount found in studying the Luo in Africa (Blount
1972) the formal data on child syntax may be strongly affected by the
parental eliciting style and the constraints on possible talk settings for
children. A vividly contrasted example of the 'discursive workshop' in
Kaluli has shown the importance of elicited imitation as an instructional
method and of cultural concern with interactional strategies.
In one Kaluli scene, two children eat food belonging to an absent
sister and the mother uses the two-year-old as an agent to shame the two
into putting the food back. Everyone knows whose food it is.
Mother to two-year-old in presence of other two children:
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Whose is it? Say that.
Is it yours? Say that.
Who are you? Say that.
As instructions, these forms can be recognized as analogous to
American mothers' directives such as Whose are these? or What are those
doing there? involving out of place possessions. What the Kaluli add is
the infant as an intermediary in these hints. In this way, parents and
older children help toddlers accomplish identifiable social ends by
telling them what to say to a second or third conversational partner.
This is a technique of teaching contextualized discourse routines, show-
ing children how to offer, request, question, assert, inform, challenge
claims, threaten, tease, and shame (Schieffelin 1979).
Just as one-to-one mapping of referential semantics and form in an
obvious, here-and-now situation has been shown to accelerate language
learning, we can expect that learning of pragmatic contrasts might be
easier this way. Contextualized modeling of specific formulae is a par-
tial solution. Kaluli children are shown how to get what they want
verbally. Sometimes they are also shown—as in the above example—how to
get what their teachers want. Kaluli children do not have to extend
formulae heard in the speech of others to themselves by guessing when the
motives are the same. The Kaluli teachers do this extension for them.
They tell the children exactly what to say. Berko Gleason and Weintraub
(1976) have pointed out limited use in English of this method but merely
for politeness formulae and restricted social routines.
From detailed ethnographic description, we hope to see how the chil-
dren extend these samples to their own use and make the general patterns
productive. In Kaluli the children's over-generalizations reveal clearly
which aspects of the modeling have entered their competence. What we
cannot yet know from such studies is whether such an instructional style
leads to faster development of one aspect of competence over another.
4.0 Pragmatics and syntax. Does language use affect syntactic
development? In the Field Manual it was pointed out that 'we know nothing
about the relations between these aspects of learning and the learning of
the basic code.' Studies by Halliday (1975), Ervin-Tripp (1977a), and
unpublished work of Wells and Schieffelin have addressed these issues.
4.1 Order contrasts. The field study of Schieffelin showed that
although Kaluli is typologically SOV, this order is used primarily in
affectively neutral narrative occasions and is less frequent in families
than OSV which focuses on the agent. So important is this contrast that
a child's demand in SOV (apparently generalized from a preceding narra-
tive passage) was ignored by the mother. The same demand in OSV usually
was not
.
An order contrast, then, is a pragmatic difference, as it probably
is in many languages. It is learned very early. Eventually the children
add an agentive suffix, which is obligatory in the OSV order, but which
the children at first overgeneralize to SOV (but not to intransitives)
.
Thus such syntactically important developments as agentive marking occur
in the context of a prior pragmatic contrast.
4.2 English production rules. Is syntax integrated with pragmatic
development in English? In a study of syntactic development in English
two-year-olds I have sought production rules for each child (Ervin-Tripp
1977a) . The purpose was to account for the telegraphic character of these
utterances, the omission of semantically important arguments, diversity
of order. Those who have worked for years with child texts recognize a
high degree of predictability in child utterances, which production
rules should capture. This predictability is obviously related to con-
text and purpose.
My tactic was to start with the larger context and to seek regulari-
ties for achieving conversational strategies. An example is the analysis
of local reply rules. Sally at 1;43 (one year, 43 weeks) had reply
patterns as follows:
Routines: Bye-bye Sally: Byehye Sally
How are you?
Where are you?
Fine
To questions with rising pitch: ( Yeah
REPEAT (stress changed segments)
Nonresponse
(for any of above carry out
feasible act mentioned by other)
Hm: SELF REPEAT (added at 1;45)
This description displays the fact that children's compliance, or
not, with explicit directives may be accompanied by replies which are
responsive to the rising pitch in the question format of directives such
as Can you open the door? There isn't necessarily a congruence between
the two response systems. (See below, 5.4.3.)
A more elaborate description of a reply and initiation system of an
older child (2.3 to 2.5 or nearly two and a half) shows considerable
enlargement of abilities. This child differentiated between directives
and information questions in replies, and could herself initiate a ques-
tion. Analysis being of natural family interaction, some events did not
appear in the corpus.
This analysis by categories has a strong debt first to Michael
Halliday and then to Gordon Wells, who worked out functional categories
(Wells 1973). The method was to make an analysis by function or act,
and then make a matrix which matched form against act. The description
in Table 2 sought the most concrete formulation which minimized postulation
of either function or syntactic categories. Examples of the classes labeled
proper name, act, object of action, and common object are these which
were grouped in the following chart as ACT (+ OBJ) : put it, tear this,
do cape, eat my breakfast, see, come-here, and go-peepee. While the
grouping cuts across transitive/intransitive, the pragmatic categories,
such as 'announce achievement' did too.
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PRODUCTION RULES OF ELLY (2.3-2.5)
Replies: ,^ ,. ^. x » ^ i O.K. _ , . i^o(to directive) Assent:
^^^y Refuse: \^^^_^^^
(to rising pitch) Agree: yeah Deny: No
(to statements) Affirm:
{ ^gp^^
(to insult) Epithet: REPEAT
,
. s ,1 . [There he/it is.(to question) Where question: / / jjAwg
'^^^^^'^
i OBJECT
Initiatives:
Call attention: (ffew) + NAME „ , ., . ^Look^ Command Observe: \^^^^^^ qbJ
You like it? [mine
Offer: Wcmt this? Claim: (That's) \my OBJECT
Here
\
NAME '
S
Prohibit or
_ j Stop it Permission request: Can I + ACT?
Mock Warning * \ Don't Command: (you) + ACT (+ OBJ)
Complete act: There Announce achievement: I + ACT (-1-0BJ)
Solicit info: What's that? Identify: That OBJECT
Table 2
In this proposal, functional development is treated as primary. The
studies of gestural development, such as Carter's (1974), suggest that
there are some intent primes, just as there is evidence from such studies
as Goldin-Meadow's (1975) of such cognitive features as patient—act of
transfer—recipient. Starting with function categories resulted in a
massive simplification of the data in early speech especially in natural
interaction where interpersonal acts are diverse and speech is often
formulaic. Failure to make such classifications is likely to result in
confusiii? superficially parallel instances in which the production system
is quite different, as in I want dolly and I build tower. It became
apparent in rhis work that the syntactic rules one can derive from textual
data depend st'-ongly on the type of interaction sampled. We found
extreme differences between peer speech and the speech with adults who
use special speech-eliciting acts with children.
When contextual, functional, and discourse information is included
in production rules, the level of abstractness of syntax may prove to be
fairly limited at first. When there is evidence of transfer of patterns
across function categories, the degree of generality of syntactic catego-
ries may increase until syntax must be treated as a separate system. It
still could remain the case that for some functions, such as greetings,
production rules could remain relatively low level and formulaic. In
the case of directives, forms such as 'Can you . . .', which begin as
formulas and are commonly so used, may be reanalyzed later to permit
production of such paraphrases as 'Would you be able to . . .' Thus the
level of abstractness may change even in adults.
Just as children appear to differ in whether their pragmatic
2A6
competence is elaborated more than their referential system in speech
(Dore 1973) it seems likely that social emphasis on pragmatic differen-
tiations such as the attention in Kaluli to social strategies might affect
the developmental sequence in the emergence of syntax.
5.0 Sociolinguistic rules. The discussion of sociolinguistic
aspects of competence in the Field Manual included style-, register-,
and code-switching, politeness, elaborated and restricted code use, the
contextual factors which condition formal alternation in speech, and the
sequential structure of speech events. Collections of studies of these
topics have appeared in Ervin-Tripp and Mitchell-Kernan's Child Discourse,
Ochs and Schieffelin's Developmental Pragmatios , and in Language in
Society Vol. 7, No. 3, 1978. Only a few of these studies were deliber-
ately comparative, specifically the studies of directives by Hollos and
Beeman (1978) and of arguments by Lein and Brenneis (1978)
.
5.1 Mapping complexity. When we address someone, or make a request,
we do at least two things at once. We accomplish a communicative act
such as calling out, or requesting, and we also convey our social catego-
rizing of them and of our relationship. If either is already known, the
choice is predictable, there is no new information, and the listener can
leave in the background this aspect of the interaction.
When an act is expected or obvious, the formal alternatives can
focus on the social relationship. In a study of roommates, a roommate
said to one blocking his way 'You make a good door, Sal'. Since his
purpose was sufficiently obvious, his focus could be on a solidary joking
relationship. In such cases, elliptical reference, such as mention of
the door, was adequate. If both the social relationship and the act are
unclear, several alternative interpretations can compete.
INTERPRETATION AND CONTEXT:
Child-adult dyads
In Table 3, the same words can accomplish different acts or have
different purposes, and the same acts can be expressed in different ways.
We have this complex system because it allows us to do several things at
once very efficiently. In the case of calling out to people, it is clear
what we are doing. Consider the following example: One of my children
answered the telephone briefly and then shouted Hey ugly\ The act of
summoning was obvious. The insult was obvious. What was left unspecified
was who was addressed. I knew that it wasn't meant for me. The insulted
person had to identify himself and to volunteer to accept the insult.
Research on social meaning in the sixties focused on the social
complexity of address rules (Brown and Oilman 1960, Ervin-Tripp 1969a),
and it appears likely that some universals can be found in address systems.
These studies typically hold constant and do not attend to the interac-
tional or discourse functions of the naming. They assume function is not
a problem. When we examine communicative acts such as directives we add
two new types of complexity. One is that we are dealing with sentences,
not just noun phrases, so that there is much more structural complexity.
The other is that the purpose can be hidden. The problem of recognizing
purpose has attracted attention from philosophers and linguists since
they cannot compute conveyed intent easily without additional information
beyond syntax and semantics. What has not been seen in this research is
its intersection with studies of social alternations. Table 3 illustrates
that social meaning and understood intent must be interconnected system-
atically.
5.2 Contextual prediction. Recently at a family dinner, I heard a
niece, looking at the home-baked cake before her at the center of the
table, say Is the cake there? A typical analysis of my understanding of
this utterance would require that I entertain and reject the hypothesis
that she wanted to know if the cake was there as a request for information
about location. Having rejected that interpretation I could turn to
other possibilities for her intent.
We are all aware, at times, of such searches. But there must be a
difference between the occasions on which we are aware and those in which
there is immediate rapid interpretation. Also, there must be a reason
why we must, to ensure a literal interpretation of such a question, make
sure that the more routine intent is not heard. Such occasions are
numerous, as when we just want to know if someone is there and not have
them summoned to the phone (Ervin-Tripp 1976a) . Such an interpretation
will not account for how children acquire communicative competence in
hearing imbedded directives such as Do you wanna play on the swings? before
their syntax or computational inference skills are fully developed. Such
a view omits the state of the hearer at the time before the utterance
occurs. I wish to argue that most of the time utterances do less work
than we have assumed. I will also argue that it is precisely this fact
that allows us to develop the potential for understanding the remaining
cases.
We have been examining nearly a hundred videotaped scenes with fami-
lies, seeking attempts to control conversational partners. The families
were videotaped in their homes, and they included children ranging in age
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from one to eight years. In some scenes there were siblings, in some
visiting friends. In these videotapes, we noticed a strong sequential
structuring of activity. The activity sequences might include initiation,
negotiation, stage-setting, internal structure according to the activity,
repairs, episode units, and terminations. Sometimes we saw the children
doing a lot of work to set the scene for an activity that doesn't take
place. They allocate roles, place people and objects in space, allocate
or claim territory. Sometimes there are structured or routinized activi-
ties such as games. If we observed discussions around topics, the topical
sequences would have internal structure.
At the same time, we can see orderly sequences in surface structure.
In a text we may find boundary markers, turntaking, style shifts, and
such local sequencing as repetition, replies, and tying forms. For
example, questions solicit answers, people pronominalize or form ellipses
based on previous utterances, add on with conjunctions. These features
can, to some extent, be examined without regard to the properties of
activity.
Activities may have very strong structure. In a game of lotto, when
the mother picks up a card it must be claimed and placed. Her speech then
is quite redundant with prior knowledge of the participant, if she says
Where does this go? and shows the card. If she says Who has the hear?
Hew is the bear? or Here 's the bear she identifies the bear instead of
showing it, so the net effect is the same. From the standpoint of activity
consequences the interpretation of all these surface forms is identical.
At the same time, these sentences differ in their surface sequential
properties. If she says Where does this go? there might be a greater
chance of eliciting Here. If she says Who has the bear? she might more
often receive Me, but we can expect considerable overlap in replies
because replies may be more attentive to the activity system than to the
surface structure.
Realization rules display purposes through the choice of words or
actions. In this example, the realization rules would have to show that
there are several ways to make offers in a lotto game. We don't know why
the mother chooses different formulations at different times.
Realizations, as we saw in Table 3, are affected by social informa-
tion. Social information includes both givens with which participants
enter the scene, like age, sex, power, and setting, and negotiable social
components like affect, task, and key or mood. Listeners who have little
prior information may be able to guess power, feelings, or task from the
choices, so that social reality and speech influence each other.
Because of the effect of information available at a given point in
discourse, which includes activity or topic, the sequence of surface
forms, and social givens, it is possible to construct predictions about
what will happen next. We recently tried this with a videotape from our
corpus, giving viewers a transcript and letting them see both transcript
and scene up to a critical point, and then moving to another test point.
Overall they were successful half the time in predicting the next act.
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They were surprised at their own success, which sometimes included
verbatim accuracy.
5.3 Act and form. The relation between activity and realization is
affected by the intention of actors, which can of course alter tasks. In
looking for the relation between intention and verbal forms, we were faced
with the formidable task of identifying speaker purposes. Formidable,
yes, but we do it all day in natural interaction, so this skill must be
well-developed in sociable humans. To delve deeply, as in the study of
Labov and Fanshel (1977), may be more difficult. So we decided to begin
at face value and look for formal realizations of intent.
Our categories for intent were directed at attempts to control only
the acts of others, not their beliefs, though we will see that directing
attention may be a primary means of controlling acts.
The list we made could be criticized, but it is a beginning. We have
been able to get acceptable agreement among judges in these assessments.
Acts are split between those which seek to control the hearer's actions,
and those which by defining the speaker's actions indirectly constrain the
hearer. In the first set are directives
,
prohibitions , warnings , and owner-
ship claims . In the second are offers or promises , asking permission , and
asserting intentions . In the texts we have examined so far most control
acts are directives, fewer being offers and ownership claims.
LIST OF ACTS TO BE CODED
DIRECTION to perform some action, render services, give goods.
E.g., Is there any cake left?
PROHIBITIONS to prevent the addressee from acting, or to keep out
of territory.
Stay in your own room.
THREAT of action on the other unless there is compliance.
I'll tell Mom.
WARNING to call attention to a danger or problem which will affect
the addressee and which requires prompt preventive measures.
Mom's gonna kill you.
OWNERSHIP assertion of status or territory, including prohibiting
use by others.
That's my chair.
OFFER or PROMISE of goods and services which will have some benefit
to the recipient
.
I want to do that for you.
PERMISSION/REQUEST for the speaker's action when the beneficiary
is the speaker.
May I please go out in the rain?
INTENTION by the speaker to commit an act affecting the hearer or
hearer's interests, whether or not the hearer replies.
Imply directives or prohibitions.
I'm gonna sit on your lap.
Table 4
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The primary formal categorization we have made is a division between
explicit and implicit forms as seen in Table 5.
SPEECH ACTS CODED
Form
Gesture or vocalization only.
Ellipsis, explicit in context.
Imperative,
Explicit question.
Permission questions.
Permission statement.
Explicit statement.
Aversive state.
Implicit condition.
Implicit question.
Normative statements.
Example
(Show food.)
Me too
!
Quit that.
Can you stop!
Can I have some?
You can go outside now,
That's mine.
I'm hungry.
It's finished.
Is there more?
Only mommies say honey.
Possible Intent
Offer.
Directive.
Prohibition.
Prohibition.
Directive.
Directive
.
Claim.
Directive.
Directive.
Directive.
Prohibition.
Table 5
You'll notice that any of these forms might be used for a particular
intent. I could point at a glass of wine, say me too, give me some wine,
could you give me some wine, can I have some wine, you can give me more
wine now, I want some wine, I'm thirsty, I'm out of wine, is there more
wine?, or Califomians always have two glasses of wine. These alternatives
of course, carry different consequences for discourse (Ervin-Tripp 1976a).
The first texts we have coded have shown some differences in use in
families; the analysis was drawn from 2500 utterances, of which 174 were
child control acts.
I
A. We found many more requests and directives than other types
of controlling acts in our sample. Over half were expressed
as imperatives. Ellipsis was also very frequent.
B. There is a clear change in repertoire with the age of the speaker.
At one, we found cries, gestures and one-word directives like
no. At two, need statements and imperatives were added. At
three, children add permission questions and explicit embedded
questions like aan you give me that? which require some formulaic
frames. By four we saw the first explicit statements, or hints,
but they were rare and used with adults
.
There was confirmation of the nursery school evidence (Ervin-
Tripp 1977b) that by two and a half children already differen-
tiate forms for different addressees. To other children they
produced imperatives and ellipsis. To mothers they produced
imperatives, ellipsis and need statements. To adult outsiders,
they gave permission requests and explicit questions but not
imperatives or need statements.
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5.4 Testing understanding. The directives we saw were typically
redundant with gestures. So we began to design experiments in which it
would be possible to alter contextual features systematically. In this
series of pilot studies, we wanted to change the situation and what people
say separately. So we made cartoon stories which allowed us to add or
remove pictures. We have tape recordings on cards which allow the exact
features of the stimulus to be controlled.
EXPERIMENTAL SENTENCES VARYING IN EXPLICITNESS
la. Oh, my green pen. lb. I don't like my green pen
2. Is my green pen there?
3. My green pen's there.
4. I can't find my green pen.
5. Can you find my green pen?
Table 6
In the cartoon stories we worked only with middle-level explicitness.
For example, if two children are fighting, the form might be Are you
fighting? or You're fighting. In the case of helping stories, the form
might be Is the aheaker there? or Suzy^ the checker's there. We tried
variations in intonation, and compared whether a child or mother spoke to
the two children in the pictures, whether there was a visible speaker who
could see what was going on, and whether no one spoke at all. And we
changed two other contextual factors—whether they were doing something
forbidden, or simply were present in a case where there was a problem
requiring help.
How can you tell what a three-year-old understands when such a story
is told? We asked what the children in the story did, what they said,
and why. If these produced no clear solution, we proceeded to ask what
they would do in a like situation, and what the mother or third child
wanted.
5.4.1 Practical reasoning. At three, the children are quite clear
about what acts are forbidden, and know that they should stop fighting,
throwing food, trampling on the flowers, and getting mud on their party
clothes. But they stop primarily on the basis of who is present, either
in sight or sound. If the mother can be seen or heard, they stop in 87%
of the cases. What is said is irrelevant, since they stop just as often
for a silent mother. The children know the rules of action, and when the
enforcing agent is around they obey. But they are not reacting to orders
though they give the impression of understanding the directives.
5.4.2 Effects of verbal form. In the problem situations, on the
other hand, the three-year-olds rarely supplied help without being guided
by speech, so speech was informative. Since the particular speech form
used in the stories didn't matter, it appeared that just referring to the
problem helps at each age. In order to check more closely on the effects
of form on helping, we developed some real-life situations with lost pens
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and falling objects. At various times during the picture-story procedure
we reminded the children, using one of the forms on the continuum in
Table 6. For the most explicit form can you . . . even the three-year-
olds helped in 90% of the cases. For statements, they helped about half
the time, but for the questions and naming they were rarely successful.
By five, form makes no difference, in real life helping, even in
some second-language learners of English. Even incongruous mention of a
desired object, as in lb on Table 6, is effective, provided the speaker
is hunting for something. So for the smallest children, the more explicit
the form, the greater the compliance. By five practical reasoning is
sufficient so only a mention is adequate.
5.4.3 Reasons fov action. In these situations, we can get four
kinds of information about what the children know. They said what was
done, what was said, why and what the speaker wanted. What is the rela-
tion between these? The orthodox interpretation of speech acts suggests
that the listener infers what the speaker wants from the form of the act,
and then checks the situation to see if that could be true. The imputed
order of processing is analysis of speech, interpretation of intent,
check of context, and then behavior. Where a meaning must be discarded,
the interpretive process must be repeated.
Three-year-olds, of course, do not easily discuss intent. But here
is a nicely expansive reply:
(When the mother and child come to the door with groceries, they
ask Jack and Kate, 'Is the door open?')
—What do Jack and Kate say?
—I don't know
—Well, what would you say if your mom was carrying groceries and
she said Jenny, is the door open?
—Yes. (It is closed in the picture)
—You'd say yes?
—But I'm going to open it.
—Oh, you'd open it!
—Yeah, but the wind gonna blow it closed again.
—Well, why would you open it?
—Cause I want them to get the groceries in the house so I can eat.
This reply doesn't mention what the mother says or wants. The
grocery scene involves a normal activity sequence in which groceries are
brought from the car into the house through an open door. The mother's
mention of the door has drawn attention to a barrier in the normal activity
sequence. The child, wanting the sequence to be carried out in full
therefore opens the door. But the motives of the mother's remark or
what the mother wants are not part of the inferential sequence.
By five the children can reason a good deal about the motives of the
children in the stories. Over and over they told us that the reasons
for their actions were practical. In the scene with the checker, the
mother said I can't find the checker. The child replied Here it is and
gave it back. Why? Because she needed it. When the children do not
supply help which is obviously needed, the reason is because they are
mean.
Does the answering of the mother's question play no part in the
process leading to action? Some analysis of the understanding of speech
acts see this as part of the reasoning process. Of course the form of
the reply has a surface relation to the question. In the real life
directives, a third of the Can you . . . forms elicited replies, but Is
X there? which had less likelihood of leading to action, was answered by
two thirds of the children. There was no relation between whether the
children replied, and whether they acted.
In the picture stories, too, there was no relation between replying
and acting. The child who was asked Is the checker there? might say
yes and give it back, say no and give it back, or say nothing and give
it back. Or might withhold it and say yes. Thus it appears that action
and reply are not related and may be incongruent.
Our evidence so far suggests that there are two parallel systems.
One is a semantic system which checks truth value for questions and
comments and leads to verbal replies. The other is an action system in
which words affect attention and practical reasoning leads to actions.
5.4.4 Speakers motives. What the child knows can be judged from a
variety of standpoints— from the effects of speech on what the child
does, and from the effects on what the child thinks the speaker wants.
Ultimately, from the standpoint of the theories of speech acts, the
critical issue is what a listener thinks a speaker intended—the conveyed
intent. So the most important test of children's knowledge should be
how they answer the question: What did the mother wanty what did she
mean when she said . . . ?
We did not ask this question in the real-life solicitations for help
from the clumsy experimenters who kept dropping and losing things, since
such questions would have, we thought, been too intrusive in the experi-
ment. So in what follows we shall be considering attributions of motives
to speakers in the narratives. In half the conditions, the speaker could
see what was going on, and the children said so. So from the standpoint
of communicative economy, speakers should not be seeking for information
in these cases. Yet a quarter to half the time (depending on the action
depicted) , the children said nevertheless that the speaker oust wanted
to know, yes or no, when she said I can't find the checker, is the
checker there? or are you fighting?
In attribution of motive, the children were affected by the status
of the speaker: mothers were more likely to want naughty acts to stop
than were child speakers. Some of the children, when asked about motive,
scrutinized the picture to check whether the speaker could see. When
mothers could not see, they were more often assumed to be ignorant, and
more often the seven-year-olds would plan to lie. Some very strategically
sophisticated children, then, considered the point of view and state of
knowledge of the mother right away; when asked what the children would
say, they said they would lie. Then they could avoid trouble. The
children at seven were from the standpoint of assessing knowledge more
likely to think of and be able to guess when the mother was ignorant.
The three-year-olds, you will recall, assumed that even if the mother was
out of sight she could see what was going on. This difference in ability
to imagine the physical perspective of another is a well-known feature
of cognitive maturation.
We could argue also that ability to imagine the motivation of others
changes with age. In the case of the hints, the seven-year-olds vary.
About half were immediately ready to attribute directive purpose to
hints, even when the speaker was not able to see. Some said The door's
closed. Would you like me to open it for you? The few teenagers we have
questioned routinely assume directive motives in these cases, although
in the case of the mothers, hints are particularly ill-formed ways of
getting naughty acts to stop, and the children were able to offer much
more likely explicit forms.
Conventional models for interpretation assume that the listener hears,
computes a possible intent, assesses context, and then decides what to
say and do. This model is clearly wrong for most seven-year-olds. When
they were asked what the children reply , they reply equally for cases
where they later say the speaker wants to know, and when she wants action.
They reply equally to questions and statements (unlike the three-year-olds
who reply little, and scarcely ever to statements). When asked what the
children do, their actions appear unrelated either to their replies or
their later attributions of motive. Over a third of the children who
propose help later say the speaker just wanted to know. We had a strong
impression from many of the children that the calculation of intent took
place after decisions about replies and actions, merely because we asked
about it. These children delayed, studied the pictures, sometimes re-
assessed what they said earlier on the basis of probes—at least they
recognized an inconsistency. Only the children who proposed lying were
clearly assessing both perspective and possible intent at the time of
initial replies. And in the condition in which the mother's voice sounded
angry compliance was more common—suggesting a recognition of mother's
mood as an early process, when it is a marked feature of the voice.
5.4.5 Comprehension processes. The experimental situations, as well
as our work with videotaped natural scenes, suggest that what we have
called activity sequences have a strong impact on what children expect or
plan to have happen next. In the real-life hints from the experimenters,
and in the stories with hints for help, the older children were eager to
give help, to be cooperative. In these situations verbal form made no
difference, since drawing attention to the problem was all that was needed,
In addition, speech to children can stop a competing activity, draw
them into a new focused engagement so that providing active help is more
likely. The three-year-olds who replied (usually to questions) in the
narratives also were more likely to offer help. For the three-year-olds
and half the seven-year-olds, the hints were not heard as expressing
wants. They were interpreted literally, but they shifted the attention
of the children to interaction with a new partner and to awareness of a
problem.
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In the stories about naughty actions, the children in the narrative
were already engaged in activities which many of the older children
admitted were lots of fun. The three-year-olds were especially delighted
with playing in the mud and seldom proposed stopping! Since the rules
were known by all, it is routinely assumed that mothers, at least, will
want the children to stop if they know what is going on. We found the
older children had more strategies for, and much more often proposed non-
compliance. But most important, despite this strong knowledge of mother's
values the hints were often not heard as directives, and still given
literal interpretations by almost half the seven-year-olds.
We have argued against a model which assumes that listeners at any
age regularly hear an utterance and then begin a very rapid computational
process including assessment of motive. Our evidence suggests that:
a. Participants often do not assess motive at all.
b. A considerable regularity or predictability in activities
derives from knowledge of usual or normal sequences. When verbal
interchanges occur, they are redundant with what is already
known , in many cases
.
c. The new information provided by speech may be as little as mood,
attraction of a listener to a new focused engagement, or atten-
tion to an unnoticed feature of the environment.
d. The system of local cohesion provided by questions and answers,
comments and replies can be relatively independent of, and
occasionally even incongruent with the simultaneous negotiation
of activities.
Since it is obvious that competent adults are capable at times of
calculating intent, and basing actions and replies on a multilevel analysis
that depends heavily on verbal processing (e.g. Labov and Fanshel 1977) we
have to account for how this capacity develops. The argument here is
that the contextually rich situations in childhood and later are instruc-
tional instances. In the family videotapes we have repeatedly seen adults
and older children redundantly producing directives and hints when children
have no choice at all, when the next action is already under way, entirely
predictable, or displayed with a gesture. We expect there may have to be
four conditions for children to learn to hear novel hints as directives:
a. The child has to have a sufficiently adept linguistic capacity
to interpret speech very quickly and make additional inferences
while replying.
b. The child has to be socially mature enough to assess the inten-
tions of others while interacting, that is, to take the view of
the other.
c. Hinting must be a part of the directive repertoire of those with
whom the child interacts, and must be heard in unambiguous cir-
cumstances. (This condition parallels prerequisites for the
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acquisition of grammar as in Ervin-Tripp 1973 and Slobin 1973) .
d. Possibly, the child must be able to impute to others face-
protecting motives such as avoiding imposing, for certain types
of social relationships. These appear to motivate the choice
of hints, and to define when they are an appropriate or inap-
propriate strategy.
6.0 Conolusions. The diversity of work in the decade since the
Field Manual does not lend itself to summarization. For most linguists,
the study of child competence seems marginal at best. It is usually
assumed that adult knowledge is static, fully evolved, not affected by
new learning, not sustained by unambiguous contexts, and centered in a
richly abstract and inferential understanding of language. The image one
gets is of the infinitely wise scholar in his study, out of contact with
a real world, able to understand any sentence out of context. The study
of child acquisition compels us to recognize the other side of our adult
abilities: that they are often used in repetitive, highly predictable
circumstances, that they are far more efficient than complex calculations
should permit, that they constantly are affected by new learning, and
that their most abstract and context-free occasions are nurtured by the
learning conditions of language used when we already know the structure
of the activity, social relations, or ideas to which language refers.
Thus the sources of language take us out of language.
NOTE
The experimental work on pragmatics reported here was sponsored by
NIMH Grant 26063. The data were collected by Georgette Stratos, Catherine
O'Connor, Hannah Kaltman, and Amy Strage, whose work and discussion are
gratefully acknowledged. The videotaped project was a collaboration with
Jenny Cook-Gumperz and David Gordon.
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LEXICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE ACQUISITION OF PHONOLOGY*
N. V. Smith
University College, London
It is a truism that the pronunciation of young children differs from
that of their adult models. The reasons for this divergence are unfor-
tunately not so obvious, and there is corresponding disagreement in the
literature on what constitutes an adequate model for child phonology in
general and the child's lexical representation in particular. Here I want
to survey some of the evidence pertaining to a number of interconnected
areas of dispute. I shall concentrate on the interplay of perceptual,
productional, and organizational factors underlying such divergencies, in
order to determine the nature of the child's lexical representation: how
it differs, if at all, from the adult form he hears; and how it is related
to what he produces: in other words, what constraints one can put on the
mapping from lexical representation to output. This entails deciding
whether it is necessary to postulate any level or levels intermediate
between lexical representation and pronunciation, or whether it is suffi-
cient to have just these two levels with suitable (preferably universal)
constraints on what a well-formed mapping between them can be. To the
extent that one needs to postulate intermediate or alternative levels which
are not determinate on the basis of the adult language, one is ascribing
an independent system to the child. To the extent that one is able to
predict the child's pronunciation on the basis of the adult language and
general learning strategies, one is denying that the child has his own
system. At a tangent to this issue I want to say a little about the puta-
tively innate status of such principles in the event that there are any.
Two-year-old children typically pronounce words of the adult language
as in (1):2
(1) duck ->• gAk blue -> bu:
pin -> bin bottle -> bokal
The reason for such 'mispronunciations' has been variously given as the
child's immature perceptual ability (Braine, Locke, Macken, Timm, Waterson,
etc.), his motor inability or disinclination to produce (some of) the
sounds involved (Ferguson and Farwell, Pupier, etc.), the effect of innate
neutralization rules that the child has to 'unlearn' (Cairns, Stampe) , the
effect of realization rules conforming to certain universal constraints
(Smith), the effect of idiosyncratic output constraints (Ingram, Menn,
Priestley) , or some combination of these (nearly everybody)
.
Although probably no specific individual would subscribe to either of
them, one can represent the range of alternatives by reference to a maximal
and a minimal model of child phonology, given in (2a) and (2b) respec-
tively: ^
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(2) (= Adult surface forms)
I Perceptual rules
UNDERLYING
REPRESENTATION
UNDERLYING
REPRESENTATION
Phonological
rules
I Organizational principles
CHILD'S PHONEMIC
REPRESENTATION
ORGANIZATIONAL
REPRESENTATION
Articulatory
instructions
I Reduction (mapping) rules
OUTPUT LEXICON
I
Output constraints
CHILD'S PHONEMIC
REPRESENTATION
Articulatory instructions
(Low-level phonetic rules)
OUTPUT
In these diagrams boxes represent definable levels of representation linked
by sets of formally similar rules or principles indicated by labelled
arrows. The boxes might also be labelled with the names of their hopeful
sponsors: thus, in (2a) the level of 'Organizational representation' might
be called 'David Ingram' , the 'Output lexicon' might be called 'Lise Menn'
and so on. However, I shall shroud them in decent anonymity for the present.
To see what is being claimed let us take a single simple example: the
pronunciation [boksl] for 'bottle' . If perceptual factors are responsible
for this deviation then the child's lexical representation for the word
would be something close to his output - [bokal] . If productional (motor)
difficulties were responsible then the lexical representation would be
closer to or identical with the adult /botal/. If organizational factors
were responsible then it would be being claimed that the lexical represen-
tation was 'correct' (i.e. equivalent to the adult surface form) and that
there was furthermore no motoric difficulty inherent in the pronunciation
of the sequence [b+o+t+9+1] , but that for independent psychological reasons
the child chooses to set up an additional level of representation which
disallows sequences of the relevant form. That this is not a priori ridic-
ulous (though I suspect a posteriori that it is wrong) can be seen from
such examples as (3)
:
(3) puddle
puzzle
-> pAgel
-^ pAdal
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where the child can perceive the difference between puddle and puzzle cor-
rectly, can pronounce [pAdal], but invariably reproduced 'puddle' as
[pAgal].
Rather than (2a) or (2b) I wish to argue for the position represented
in (4) , despite the fact that I previously invested in (2b)
.
(A) INPUT (= Adult surface forms)
Perceptual filter
UNDERLYING
REPRESENTATION
I
Realization (mapping) rules
CHILD'S PHONEMIC
REPRESENTATION
I
Phonetic rules
OUTPUT
(4) embodies the claim that perceptual factors are crucially involved in
the setting up of (a small subset of) underlying representations for the
child, but that there is a single level of lexical representation and a
single set of phonological realization rules (also known as 'incompetence'
rules (Smith 1971)) which map this representation onto a level describable
as the child's phonemic system: i.e. the level immediately prior to the
operation of low-level phonetic (allophonic) rules.
^
Let us look first at the child's perceptual ability and its implica-
tions for his lexical representation. It is uncontroversial that the
child's perception is somewhat in advance of his productive ability; what
is not clear is whether any aspect of his infantile pronunciation needs to
be attributed to perceptual difficulty. On the basis of various kinds of
evidence I postulated a few years ago that the brief answer to this ques-
tion was 'no'. Three representative pieces of such evidence are summarized
here. First, the child could successfully discriminate in decontextualized
situations pairs of words such as those in (5) which he produced as homo-
phones .
(5) bad, bat -* baet
teddy. Daddy -> daedi:
mouth, mouse -> maus
Second, he typically implemented changes to his system 'across-the-board'
as indicated in (6). That is, having learned to produce a particular
configuration for one word: e.g. [blu:] for blue in place of the earlier
[bu:], this new-found ability was immediately generalized to all and only
those words containing a postconsonantal liquid in the adult language.
indicating that these words must have been correctly stored,
(6) h
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(8) fvog ->- flog, wog, wlog, prog
and interword free variation of the sort exemplified in (9)
(9) bottle ^ boksl
"puddle -^ pAg3l
kennel -> keoel
cuddle -> kAdal
beetle ->- bi:tal
where a widespread rule which applies regularly in some words to velarise
a coronal stop before a dark [1], has apparently arbitrary exceptions.
Whereas the former kind of free variation can be satisfactorily accounted
for on the assumption that the child has the adult form as his lexical
representation and mangles it by rules some of which are optional, no such
explanation can account for the latter type (interword free variation)
where the pronunciation of each word is selfconsistent, which presumably
resides precisely in a difference in the child's lexical representation.
But if the cause of the variation is a difference in the lexical represen-
tation of the two items (e.g. puddle and cuddle') then it cannot be the case
that both of them are represented in terms of the adult surface form. This
establishes that the child does not always internalize the adult form; that
the cause of the difference is perceptual follows from two further observa-
tions: the piece-meal nature of the changes over time in such exceptional
items, and the fact that when the perceptual encoding rule is changed it is
applied incorrectly to some items. Whereas the vast majority of mapping
rules were virtually exceptionless, some 20% of those items which should
have undergone the velarisation rule converting puddle to [pAgal] failed to
do so. More importantly, some items, exemplified in (10), acquired their
correct pronunciation in a gradual, piece-meal fashion rather than simul-
taneously across-the-board; indicating that the child was getting things
right word by word and not by phonological generalization.
(10)
bottle
puddle
cuddle
beetle
^ bokal
-^ pAgal
-> kAdel
^ bi:kal
bottle ->•
cuddle
beetle
bokal
pAgal
kAdal
bi:tal
bottle
cuddle
beetle
^ hotel
^ pAdal
^ kAdal
->- bi:tal
More significant still, there were some adult words, listed in (11)
(11)
circle
pickle
winkle
ta:kal
pikal
winkal
circle ^
pickle ->
winkle -^
sa:kal
pikal
winkal
circle ^ sa:tal
pickle -> pital
winkle -» wintal
with an original velar, which were incorrectly given an alveolar at the
time the examples in (10) were changing. That is, after being correctly
pronounced as, for instance, [tarkal] for many months, circle and similar
words acquired an anomalous, incorrect, pronunciation with [t]. This is
a clear indication that the child's lexical representation was vacillating:
as a result of not discriminating perceptually between /t/ and /k/ in this
environment, he had to learn piece-meal which sound went with which word
after he had made the relevant perceptual progress. I had earlier stated
categorically that such mistakes were impossible and would constitute
counter-exemplary data to my model of phonological acquisition (roughly
equivalent to (2b), cf. Smith 1973:ch. 4). Macken has proved that they are
not only possible but occurred in the data on the basis of which I had made
my original prediction. My only solace is that I have demonstrated intel-
lectual honesty in the sense of Lakatos (1970), who wrote that: 'intellec-
tual honesty consists in stating the precise conditions under which one
will give up one's position.'
It should perhaps be emphasized that the proportion of words subject
to perceptually induced malformation is small (exactly how small I am not
sure) and that there is no evidence to my knowledge that the mispronuncia-
tions of normal children are a reflection of their limited perceptual
ability in the way that the mutilated productions of dysphasic children do
seem accurately to reflect a perceptual deficit. Specifically, Tallal and
her colleagues have demonstrated (cf. Tallal & Stark 1978) that a group of
children with delayed onset of speech were incapable of perceiving sound
contrasts involving rapid temporal processing: e.g. consonants with their
characteristic formant transitions as opposed to steady state vowels.
Nevertheless the minimal system represented by (2b) is clearly wrong.
It remains to be seen whether there is any justification for any other part
of the baroque complexity of (2a). To decide this matter we need to disen-
tangle a number of different strands; most importantly the difference
between a model containing say (2 + n) different levels of representation
and a model containing just two levels of representation but n different
kinds of motivation for the rules linking those levels. If we can decide
this matter then we shall also be making progress on the question of
whether children 'have their own system' or not. That is, in (4) there is
a single mapping from the underlying representation to the surface: i.e.
from something approximating very closely to the adult language to the
child's pronunciation (but cf. footnotes 3 and 4). In (2a) on the other
hand the relation between adult and child forms is much less direct and the
intervening levels of representation are what constitute the child's own
system (in at least one sense of this expression) . It is of course trivi-
ally true that since each child is different to every other child he must
have his own system in some sense; the claim that 'he has no system of his
own' then must be taken to imply that all that is required to predict the
kind of pronunciation the child will come up with is the underlying repre-
sentation and a set of principles governing how these representations can
be mapped onto the surface: i.e., the child's phonology is parasitic on
the adult language and can deviate from it only according to a very limited
set of strategies. To be specific, I proposed (1973) that there is a
single set of rules mapping lexical representations onto the phonemic forms
and that all such rules were formally and functionally constrained by
universal principles. In particular, any rule had to implement one or more
of the strategies serving to maximize the phenomena illustrated in (12)
:
(12) a) Consonant or vowel harmony as in the pronunciation [gAk]
for 'duak'
.
b) Cluster reduction as in the pronunciation [bu:] for 'blue'.
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c) Systemic simplification as in the pronunciation [roaet] neu-
tralising the four way contrast in 'mat\ 'mass', 'mash', 'match'.
d) Grammatical simplification as in the pronunciation [ai] for
both of the singular 'eye' and plural 'eyes'.
Differences between various children are then ascribable to the differen-
tial implementation of these four strategies: thus one child might imple-
ment consonant harmony by changing duck to [gAk] , another by changing it
to [dAt], and so on. It should perhaps be noted at this point that the
rules and constraints I posited then now have a little less work to do as
a result of the conclusions discussed above on the role of perception.
Apart from this class of exceptions I think the constraints still stand.
Their big advantage is that they exclude certain kinds of process from
effecting relations between adult and child forms. For instance, regular
dissimilation, as opposed to assimilation, is claimed to be impossible.
Given that such dissimilation occurs both historically and in fast speech,
this is a nontrivial and easily falsifiable prediction.^
Unfortunately the predictions made by (12) seem to be not only falsi-
fiable but false. The clearest counterexamples are provided by so-called
'idiosyncratic strategies' of the sort described by Ferguson and Farwell
(1975) and illustrated from Priestley (1977) in (13)
:
(13) Sundry polysyllabic words adopt the canonical form CVjaC
e.g. basket -> bajan
Such examples, where the set of forms concerned do not constitute a phono-
logically well-defined class, clearly fall outside the range of my
strategies and hence appear to disconfirm my position. However, Macken's
re-evaluation of the role of perception leads me to hope that the con-
straints on realization rules can be maintained as tightly as before, with
all apparent counterexamples—such as those of Priestley's—being percep-
tually conditioned and hence not due to the action of the realization rules
at all. Although (dis) confirmation of this hypothesis can come only from
perceptual experiments on children manifesting such idiosyncratic strate-
gies, it is significant that all the convincing examples are of polysylla-
bic items: i.e. items which are notoriously difficult for young children
to master perfectly for simple reasons of complexity, and items where
there is sufficient redundancy for it to be unnecessary for the child to
internalize the entirety of the word. Moreover in their longitudinal
development these forms also showed the piece-meal modification expected
of perceptually rather than strategically induced deformations.
I have always considered strategies of the sort listed above as a
universal set of necessary and sufficient conditions on mapping rules which
the child, as part of his innate endowment, brings to bear on the task of
language learning. An alternative interpretation of the complex relation-
ship between adult and child forms is that, intermediate between the
underlying representation and the phonemic representation which serves as
the basis for allophonic rules, are one or more further levels of repre-
sentation idiosyncratic to the child. Typical examples in the literature
are provided by Ingram (1974, 1976), Waterson (1971) and by the Morpheme
266
Structure conditions in Smith (1973) which I in fact argued against.
Ingram (1974, 1976) suggests three levels of representation
—
perceptual,
organizational and productional—such that the pronunciation of a word like
duck as [gAk] may be due to perceptual problems: the child cannot hear
the difference between [dAk] and [gAk]; to productional difficulties: he
cannot pronounce [dAk]; or to organizational constraints: he produces all
words with consonant harmony for independent reasons. Unfortunately
Ingram presents no evidence in favor of his organizational level except
its logical possibility. There is clearly a difference between providing
a teleology for the constraints that exist and setting up a linguistic
level for each kind of explanation. I am not denying that some of the
divergencies between adult and child forms are ultimately explicable in
terms of the organizing principles the child brings to bear on language
learning—far from it—what I am denying is that there is evidence for
setting up a further level of representation. Given universal constraints
on mapping rules and Occam's razor one has no choice but to do without
such a level.
On the same lines as Ingram, Menn (1978a) suggests that many though
not all 'rules are best seen in terms of the satisfaction of output con-
straints' of the sort 'no consonant clusters are allowed'. That is,
Menn is claiming that the absence of consonant clusters is to be attribu-
ted not (or not only) to the operation of a strategy defined over the adult
input, but wholly or in part to the child's conforming to a template
peculiar to his own system. It is then a clear instance of a claim that
the child does have his own system.
Before attempting to evaluate this claim two points need to be made:
first, that realization rules (i.e. mapping rules parasitic on the adult
language) are necessary anyway so that the correct output is associated
with the correct lexical representation; second, that in many, perhaps
most, instances realization rules and output constraints make equivalent
predictions. Accordingly Occam makes it incumbent on an output cons trainer
to justify invoking the extra construct.
Except for the case of 'idiosyncratic strategies' which I have already
suggested are perceptual in nature, I know of no strong evidence (but cf.
note 6) in favor of a level such as the 'Output lexicon' in (2a), and I
believe that there are objections to it in principle. Output constraints
are redundant. To justify this claim let me first give a case where a
mapping rule can handle the data but an output constraint is unable even
to describe what is going on. For somewhat over a year A had a rule
converting adult sequences of the form CyVC to the form CVp, resulting
inter alia in the examples in (14):
(1^) quick -y kip
quite -> kaip
twice ^ taip
Given that there was another rule reducing clusters of a consonant fol-
lowed by a sonorant to the consonant, as exemplified in (15):
(15) green
black -> baek
the expected output of forms with postconsonantal /w/ would be CVC. Given
further that CVC forms with all consonants in position C2 were allowed,
as witness the examples in (16)
:
(16) skip ^ kip
kiss * kit
kick -> kik
then the forms given in (14) can clearly not be accounted for by an output
constraint. However, a strategy of consonant harmony, assimilating the
final consonant to the point of articulation of the labial /w/, accounts
for the facts simply. Realization rules are then clearly necessary merely
to achieve observational adequacy. Moreover, the relation between the
segments in the underlying and the segments in the child's surface forms
is a many:many one—a situation which output constraints are unable to
handle. Although the neutralization of an adult contrast by the child
(of the sort seen in (12c)) can be described by either output constraints
or realization rules, the reverse situation, where a single segment in
the adult language is realized alternatively as two or more different
segments by the child, is captured very simply by means of an optional
rule, but cannot be handled by output constraints. The notion 'optional
output constraint' is incoherent.
Further, consider the longitudinal development of certain forms in
A's speech, as illustrated in (17):
(17) ti t2 t3
slip -> lip slip -^ lip slip -* iip
bit -> bit bit -> bit bit ^ bit
pit ->• bit pit -> pit pit -^ pit
spit -> bit spit -» pit spit -> pit
At time t^ there were two relevant processes operative: one deleting pre-
consonantal /s/, the other neutralizing the adult voicing contrast. At
t2 the rule neutralizing voicing disappeared and the child correctly
contrasted pit and bit- As spit still fell together with pit rather than
bit at this stage, I assume that the child had a rule devoicing non-
sonorant consonants after /s/ which applied before /s/ deletion; cf. (18).
(18) [ ^ ] [-voiced] / s
-son
At t3 the child suddenly acquired a series of so-called voiceless sonorants,
as illustrated in (19)
:
(19) Smith -> mit
snail -> neil
slip -^ iip
That is, he regularly and consistently used sounds which, although common
in Welsh, Burmese, and Classical Aztec, are not typical of British English.
It is hard to see what account of this could be given by output constraints,
but these data are an automatic consequence of a process of realization
rule simplification: the structural description of the rule (18) has
been simplified by the omission of the feature sonorant to give the rule
in (20):
(20) C ^ [-voiced] / s
It is of course impossible to prove that something does not exist:
evidence for it may turn up tomorrow. I think though that output con-
straints come into the category of objects for whose existence no evidence
has yet been given.
^
Indirect support for this position also comes from perceptual evidence.
I take it that the levels of 'Underlying representation' and 'Child's
phonemic representation' in (4) have psychological reality for the child
(as also do the rules linking them, as will be clear from the preceding
discussion of rule simplification) , though they have reality of somewhat
different kinds. Thus the child's perception is in terms of the system
given by the former level and his production in terms of the system
defined by the latter level. Dodd (1975) has shown in her experimental
work that children are better at understanding an unfamiliar adult's tape-
recorded speech than they are at understanding tape-recordings of their
own speech. Their understanding of their own speech was successful
precisely to the degree that it approximated to the adult forms: i.e. the
greater the divergence the less the understanding. Their understanding
adult forms which they often did not differentiate in their own speech
clearly implies that they have the adult form as one part of their lexical
representation. Their failure to understand their own forms equally
clearly detracts from the plausibility of the argument that that form too
is stored in any way in their heads. This supports the claim for the
psychological reality of the level of lexical representation in (4) ; the
reality of the level of the child's phonemic representation is attested to
by simple productional facts (cf. Braine 1976). It is not clear to me
what, if anything, could constitute evidence for the psychological reality
of a further level.
It might also be added that postulating this extra level, which is
an addition to the elegant Kiparsky and Menn (1978) model of language
acquisition, lands Menn (1978a) in further descriptive problems which
necessitate building the Duke of York gambit (cf. Pullum 1976) into auto-
segmental phonology.' I will not pursue t?iis horror story here. Again
I should emphasize that I do not doubt the heterogeneity of the explana-
tions for the rules in (4) : the examples in (9) may well be explained
ultimately in perceptual terms, the examples in (14) in organizational
terms, those in (17) in terms of the psychological reality of the mapping
rules, and probably some changes—e.g. those in (12c)—are due solely to
the motor difficulty of the articulations involved. None of these, however,
motivates the setting up of further psychologically real linguistic levels.
Another way in which the child's lexical representation might diverge
from the adult surface form is in the completeness of the specification
of segments and sequences of segments. It has been suggested by, among
others, Wilbur (forthcoming) and Ingram (1974) that in those cases where
the child's pronunciation diverges from the adult's by the absence in the
former of a segment in the latter, the child has a partial specification
of the word as his lexical representation rather than the complete adult
surface form. Despite the fact that I was party to a somewhat similar
suggestion myself once (cf. Morton and Smith 1974) the claim seems implau-
sible. The claim is that if a child pronounces spoon as [bu] for instance,
then his representation of it may be taken to be XpuX, where X indicates
the presence of a segment or segments either without further specifica-
tion or with incomplete specification (Ingram 1974). However, partial
specification (with the limiting case being that of noise indeterminate
from all else except silence) is incompatible with what we know about
perception in two-year-olds. Thus any minimal pair of the adult language
whose minimal difference resides in a segment or segments represented by
Ingram as X is predicted as equivalent to the child. Either observed
across-the-board change or perceptual testing of minimal pairs of the
sort conducted by Barton would choose, for any child, between the total
and the partial hypothesis. Further evidence against the partial specifi-
cation hypothesis comes from the reported avoidance by some children of
homonymous outputs. That is, otherwise regular rules have exceptions if
and only if the failure of some form to undergo such a rule avoids the
child's producing homophones.
The only area where specifications might be incomplete is again where
there is perceptual confusion 'upstream' of the lexical representation.
If such forms are represented partially then either of two or more neutral-
ized adult equivalents should surface in the child's production. If such
forms are represented totally but incorrectly then only one form should
appear until the mistake is discovered and rectified.
Earlier I suggested that the constraints on realization rules I have
been defending are universal. If true, the most plausible, albeit not
necessary, assumption is that this universality reflects innateness: it
is biologically determined. Innateness is a dangerous area, so let me
hedge (a little). Kiparsky and Menn (1978) have argued convincingly that
the rules typical of child phonology are all invented by the child as
solutions to specific problems, rather than being innately specified.
While I accept this in one sense (it is fully compatible with Smith 1973)
,
and take it as a cogent critique of Stampe's (1969) position, it still
seems necessary to account in more general terms for the rather limited
range of solutions that children do come up with. It is at this level of
abstraction that it makes sense to talk about innateness. Note, inciden-
tally, that the term 'innate' itself has been given a number of different
interpretations. Following Aslin and Pisoni (1978—in turn following
Gottlieb) we can distinguish among:
i) an ability which is fully developed at birth but which may be
lost if external stimulation is absent. A typical example is
provided by vision;
ii) an ability which is partially developed at birth such as
birdsong (in birds that is);
iii) an ability which is undeveloped at birth but which is trig-
gered off by some external stimulus, either immediately as in
imprinting or after further maturation.
It seems clear that the ability to invent phonological rules is an
instance of this final type. The ability is not present at birth; indeed,
it may not operate fully in the earliest stages of language acquisition,
as witness the existence of 'phonological idioms' which by-pass the rules:
e.g. the early pronunciation [priti] for pretty reported by Leopold (1939-
47), and it is obviously dependent on external stimulation. Note that this
is not a claim for empiricist inductivism: rather it is a claim that the
hypotheses the child can come up with to solve his problems belong to an
antecedently well-defined set, constrained by the strategies discussed
above and illustrated in (12)
.
Some corroboration for this view comes from the phonological develop-
ment of the prelinguistically profoundly deaf (cf. Dodd & Hermelin 1977)
where the external stimulus is not even auditory. Despite their disad-
vantages, deaf children internalize phonological rules which are in major
respects the same as those of the hearing: i.e. their deformations from
the adult norm conform to the same constraints as do those of the hearing
(and as those of some dysphasics do not—cf. Smith 1975). Indeed, it also
turns out that much of the information encoded in speech can be inferred
by hearing listeners on the basis of visual (lip-read) input (Dodd 1977) .
That is, the hypotheses the child can come up with are not only 'pre-
ordained' but are also modality neutral.
Elsewhere in this volume, McCawley and Comrie are both severely
critical of the postulation of universals either on the basis of very
limited (English language) data or inherent implausibility . The answer to
their strictures resides in proposing specific, motivated, falsifiable
universal claims. Although my examples are drawn only from English and
largely from one child, I have tried to do just that.
*I would like to dedicate this article to John Trim, who first taught
me linguistics and who first encouraged me to work on the acquisition of
phonology.
I am grateful to Deirdre Wilson for lier comments on a preliminary
version of this paper, to Charles Ferguson and John Locke for a number of
stimulating discussions after the lecture and to Barbara Dodd and Geoff
Pullum for helpful observations on the revised version. The foregoing are
to be taken as agreeing only with those parts of the article which are true.
2
Unless otherwise indicated acquisitional data are taken from the
analysis of Amahl in Smith (1973). For exegetical clarity I have omitted
irrelevant phonetic detail, and in some cases have included examples from
different stages of A's development without comment.
In fact both these diagrams embody an important oversimplification
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in that they make no distinction between the phonetic and the phonemic
shape of the adult surface forms. I have assumed tacitly that the input
is in some kind of phonemic code, but the longitudinal development of the
acquisition of some contrasts could be taken to argue against such an
assumption. For instance, A acquired the voiced/voiceless contrast first
in final position, then medially and last of all in initial position (cf.
Smith 1973:95-96). It may either be the case that this is the result of
the child not identifying the initial, medial and final allophones of the
adult phonemes; or it may be that, despite such identification, the
different positions are more salient for him and hence override the pho-
nemic identity. It is not clear to me what kind of data would decide
between these alternatives. In those cases where all and only the allo-
phones of one adult phoneme change their realization simultaneously we
do have evidence for the identification by the child of the phonemic
status of the allophones. Unfortunately the necessary stipulation 'all
and only' makes such cases extremely rare. Note that this issue is
separate, or at least separable, from the issue as to whether the child
stores lexical items in a phonemic or a phonetic code (cf. Morton and
Smith 1974 for a brief discussion, and also note 4 below).
Mutatis mutandis the remarks of note 3 apply here too. That is, it
is hard to find evidence which demonstrates conclusively that the level
designated 'Child's phonemic representation' is psychologically real and
distinct from the phonetic representation of the 'Output'.
It follows that Ingram's attempt (1974) to reanalyze some of the
data from Smith (1973) in terms of dissimilation is a priori undesirable.
In fact Ingram provides no justification for his analysis, and to replace
a constrained system by a relatively unconstrained system without arguing
for the increase in expressive power entailed thereby is counterproductive.
Evidence for output constraints could be found in principle if it
could be shown that two rules, justified by reference to different strate-
gies, conspired to produce the same output. Macken (1978b) has suggested
that one such example obtains in the interaction of consonant harmony and
metathesis, which conspire to produce the constraint that coronals may
not appear before labials or velars (cf. Morpheme Structure Condition 4
in Smith 1973:41-42). Such a condition, captured by a Morpheme structure
rule or an output constraint, appears to encapsulate a generalization
which is missed by the two realization rules. However, whether this
example finally turns out to substantiate output constraints or not will
in turn depend on an experimental evaluation of Herman's (1977) claim
that all metatheses are perceptually conditioned. I suspect that they
are not, but if not, then the case for output constraints is correspond-
ingly strengthened, because of the implication that consonant harmony and
metathesis are processes of the same, realizational , type.
To be specific, Menn's position entails that a word such as fish
pronounced as, say, [ij] by the child has the following derivation. It
starts with a full specification of the content and linear sequence of
the three segments /f/, /i/, and /J/. Then, because fricatives occur in
the child's speech only in final position, the redundant linear sequence
of the segments is suppressed in his lexical representation. Finally,
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to account for the child's pronunciation with [J] in final position,
linear ordering is reinstated. Ptolemy would have approved.
REFERENCES
Aslin, R. and D. Pisoni. 1978. Some developmental processes in speech
perception. Paper presented at the conference on Child Phonology,
Bethesda, Md. May, 1978.
Barton, D. 1976. The role of perception in the acquisition of phonology.
University of London Ph.D. thesis. Relevant parts of this appear in
Phonemic discrimination and the knowledge of words in children under
3 years. Papers and reports on child language development, Stanford.
Herman, R. 1977. Natural phonological processes at the one-word stage.
Lingua 43. 1-21.
Braine, M. 1974. On what might constitute learnable phonology. Lg. 50.
270-99.
. 1976. Review of Smith (1973). Lg. 52. 489-98.
Cairns, C. 1969. Markedness, neutralisation and universal redundancy
rules. Lg. 45. 863-815.
Cutting, J. and P. Eimas. 1975. Phonetic feature analysers and the
processing of speech in infants. The role of speech in language, ed.
by J. Kavanagh and J. Cutting, 127-48. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Dodd, B. 1975. Children's understanding of their own phonological forms.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 27. 165-72.
1977. The role of vision in the perception of speech. Perception
6. 31-40.
and B. Hermelin. 1977. Phonological coding by the prelinguistically
deaf. Perception and Psychophysics 21. 413-17.
Eilers, R. 1978. The complex nature of infant speech perception. Paper
presented at the conference on Child Phonology, Bethesda, Md. May,
1978.
Eimas, P. 1975. Auditory and phonetic coding of the cues for speech:
Discrimination of the r - 1 distinction by young infants. Perception
and Psychophysics 18. 341-47.
Ferguson, C. and C. Farwell. 1975. Words and sounds in early language
acquisition. Lg. 51. 419-39.
Ingram, D. 1974. Phonological rules in young children. Journal of Child
Language 1. 49-64.
. 1976. Phonological analysis of a child. Glossa 10. 3-27.
Jusczyk, P., B. Rosner, J. Cutting, C. Foard and L. Smith. 1977. Categori-
cal perception of non-speech sounds by two-month-old infants.
Perception and Psychophysics 21. 50-54.
Jusczyk, P. and E. Thompson. 1978. Perception of a phonetic contrast in
multisyllabic utterances by two-month-old infants. Perception and
Psychophysics 23. 105-9.
Kiparsky, P. and L. Menn. 1978. On the acquisition of phonology. Language
and thought, ed. by J. McNamara, 43-78. New York: Academic Press.
Kuhl, P. and J. Miller. 1975. Speech perception by the chinchilla:
Voiced - voiceless distinction in alveolar plosive consonants.
Science 190. 69-72.
273
Lakatos, I. 1970. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research
programmes. Criticism and the growth of knowledge, ed. by I. Lakatos
and A. Musgrave, 91-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leopold, W. 1939-47. Speech development of a bilingual child: A linguist's
record. 4 vols. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press.
Locke, J. 1979. The child's processing of phonology. Minnesota symposium
on child psychology 12, ed. by W. Collins, 83-119. Princeton, N.J,:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Macken, M. 1978a. The child's lexical representation: Evidence from the
"puzzle-puddle-pickle" phenomenon. Mimeo. Stanford University.
1978b. Aspects of the acquisition of stop systems: A cross-
linguistic perspective. Paper presented at the conference on Child
Phonology. Bethesda, Md . May 1978.
Menn, L. 1978a. Phonological units in beginning speech. Proceedings of
the symposium on segement organization and the syllable, ed. by
A. Bell and J. Hooper.
1978b. Phonological theory and child phonology. Paper presented
at the conference on Child Phonology. Bethesda, Md. May, 1978.
Morse, P. 1972. The discrimination of speech and non-speech stimuli in
early childhood. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 14.
477-92.
Morton, J. and N. Smith. 1974. Some ideas concerning the acquisition of
phonology. Problemes actuels en psycholinguistique. Editions du
C.N.R.S. 161-76.
Priestley, T. 1977. One idiosyncratic strategy in the acquisition of
phonology. Journal of Child Language 4. 45-65.
Pullum, G. 1976. The Duke of York gambit. Journal of Linguistics 12.
83-102.
Pupier, P. 1977. Quelques observations sur I'acquisition de la phonologie
par des enfants montrealais de 2 ans. Montreal Working Papers in
Linguistics 9. 175-202.
Siegel, J. and W. Siegel. 1977. Absolute identification of notes and
intervals by musicians. Perception and Psychophysics 21. 143-52.
Smith, N. 1971. Puggles and lellow lollies. Listener 86. No. 2227.
759-60.
1973. The acquisition of phonology: A case study. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
. 1975. Universal tendencies in the child's acquisition of phonology.
Language, cognitive deficits and retardation, ed. by N. O'Connor.
IRMMH Study Group 7. Woburn, Mass.: Butterworths
.
Stampe, D. 1969. The acquisition of phonetic representations. Chicago
Linguistic Society 5. 443-54.
Tallal, P. and R. Stark. 1978. Do the speech production abilities of
language impaired children mirror their perceptual abilities? Paper
presented at the Institute of Acoustics symposium on Children's
Speech: Production and Perception, U.C.L. June, 1978.
Timm, L. 1977. A child's acquisition of Russian phonology. Journal of
Child Language 4. 329-39.
Waterson, N. 1971. Child phonology: A prosodic view. Journal of Lin-
guistics 7. 179-211.
Wilbur, R. (forthcoming) Theoretical phonology and child phonology.
Phonology in the seventies, ed. by D. Goyvaerts.

The following special issues are in preparation:
Relational Grammar and Semantics
Editor: Jerry L. Morgan
Studies in Arabic Linguistics
Editor: Michael J. Kenstowicz
Studies in Language Variation:
Non western Case Studies
Editor: Braj B. Kachru
South Asian Linguistics: Syntax
and Semantics
Editor: Yamuna Kachru
STUDIES IN THE LINGUISTIC SCIENCES
The following issues of SLS are out of print:
Spring 1971, Vol. 1, No. 1, Papers in General Linguistics; Fall 1971, Vol. 1,
No. 2, Papers on Hindi Syntax, Editor: Yamuna Kachru; Spring 1972, Vol. 2,
No. \, Papers on Syntax and Semantics, Editor: Georgia M. Green; Fall 1972,
Vol. 2, No. 2, Studies in Baltic Linguistics, Editors: Hans H. Hock and
Michael J. Kenstowicz; Spring 1973, Vol. 3, No. 1, Papers in General
Linguistics; Fall 1973, Vol. 3, No. 2, Papers on South Asian Linguistics,
Editor: Braj B. Kachru; and Spring 1976, Vol. 6, No. 1, Papers in General
Linguistics, Special section: Topics in relational grammar. Editor: Jerry L.
Morgan.
The following issues are available:
Spring 1974 Vol. 4, No. 1, Papers in General Linguistics $3.50
Fall 1974 Vol. 4, No. 1, Papers on Phonetics and Phonology
Editors: Charles W. Kisseberth and
Chin-W. Kim
A
$3.50
Spring 1975 Vol.



->
.
^
!\^^
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA
410ST92 C001
STUDIES IN THE LINGUISTIC SCIENCES; URBA
8 1978
3 0112 025054617
